Fertility patterns among religious groups in Canada

The U shape that has been traced out by the crude birth rate in the United States and Canada is well known. Falling birth rates reached a low point in the mid-1930’s; the rate rose to a peak in 1947 and remained high through the 1950’s. In terms of cohorts, completed family size was smallest for women born around 1910, whose childbearing was concentrated in the 1930’s. With data from the 1961 census of Canada, trends in cohort marital fertility by religion are examined. The U pattern appears for both Protestants and Jews. For Catholics, a reversal in the downward trend of family size had not appeared by 1961, although the U pattern can be discerned for some subgroups such as Catholics living in big cities and persons of Irish ancestry. In the United States, however, changes in family size for all three religious groups and both whites and nonwhites follow the U pattern. Religious differentials in family size in Canada have been decreasing, but they remain much larger than either religious or color differentials in the United States, which show no decrease. The distinctive features of Catholic fertility in Canada are most pronounced among the regionallyconcentrated French Canadians, suggesting an interplay of religious, regional, and ethnic influences.     

Adolescent fertility and religion in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in the year 2000: the role of Protestantism

Social transformations in Brazil in recent years have included a substantial increase in adolescent fertility, a dramatic rise in membership of Protestant religious denominations, and an accompanying decline in the number of Catholics. We used the 2000 Brazil Census to examine differentials in fertility and family formation among adolescents living in Rio de Janeiro by the following religious denominations: Catholic; Baptist; other mainline Protestant; Assembly of God Church; Universal Church of the Kingdom of God; other Pentecostal Protestant; and no religion. Results from logistic regression models show that the majority of the Protestants are at a lower risk of adolescent fertility than Catholics, and that among adolescents who have had a child, most Protestants are more likely than Catholics to be in a committed union. Our findings offer some support for the hypothesis that Protestant churches are more effective than the Catholic Church in discouraging premarital sexual relations and childbearing among adolescents.     

Marital fertility and religion in Spain, 1985 and 1999

Since the transition to democracy in Spain in 1975, both total fertility and rates of church attendance of Catholics have dropped dramatically. In this study the 1985 and 1999 Spanish Fertility Surveys were used to investigate whether the significance of religion for fertility behaviour -- current family size and the spacing of births -- changed between the survey dates. In the 1985 survey, family size was similar for those Catholics who actively participated in religious activities and those who, though nominally Catholic, were not active participants. By 1999, the family size of the latter was lower and comparable to the family size of those without religious affiliation. These findings accord with the declines in both church attendance and fertility in Spain. The small groups of Protestants and Muslims had the highest fertility. Women in inter-faith unions had relatively low fertility.     

Socio-economic status and fertility decline: Insights from historical transitions in Europe and North America

The timings of historical fertility transitions in different regions are well understood by demographers, but much less is known regarding their specific features and causes. In the study reported in this paper, we used longitudinal micro-level data for five local populations in Europe and North America to analyse the relationship between socio-economic status and fertility during the fertility transition. Using comparable analytical models and class schemes for each population, we examined the changing socio-economic differences in marital fertility and related these to common theories on fertility behaviour. Our results do not provide support for the hypothesis of universally high fertility among the upper classes in pre-transitional society, but do support the idea that the upper classes acted as forerunners by reducing their fertility before other groups. Farmers and unskilled workers were the latest to start limiting their fertility. Apart from these similarities, patterns of class differences in fertility varied significantly between populations.     

A further look at catholic fertility

The purpose of this paper is to determine the extent to which suburbanization has influenced the traditional fertility differences observed between Catholics and Protestants. It is hypothesized that suburbanization has served to decrease religious differences in fertility, since in the more advanced stages of urbanism, that is, suburbanization, the Catholic population is likely to adopt the fertility patterns of the larger and more secularized society. Attention is focused on two objectives: (1) to examine selected aspects of fertility for Catholic8 and Protestants living in metropolitan areas and (2) to analyze religious differentials in fertility among residents in different parts of the metropolitan community.The data, consisting of a sample of households in six metropolitan areas in three population size classes, supported the general findings pertaining to religious differences in fertility that have been reported in the literature. Catholics had larger families, shorter average spacing between children, and longer fertility spans when compared to Protestants, even when a number of control variables were employed. Examining fertility differences between Catholics and Protestants in central city and suburban segments of large and small metropolitan areas, we found that the data indicated that marked Catholic-Protestant differences are still found in central cities. However, fertility differences between the two religious groups tended largely to disappear among suburban residents. The convergence in the fertility patterns of suburbanites is due to combined effects of higher fertility among Protestant suburban residents when compared to central city Protestants and the tendency of suburban Catholics to have fewer children than those who live in the city. The net result is convergence in suburban fertility.     

Family limitation and the fertility transition: Evidence from the age patterns of fertility in Europe and Asia

Summary The age patterns of marital fertility levels and decline in modern Asia and historical Europe are analysed in order to answer two questions: (1) How closely do the age patterns of marital fertility in both areas prior to a systematic fertility decline conform to the age pattern of natural fertility? (2) How similar are the age patterns of the fertility transition experienced in Europe in the past, and the age pattern of fertility decline now under way in a number of Asian populations? The answers have important implications for our understanding of the fertility transition. They suggest that modern family limitation (i.e. parity-specific fertility control) was largely absent prior to a secular decline in marital fertility in both Europe and Asia. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that once the practice of family limitation starts to spread among the broader strata of the population, it seems almost inevitably to increase until it becomes a common behavioural norm. In this respect, the modern fertility transition appears to result from the spread of innovative behaviour and cannot be viewed simply as an adjustment to new socio-economic circumstances based on previously established behavioural mechanisms.     

Changes in fertility in Japan by region: 1920–1965

Changes in fertility for the 46 prefectures of Japan are traced from 1920 to 1965, using census and vital statistics. During the period, substantial declines were recorded in both marital-fertility levels and the proportions of women of childbearing age who were married. Regional variation is pronounced in the timing of the onset of the decline in marital fertility. Only in the most industrialized districts did marital fertility begin to fall before 1950; thereafter, sharp declines were recorded in all parts of Japan. The marriage proportion, in contrast, was falling rather steadily throughout the islands between 1920 and 1950, after which the proportion stabilized. The decline in overall fertility that occurred before 1950was caused, then, primarily by a reduction in the proportion married; only after 1950 did a decline in marital fertility become a. major factor. The time pattern of change in marital-fertility levels and proportions married for Japan differs from that observed in western Europe, where low proportions married are recorded in the earliest national censuses. Apparently a fall in proportions married in western Europe preceded by one or two centuries the major sustained declines in marital fertility that were part of the so-called demographic transition.     

Religion and fertility in the United States: New patterns

In the United States, the baby boom-era pattern of high Catholic and low Protestant fertility has ended. Among non-Hispanic whites in the 1980s, Catholic total fertility rates (TFRs) were about one-quarter of a child lower than Protestant rates (1.64 vs. 1.91). Most of the Protestant-Catholic difference is related to later and less frequent marriage among Catholics. Future research on the demography of religious groups should focus on explaining the delayed marriage pattern of Catholics, the high fertility of Mormons and frequently attending Protestants, and the very low fertility of those with no religious affiliation.     

Fertility of the jews

The objectives of this paper were to review and summarize the existing literature on Jewish fertility and to discuss the highlights of data on fertility trends and differentials based on survey data obtained on the Jewish population of the metropolitan area of Providence, Rhode Island. The literature consistently confirmed the finding of lower fertility among Jews since the 1880's in the United States and for the last seventy-five years in a variety of European countries.A review of available data on fertility trends and differentials within the Jewish population indicated contradictory and inconsistent findings. The Providence survey data pointed to changing patterns of fertility among Jews and clarified a number of seeming inconsistencies. These data suggested (1) the pre-World War II decline and postwar recovery of Jewish fertility; (2) the change from an inverse relationship of social class and Jewish fertility among first-generation Jews to a direct relationship among second- and third-generation Jews; (3) the changing relationship of religiosity and Jewish fertility, which reflects social class changes.Finally, an attempt is made to clarify the interpretation of these and related findings by placing the analysis of Jewish fertility in the context of assimilation and acculturation.     

Immigrant fertility patterns and differentials in Australia, 1971–1976

In this paper the fertility patterns and differentials among various immigrant groups in Australia are examined. Official vital statistics for the period 1971–76 are used.

Fertility ratios standardized by age and marital status suggest that the overall fertility of foreign-born women was higher in both 1971 and 1976; however, some evidence -of convergence towards an ‘Australian’ norm was found.

Four distinct patterns of fertility were noted. In two of them, Arab and South European, marital fertility was substantially higher but non-marital fertility quite low. The North-West European pattern was closest to that of the native-born; however, in the East European pattern fertility was lowest. Component analysis showed that most of the differences between the total fertility rate of Australians and those of the other groups reflect the significantly higher marital fertility rates and proportions married among the foreign-born groups.     

The Role of Religion in Union Formation: An Economic Perspective

Previous research has shown that the faith in which a young woman is brought up has important effects on the subjective costs and/or benefits of many decisions that she makes over the life cycle, including schooling, employment, and fertility. Based on this evidence, the present paper develops hypotheses regarding patterns of entry into marriage and cohabitation for the main religious groups in the United States: mainline Protestants, conservative Protestants, Catholics, Mormons, Jews, and the unaffiliated. The empirical results, based on young women from the 1995 National Survey of Family Growth, are generally supportive of the hypotheses.     

Religion and fertility in the United States: The importance of marriage patterns and hispanic origin

The marital fertility of white Catholic wives in the United States was higher than that of non-Catholic wives in 1977–1981, but when Hispanics were excluded, the differential disappeared; therefore, the Catholic-non-Catholic differential in recent years was due entirely to the higher fertility of Hispanic Catholics. The Total Fertility Rates (TFR) of Catholics were slightly lower in 1977–1981 than those for white Protestants, primarily because Catholic women tend to marry later than Protestant women. This finding was confirmed by multivariate analysis of data on children ever born. We examine some additional data and various theories to speculate on whether these patterns will last.     

Fertility levels and differentials in Beirut during wartime: an indirect estimation based on maternity registers

In this paper, total fertility estimates for Greater Beirut in the mid-eighties and early nineties are presented, and changes in socio-religious differentials of fertility across time are explored. The baseline information was recorded from registration details for all maternities in Beirut and its inner suburbs in 1984 and 1991: age of mother, number of children ever-born, hospital class, and religion of newborn. An indirect method was used to estimate total fertility from the joint distribution of mothers by age and parity, and, using hospital class as a proxy for social class, differentials in fertility were investigated by Poisson regression. The estimates of total fertility for Beirut shifted from 2.60 in 1984 to 2.52 in 1991, and were higher for Muslims than for Christians in the two periods. The regression analysis showed that: (1) the difference between the two religious groups persisted after control for social class, and in fact applied to the lower social class; (2) fertility dropped between the two dates in the lower social class, and more so for Muslims than for Christians. In comparison with other countries of the region, the decline in Beirut was found to be relatively modest. If the trends assessed in this study were to continue, the religious-based fertility differentials would taper off progressively in the capital city of Lebanon.     

Completing the fertility transition in the developing world: The role of educational differences and fertility preferences

This study summarizes patterns of educational differentials in wanted and unwanted fertility at different stages of the fertility transition. The data are from Demographic and Health Surveys in 57 less developed countries. As the transition proceeds, educational differentials in wanted fertility tend to decline and differentials in unwanted fertility tend to rise. An assessment of fertility patterns in developed and less developed countries with low fertility concludes that these differentials are likely to remain substantial when less developed countries reach the end of their transitions. This conclusion implies that the educational composition of the population remains a key predictor of overall fertility in late transitional countries and that low levels of schooling can be a cause of stalling fertility.     

Completing the fertility transition in the developing world: The role of educational differences and fertility preferences

This study summarizes patterns of educational differentials in wanted and unwanted fertility at different stages of the fertility transition. The data are from Demographic and Health Surveys in 57 less developed countries. As the transition proceeds, educational differentials in wanted fertility tend to decline and differentials in unwanted fertility tend to rise. An assessment of fertility patterns in developed and less developed countries with low fertility concludes that these differentials are likely to remain substantial when less developed countries reach the end of their transitions. This conclusion implies that the educational composition of the population remains a key predictor of overall fertility in late transitional countries and that low levels of schooling can be a cause of stalling fertility.     

Sex,Breastfeeding, and Marital Fertility in Pretransition China

Coital frequency is at the heart of the debate over low marital fertility in pretransition China. This study argues that coital frequency in contemporary China is indicative of sexual behavior in an earlier era. Frequency of intercourse is low in China relative to Europe, a natural outgrowth of a traditional family system and related sexual culture only partially transformed by a century of family revolution. Customary sexual behaviors and breastfeeding practices together shaped the Chinese historical fertility regime as they did the European. As explanations for China's low marital fertility, these proximate determinants leave little scope for the operation of fecundity‐reducing malnutrition on the one hand, or deliberate fertility control on the other. The fertility regimes of other pretransition agrarian societies more closely resemble China's than Europe's, seeming to confirm a pattern of European demographic exceptionalism.     

The Origins of the Chinese Fertility Decline

Education and urbanization are shown to have been negatively correlated to marital fertility in both urban and rural China prior to the initiation of the substantial family planning programs. We maintain that early use of contraception by better educated and urban strata is a plausible cause of the observed fertility differentials because other proximate variables are unlikely. Coale's m, a presumed indicator of controlled fertility, suggests early fertility control in urban and better educated strata. The apparent preprogram beginnings of fertility control among educational and urban elites does not, however, minimize the awesome effects on fertility of the powerful Chinese family planning programs, once begun.     

Religious fertility differentials in Thailand, 1960

Abstract Although the evidence supporting high fertility in Thailand is clear-cut, little is known about fertility differentials within the population. As part of a larger investigation, a special 1 % tabulation of the 1960 Thai census data on number of children ever-born to married women has been analysed to determine the extent of differentials by religion and urban-rural status. The findings point to considerable differentials among Buddhists, Moslems, and Confucianists. Standardizing for age, the number of children ever-born to 12/loslems averaged well below the number born to Buddhists. Confucian fertility was intermediate. Within specific age groups, the number of children ever-born to Moslem women was considerably below the Buddhist average and the differentials were sharper in the higher age groups. By contrast, Confucian fertility was highest of all in the age groups under 35, but lower than the Buddhist averages among older women. Significant urban-rural differentials also exist. For both the Buddhist and the Confucian women, fertility is markedly lower in urban than in rural categories. When controlling for both age and urban-rural status, Buddhist and Confucian differences tend to be minimal. By contrast, Moslem fertility was highest in the most urban category - Bangkok - but was considerably lower and substantially below the fertility levels of Buddhists and Confucianists in all other urban-rural categories. The census data in themselves do not permit adequate analysis of the reasons for the differentials. Later age at marriage in urban places may be a significant factor in accounting for the overall differentials in urban-rural fertility ; but this relation is much less clear for specific religious groups, particularly since Moslems marry at a considerably earlier age. More frequent divorce and remarriage may lower Moslem rates. Poorer health may also be a factor.