Religion and fertility: A replication

Jones and Westoff (1979) reported a study offertility trends among white women in intact first marriages. They found that the fertility of white Catholic and non-Catholic wives was converging. The differential had all but disappeared, as had the differential by frequency of communion among Catholic wives. We replicated their study using data from the 1976 National Survey of Family Growth. We found that the fertility of the two religious groups was indeed converging, but the Catholic-non-Catholic differential was larger than that found by Jones and Westoff—how much larger depends on what measure is used. Moreover, we found that the differential by frequency of communion among Catholic wives was not converging. Possible explanations of the apparent differences in the findings are discussed.     

Religious Differentials in Reproduction: the Effects of Sectarian Education

College-educated Catholic women in the 1976 National Survey of Family Growth had higher actual and expected fertility than did college educated Protestants. Moreover, Catholic colleges or universities had a pronatalist effect on alumnae. Thus, a significant part of the higher Catholic than Protestant cumulative fertility among college-educated women arose from the greater propensity of such Catholics to attend sectarian schools and colleges. The implications are explored.     

The effects of formal church affiliation and religiosity on the fertility patterns of Mexican-American catholics

The effects of religion on the fertility patterns of Mexican Americans are examined with two different path models, the Institutional Model using formal affiliation with the Roman Catholic Church as a measure of religion, and the Religiosity Model using a measure of religiosity. Each model, tested separately for husbands and wives, examines the effects of religion on types of contraceptive methods used and on wanted family size. Although the majority of Mexican Americans are Catholics and tend to have large families, religion does not seem to have the same effect on their fertility patterns as on that of other Catholics in the United States. Among the men, neither formal affiliation nor religiosity affect the fertility patterns in any way, while among the women the effect is slight. Considering the Catholic Church’s position on contraceptive usage, it is especially noteworthy that religion does not affect the use or non-use of the more effective means of contraception, a factor contributing to the generally weak association between the measures of religion and wanted family size. The last section attempts a partial explanation of why the results turned out as they did.     

Age at marriage as a variable in socio-economic differentials in fertility

Earlier studies have pointed out that socio-economic differentials in fertility depend upon both religion and farm background. These studies report a negative relation between fertility and socio-economic status for non-Catholic American couples in contrast to a positive relation for Catholics. Likewise, a negative differential for American couples with farm background has been observed in contrast to no differential for twogeneration urbanites. Age at marriage is a third such interaction variable: the strong negative socio-economic differential observed when wife’s age at marriage is under 19 diminishes with advancing age at marriage and becomes positive for wives who married at age 23 or older. Moreover, for both non-Catholics and Catholics, couples with and without farm background, the differential by wife’s education is negative when wife’s age at marriage is young, positive when her age at marriage is old. Both sociological factors (the incidence of non-familial adult roles) and differential fecundity appear to underlie the interaction. The analysis is based on reports of once-married, white, nonfarm wives aged 30 to 39 included in the 1955 or 1960 Growth of American Families Studies or the 1965 National Fertility Study (approximately 1,000 in each survey).     

A further look at catholic fertility

The purpose of this paper is to determine the extent to which suburbanization has influenced the traditional fertility differences observed between Catholics and Protestants. It is hypothesized that suburbanization has served to decrease religious differences in fertility, since in the more advanced stages of urbanism, that is, suburbanization, the Catholic population is likely to adopt the fertility patterns of the larger and more secularized society. Attention is focused on two objectives: (1) to examine selected aspects of fertility for Catholic8 and Protestants living in metropolitan areas and (2) to analyze religious differentials in fertility among residents in different parts of the metropolitan community.The data, consisting of a sample of households in six metropolitan areas in three population size classes, supported the general findings pertaining to religious differences in fertility that have been reported in the literature. Catholics had larger families, shorter average spacing between children, and longer fertility spans when compared to Protestants, even when a number of control variables were employed. Examining fertility differences between Catholics and Protestants in central city and suburban segments of large and small metropolitan areas, we found that the data indicated that marked Catholic-Protestant differences are still found in central cities. However, fertility differences between the two religious groups tended largely to disappear among suburban residents. The convergence in the fertility patterns of suburbanites is due to combined effects of higher fertility among Protestant suburban residents when compared to central city Protestants and the tendency of suburban Catholics to have fewer children than those who live in the city. The net result is convergence in suburban fertility.     

Religion and fertility in the United States: New patterns

In the United States, the baby boom-era pattern of high Catholic and low Protestant fertility has ended. Among non-Hispanic whites in the 1980s, Catholic total fertility rates (TFRs) were about one-quarter of a child lower than Protestant rates (1.64 vs. 1.91). Most of the Protestant-Catholic difference is related to later and less frequent marriage among Catholics. Future research on the demography of religious groups should focus on explaining the delayed marriage pattern of Catholics, the high fertility of Mormons and frequently attending Protestants, and the very low fertility of those with no religious affiliation.     

Adolescent fertility and religion in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in the year 2000: the role of Protestantism

Social transformations in Brazil in recent years have included a substantial increase in adolescent fertility, a dramatic rise in membership of Protestant religious denominations, and an accompanying decline in the number of Catholics. We used the 2000 Brazil Census to examine differentials in fertility and family formation among adolescents living in Rio de Janeiro by the following religious denominations: Catholic; Baptist; other mainline Protestant; Assembly of God Church; Universal Church of the Kingdom of God; other Pentecostal Protestant; and no religion. Results from logistic regression models show that the majority of the Protestants are at a lower risk of adolescent fertility than Catholics, and that among adolescents who have had a child, most Protestants are more likely than Catholics to be in a committed union. Our findings offer some support for the hypothesis that Protestant churches are more effective than the Catholic Church in discouraging premarital sexual relations and childbearing among adolescents.     

Economic determinants of fertility: Results from cross sectional aggregate data

Census data for areal units, SMSA’s in 1960 and cities in 1940, are used to test hypotheses and estimate parameters concerning the influence of a variety of socioeconomic variables on fertility rates of ever married white and nonwhite women aged 25–29, 30–34, 35–44, and 45–49. An economic model of the demand for children is adopted as the theoretical framework. The principal findings are that the market earnings opportunities for wives have an important negative effect on the fertility rate and that male income, representing the income of husbands, has a small but positive effect on fertility. The implication of these results is that changes in economic variables, for example, improvements in the employment opportunities and wages for wives or the establishment of a children’s allowance program, may be expected to affect fertility.     

Residence background and fertility in Greater Bombay

Abstract The residence background of wives who migrate to metropolitan areas plays an important role in determining their fertility. From the data collected during 1966, relating to 7,872 currently married women of Greater Bombay, an attempt was made to establish differentials in marital fertility by residence background of the wives. This was categorized into three groups - non-migrants, urban migrants and rural migrants. It was observed that rural migrant wives exhibited significantly higher fertility compared with the other two groups, and this was explained by their lower educational attainment. Between the non-migrant and the urban migrant wives the latter consistently showed lower fertility for all age groups up to 40, while there was a reversal in the age group 40 and above, where non-migrants exhibited lower fertility. The urban migrant wives showed a somewhat higher level of education, most likely on account of selectivity, compared to the non-migrants. However, presence of a sizeable number of Parsee wives, characterized by a distinct urban culture and considerably lower fertility, was largely responsible for the low fertility of the non-migrant wives in the age group 40 and above. The variable that has emerged as the most influential in creating fertility differentials is education of the wife, which is shown to be negatively associated with the level of fertility. Wife's education explains to a large extent the observed fertility differentials by residence background.     

Marital fertility and religion in Spain, 1985 and 1999

Since the transition to democracy in Spain in 1975, both total fertility and rates of church attendance of Catholics have dropped dramatically. In this study the 1985 and 1999 Spanish Fertility Surveys were used to investigate whether the significance of religion for fertility behaviour -- current family size and the spacing of births -- changed between the survey dates. In the 1985 survey, family size was similar for those Catholics who actively participated in religious activities and those who, though nominally Catholic, were not active participants. By 1999, the family size of the latter was lower and comparable to the family size of those without religious affiliation. These findings accord with the declines in both church attendance and fertility in Spain. The small groups of Protestants and Muslims had the highest fertility. Women in inter-faith unions had relatively low fertility.     

Aboriginal fertility: Trends and prospects

Estimates of Aboriginal fertility compiled from an analysis of 1981 and 1986 Census data on children ever borne by Aboriginal women reveal age-specific fertility rates slightly higher than those of other Australian women at ages above 25, but very much higher rates for younger women. The result is a total fertility ratio more than 50 per cent higher than in the total Australian population, with no more than slight variation between States and Territories. A differential analysis using standardized indices shows considerable differences in levels of fertility of categories of young Aboriginal women classified by education, labour force status and income, and also differences between urban and rural areas. Analysis of prospects for Aboriginal fertility levels confirms the likelihood of continuation in the downward drift in levels of fertility that has been established during the past decade. Comparison of the estimates with another recent set of estimates obtained using the own-children method shows broad conformity in levels of total fertility ratios over time, except in the most recent period, the mid-1980s. Nevertheless, the own-children estimates distort the recent trend and also the age distribution of Aboriginal fertility.     

Does Religion Influence Fertility in Developing Countries

This paper examines religious group differences in fertility in developing nations. Using data from the Demographic and Health Surveys of 30 countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, this paper documents Muslim/Christian and Catholic/Protestant differences in the number of children under age 5. The paper also considers possible explanations for these differences including level of development, religious mix, social characteristics and proximate determinants of fertility. Muslim fertility is substantially higher than Christian fertility in many countries, but the average difference between Catholics and Protestants is small. Cross-national variation in group differences is at least as large as the average difference. Although level of development, social characteristics and proximate determinants play an important role in religious differences, they do not explain cross-national variation in these differences.     

Hispanic Fertility,Religion and Religiousness in the U.S.

Is the higher fertility of Hispanics in the United States due to their religion and/or to their greater religiousness? Evidence from national survey data indicates no difference in fertility between Protestant and Catholic Hispanic women but Hispanics are more religious than non-Hispanics in terms of the perceived importance of religion in their personal lives. Religiousness is associated with higher fertility but Hispanic fertility is higher than non-Hispanic fertility regardless of religion or religiousness. Ethnic differences in education and income in turn are more important for fertility than the religious dimension.     

Fertility patterns among religious groups in Canada

The U shape that has been traced out by the crude birth rate in the United States and Canada is well known. Falling birth rates reached a low point in the mid-1930’s; the rate rose to a peak in 1947 and remained high through the 1950’s. In terms of cohorts, completed family size was smallest for women born around 1910, whose childbearing was concentrated in the 1930’s. With data from the 1961 census of Canada, trends in cohort marital fertility by religion are examined. The U pattern appears for both Protestants and Jews. For Catholics, a reversal in the downward trend of family size had not appeared by 1961, although the U pattern can be discerned for some subgroups such as Catholics living in big cities and persons of Irish ancestry. In the United States, however, changes in family size for all three religious groups and both whites and nonwhites follow the U pattern. Religious differentials in family size in Canada have been decreasing, but they remain much larger than either religious or color differentials in the United States, which show no decrease. The distinctive features of Catholic fertility in Canada are most pronounced among the regionallyconcentrated French Canadians, suggesting an interplay of religious, regional, and ethnic influences.     

The relation of psychological,social, and economic variables to fertility-related decisions

To test a recent model of social behavior, a questionnaire was designed and administered to 270 married women in a midwestern city. A stratified random sample was obtained, comprising a 2 × 3 factorial design (Catholic vs. Protestant and high vs. middle vs. low socioeconomic status). It was hypothesized that an individual’s intention to engage in a fertility-related behavior would be highly correlated with (a) her beliefs about the consequences of performing that behavior weighted by the value of those consequences, and/or (b) her beliefs about what relevant others think she should do and her motivation to comply with those others. The data strongly supported this hypothesis for each of three different behaviors. Analysis of variance revealed a significant religious differential for intentions to have a two-child family (Catholics were less likely to intend to have a two-child family than Protestants). This differential was further examined in terms of the proposed model of behavior.     

American Catholicism and the International Family Planning Movement

This paper examines the role of the American Catholic Church in the international family planning movement and discusses elements of the Catholic opposition to birth control. The paper argues that the reaction of American Catholics to government support for contraceptive services was based not only on the Church's condemnation of particular contraceptive methods, but also on a variety of other factors including class and ethnic hostility between Catholics and the promoters of family planning, jurisdictional disputes over what institutions would guide family life, the perceived threat that government support of family planning was to the authority of the Church and the Church's understanding of sex and women. The role of an American theology of political compromise and accommodation in mitigating the American Catholic Church's opposition to organized family planning is assessed.     

A comparison of the size of families of roman catholics and non-catholics in Great Britain

Abstract In a recent study of family size ideals in the D.S.A. it was found that in the 1960'S the mean ideal family size of Catholics was about half a child higher than the mean ideal size of non-Catholics. This note describes an analysis of similar data for married women in Great Britain, derived from an investigation undertaken in 1966 for the Population Investigation Committee. A difference in ideal family size, which was of the same order as the American difference, was found; and, in addition, the actual fertility of Catholics was compared with that of others.     

Income and fertility: The elusive relationship

This paper uses longitudinal data for 1962–1977 to examine the relationship of husband’s income to 1962 expected fertility, to final parity, and to the discrepancy between initial expectations and final parity, separately for four groups of women who in 1962 either had just given birth to a first, second, or fourth child or had just been married. Although economic reasons frequently were cited in 1977 for downward revisions in family size goals, husband’s income was not positively related to fertility in three of the four parity groups. For the merged sample, excluding women with unwanted births, husband’s income showed a small positive relationship to completed fertility.     

The end of “Catholic” fertility

Catholic and non-Catholic fertility during the post-World War II period are compared in this paper. Evidence accumulated across five sample surveys of fertility in the United States, which were conducted at five-year intervals from 1955 through 1975, forms the basis for the analysis; both cohort and period measures are employed. Starting from a situation where Catholic fertility was very little higher than that of non-Catholics, it is shown that the differential increased markedly during the baby boom and then declined to a point where the two trends nearly come together in the mid-1970s. Interpretation of the recent convergence in the light of various theories that have been put forward to explain the differential suggests that it will be an enduring phenomenon.