Family planning and economic development in Shifang County]

According to Marx, population either hinders or expedites economic development. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, Shifang County's population grew unchecked. In the 1960s its annual rate of population growth was higher than the national average. Because the growth of material goods was insufficient in supporting the increase in population, the national economy suffered. In 1977, of those Shifang families in debt to the production brigade, over 80% were multiple children families. Some of these families owed over 1300 yuan after 10 years. Obviously such families cannot be counted on to expand the economy or to increase family incomes. Between 1971 and 1981 when Shifang County began family planning, the average annual rate of growth was lower than the national average. At the same time, material production gradually matched population reproduction, expediting economic development. If, with the current age structure (32.19% are aged 0-15 years; 4.95% are over 65 years; average age is 28.41 years), each family has only 1 child, then the rate of natural growth from 1981-2000 will be 3.6% annually. A yearly decrease in population would enable the County to build up pension funds, save on food, maintain the current standard for acreage allotment and expand accumulated capital.     

Does money buy satisfaction?

There was no change in the distribution of satisfaction with the standard of living among Detroit area wives between 1955 and 1971, although current-dollar median family income more than doubled and constant-dollar income increased by forty per cent. Cross-sectional variation in satisfaction is, however, related to income and, in particular, to relative position in the income distribution. Whereas regressions of satisfaction on income in current or constant dollars, or the logarithm thereof, suggest that at the same income there was less satisfaction in 1971 than in 1955, there is no significant year effect in the equation using the income-position variable. Easterlin's thesis that rising levels of income do not produce rises in the average subjective estimate of welfare is supported. The thesis raises difficult questions for students of subjective social indicators.     

Regional Price Parities and Real Regional Income for the United States

The success and expansion of the International Comparison Program (ICP) has led to an increase in interest and effort on the estimation of sub-national price levels and purchasing power parities (PPPs). The ICP highlighted a difficulty that large countries such as Brazil, Russia, India and China face during the price-collection phase, namely how to obtain average prices when there are large disparities in many types of expenditure categories, such as housing prices between rural and urban settings. The fact that such disparities were in evidence led to more research on within-country PPPs, or regional price parities (RPPs). The difference between a RPP and the PPPs is simply that the former are in the same currency, while PPPs are usually converted to a reference country or currency by the exchange rate, such as the United States Dollar or the Euro. This paper describes the methodology used to estimate the RPPs within the United States, and shows their effect on measures of income adjusted to constant dollars, termed real regional incomes.     

Thailand: family planning program exceeds targets

According to Dr. Somboon Vacharothai, Director General of the Ministry of Public Health, the number of people in Thailand who practiced family planning exceeded last year's target. 664,895 individuals used family planning services; this was 62.2% above the planned target for 1976. It was further predicted that 700,000 persons would be recruited by the family planning program in 1977. The preferred method of birth control was the oral contraceptive; it is the method of 800,000 acceptors. Service outlets have been extended rapidly with 5836 medical centers providing family planning services throughout Thailand. Government allocations for family planning have increased from 0.9 million dollars in 1975 to 2.47 million dollars in 1977.     

Marital fertility and religion in Spain, 1985 and 1999

Since the transition to democracy in Spain in 1975, both total fertility and rates of church attendance of Catholics have dropped dramatically. In this study the 1985 and 1999 Spanish Fertility Surveys were used to investigate whether the significance of religion for fertility behaviour -- current family size and the spacing of births -- changed between the survey dates. In the 1985 survey, family size was similar for those Catholics who actively participated in religious activities and those who, though nominally Catholic, were not active participants. By 1999, the family size of the latter was lower and comparable to the family size of those without religious affiliation. These findings accord with the declines in both church attendance and fertility in Spain. The small groups of Protestants and Muslims had the highest fertility. Women in inter-faith unions had relatively low fertility.     

Living conditions among the poor in four rich countries

The share of income going to the poorest 10% of Americans is much smaller than the share of income going to the poorest 10% of Canadians, Swedes, or Germans (before unification). However, comparisons across countries of the distribution of housing conditions, consumer durables, health, and visits to the doctor and dentist suggest that compared to the average person in their country, low-income Americans are no worse off than low-income residents of other countries. But these conclusions partly depend on how income is adjusted for family size. Americans whose incomes are low for a long time may suffer more material deprivation than Canadians whose incomes are low for a long time. Conclusions about economic well-being based on current income may not rank nations the same as comparisons based on deprivation in living conditions.The Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, The Russell Sage Foundation, the National Science Foundation and a Small Grant from the Institute for Research on Poverty provided funding for various stages of this project. I am indebted to Christopher Jencks and two anonymous reviewers for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I am also indebted to Larry Radbill who provided computer programing for the United States and Swedish data and valuable technical suggestions. Monica Ardelt provided computer programing and technical assistance for the German data. Johan Fritzel provided technical assistance for the Swedish data and David Rhodes, Karen Rolf, and Tim Veenstra provided computer programing for the Unites States data.     

Reproductive ideals and educational attainment among white Americans, 1943-1960

Abstract Would the persistent inverse relation between educational attainment and family size in the United States be removed if actual fertility were equal to ideal? Data on ideal family size from 10 national surveys among white Americans of both sexes (from 1943 to 1960) show that gradeschool level respondents have higher ideals than the more educated even when age, religious affiliation, and farm residence are used as controls. Comparison of these ideals with the actual family size or ever-fertile women in the United States indicates that, on the average, the actual family size of all major educational groups falls below the ideal, but the college-educated are furthest from their ideal. If this group lessened the gap between actual and ideal family size, the educational differential in fertility would decrease, but at the price of increasing the rate of population growth.     

Changes in the Living Arrangements of Elderly People in Greece: 1974–1999

During the period 1974–1999 two contrasting trends were observed with respect to the living arrangements of older people in Greece. On the one hand the proportion of older people living with their unmarried children had been slightly rising while on the other hand the proportion of older people living with their married children declined substantially. As a result of the declining trend in the incidence of co-residence with married children the percentage of older people living with their children or other members of their extended family fell by 25% points (from a 58% in 1974 to about 33% in 1999). Our analysis suggests that the main driving force behind the decrease in co-residence between older people and their married children was the rise in the incomes of older people (which resulted from some important exogenous policy changes which increased substantially pension incomes). On the other hand, the main driving force behind the slight increase in the co-residence with unmarried children was the increase in the percentage of unmarried younger people (which is associated with the postponement in the age of marriage) and the high and in some cases increasing needs of children’s generation.     

Fertility and economic status - some recent findings on differentials in Sweden

Abstract The relationship between economic status and family size has generally been found to be negative; the lower the income the higher the fertility. In some cases this inverse relationship breaks down at the top end of the income scale; in other words, people with very high incomes have larger families than those with high incomes. In a few rather special cases positive relationships have been found(1).     

Sub-Saharan Africa: population pressures on development

The population of sub-Saharan Africa, estimated at 434 million in 1984, is expected to reach 1.4 billion by 2025. The birth rate, currently 48/1000 population, continues to increase, and the death rate, 17/1000, is declining. Rapid population growth has curtailed government efforts to provide adequate nutrition, preserve the land base essential for future development, meet the demand for jobs, education, and health services, and address overcrowding in urban areas. Low education, rural residence, and low incomes are key contributors to the area's high fertility. Other factors include women's restricted roles, early age at marriage, a need for children as a source of security and support in old age, and limited knowledge of and access to modern methods of contraception. Average desired family size, which is higher than actual family size in most countries, is 6-9 children. Although government leaders have expressed ambivalence toward development of population policies and family planning programs as a result of the identification of such programs with Western aid donors, the policy climat is gradually changing. By mid-1984, at least 13 of the 42 countries in the region had indicated that they consider current fertility rates too high and support government and/or private family planning programs to reduce fertility. In addition, 26 countries in the region provide some government family planning services, usually integrated with maternal and child health programs. However, 10 countries in the region do not support family planning services for any reason. Unfortunately, sub-Saharan Africa has not yet produced a family planning program with a measurable effect on fertility that could serve as a model for other countries in the region. Social and economic change is central to any hope of fertility reduction in sub-Saharan Africa. Lower infant and child mortality rates, rising incomes, higher education, greater economic and social opportunities for women, and increased security would provide a climate more conducive to fertility decline. Given the limited demand, great sensitivity must be shown in implementing family planning programs.     

The life-cycle squeeze: The interaction of men’s occupational and family life cycles

This paper is concerned with analyzing one structural source of pressure for wives to contribute to family income. This is the "life-cycle squeeze"-the situation where a man's resources are inadequate to meet the needs engendered by the number and ages of his children. Studies of how economic needs vary by family life-cycle stage indicate that one high point of need occurs when men are in their forties and early fifties. However, 1960 Census data on earnings patterns by age indicate that in only relatively high-level professional, managerial and sales occupations do average earnings peak at the same time family income needs are peaking. For most blue-collar and many medium- and low-level white collar occupations, median earnings are highest for younger men, and men at an age when family costs are at their maximum are earning somewhat less, on the average. As a consequence, the families of such men run the risk of a deterioration in their level of living unless an additional income is brought into the household.     

遵义市“四在农家”活动调查报告

贵州省遵义市开展以“富、学、乐、美”为主要内容的“四在农家”活动,帮助农民增收致富;大力加强教育培训,提高农民综合素质;不断丰富农民群众精神文化生活,促进人的全面发展;开展计划生育优质服务活动,改善计划生育卫生服务环境和农民的生活环境。“四在农家”活动加强了人口和计划生育工作,加强了农村人口文化建设,改善了农民生活环境,提高了农民素质,促进了农村人口发展,有力地推进了新农村建设,取得了显著成效。     

Beyond Material Explanations: Family Solidarity and Mortality,a Small Area‐level Analysis

Social solidarity, being embedded in a network of binding social relationships, tends to extend human longevity. Yet while average incomes in the Western world, and with them, life expectancies, have risen dramatically, the second demographic transition has occasioned a breakdown in traditional family forms. This article considers whether these trends in family life may have slowed the rise in life expectancy. I present a cross‐sectional analysis of Israeli statistical areas (SAs), for which I construct indexes of Standard of Living (SOL), Traditional Family Structure (TFS), and Religiosity (R). I show that (1) increases in all three of these indexes are associated with lower levels of mortality, (2) male mortality is more sensitive to differences in SOL and TFS than is female mortality, and (3) net of differences in SOL and TFS, there is no difference in the mortality levels of Arab and Jewish populations.     

家庭养老需求与家庭养老功能弱化的张力及其弥合

人口老龄化是当前中国社会所面临的重要挑战之一。一方面,老年人的特征和人性本能共同决定了人们对家庭养老需求十分强烈;另一方面,家庭结构变迁和人们生活方式的变化导致家庭养老功能逐步弱化。两者之间的张力造就了当前中国社会所特有的家庭养老困境。如何弥合二者之间的张力需要建构家庭和社会联动性的居家养老模式,应发挥各方优势,整合资源,破解家庭养老困境。     

Communist and non-communist Europe: Functional differentiation, 1970–1985

Examining four variables related to quality of life in the respective societies — the value of international trade in U.S. dollars, air passenger mileage, total school enrollments and life expectancy — this study distinguishes several Communist Eastern European states from several Non-Communist Western European states over four time intervals: 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985. The method employed is discriminant analysis. The degree of distinction achieved with the four variables is remarkably clearcut and does not appear to be the simple consequence of different levels of economic development.     

The economic explanation of fertility changes in the United States

Abstract It is widely assumed that fertility varies positively with economic conditions. Actually this assumption receives little support from the historical record. For a century before 1930 fertility declined while the economy expanded and real incomes rose. Then for nearly three decades fertility and incomes fell and rose together. Since 1960 they have again moved in opposite directions. Clearly, no simple generalization about their relation will hold water. More sophisticated explanations are based on relative rather than absolute incomes. Banks suggested that the downturn in English fertility in the 1870's might have occurred because standards of middle-class consumption rose faster than middle-class incomes, but he found the evidence inconclusive. To reconcile the post-war baby boom in the United States with earlier experience, Easterlin has argued that fertility is determined by the relationship between the income of couples in their twenties and the income of their parents ten to fifteen years earlier. Among the weaknesses of this theory as applied to U.S. experience are its failure to explain the sharp drop in fertility, including that of native white urban women, in the 1920's; the fact that fertility rose most in the baby boom at the higher socio-economic levels where incomes rose least; and the sharp decline of fertility after 1962 in spite of the favourable trend of incomes, including those of younger people. The broad conclusion is that while couples no doubt do consider income, employment opportunities, etc. in deciding how many children to have, such considerations have had a relatively minor influence on changes in fertility, which for the most part have been the result of changes in attitudes. Even the post-war baby boom was a result not only of higher incomes and full employment but also of a shift in attitudes toward family size, particularly among the better-educated, economically better-off sections of society.     

Family Sponsorship and Late-Age Immigration in Aging America: Revised and Expanded Estimates of Chained Migration

We use the Immigrants Admitted to the United States (microdata) supplemented with special tabulations from the Department of Homeland Security to examine how family reunification impacts the age composition of new immigrant cohorts since 1980. We develop a family migration multiplier measure for the period 1981–2009 that improves on prior studies by including immigrants granted legal status under the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act and relaxing unrealistic assumptions required by synthetic cohort measures. Results show that every 100 initiating immigrants admitted between 1981 and 1985 sponsored an average of 260 family members; the comparable figure for initiating immigrants for the 1996–2000 cohort is 345 family members. Furthermore, the number of family migrants ages 50 and over rose from 44 to 74 per 100 initiating migrants. The discussion considers the health and welfare implications of late-age immigration in a climate of growing fiscal restraint and an aging native population.     

Public perceptions of the ideal number of children for contemporary families

Demographic and family dynamics have been influenced by the recent downturn in average family size. This research examines perceptions of the ideal size for contemporary families and beliefs regarding factors which have contributed to families' decisions to have fewer children. Findings reveal that the two child family is the overwhelming standard chosen by respondents, and that this preference holds for virtually all demographic categories. Three of five reasons offered for smaller families today (expense of children, wives working and better birth control) were viewed as important by over 85% of those sampled.A previous version of this paper was presented at the annual meetings of the Southern Demographic Group, Austin, Texas, October, 1985. Support for computer analyses was provided by the Office of Computer and Information Services, University of Maryland Baltimore County.     

Determinants of fertility and the unmet need for family planning in Indonesia

Indonesia's fertility has declined to an average of slightly more than 3 children/woman. The islands of Java and Bali have the lowest birth rates. Indonesia's family planning program has been a model of innovation, flexibility, and community involvement, and has been effective in reducing fertility, changing family preferences, and increasing contraceptive use. Fertility decline is also determined by factors other than contraceptive use, as provinces in Jakarta and East Java has low fertility and low contraceptive use. Recent research by Suyono and Palmore found that among cohorts of women in Jakarta lowest fertility rates were explained by greater nonexposure to pregnancy in an unmarried state or by a divorced or widowed status, and by infecundity. In East Java, fertility determinants were the same with the possible addition of lower coital frequency. The study estimated nonexposure due to marriage, infecundity, and contraceptive use. Policy considerations, however, are concerned with the exposed state of the percentage of time women are currently married, fecund, not using contraceptive, and sexually active. Suyono and Palmore also calculated the percentage of time spent in the exposed state by province. The estimates ranged from 12% in Yogyakarta to 25% in West Java and the Outer Islands. Exposed was further divided into groups with a manifest, latent, and no current need. Women with a manifest need for family planning are those who are aware of their contraceptive needs to stop or postpone childbearing and not using. Manifest need was highest in high fertility areas: 12% in Central Java, 13% in West Java, and 12% in the Outer Islands. Programs targeting these women should focus on wider availability of information and services. Women with latent needs are unaware of their need for family planning and are not using contraception. These women were also concentrated in high fertility areas. The percentage of years spent in the latent unmet need state was estimated at 23-24% in West Java and the Outer Islands. Program emphasis should be on education and motivation to show how family size can be controlled. Women with current need can be educated toward future acceptance.     

Family sizes of children and family sizes of women

This paper demonstrates the relation that obtains between the average family size of women and the average family size of offspring of those women. It estimates the value of these two measures for cohorts of American women aged 45–49 in various years from 1890 to 1970. It shows that children born during the post-war baby boom actually derived from smaller families than those born during the low-fertility 1930’s; that under current patterns a woman would have to bear an average of almost two children fewer than were borne by her mother merely to keep population fertility rates constant from generation to generation; and that average family size for nonwhite children exceeds that for white by 50 percent, although the racial difference in family sizes of women is only 19 percent.