关系营销也腐败

<正>关系营销是指以建立、维护、经营、改善、调整各种关系为核心,对传统的交易营销理念进行改革的新理论,核心是关系管理,基础是客户关系管理,前提是有效的内部营销。按营销关系的博弈结果,一般将营销关系划分为增值型、冲消型、腐败型和公害型四类。其中腐败型营销关系,就是公司营销活动中公司职员利用自身特殊的权力、岗位、职务,在与供应商、分销商、终端客户、金融机构等各类关系的建立、维护、沟通活动中,变公司     

腐败的经济分析

本文仅将腐败界定为经济人的一种理性行为选择,并将运用成本-收益理论,腐败的供给需求理论,产权制度理论对代理人的腐败选择的成因进行分析,最后对有损社会利益的腐败行为的制度改进提出建议。     

跨国公司应对内部腐败

<正>除了外部商业腐败,出现在跨国公司的内部员工腐败更让人们大为震惊。种种迹象表明,来自跨国公司内部的员工腐败,已经不是单一的偶然事件。事实上,从跨国公司底层的采购人员到高层的管理人员,“腐败”一词已经不再新鲜。有人如此评价跨国公司出现的员工腐败现象:“这些腐败分子的存在就像吸血鬼一样,如果不杜绝他们, 企业最终会因为他们的存在而走向死亡。”     

公民社会视域下的腐败治理策略研究

公民社会是向政府表达诉求的重要载体，其内核价值中的契约精神和民主法治具备反腐败的可能性，在认识到公民社会对腐败腐败治理的意义的基础上寻求一种引导公民反腐的理论和实践路径，不仅铺开了腐败的治理网络，对整个社会的腐败治理也具有积极的作用。     

保持对腐败的痛感

漫天的传言和跌宕起伏的官场生态一次又一次锻炼了中国人的心理素质,可以说,我们的社会已经具备了消化腐败案件冲击的基础。从个体腐败到腐败的集团化和黑社会化,从厅局级到省部级,腐败在不断深化。同时,腐败从政治领域向社会领域蔓延,从官员腐败向民众腐败发展。更多的人不再只是痛恨腐败,而是忙着研究如何在腐败的前提下获取自己的利益。当人们都适应了腐败并努力寻求自己的腐败方式时,腐败便进入了它的最高形式,那就是社会腐败。     

浅谈寻租性腐败的原因及其治理对策

随着我国市场经济的迅速发展，寻租性腐败也愈演愈烈，日益引起人们的关注。因此，对寻租性腐败的危害，产生的原因，治理的对策进行分析具有非常重要的意义。     

正视和消除腐败的群众基础

<正>腐败首先产生在官场。在清朝,由于官员俸禄偏低,官场腐败习以为常。"三年清知府,十万雪花银"就是这种现象的生动写照。收入长期偏低,容易诱发贪污受贿、不给好处不办事的腐败现象。此外,机构臃肿、人员冗杂也是产生腐败的温床。上梁不正下梁歪。官场腐败     

“家族式腐败”警示录

腐败者一直都在寻求腐败形式的变化。但千变万化都可以归结为两个方向上的努力。一是寻求“外在”的技术或手段的“创新”，即如何将权力运用得更好，以最少的成本，谋取最大的利益；二是稳固“内在”的根基或背景，即如何维持固有的权力或进一步扩展权力，寻求更为稳定的依托。家族参与的“家族式腐败”，可能是腐败者认为的揽钱最佳模式。     

腐败、腐败治理与资本外逃关系的博弈分析

本文建立了一个多节点信息集的不完美动态博弈模型,分析了国内合法资本拥有者与非法资本拥有者在政府治理腐败不同力度下的均衡投资策略.分析结果表明,在资本市场开放与财政支出刚性条件下,当因腐败而使非法资本积累达到一定程度时,对腐败进行严厉打击会引致国内非法资本连同合法资本的资本外逃均衡,最后,提出了抑制资本外逃的政策启示.     

工程建设中腐败的表现、成因及预防对策

随着社会的发展,工程建设领域成为了腐败发生的高危地带,如何预防工程建设中腐败问题的发生已经成为人们关注的热点问题。本文首先从工程建设中腐败的表现出发,分析了腐败产生的原因并提出了相应的预防对策。     

Dissecting Public Sector Corruption in Bangladesh: Issues and Problems of Control

The public sector in Bangladesh is ridden with corruption of various dimensions and shades. Apart from bribery, rent-seeking and misappropriation of funds, the performance of public organizations is adversely affected by a host of other factors like excessive lobbying, delays in service provision, pilferage and larceny, irresponsible conduct of officials, bureaucratic intemperance, patronage and clientelism. The several institutional mechanisms to combat administrative malfeasance are rendered ineffective by a non-committed political leadership, a blase"d bureaucracy, weak accountability structures, and unproductive legislative labors. The public body for controlling corruption is itself associated with all sorts of malpractices and conducts its affair most unprofessionally. Despite several attempts, the constitutionally authorized ombudsman is yet to find its place in the governance framework.     

Moral Hazard in High Office and the Dynamics of Aristocracy

Both aristocratic privileges and constitutional constraints in traditional monarchies can be derived from a ruler's incentive to minimize expected costs of moral‐hazard rents for high officials. We consider a dynamic moral‐hazard model of governors serving a sovereign prince, who must deter them from rebellion and hidden corruption which could cause costly crises. To minimize costs, a governor's rewards for good performance should be deferred up to the maximal credit that the prince can be trusted to pay. In the long run, we find that high officials can become an entrenched aristocracy with low turnover and large claims on the ruler. Dismissals for bad performance should be randomized to avoid inciting rebellions, but the prince can profit from reselling vacant offices, and so his decisions to dismiss high officials require institutionalized monitoring. A soft budget constraint that forgives losses for low‐credit governors can become efficient when costs of corruption are low.     

腐败如何影响了中国的环境污染？——基于非正规经济的视角

现有关于腐败如何影响环境污染的研究多数忽略了非正规经济的作用,而非正规经济的存在将会影响到腐败与环境污染之间的关系。为此,本文首先从理论上研究了腐败和非正规经济对环境污染的影响。研究显示,腐败通过提高非正规经济规模增加了环境污染;同时,腐败通过减少正规经济规模降低了环境污染。基于1998-2016年中国省级层面的面板数据,本文利用系统GMM方法考察了腐败和非正规经济活动对中国环境质量的影响效应。结果表明,腐败通过扩大非正规经济规模对中国环境污染的间接影响显著为正,腐败总体上改善了中国的环境质量,说明腐败对中国环境污染的直接效应占主导。非正规经济规模对中国环境污染的影响显著为正,腐败程度越高,非正规经济对中国环境质量的负面影响也越大。     

Imperfect Detection of Tax Evasion in a Corrupt Tax Administration

This article models the imperfect detection of tax evasion motivated by the existence of a corrupt tax administration. Consistent with previous literature, fines and audit probabilities both have a positive effect on compliance. Moreover, the model shows that they have a negative effect on the bribes paid to corrupt tax officials. More corruption decreases compliance levels, giving honest auditors incentives to work harder to detect evasion. Giving inspectors a share of the detected evasion (tax farming) makes auditors work harder; however, increasing their wages reduces their exerted effort to discover evasion. Higher compliance can as well be achieved by hiring more efficient inspectors.     

Dynamics of Corruption and Citizens’ Trust in Anti-Corruption Agencies in Three South Asian Countries

The comparative analyses of citizens’ trust in Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) in three countries’ (Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka) indicate that despite ACA’s low level of effectiveness in curbing corruption, trust level varies. The Nepalese ACA has higher level of trust than Bangladesh and Sri Lanka which is earned by targeting mainly lower level public officials. Though it fails to reduce the level of corruption in Nepal; citizens tend to trust ACA more. This is because of higher visibility of ACA’s activities. Such findings indicate about the methodological challenge to use ‘trust’ as a proxy to measure institutional performance.     

风险规避与一级密封拍卖的有限腐败——模型及实验

在风险中性假设的有限腐败一级密封拍卖模型基础上,构建容纳风险规避的有限腐败一级密封拍卖的一般模型,依据模型进行基于计算机局域网的多组并行的实验室实验;实验包含一个作为基准的无腐败一级密封拍卖和三种有限腐败程度的一级密封拍卖,并设计两种收益计算方式和保留价设置,实验研究对比两种模型的预测力,考察存在有限腐败的一级密封拍卖的效率和竞标人行为。研究结果表明,有限腐败机制不影响一级密封拍卖的效率,成交价格方面有腐败与无腐败的拍卖之间没有显著差异;腐败者的期望收益有所上升,高报价更为激进而低报价更为保守;腐败者是异质的,其报价行为具有禀赋依赖性;非腐败者的行为和卖者收益没有显著变化。实验结果表明包含腐败者风险规避特征的模型预测力更好。     

Seeds of Corruption? The Contingent Role of Ties to Politicians and Foreign Subsidiary Relations with Government-Sponsored Financial Institutions

In drawing from transaction cost economics and social network theories, this study examines the influence of corruption as a determinant of foreign subsidiary formal contracting practices with government-sponsored financial institutions. We hypothesize that lower corruption distance (between parent home and host countries) and higher perceived corruption (in host country) are positively related, and mutually reinforcing, when considering a foreign subsidiary's propensity to formally contract with government-sponsored financial institutions. We also suggest that these relationships strengthen with the intensification of political ties to government officials who can offer preferential political services via contractual agreements, changing the nature of market transactions in favour of a foreign subsidiary. We found support for our hypotheses using data from a sample of over 350 subsidiaries located in the Philippines and Thailand.     

Do contextual factors matter?

Drawing on the moral intensity concept and attribution theory, this vignette study investigates the influence of contextual factors on people’s ethical judgments of others’ behavior in corruption situations. It examines differences regarding corruption occurring in a national or international context, in an environment where it is usual or unusual, with high or low bribes, initiatively or reactively, because of private or organizational motives, and in situations of financial sufficiency or deficiency. The results show that corruption in situations where it is usual, motivated by organizational reasons, and initiated because of financial difficulties is judged as significantly less unethical. The paper discusses the findings’ implications for the prevention of corruption in organizations.     

企业家社交关系对关联信用风险传染影响的研究——基于双层网络视角

关联信用风险是指某些企业违约,导致与其存在关联关系的企业违约或违约可能性增大的这类信用风险。企业家的社交关系会影响企业之间关联信用风险的传染效应。本文利用双层网络刻画企业家和企业所形成的耦合网络,分析企业家的社交关系对关联信用风险传染的影响路径,构建双层网络中关联信用风险的传染模型,并考察企业家社交网络和双层网络的结构等因素对关联信用风险传染效应的影响。研究结果表明：企业家的社交关系是影响关联信用风险传染的重要因素;企业家社交-企业关联双层网络的拓扑结构也会影响关联信用风险的传染效应;提高双层网络的相似度,可以抑制关联信用风险在关联企业网络中的传染。本文的研究进一步拓展了信用风险的研究视角,为银行等金融机构对信用风险的提供科学的决策依据。     

Combating Corruption and Managing Integrity in Malaysia: A Critical Overview of Recent Strategies and Initiatives

The Government of Malaysia has made continuous efforts and put in place an elaborate set of strategies and institutions aimed at combating corruption and promoting integrity in the society. The nation’s anti-corruption drive has lately received a major boost. The Badawi government that came to power in 2003 following 22 years of the Mahathir era declared containing corruption as its main priority which was followed by a series of concrete measures. However, the governmental attempts and strategies in Malaysia appear to have met with little success, as evidenced by the current data that suggests entrenched corruption in the society. Evidence shows that despite governmental campaigns and initiatives, corruption has remained acute, widespread and, in fact, worsened in recent years. This paper presents a critical overview of the anti-corruption strategies being followed in Malaysia and explores the problems and limitations of the current approach to fighting corruption and managing integrity in the society.