Capital structure decisions in family firms: empirical evidence from a bank-based economy

This paper analyzes the question if and how founding families influence the capital structure decision of their firms. By using a unique, partially hand-collected panel dataset of 660 listed German companies (5,135 firm years) over the period 1995–2006, we come up with the following results: German family firms have significantly lower leverage ratios than non-family firms. With respect to the question how families influence the capital structure of their firms, we can show that the family impact is mostly driven via management involvement. In this context, we also detect that the presence of a founder CEO has a strong negative effect on the leverage ratio. Our results prove to be stable against a battery of robustness tests, including the influence of other types of blockholders and the firms’ life cycle. Moreover, we use a propensity-score based matching estimator to alleviate concerns of reverse causality. Overall, our study suggests a strong, negative and causal relationship between family firm characteristics (especially family management) and the level of leverage.     

Board characteristics effects on performance in family and non-family business: a multi-theoretical approach

This paper examines the role of the board of directors in influencing the value of Italian listed firms from 2003 to 2013. In particular, employing agency, stewardship and resource dependence theories, the study aims to compare board characteristics in family and non-family firms and define the theory that best applies to family firms. Empirical results show that the presence of CEO duality and busy directors has a positive effect on the value of family firms, while gender diversity has a negative impact on the value when a member of the family leads a family firm. Conversely, the size of the board positively affects the value of non-family firms. Our main findings suggest the prevalence, in family firms, of the benefits of the board structure argued by stewardship and resource dependence theories rather than the disadvantages expected from agency theory.     

The impact of family CEO’s ownership and the moderating effect of the second largest owner in private family firms

This study explores two ownership issues in private family firms. First, we investigate the relationship between the ownership of family CEOs and firm performance, and postulate that this relationship in private family firms is more complex than the inverted “U” relationship found in public family firms. Second, we predict a potential moderating effect of the second largest owner, who may exert a monitoring role on family CEOs. We focus on private family firms as recent studies show that private family firms have distinct features compared to public family firms, and that findings documented in public family firms may not apply to the ubiquitous, but much less studied, private family firms. We have applied agency theory to develop the two hypotheses, used secondary data on a large sample of private family firms, utilized an adjusted conventional quadratic technique to test the hypotheses, and validated the findings using a second method of piecewise linear specification. The results show that the non-linear relationship between the ownership of family CEOs and firm performance is more complicated than the often-documented inverted “U” shape from public firms. Meanwhile, the second largest owner with a high enough ownership stake can impose a positive moderating effect by mitigating potential agency problems caused by family CEOs.     

The governance role of multiple large shareholders: evidence from the valuation of cash holdings

This paper investigates the governance role of multiple large shareholders (MLS, henceforth), as evidenced by their impact on the valuation of cash holdings. For a sample of 2,723 firms from 22 countries, we find that the presence of MLS enhances the valuation of firms’ cash holdings. In particular, we show that the valuation of cash is positively associated with an even distribution of blockholders’ voting rights and with higher contestability of the largest shareholder’s control. We also show that the impact of MLS on the valuation of cash holdings is more pronounced for family-controlled firms, consistent with investors perceiving family owners as associated with greater expropriation risk. Overall, our results contribute to the literature on corporate governance by showing that MLS improve internal monitoring and moderate the agency costs of firms’ cash holdings.     

CEO Duality,Agency Costs,and Internal Capital Allocation Efficiency

This study examines the impact of CEO duality on firms’ internal capital allocation efficiency. We observe that when the CEO is also chair of the board, diversified firms make inefficient investments, as they allocate more capital to business segments with relatively low growth opportunities over segments with high growth opportunities. The adverse impact of CEO duality on investment efficiency prevails only among firms that face high agency problems, as captured by high free cash flows, staggered board structure and low board independence. Depending on the severity of the agency problem, CEO duality is associated with a decrease in industry‐adjusted investment in high‐growth segments of 1% to 2.1% over the following year, relative to that in low‐growth segments. However, CEOs’ equity‐based compensation curbs the negative effect of CEO duality on internal capital allocation efficiency. Overall, the findings of this study offer strong support for the agency theory and postulate the internal capital allocation policy as an important channel through which CEO duality lowers firm value in diversified firms.     

资产流动性与债务期限结构——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

目前,资产流动性对债务期限结构的影响在理论上存在很大争议,主要有"正向影响"、"负向影响"和"倒U型影响"三种观点。本文以我国沪深两市A股市场1998-2009年间12110个公司年度观测值为样本,采用资产交易强度衡量资产流动性,实证检验了上述三种观点。结果表明,资产流动性越高的公司债务期限越长,即资产流动性正向影响债务期限结构,支持了较高的资产流动性能够增加公司清算价值从而延长债务期限的经典理论。     

Corporate Political Activity and Firm Performance: The Moderating Effects of International and Product Diversification

Prior research has found that corporate political activity (CPA) can both positively and negatively impact firm performance. Combining agency theory with the resource-based view, we examine the relationship between domestic lobbying (a key form of CPA) and firm performance by explicating the moderating effects of international and product diversification. We argue that expansion into international and product markets increases a firm's resources and reduces agency costs in domestic lobbying. Our results, based on a sample of 737 firms, show that lobbying is positively associated with performance for firms that are diversified in both international markets and along product-lines; whereas lobbying is counter-productive for purely domestic and undiversified firms. Our results contribute to the literature on the firm performance implications of corporate political activity by highlighting the roles of international and product diversification.     

Dual-class shares,external financing needs,and firm performance

Whereas the agency theory predicts that dual-class shares decrease firm performance, the stewardship theory predicts that dual-class shares increase firm performance. The cumulative findings on the performance consequences of dual-class shares have been weak and/or inconclusive. Because endogeneity is a constant challenge in empirical corporate governance studies, this study uses a unique law change in Switzerland as a source of exogenous variation in the fraction of firms with dual-class shares. Controlling for firm fixed effects and time-varying confounders, we find that dual-class shares neither harm nor benefit firm performance on average. However, dual-class shares increase firm performance if the firm requires external finance and dual-class shares decrease firm performance if the firm does not require external finance. External financing needs mitigate the agency costs between controlling and minority shareholders and create a context in which dual-class shares facilitate firm-specific investments instead of private perquisites. The study’s results have both managerial and policy implications.     

Does family matter? Ownership,motives and firms’ environmental strategy

Extant research has primarily focused on the economic drivers and outcomes of corporate environmental performance. This trajectory oversimplifies the motives for environmental strategies across all firm types and particularly overlooks how firm ownership presents other motives for environmental strategies. In this study, we leverage institutional theory to examine how family motives, underpinned by family members' desire to gain or preserve family legitimacy and socio-emotional wealth, affect ISO 14001 certification. Using firm-level data, we find that family ownership has a positive effect on ISO 14001 certification. This effect is stronger for firms whose names include the family name and also for firms located closer to large cities. Our study contributes to nonmarket strategy literature by showing that family motives underpin firms’ environmental initiatives. It also contributes to institutional theory by delineating the levels of legitimacy that spur nonmarket strategy in family firms.     

股权收购(Buyouts)的债务估值和违约决策

杠杆收购是股权收购交易的主要形式,所以对于股权收购而言,债权和股权的价值估算至关重要。但一方面鉴于股权收购交易所需的大量资金,股权收购主要采用分层债务结构进行债务融资,另一方面囿于收购的目标公司具有显著的特质风险,传统的Leland模型无法对这类债务和股权进行定价。为此,本文基于股权收购的多层融资结构,构建数理模型研究了股权收购交易的债权和股权的定价方法,并分析了最优破产决策和违约概率。基于实证参数值,模型预测的股东内部收益率和违约概率与实证结论十分接近。当标的资产价值下降时,目标公司的杠杆比率快速提升,优先级较低的债务迅速贬值,从而解释了投资者抢购安全资产的动机。通过对比分析,本文发现采用单层融资结构会提高融资成本,使得股权受损,这为分层债务结构提供了理论依据。最后,本文比较静态分析了标的资产波动率和市场利率对估值和破产决策的影响,结论支持了实证研究中有关市场利率与股权收购相关性的结论。     

Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from Israel

The study examines the effect of ownership structure on firm performance. We distinguish between family firms, firms controlled by partnerships of individuals, concern controlled firms, and firms where blockholders have less than 50% of the vote. The empirical work analyzes data on 280 Israeli firms and employs the technique of Data Envelopment Analysis. It is found that owner-manager firms are less efficient in generating net income than firms managed by a professional (non-owner) manager, and that family firms run by their owners perform (relatively) the worst. This evidence suggests that the modern form of business organization, namely the open corporation with disperse ownership and non-owner managers, promotes firm performance.     

VERTICAL RELATIONS UNDER CREDIT CONSTRAINTS

We model the impact that credit constraints and market risk have on the vertical relationships between firms in the supply chain. Firms which might face credit constraints in future investments become endogenously risk averse when accumulating pledgable assets. In the short run, the optimal supply contract involves risk sharing, so inducing double marginalization. Credit constraints thus result in higher retail prices, and this is true whether the firm is debt or equity funded. Further, we offer a new theory of supplier finance arms as we show an intrinsic complementarity between supply and lending which reduces financing inefficiencies created by informational asymmetries. The model offers: a theory of countervailing power based on credit constraints; a transmission mechanism linking the cost of borrowing with retail prices; and a motive for outsourcing supply (or distribution) in the face of market risk.     

资本结构、股权结构、成长机会与公司绩效

本文在代理成本理论的架构下,以公司成长机会为背景,分析了资本结构和股权结构对公司绩效的影响,并利用 1998 年年底之前在上海和深圳两个交易所上市的 498 家上市公司 1999 至 2001 年三年间1494 个观察值为样本进行了实证分析。结果表明,对于不同成长性的公司而言, 资本结构和股权结构对公司绩效的影响存在较大差异,从而为我们选择理想的资本结构和股权结构提供了有益的启示。     

Determinanten der Vorstandsvergütung

Using a novel, hand-collected data set covering all German non-financial firms listed in the Prime Standard of FWB (Frankfurt Stock Exchange), we examine determinants of executive compensation in German listed firms. We distinguish three potential determinants: firm characteristics, firm performance, and corporate governance characteristics. While we find that simple firm characteristics like size and industry affiliation together with time effects explain more than 60 % of variation in overall compensation, performance characteristics are economically inconsequential for the explanation of compensation levels. When we distinguish between widely held firms and firms with a large blockholder, we find that the latter grant compensation packages that are smaller, less sensitive to the firm’s stock market performance but more sensitive to the firm’s operating performance. Finally, we confirm that supervisory board characteristics also affect the level of executive compensation in German firms. Overall, our findings suggest that although the corporate governance environment in Germany has changed dramatically during the last decade, German listed firms are still exposed to high agency costs.     

The Role of Debt Contracts in UK Corporate Governance

The model of managerial incentives used in Positive Accounting Theory sees debt contracts as important in accounting choices in firms. The paper argues that agency theory and costly contracting theory imply a much wider role for debt contracts as corporate governance mechanisms for controlling relationships between lenders and firms. We analyse the creditor's problem in providing debt to the firm in terms of anticipated agency costs. This analysis leads to a consideration of contracting solutions involving the choice of debt contract terms providing credit protections which are efficient in agency cost and contracting cost terms.The model of debt contracts accepted in the literature is based upon US research, both theoretical and empirical, and thus reflects US institutional experience. This model involves detailed bonding and monitoring terms focusing upon financial and other covenants and implies customisation of such terms to meet creditors' contracting requirements. The paper reviews evidence on the applicability of this model in practice and concludes that, despite broad similarities, institutional biases are present if the model is applied to countries other than the US. We examine evidence on UK debt contracting practices, in particular contract form and content, types of covenant, lenders' perceptions of the role of covenants as control mechanisms, and the issue of standardisation versus customisation. The paper identifies important differences in debt contracting in the UK, for example in types of covenants and the role perceived for them by creditors and identifies standardisation in contract terms as being more common than often implied by other research.     

家族控制、两权分离与债务期限结构选择——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文利用我国2002-2008年家族控制上市公司数据,在控制相关变量下,从债务代理成本视角经验检查在中国债权人法律保护较弱的背景中,终极控制股东(家族)是否影响公司债务期限结构。本文提供的经验证据表明,终极控制股东显著影响公司债务期限结构。具体而言:(1)终极控制股东的控制权越大,公司具有显著低的长期债务水平;(2)终极控制股东的控制权与现金流量权分离度与公司债务期限显著负相关;(3)终极控制股东在上市公司中指派高管与公司债务期限显著负相关。     

Total Board Compensation,Governance and Performance of Spanish Listed Companies

In this paper we present empirical evidence on the relationship between board remuneration of a sample of large Spanish companies and a set of explanatory variables such as performance and size of the company. The objective is to provide additional empirical evidence based on the agency theory for the Spanish institutional context, which differs from most ‘Anglo–Saxon’ model studies. We focus on the impact of a company's governance structure on the relationship between pay and performance. Specifically, we consider ownership concentration and firm leverage as key determinants of the board–shareholders relationship. Our results confirm the positive relationship between board remuneration and company performance, which is stronger for book values than for stock market measures. Industry performance also explains the remuneration and provides useful information for evaluating board behaviour. Company size is also related to board remuneration and affects the pay–performance relationship, although it is not relevant when we use an elasticity approach. Finally, the governance structure of companies is relevant when explaining the power of the compensation–performance relationship, and differences between the impact of ownership concentration and firm leverage on this relationship are found.     

Firm reputation and investment decisions: The contingency role of securities analysts' recommendations

Moving beyond resource-based consequences of a firm's reputation, we develop a behavioral perspective on the impact of corporate reputation. Although there has been extensive discussion in previous studies of the benefits of reputation in terms of gaining resource advantages, we apply theory on self-regulatory focus to suggest that highly reputable firms may tend to have a prevention focus rather than a promotion focus in their investment strategies. This tendency will lead the firm to opt for low-risk investments rather than high-risk investments. Furthermore, we develop a contingency model and argue that the main effect of reputation on the investment decisions of the firm is further strengthened by the negative recommendations of securities analysts. We find support for our hypotheses. In doing so, we address emerging theories about the potential negative consequences of a firm's reputation and provide important insights for our theoretical understanding of the behavior of highly reputable firms.     

基于可协商的可转换债券和企业资本结构

本文将债务协商机制引入利用普通股和可转换债券融资的上市企业,在一个动态模型框架下分析其对债券投资者行为和企业资本结构的影响。首先分别对采取破产清算和债务协商下,利用可转换债券和普通股融资的企业建模;然后利用风险中性定价方法给出企业证券价值的显示解;最后通过数值结果分析债务协商机制的影响并给出经济解释。数值分析表明：相比企业破产清算,协商可以提高企业价值、股权价值。当股东的谈判能力在一定的范围时,协商可以提高债券价值、降低企业杠杆率,增加社会福利。股东谈判能力越强,可转债投资者的转换时机越早。本文的研究丰富了可转换债券的融资理论,为可转换债券融资企业的去杠杆提供了一定的理论指导。     

Sourcing Strategy,Supplier Relationships and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation of UK Organizations

This article conceptualizes and empirically examines buyer–supplier relationships in respect of supply sourcing strategies, relationship characteristics and firm performance. Two sourcing strategies available to organizations are examined, critical and leverage, which in turn, influence the approach to managing the supplier relationship (arms‐length or collaborative). We argue that different relationship approaches are appropriate to achieving different performance outcomes. A structural equation model, using a sample of 142 manufacturing firms based in the United Kingdom, is used to test this hypothesized model. The results indicate that a critical sourcing strategy requires collaborative supplier relationships in order to achieve higher relationship and business outcomes, while leverage sourcing strategies have a direct impact on these same performance outcomes. In addition, a leverage strategy was associated with increased levels of supplier power, though this power was found not to have a significant effect on performance. Our study provides support for the importance of aligning sourcing strategies to particular supplier relationship approaches in order to improve firm performance. Managerial implications of these findings and future directions for research are then offered.