Nozick on Sen: A misunderstanding

This discussion examines Robert Nozick's claim inAnarchy, State, and Utopia (New York 1974) that his entitlement theory of justice avoids the paradox of collective choice shown by A. K. Sen inCollective Choice and Social Welfare (San Francisco 1970). Nozick argues his system is a stable principle of distributive justice. The author shows Nozick's principle of justice in transfer qualifies as a social decision function in Sen's sense because it is a collective choice rule and meets necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a choice function. Next the author demonstrates Nozick's principle of justice in transfer requkes Sen's conditions of unrestricted domain, the Pareto principle, and liberalism which are the conditions of the Sen paradox Nozick claims to avoid. Thus, Nozick's principle of justice in transfer is shown not to be a stable principle of distributive justice.     

On some suggestions for having non-binary social choice functions

The various paradoxes of social choice uncovered by Arrow [1], Sen [10] and others have led some writers to question the basic assumption of a binary social choice function underlying most of these paradoxes. Schwartz [8], for example, proves an important theorem which may be considered to be a generalization of the famous paradox of Arrow, and then lays the blame for this paradox on the assumption of a binary social choice function. He then proceeds to define a type of choice functions which, like binary choice functions, define the best elements in sets of more than two alternatives on the basis of binary comparisons, but which, as he claims, have an advantage over binary choice functions, in so far as they always ensure the existence of best elements for sets of more than two alternatives irrespective of the results of binary comparisons. The purpose of this paper is to show that even a considerable weakening of the assumption of a binary social choice function does not go very far towards solving some of the paradoxes under consideration, and that if replacing the requirement of a binary social choice function by a Schwartz type social choice function solves these paradoxes, it does so only by violating the universally acceptable value judgment that in choosing from a set of alternatives, society should never choose an alternative which is Pareto inoptimal in that set (i.e., the socially best alternatives in a set should always be Pareto optimal). This argument is substantiated with the help of an extended version of Sen's [10] paradox of a Paretian liberal, and thus a by-product of our analysis is a generalization of the theorem of Sen [10]. The argument itself, however, is more general and applies also to the impossibility result proved by Schwartz [8].We are extremely grateful to Amartya Sen for his helpful comments.

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A Paretian liberal dilemma without collective rationality

This note proposes a principle of liberalism which is a simple and plausible variant of Sen's principle of minimal liberalism. The former principle is shown to be incompatible with the weak Pareto principle; and this impossibility result is not dependent on the preference-aggregating rule being restricted by any collective rationality condition.     

The impossibility of a paretian loyalist

Amartya Sen has argued the impossibility of the Paretian liberal. While his abstract argument is compelling, the concrete significance of the conclusion is in some doubt. This is because it is not clear how important liberalism in his sense is; in particular it is not clear that the sort of liberalism required for the impossibility result is a compelling variety. We show that even if the argument cannot be used to establish the inconsistency of Paretianism and common-or-garden liberalism, it can be adapted to prove a parallel impossibility. This is the impossibility of combining the Pareto criterion with a loyalty constraint involving certain claim-rights rather than liberty-rights. The impossibility of the Paretian loyalist is of interest in itself but it is also interesting for the light it throws on the source of Sen-style impossibilities.     

How to combine pareto optimality with liberty considerations

I argue that the liberty condition of Sen's important impossibility of a Paretian liberal result is not a condition that liberals (or libertarians) would accept. The problem is that an appropriate liberty condition must be formulated in terms of consent - not in terms of preference. To formulate an adequate condition the framework needs to expand from collective choice rules (which only take information about preferences as input) to rights-based social choice rules (which also take as input information about which options have been consented to and which would violate someone's rights). I formulate a more adequate liberty condition based on the notion of consent that is acceptable to liberals, and then show that Pareto optimality is incompatible even with that condition. I then show how the liberty condition can be weakened in a plausible manner, and describe an interesting class of theories - rights-based Paretian theories - that satisfy the Pareto optimality requirement while being sensitive to liberty considerations.     

Liberals,information and Webster's principles

Critiques two social choice principles employed by Webster's analysis of using information to resolve Sen's paradox of the Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal.     

Nozick on Sen: A reply to Perelli-Minetti

Perelli-Minetti argues that Nozick's principle of justice in transfer requires, inter alia, Sen's liberalism condition (L) and is subject to Sen's paradox. It is shown here that a weaker liberalism condition L _W is sufficient for justice in transfer and consistent with Sen's other conditions on the social decision function. The conjunction of conditions L _W, I _P, and N is equivalent to L. It is implausible and perhaps illogical that a society applying Nozick's entitlement theory will impose both I _P and N, and if it does not, then Sen's paradox does not affect Nozick's theory of justice in transfer.     

Justice,liberty, unanimity and the axioms of identity

Two new justice constraints on liberal rights and the Pareto rule are proposed and analysed. Each resolves both Sen and Gibbard paradoxes. The first, following Hammond, requires no axiom of identity. The second, following Sen and Suppes, resolves Sen Paradoxes for two rights, but requires the axiom of complete identity to resolve Gibbard paradoxes and Sen Paradoxes with three or more rights. This second constraint therefore turns social conflicts over rights into disagreements about interpersonal and intersituational comparisons. By itself it solves the majoritarian paradox and the all-but-one-person-is-decisive paradox.     

Liberals and information

A resolution of Sen's paretian liberal paradox is provided which does not require agents to waive their rights or have self-supporting preferences. The solution concept is an elaboration of a certain kind of path dependence, primary path construction.     

Towards a Two-dimensional Analysis of Welfare Ideologies

This article provides a critical analysis of some accounts of welfare ideologies which have appeared in the last eight years. It is argued that in these accounts welfare ideologies have been presented as ranged along a continuum from "anti-collectivist", "market liberal", or "residual" to "Marxist" or "structural" with intermediate positions variously described as "political liberal", "reluctant collectivist", "social democratic", "Fabian socialist", or "institutional". It is further argued that these one-dimensional accounts are seriously misleading because they fail to give sufficient recognition to the part played by conservatism in the development and justification of modern interventionist states and because they identify Marxism with collectivism and ignore the anti-collectivist strand in socialist thought. These elements are more easily accommodated within an alternative two-dimensional framework for the analysis of welfare ideologies which is briefly outlined.     

The conflict between naive and sophisticated choice as a form of the ‘liberal paradox’

Pareto-inefficient perfect equilibria can be represented by the liberal paradox approach of Sen, appropriately reconfigured to model intertemporal decision-making by an individual. We show that the preference profile used by Grout (1982) to construct a case in which naive choice Pareto-dominates sophisticated choice can be so represented, if tastes change and if the individual can make decisions at time t, which restrict or determine opportunities available in period t + 1 and beyond. This ability to make a decision that binds oneself in the future is a form of rights assignment. We also show how two resolutions of the liberal paradox work out in the individual decision framework.     

The doctrinal paradox, the discursive dilemma, and logical aggregation theory

Judgment aggregation theory, or rather, as we conceive of it here, logical aggregation theory generalizes social choice theory by having the aggregation rule bear on judgments of all kinds instead of merely preference judgments. It derives from Kornhauser and Sager??s doctrinal paradox and List and Pettit??s discursive dilemma, two problems that we distinguish emphatically here. The current theory has developed from the discursive dilemma, rather than the doctrinal paradox, and the final objective of the paper is to give the latter its own theoretical development along the line of recent work by Dietrich and Mongin. However, the paper also aims at reviewing logical aggregation theory as such, and it covers impossibility theorems by Dietrich, Dietrich and List, Dokow and Holzman, List and Pettit, Mongin, Nehring and Puppe, Pauly and van Hees, providing a uniform logical framework in which they can be compared with each other. The review goes through three historical stages: the initial paradox and dilemma, the scattered early results on the independence axiom, and the so-called canonical theorem, a collective achievement that provided the theory with its specific method of analysis. The paper goes some way towards philosophical logic, first by briefly connecting the aggregative framework of judgment with the modern philosophy of judgment, and second by thoroughly discussing and axiomatizing the ??general logic?? built in this framework.     

Invoking a Cartesian product structure on social states

The purpose of this article is to introduce a Cartesian product structure into the social choice theoretical framework and to examine if new possibility results to Gibbard’s and Sen’s paradoxes can be developed thanks to it. We believe that a Cartesian product structure is a pertinent way to describe individual rights in the social choice theory since it discriminates the personal features comprised in each social state. First we define some conceptual and formal tools related to the Cartesian product structure. We then apply these notions to Gibbard’s paradox and to Sen’s impossibility of a Paretian liberal. Finally we compare the advantages of our approach to other solutions proposed in the literature for both impossibility theorems.     

Liberalism,non-binary choice and Pareto principle

It is shown in this paper that a very mild form of Pareto principle is compatible with a set of restrictive conditions. Deriving a choice set identical with the set of alternatives in the case of paradox of voting amounts to begging the problem. If we restrict that the choice set should be a proper sub-set of the original set, the paradox will be revived. In the realistic sense liberalism may well be treated as an outcome of the choice rather than as a basic value judgement. Choice of Rules of the Game ought to be the first step and then only society can seek the optimal situation under those Rules.I am very grateful to P. K. Pattanaik for helpful discussions and valuable comments on the first draft. I am also grateful to Prof. Amartya Sen whose lectures at the Delhi School of Economics introduced me to the theory of social choice.     

Bayesian decision theory,rule utilitarianism,and Arrow's impossibility theorem

The first part of this paper reexamines the logical foundations of Bayesian decision theory and argues that the Bayesian criterion of expected-utility maximization is the only decision criterion consistent with rationality. On the other hand, the Bayesian criterion, together with the Pareto optimality requirement, inescapably entails a utilitarian theory of morality. The next sections discuss the role both of cardinal utility and of cardinal interpersonal comparisons of utility in ethics. It is shown that the utilitarian welfare function satisfies all of Arrow's social choice postulates avoiding the celebrated impossibility theorem by making use of information which is unavailable in Arrow's original framework. Finally, rule utilitarianism is contrasted with act utilitarianism and judged to be preferable for the purposes of ethical theory.     

The chain store paradox

The chain store game is a simple game in extensive form which produces an inconsistency between game theoretical reasoning and plausible human behavior. Well-informed players must be expected to disobey game theoretical recommendations.The chain store paradox throws new light on the well-known difficulties arising in connection with finite repetitions of the prisoners dilemma game. Whereas these difficulties can be resolved by the assumption of secondary utilities arising in the course of playing the game, a similar approach to the chain store paradox is less satisfactory.It is argued that the explanation of the paradox requires a limited rationality view of human decision behavior. For this purpose a three-level theory of decision making is developed, where decisions can be made on different levels of rationality. This theory explains why insight into the rational solution of a decision problem does not necessarily mean that the corresponding course of action will be taken.     

Productive welfare: Korea's third way?

How can the various pressures of economic globalisation and changes in the established welfare systems of the industrialised nations inform the development of the Korean welfare state? As the twenty‐first century dawns, Korea is confronted with a serious dilemma: How to adapt to globalisation and survive under worldwide competition and at the same time construct an effective egalitarian welfare state? The objective of this paper is to explore the future directions for the Korean social welfare system as it adjusts to economic globalisation. As it seeks a course between the social democratic welfare state model and the rising tide of the neo‐liberal welfare state, we pose the question: Is there a ‘third way’ for Korea? In trying to discern where the Korean welfare state is headed, it may be helpful to understand where it has come from and how it compares with the established welfare states in the industrialised nations.     

Contingent on Context? Social Work and the State in Australia, Britain, and the USA

Correspondence to John Harris, School of Health and Social Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK. E-mail: j.harris{at}warwick.ac.uk Summary The notion that social work is an international profession,operating with generally similar goals, methodologies, and commonvalues is considered critically. Examining the political andsocial contexts of three countries with liberal democratic governments—Australia,Britain and the United States—the role of social workwithin the welfare processes of each country is compared. Whilesocial work as an identifiable professional activity sharessome features, it is argued that the idea of its having a coreessence needs to be tempered with a realistic assessment ofthe importance of contextually created difference. Recent andrapid developments in the institutional context, such as thoseexperienced in these three countries, further underscore thelimited utility of the notion of a common professional project.     

Rethinking the construction of welfare in Mexico: Going beyond the economic measures

This study utilized a multidimensional measure of social welfare composed of 26 social indicators integrated in nine categories: education, employment and social protection, income, health, housing conditions, subjective wellbeing, social capital, use of technology, and culture and leisure to help understand social welfare in Mexico. We also compared the integrated measure with the Human Development Index. Estimation was performed using the method. Our analysis indicated that the health and housing conditions categories contributed the most to social welfare across the 32 Mexican States. In relation to the indicators, income and trust in other people were associated with welfare. Further, results on the welfare ranking of Mexican states revealed variations between the two indices and the HDI). Specifically, only four states occupied the same position on both indices, ten recorded different positions on moving up or down from their levels of social welfare. Implications of observed correlations are presented.     

Is the Person-Affecting Intuition Paradoxical?

This article critically examines some of the inconsistency objections that have been put forward by John Broome, Larry Temkin and others against the so-called "person-affecting," or "person-based," restriction in normative ethics, including "extra people" problems and a version of the nonidentity problem from Kavka and Parfit. Certain Pareto principles and a version of the "mere addition paradox" are discussed along the way. The inconsistencies at issue can be avoided, it is argued, by situating the person-affecting intuition within a non-additive form of maximizing consequentialism – a theory which then competes with such additive, or aggregative, forms of maximizing consequentialism as "totalism" and "averagism."