Family Policies and the Western European Fertility Divide: Insights from a Natural Experiment in Belgium

Countries in Northwestern Europe, including Belgium, report cohort fertility levels of close to two children per woman; whereas Central European countries, such as Germany, have levels of around 1.6 children. In seeking to explain these differences, some scholars have stressed the role of the social policy context, while others have pointed to variation in fertility‐related social norms. But because these influences are interdependent, it is difficult to isolate their effects on fertility trends. This study attempts to disentangle these two factors by drawing on a quasi‐natural experiment. After World War I Germany was compelled to cede the Eupen–Malmedy territory to Belgium. The population of this region has retained its German linguistic identity, but has been subject to Belgian social policies. We examine whether the fertility trends in this German‐speaking region of Belgium follow the Belgian or the German pattern. Our findings indicate that they generally resemble the Belgian pattern. This suggests that institutional factors are important for understanding the current fertility differences in Western Europe.     

Declining fertility and policy intervention in Europe: Some lessons for Australia?

The contemporary fertility situation in Europe is outlined with emphasis on trends in the late 1990s. It is shown that while most European countries have lower fertility levels than Australia there is wide variation between countries with respect to both their levels of fertility and their rate of fertility decline. While almost all countries are experiencing fertility decline the rate of decline is higher and the fertility is lower in countries where the male-breadwinner model is strongest. Attempts to influence fertility in European nations are discussed, particularly those involving the introduction of family-friendly policies. It is clear that despite popular beliefs to the contrary, societies where male-breadwinner models influence policy most are those with lowest fertility. The lesson for Australia is that family-friendly policies not only are desirable from the perspective of moving toward gender equality but are likely to stabilize or perhaps even marginally increase fertility.     

Why do English-speaking countries have relatively high fertility?

In broad terms, the division in Europe between countries with very low fertility and countries with sustainable fertility matches Esping-Anderson’s classification of the same countries into ‘conservative’ and ‘social democratic’ (Esping-Anderson 1990). A central difference between these two types relates to their preferred models of the family. The conservative countries hold more to the ‘breadwinner’ model of the family while the social democratic countries seek higher levels of gender equity within the family and in the workplace. State support in both conservative and social democratic countries is designed to be consistent with these differing views of the family. Would we then not expect fertility to be very low in Esping-Anderson’s third group of countries, the ‘liberal’ countries, essentially English-speaking countries? By the Esping-Anderson definition, liberal countries are notable for their lack of support for families from public sources. Instead, according to Esping-Anderson, families must rely upon market provision for the services that they may need to combine work and family and they must rely on market employment to generate the income required to support their children. Contrary to this theory, whether measured by contemporary cross-sectional fertility or completed cohort fertility, with the exception of Canada, English-speaking countries now have the highest fertility rates among the countries that were classified by Esping-Anderson. Given the strength of theoretical explanation that arises from comparative studies of fertility in Europe, the paper examines why fertility in English-speaking countries seems not to follow expectation.     

Population Policies in Developed Countries: How do Australia’S Policies Compare?

This paper compares international population policies with respect to population growth, fertility and immigration, and discusses current attitudes to the demographic situation in developed countries. Only Canada, the United States and Australia have a policy of continuing high immigration, and Australia’s migrant intake per head of population is considerably higher than for the other two countries. An emerging philosophy in Britain and Europe is a focus on “child quality” and the well-being of a near stationary population, rather than continued population growth. There is also an awareness that immigration is not a solution to the ageing “problem” and that there are more efficient non-demographic means of coping with an older population.     

A summary analysis of the 3rd inquiry

20 ESCAP member countries responded to the "Third Population Inquiry among Governments: Population policies in the context of development in 1976." The questionnaire sent to the member countries covered economic and social development and population growth, mortality, fertility and family formation, population distribution and internal migration, international migration, population data collection and research, training, and institutional arrangements for the formulation of population policies within development. Most of the governments in the ESCAP region that responded indicate that the present rate of population growth constrains their social and economic development. Among the governments that consider the present rate of population growth to constrain economic and social development, 13 countries regarded the most appropriate response to the constraint would include an adjustment of both socioeconomic and demographic factors. 11 of the governments regarded their present levels of average life expectancy at birth "acceptable" and 7 identified their levels as "unacceptable." Most of the governments who responded consider that, in general, their present level of fertility is too high and constrains family well-being. Internal migration and population distribution are coming to be seen as concerns for government population policy. The most popular approaches to distributing economic and social activities are rural development, urban and regional development and industrial dispersion. There was much less concern among the governments returning the questionnaire about the effect of international migration than internal migration on social and economic development.     

Back to the Future: a Sensitivity Analysis to Predict Future Fertility Rates Considering the Influence of Family Policies—The Cases of Spain and Norway

This article analyzes the relationship between family policies focused on childcare for children under the age of three and fertility levels. In the current context of very low European fertility, it is important to understand whether public support for families can help increase fertility or if, on the contrary, existing fertility levels are the exact reflection of the reproductive desires of families, regardless of the family-support of the policies that may exist in each country. This analysis was carried out through a stochastic dynamic mathematical model that incorporates both demographic variables and family policy variables. A sensitivity analysis was carried out on Spain and Norway, two countries that have very different models of family policies. This sensitivity analysis allows establishing a relationship between the existing family policies and the total fertility rate and also the expected evolution of fertility rates in the future, if the current family policies remain constant. The results showed that the models which lead to an increase in fertility are those which are most generous and which also incorporate a gender perspective, so they allow the identification of good practices and maximum levels of policy efficiency in regards to different objectives such as increase fertility and advances towards gender equality. By contrast, models with erratic and insufficient support clearly contribute to maintaining fertility at very low levels and perpetuate unequal gender relationships. There is, therefore, space for state agency to develop more effective public policies in both dimensions.

     

A Case for “Reverse One-Child” Policies in Japan and South Korea? Examining the Link Between Education Costs and Lowest-Low Fertility

Household spending on children’s pre-tertiary education is exceptionally high in Japan and South Korea, and has been cited as a cause of low fertility. Previous research attributes this high spending to a cultural emphasis on education in East Asian countries. In this paper, we argue that institutional factors, namely higher education and labor market systems, play an important role in reinforcing the pressure on parents to invest in their children’s education. We review evidence showing that graduating from a prestigious university has very high economic and social returns in Japan and South Korea, and examine the implications for fertility within the framework of quantity–quality models. Finally, we put forward ‘reverse one-child’ policies that directly address the unintended consequences of these institutional factors on fertility. These policies have the additional virtues of having very low fiscal requirements and reducing social inequality.     

Fertility and union formation during crisis and societal consolidation in the Western Balkans

Fertility decline in central and eastern Europe (CEE) since the fall of the communist regimes has been driven by both stopping and postponement of childbearing: two processes that have been related to crisis and economic development, respectively. In the Western Balkans these economic and political contexts followed each other in the form of a biphasic transition. I examine whether this sequence triggered fertility responses like those observed elsewhere. Relying on three independent data sources, I cross-validate the levels of, and describe the trends in, union formation and fertility (by birth order) between 1980 and 2010. Results do not reveal widespread declines in fertility to lowest-low levels during the most acute period of crisis. The subsequent postponement of marriage and first birth was also limited, and the two-child family remains the norm. This relative resilience of childbearing patterns compared with other CEE countries is discussed with reference to the institutional context.     

Is Lowest‐Low Fertility in Europe Explained by the Postponement of Childbearing?

In 2001, more than half of Europe's population lived in countries with a total fertility rate (TFR) at or below 1.3. Use of the adjusted TFR proposed by Bongaarts and Feeney, which takes into account the effects of the ongoing fertility postponement, changes the European fertility map considerably. All 27 countries analyzed had adjusted TFRs in 1995–2000 above 1.4. Thus, the “lowest‐low” fertility in Europe may be interpreted as a temporary consequence of the increasing age at motherhood. However, substantial regional differences in fertility level across Europe persist even when the differential pace of fertility postponement is taken into account. The estimated adjusted TFRs in Europe (1.63) and in the 25‐member European Union (1.71) contrast with the TFR levels of 1.40 and 1.46, respectively. These seemingly small differences have vastly different implications in terms of the potential long‐term pace of population decline.     

Economic and Institutional Context and Second Births in Seven European Countries

The extent to which mothers progress to a second child varies greatly between European countries. Although both institutional and economic context are believed to be partly responsible for these differences, available research on economic conditions and fertility mostly focuses on first births and studies on family policy and fertility have hitherto insufficiently addressed population heterogeneity. Combining longitudinal microdata from the Harmonized Histories with contextual data on labour market uncertainty and family policy, this paper uses discrete-time hazard models to analyse the impact of economic and institutional context on second birth hazards of 22,298 women in 7 European countries between 1970 and 2002. Particular attention is paid to variation in the contextual effects by level of education. We find that aggregate-level unemployment and temporary employment reduce second birth hazards, particularly for low- and medium-level educated women. Family policies are positively related to second birth hazards. Whereas family allowances stimulate second births particularly among low educated mothers, the positive effect of childcare is invariant by level of education.     

Population policies in socialist countries of Europe

Abstract The emergence, in the mid-sixties, of policies aimed at counteracting rapid fertility decline in some socialist countries of Europe is discussed in the paper. Following a summary of recent population trends and policies in nine European socialist countries, and brief comments on ideological and theoretical considerations, factors relevant to policy decision are discussed. Population policies aiming at encouraging fertility exist in five countries, viz. German Demographic Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Recent developments appear to include attempts to stimulate third births with measures aiming to improve economic conditions of large families, the status of women, education and restriction of induced abortion.     

Institutions and Development: A Conceptual Reanalysis

This essay reviews the concept of “institutions” as used in the recent economic literatures on firms and national development and notes its limitations. An alternative framework is proposed that draws on classic and contemporary sociological theory to position the concept of institutions in relation to other basic elements of culture and social structure. The framework is used to analyze (1) the failure of attempts to transplant institutions of developed countries into the global South and (2) the dynamics of massive privatization in Mexico. The bearing of this framework on current institutional theories of social change is examined, leading to the identification of sources of change at different levels of causal significance and scope. This modified theory of change is applied to the longstanding demographic debates on historical and institutional determinants of fertility transitions. The bearing of the proposed “thick institutionalist” framework on social theory and future development policies is discussed.     

Policy responses to low fertility and its consequences: A global survey

Fertility at or below replacement level now characterizes 64 countries with populations totalling 44 per cent of that of the world. Many of these countries have total fertility rates below 1.5 and some have recorded below-replacement fertility for decades. It appears likely that some countries will eventually adopt policies aimed at raising fertility. Accordingly, the paper examines the effect of past policies of this type, and briefly looks to the future.     

Delayed Marriage and Very Low Fertility in Pacific Asia

The general decline in fertility levels in Pacific Asia has in its vanguard countries where fertility rates are among the lowest in the world. A related trend is toward delayed marriage and nonmarriage. When prevalence of cohabitation in European countries is allowed for, levels of “effective singlehood” in many countries of Pacific Asia have run ahead of those in northern and western Europe. This raises questions about the extent to which delayed marriage has been implicated in fertility declines, and whether the same factors are leading both to delayed marriage and to lowered fertility within marriage. The article argues that involuntary nonmarriage is likely to be more common in Pacific Asia than in Western countries, and that resultant involuntary childlessness plays a substantial role in the low fertility rates currently observed.     

The objectives of government policies on fertility control in Eastern Europe

Although demographers from the communist countries continue to maintain that overpopulation in the Malthusian sense Is possible only under capitalism, some East European demographers now concede that a form of overpopulation may, at times and under certain conditions, exist In a communist society. In this connection the ideological framework for an optimum population policy under communism has been developed, and demographers have been given the task of determining what the optimum population is and how it is to be attained. There has been considerable ferment on the Issue of fertility control in both the literature and action programmes of Poland, Chechoslovakia, and Hungary. The latter two countries have conducted surveys on family planning, including the use and effectiveness of contraceptives, and have established demographic journals.

All the communist countries of Eastern Europe except Albania and East Germany have relaxed laws restricting abortions and conducted campaigns for the spread of contraceptives. At the same time family allowances have been continued. These paradoxically divergent policies can be rationalized as attempts to sustain existing families while providing the basis for regulating future fertility to achieve an optimum population in relation to the resources of the respective countries.     

Work-family conflict in comparative perspective: The role of social policies

This study focuses on the role of social policies in mitigating work-family incompatibilities in 27 countries. We ask whether work-family conflict is reduced in countries that provide family-friendly policies and flexible employment arrangements, and whether women and men are similarly affected by such policies. The study, based on the ISSP 2002, demonstrates considerable variation among countries in the perceived work-family conflict. In all but two countries, women report higher levels of conflict than men. At the individual level, working hours, the presence of children and work characteristics affect the perception of conflict. At the macro level, childcare availability and to a certain extent maternity leave reduce women's and men's sense of conflict. Additionally, the availability of childcare facilities alleviates the adverse effect of children on work-family balance for mothers while flexible job arrangements intensify this effect.     

Causes of fertility decline in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union II

Abstract The first part of this study (which appeared in the preceding issue of Population Studies) assessed the extent of the decline in fertility in the countries of the area during the last 10-15 years, and analyzed the purely demographic aspects ofthis phenomenon. Part II examines the socio-economic differentials in fertility, with regard to such variables as urban-rural residence, socio-occupational and employment status of women, educational attainment, income and housing conditions, and the consequent impact of structural changes in these characteristics of the population on observed fertility trends. The broad conclusion is that the fertility differentials usually found in western societies are also relevant to the socialist countries of eastern Europe, and that the dramatic falls in fertility in the 1950's and the 1960's have largely been the outcome ofthe deep and rapid structural changes, particularly those associated with urbanization, educational attainment and the incidence of female employment. The last part of the study is concerned with the impact on post-war fertility trends of social legislation and of general economic policies, particularly in the fields of employment and income. An appraisal of the extent of family planning is followed by a discussion of the recent pro-natalist measures introduced in most countries of the area and of their effectiveness.     

Three Fertility Compromises and Two Transitions

Demographers and those concerned with population policy are increasingly focusing on the steep fertility declines that occurred in developed countries from the 1960s and the consequent widespread below-replacement fertility levels. The decline has been termed the Second Demographic Transition. This paper argues that the recent demographic change can best be understood and analyzed if we broaden the concept to include the first demographic transition, and the three demographically more settled periods preceding, separating, and following the two fertility transitions. These more settled periods or “compromises” are examined to ascertain their nature and so to help predict the likely developments in the present or third compromise. It is argued that the third compromise has now extended for 20 years with little movement in fertility rates or other socioeconomic behavior which has been said to be associated with the second transition, and that this provides sufficient evidence for analysis. The approach has two key aspects. First, it is confined in Europe to countries that distinctly experienced the full five demographic periods, namely northwestern and central Europe. Second, the analysis gains strength by including non-European countries that progressed through all five stages, namely the English-speaking countries of overseas European settlement: USA, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.     

A demographic explanation for the recent rise in European fertility

Between 1998 and 2008 European countries experienced the first continent-wide increase in the period total fertility rate (TFR) since the 1960s. After discussing period and cohort influences on fertility trends, we examine the role of tempo distortions of period fertility and different methods for removing them. We highlight the usefulness of a new indicator: the tempo- and parity-adjusted total fertility rate (TFRp*). This variant of the adjusted total fertility rate proposed by Bongaarts and Feeney also controls for the parity composition of the female population and provides more stable values than the indicators proposed in the past. Finally, we estimate levels and trends in tempo and parity distribution distortions in selected countries in Europe. Our analysis of period and cohort fertility indicators in the Czech Republic, Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden shows that the new adjusted measure gives a remarkable fit with the completed fertility of women in prime childbearing years in a given period, which suggests that it provides an accurate adjustment for tempo and parity composition distortions. Using an expanded dataset for ten countries, we demonstrate that adjusted fertility as measured by TFRp* remained nearly stable since the late 1990s. This finding implies that the recent upturns in the period TFR in Europe are largely explained by a decline in the pace of fertility postponement. Other tempo-adjusted fertility indicators have not indicated such a large role for the diminishing tempo effect in these TFR upturns. As countries proceed through their postponement transitions, tempo effects will decline further and eventually disappear, thus putting continued upward pressure on period fertility. However, such an upward trend may be obscured for a few years by the effects of economic recession.     

经济增长、生育政策与生育率——基于跨国面板数据的实证研究

文章基于不同发展水平、采取不同生育政策分布在不同地区的十个国家1970—2009年的面板数据对经济增长、生育政策与生育率之间的关系进行实证分析,对近年来部分学者提出的经济增长与生育率之间的U形关系,采取选择不同样本、加入政策变量和其他与生育率相关的重要经济指标如妇女的教育程度、城镇化率、工业化率等进行再检验,结果支持该假说,经济增长在经济发展程度整体较低的阶段与生育率呈现较高的负相关,但当经济增长达到一定程度时,收入效应取代替代效应对生育率起主要推动作用,如果再辅之以相关的激励政策和措施,生育率会出现轻微的反弹。因此,对于已采取生育控制政策的国家,可以结合经济社会发展指标权衡利弊,适时调整政策。