The Rehabilitation of Common Sense: Social Representations,Science and Cognitive Polyphasia

In Psychoanalysis, its image and its public (PIP) Moscovici introduced the theory of social representations and took further the project of rehabilitating common sense. In this paper I examine this project through a consideration of the problem of cognitive polyphasia, and the continuity and discontinuity between different systems of knowing. Focusing on the relations between science and common sense. I ask why, despite considerable evidence to the contrary, the scientific imagination tends to deny its relation to common sense and believe that can displace it. I argue that the psychosocial dynamic between common sense and science is revealing of how heavily they are entangled in, and indeed indebted to each other. Even more, this dynamic allows for a full appreciation of what the theory of social representations calls states of cognitive polyphasia. Different systems of thinking and knowing do not displace each other but live side by side, co‐existing in a variety of ways, fulfilling different functions and answering different needs in social life.     

Social Representations and Repression: Examining the First Formulations of Freud and Moscovici

The English edition of Moscovici's classic work on the social representation of psychoanalysis enables us to reflect on the historical origins of psychoanalytic ideas and of social representation theory itself. Moscovici claimed that science was both univocal and abstract and, in these respects, it differs from the social representations of commonsense. This paper explores these notions, especially in relation to Moscovici's claim that psychoanalytic theory is to be found in Freud's first formulations. It is suggested that some of the processes, which Moscovici attributes to the passage of psychoanalytic ideas to commonsense, can be found occur in the early history of psychoanalysis. This can be seen in Freud's criticisms of the way Jung used the concept of “complex”. Moreover, psychoanalytic theory could never be univocal for it incorporated the voices of patients and their representations of the world. An examination of Studies on Hysteria reveals further multivocality as Freud uses both the “action” language of ordinary life and the reified, nominalized language of science. Examples are given in relation to the first formulations of the key psychoanalytic concept of “repression”. Some comparisons are made between Freud's first formulations of “repression” and Moscovici's first formulations of “social representation”.     

Social Representations: The Beautiful Invention

Psychoanalysis: Its Image and Its Public is a perfect illustration of Tarde's claim that ‘beautiful’ should be reserved for ideas that lead to a discovery of more ideas and to an invention that we can judge as fruitful for the future. The article examines the influence of the book in geographical, historical and scientific contexts and traces the development and diffusion of the theory of social representations throughout four periods. The article highlights the difference between the first edition in 1961, and the second one in 1976, and it examines the development of Moscovici's ideas over time. The first edition of Psychoanalysis, based on the criticism of sociology of knowledge, underlines common sense as a new object of study, attempting to capture complex social phenomena. It shows common sense as a legitimate object of study that interweaves social, cultural and individual dimensions in the constitution of social reality. The 1976 edition emphasises that language and communication and its role in the theory of social knowledge. The book has had manifold impact on new areas of study. An overview of international research in social representations shows how this work has inspired scholars all over the world, has lead to creating Schools of research and to innovative proposals not only in terms of domains that have been studied but also in terms of theoretical models and methodological concerns.     

The Breakdown of the Hegemonic Representation of Madness in Africa

Social science has recently examined the dramatic increase of witchcraft and magic in everyday contemporary African. A study, which took place in the 1970's, on the representation of madness in postcolonial Congo, contributes to the elucidation of such an outgrowth. In line with the first version of La Psychoanalyse, it aimed at identifying variations in the images, beliefs, and attitudes associated with groups whose social positioning differed in relation to modernity. Sixty old men were interviewed. The respondents provided a representation in the making that neither reflected Western knowledge nor faithfully echoed local patterns. The Western elements were anchored in a strongly objectified local belief system. For “traditional” informants the meaning attributed to madness testifies to the transformation of a hegemonic representation into a polemical one since it addressed the question of their identity shaken by modernity. An emancipated representation emerged within the most educated group. A secondary analysis of the data contributes to current theoretical debates within social representations theory in focusing on tolerance/intolerance to alternative representations through semantic barriers. It brings more evidence to the fragmentation of the hegemonic system of belief and confirms how social—identity content and relations mediate knowledge construction.     

National Identity,Citizenship and Immigration: Putting Identity in Context

In this paper we suggest that there is a need to examine what is meant by “context” in Social Psychology and present an example of how to place identity in its social and institutional context. Taking the case of British naturalisation, the process whereby migrants become citizens, we show that the identity of naturalised citizens is defined by common‐sense ideas about Britishness and by immigration policies. An analysis of policy documents on “earned citizenship” and interviews with naturalised citizens shows that the distinction between “elite” and “non‐elite” migrants is evident in both the “reified” sphere of policy and the “common sense” sphere of everyday identity construction. While social representations embedded in lay experience construct ethno‐cultural similarity and difference, immigration policies engage in an institutionalised positioning process by determining migrants' rights of mobility. These spheres of knowledge and practice are not disconnected as these two levels of “managing otherness” overlap—it is the poorer, less skilled migrants, originating outside the West who epitomise difference (within a consensual sphere) and have less freedom of mobility (within a reified sphere). We show that the context of identity should be understood as simultaneously psychological and political.     

Harre's Social Philosophy and Political Philosophy: A Social Scientific Critique

In his article, “Saving Critical Realism,” Harre (2009 ) relates his revised philosophy of science to a social philosophy concerning the nature of society, and to a political philosophy regarding the nature of freedom and reform. I argue that his social philosophy and political philosophy rest upon an individualistic sense of society and freedom. I demonstrate that his individualism is factually and politically untenable. (I shall not comment on his philosophy of science, although the errors in his social and political philosophies make it suspect.) I counterpose an alternative social philosophy and political philosophy that are based on a structural model of society, freedom, and social change. My critique demonstrates how social science can adjudicate claims of structuralist vs. individualist social and political philosophy. It also argues that social science must constitute the basis for formulating political ideals of freedom and social organization if these are to be viable.     

The Epistemological Significance of the Theory of Social Representations

The theory of social representations must be understood in terms of its proper epistemology so that it can accomplish its full potential in social sciences. This is often difficult to achieve because researchers comprehend it in terms of concepts that are part of static and individualistic Newtonian epistemology rather than in terms of dynamic and relational Einsteinian epistemology. This article considers three signposts that Moscovici identifies and analyses in the theory of relativity, namely the relation between epistemology and science, theory and method, and the argument against the explanation of effects by their causes. The following question is posed: are these signposts also characteristic of the theory of social representations? This question is examined focusing on interactional epistemology, theory and method and the diversity of natural thinking and communication. Moscovici's Psychoanalysis shows that natural thinking appears in a plurality of modes according to the situation in which it takes place and according to social groups towards which it is directed. Natural thinking is controversial and communication‐centred. Different professionals, groups and lay people use different kinds of speaking and different communicative genres when they try to resolve “the same” problem. The article suggests that bringing together dialogicality, dialogical linguistics and the theory of social representations may open up new possibilities for theoretical developments in social psychology.     

The science of republicanism: Hobbes and Publius

Sheldon S. Wolin in “Hobbes and the Culture of Despotism,” asks a most important question: “is there a political element embedded in the social representation of scientific knowledge, such that to think in certain representational terms is to re-describe certain political postures, depending on the political character of the representations?” (1961). In this paper I examine this observation and outline the sense in which the scientific enterprise influences both Hobbes and Publius and how Hobbes is a stepping stone for Publius in the construction of a commercially grounded, constitutionally based republican system.     

Chinese Perceptions of the Scandinavian Social Policy Model

This paper highlights the stereotypical images characteristic of Chinese social research on the Scandinavian model. How do Chinese commentators explain the development of the Scandinavian social policy model and how do they assess it? Is it deemed morally sound and sustainable? Reasons for the contrasts of interpretation between Chinese and Scandinavian authors are categorized along two dimensions. There are “missing elements”, typically the notions of social solidarity and social citizenship, which tend to be ignored by Chinese writers though underscored by Scandinavian writers. There are also “added elements”, generated from Chinese contexts, which affect Chinese interpretations of the Scandinavian model. The study argues that since each welfare regime type is possessed of its own normative codes, supported by its own particular social order, it is necessary to decode such elements—especially cultural notions of welfare—to appreciate the points of view being expressed.     

Siting Praxeology. The Methodological Significance of “Public” in Theories of Social Practices

The concept of “site” is at the center of current debates in theories of social practices as well as in cultural anthropology. It is unclear, however, how to assess the associated methodological assumption that overriding social structures or cultural formations can manifest themselves in sites. The article draws on the conception of social practices and introduces the notion of “publicness” in order to explicate how and why sociality and social structures can be accessed through “siting”. Sites as well as social practices, it is claimed, have to be conceptualized as essentially public and thus principally observable phenomena. This assumption of publicness implicit to both site ontology and theories of social practices is unfolded on the basis of a praxeological reformulation of the paradigm of joint attention elaborated in developmental psychology. To avoid presentist misinterpretations, we then conceptualize sociality as chains of practices across time and space, drawing on the works of Theodore Schatzki, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Anthony Giddens and Bruno Latour. The public carriers of practices (artifacts, symbols, media, bodies) and the translocal structures they establish acquire particular significance in these approaches. In a further step, we present some methodological consequences of the “publicness assumption” and support our arguments by referring to Pierre Bourdieu's study on Distinction.     

Sensing Bodies and Digitally Mediated Distress

ABSTRACT

In The Five Senses (2008) Michel Serres shows how the body is not an abstracted, dislocated surface that allows for the objectification of the senses and instead illustrates how it is a process: one of continually infolding sensitivities that translate our bodily feelings into a fluid sense of the world. In this article we explore what it means to be a body in the mediated environments of everyday lives of those who visit social media sites that are designed to help people deal with mental distress. We will discuss the way that “bodies” must tack between oft-competing pressures and draws, which emanate from the performance of sense that is contained within these sites. Attempts to “make” sense of the body in such terrains often require an increasingly sophisticated set of skills and expertise and can, despite our best efforts, result in the body being transported to unexpected places. In order to capture a sense of movement, people must try to transform their offline experiences into a set of actions that can be rendered meaningful in terms of an online domain, which we argue is against the way that people sense. We develop a theory of sensory bodies as subject to continual “movement,” drawing on the work of Serres, Simondon, and Manning, before discussing three examples of social media use in mental health, and the potential implications for people having to learn to sense in and through such online spaces.     

Kurt Lewin's Leadership Studies and His Legacy to Social Psychology: Is There Nothing as Practical as a Good Theory?

This paper re‐examines Kurt Lewin's classic leadership studies, using them as a concrete example to explore his wider legacy to social psychology. Lewin distinguished between advanced “Galileian” science, which was based on analysing particular examples, and backward “Aristotelian” science, which used statistical analyses. Close examination of the way Lewin wrote about the leadership studies reveals that he used the sort of binary, value‐laden concepts that he criticised as “Aristotelian”. Such concepts, especially those of “democracy” and “autocracy”, affected the way that he analysed the results and the ways that later social scientists have understood, and misunderstood, the studies. It is argued that Lewin's famous motto—“there is nothing as practical as a good theory”—is too simple to fit the tensions between the leadership studies and his own views of what counts as good theory.     

Re‐conceptualizing Abstract Conceptualization in Social Theory: The Case of the “Structure” Concept

I this paper, I draw on recent research on the radically embodied and perceptual bases of conceptualization in linguistics and cognitive science to develop a new way of reading and evaluating abstract concepts in social theory. I call this approach Sociological Idea Analysis. I argue that, in contrast to the traditional view of abstract concepts, which conceives them as amodal “presuppositions” removed from experience, abstract concepts are irreducibly grounded in experience and partake of non‐negotiable perceptual‐symbolic features from which a non‐propositional “logic” naturally follows. This implies that uncovering the imagistic bases of allegedly abstract notions should be a key part of theoretical evaluation of concepts in social theory. I provide a case study of the general category of “structure” in the social and human sciences to demonstrate the analytic utility of the approach.     

Institutions and Social Structures1

This paper clarifies the terms “institutions” and “social structures” and related terms “rules”, “conventions”, “norms”, “values” and “customs”. Part one explores the similarities between institutions and social structures whilst the second and third parts explore differences. Part two considers institutions, rules, habits or habitus and habituation, whilst part three critically reflects on three common conceptions of social structures. The conclusion comments upon reflexive deliberation via the internal conversation.     

Micro‐situational Foundations of Social Structure: An Interactionist Exploration of Affective Sanctioning

Micro‐interaction dynamics of affective sanctioning have been widely acknowledged but rarely related to the emergence of social phenomena. This paper aims to highlight the constitutive force of interaction activity by critically analysing two sociological models, Bourdieu's theory of practice and Barnes's Performative Theory of Social Institutions (PTSI). Such a comparison allows me to reveal two differing models of social phenomena currently operating in sociological debates: an extrinsic structuralist model which tacitly conveys macro‐structural phenomena as prior and determinant of individuals and their micro‐interactions, and an intrinsic structuralism model which prioritizes individuals’ interactions and conceives them as constituting both the individual and the structural. I argue that the latter's emphasis on the dynamics of mutual susceptibility to affective sanctioning as underpinning consensus among inherently heterogeneous individuals provides a platform to further support the tenets of Interactionism and helps to expose Bourdieu's over‐deterministic methodological individualism prevalent in most sociological theory. I conclude that by conceiving emotions as causal, rather than the effect of social forces, sociological theory can provide an explanation of both individual practices and systemic phenomena which resolves macro‐structural tensions. In doing so, I suggest an ontological understanding of the “social” which supports the Interactionist central tenet that the local takes priority over wider structural phenomena.     

The Development of Social Assistance and Unemployment Insurance in Germany and Japan

Both Japan and (West) Germany were subjected to foreign “Allied”Occupation from 1945. In this fiftieth anniversary year of the ending of World War Two and the commencement of these periods of Occupation, this paper assesses and compares the impact of the latter experience on social policy development in Germany and Japan. In particular, it focusses on social assistance and unemployment insurance, on the grounds that provision for “the able-bodied poor”constitutes a clear guide as to how far each society has progressed or is progressing along the road to “social citizenship”as defined by T. H. Marshall. The import of Allied Occupation was in practice quite different in the two cases, not least because of their very different paths of social policy development beforehand. Developments in the wake of Occupation and upto the present are nonetheless indicative of there being some elements of policy “convergence”, which welfare state regime theory has hitherto failed to allow for in its concentration upon “whole systems”at the expense of more detailed policy “subsystem”review.     

“宗教礼物论”的可能性：礼物与宗教的内在联系

本文认为，“宗教礼物论”是一个具有潜力的理论视角，它以莫斯等人的礼物理论为基础，探讨宗教现象及其与社会的关系。本文在述评现有文献的基础上，探讨礼物与宗教的内在关系，进而分析礼物理论与宗教社会学的亲和性。文章认为：首先，礼物与宗教是双向关联的，两者相辅相成，不仅宗教现象中蕴含着礼物逻辑，而且宗教为礼物的内在价值提供了神圣性的基础；其次，礼物和宗教都与社会团结的法则直接关联，这一点体现在两者共通的自愿式义务性上，两者既融合了情感性联系和工具性联系，也融合了相互性伦理和等级性伦理；最后，“宗教礼物论”的优势最可能体现在对宗教之“非自主选择性”的分析上，而它的潜在挑战则主要在应对社会变迁与价值倾向上。     

The Generality of Theory and the Specificity of Social Behavior: Contrasting Experimental and Hermeneutic Social Science

Since its inception, experimental social psychology has arguably been of two minds about the nature and role of theory. Contemporary social psychology's experimental approach has been strongly informed by the “nomological‐deductive” approach of Carl Hempel in tandem with the “hypothetico‐deducive” approach of Karl Popper. Social psychology's commitment to this hybrid model of science has produced at least two serious obstacles to more fruitful theorizing about human experience: (1) the problem of situational specificity, and (2) the manifest impossibility of formulating meaningful general laws of human social behavior. It is argued that a social psychology based on the search for this kind of lawfulness, under the auspices of either a strict or loose interpretation of the largely Hempelian model, is ultimately unworkable. An alternative approach to social psychology that is attentive both to the need for understanding individual situations and behaviors and to the need for generalized understanding of actual human behaviors is offered. This approach is grounded in the hermeneutic tradition.