Dynamic Pricing and Lead‐Time Policies for Make‐to‐Order Systems*

Make‐to‐order firms use different approaches for managing their lead‐times and pricing in the face of changing market conditions. A particular firm's approach may be largely dictated by environmental constraints. For example, it makes little sense to carefully manage lead‐time if its effect on demand is muted, as it can be in situations where leadtime is difficult for the market to gauge or requires investment to estimate. Similarly, it can be impractical to change capacity and price. However, environmental constraints are likely to become less of an issue in the future with the expanding e‐business infrastructure, and this trend raises questions into how to manage effectively the marketing mix of price and lead‐time in a more “friction‐free” setting. We study a simple model of a make‐to‐order firm, and we examine policies for adjusting price and capacity in response to periodic and unpredictable shifts in how the market values price and lead‐time. Our analysis suggests that maintaining a fixed capacity while using lead‐time and/or price to absorb changes in the market will be most attractive when stability in throughput and profit are highly valued, but in volatile markets, this stability comes at a cost of low profits. From a pure profit maximization perspective, it is best to strive for a short and consistent lead‐times by adjusting both capacity and price in response to market changes.     

Optimal Quantity Discount Design with Limited Information Sharing*

In this article we address the optimal quantity discount design problem of a supplier in a two‐stage supply chain where the supplier and the buyer share annual demand information only. The supply chain faces a constant deterministic demand that is not price sensitive and operates with fixed setup costs in both stages. We show that the supplier can actually moderate a cost‐minimizing buyer to order in quantities different than the buyer's optimal order quantity in the traditional setting and develop a multi‐breakpoint quantity discount scheme that maximizes supplier's expected net savings. The proposed multi‐breakpoint discount scheme can be easily computed from the available information and, while also maximizing the supplier's net savings, is very effective in achieving high levels of supply chain coordination efficiency in the presence of limited information.     

Quantity Flexibility Contract in the Presence of Discount Incentive

We design a new contract, which we refer to as the QFi contract, that combines the quantity flexibility (QF) mechanism and the price‐only discount incentive. Under the QF contract, the buyer does not assume full responsibility for the forecast, yet the supplier guarantees the availability of the forecasted quantity and extra buffer inventory. In contrast, the price‐only discount contract places full inventory burden on the buyer. We show that the proposed QFi contract effectively balances the inventory risk for both the buyer and the supplier considering both the QF and discount mechanisms. We also show that the QFi contract is able to achieve supply chain coordination. More importantly, the QFi contract's coordinating price scheme does not require knowledge of demand distribution. We identify areas where the buyer and supplier may both benefit from implementing the QFi contract as opposed to the extant QF or price‐only (wholesale) discount contractual decisions in a decentralized supply chain. We also specify the conditions under which supply chain coordination can be achieved in a win‐win manner. We conclude with managerial implications and provide directions for future research.     

Channel Coordination for a Supply Chain with a Risk‐Neutral Manufacturer and a Loss‐Averse Retailer*

This articles considers a decentralized supply chain in which a single manufacturer is selling a perishable product to a single retailer facing uncertain demand. It differs from traditional supply chain contract models in two ways. First, while traditional supply chain models are based on risk neutrality, this article takes the viewpoint of behavioral principal–agency theory and assumes the manufacturer is risk neutral and the retailer is loss averse. Second, while gain/loss (GL) sharing is common in practice, there is a lack of analysis of GL‐sharing contracts in the supply chain contract literature. This article investigates the role of a GL‐sharing provision for mitigating the loss‐aversion effect, which drives down the retailer order quantity and total supply chain profit. We analyze contracts that include GL‐sharing‐and‐buyback (GLB) credit provisions as well as the special cases of GL contracts and buyback contracts. Our analytical and numerical results lend insight into how a manufacturer can design a contract to improve total supply chain, manufacturer, and retailer performance. In particular, we show that there exists a special class of distribution‐free GLB contracts that can coordinate the supply chain and arbitrarily allocate the expected supply chain profit between the manufacturer and retailer; in contrast with other contracts, the parameter values for contracts in this class do not depend on the probability distribution of market demand. This feature is meaningful in practice because (i) the probability distribution of demand faced by a retailer is typically unknown by the manufacturer and (ii) a manufacturer can offer the same contract to multiple noncompeting retailers that differ by demand distribution and still coordinate the supply chains.     

The Agency Model for Digital Goods

While digital goods industries such as entertainment, software, and publishing are growing at a rapid pace, traditional supply chain contract models have failed to evolve with the new digital economy. To illustrate, the agency model utilized by the e‐book publishing industry has recently received much negative attention brought by the U.S. Department of Justice's lawsuit against Apple, Inc. The emerging agency model in the e‐book industry works as follows: the publisher sets the price of the digital goods and the retailers who serve as agents retain a percentage of the revenue associated with a consumer purchase. The regulators claim that the agency model is hurting this industry as well as the consumer's welfare because e‐book prices have increased after the introduction of the agency model. We investigate the strategic impact of the agency model by examining a digital goods supply chain with one supplier and two competing retailers. In comparison to the benchmark wholesale model, we find that the agency model can coordinate the competing retailers by dividing the coordinated profits into a prenegotiated revenue sharing proportion. Further, we also identify the Pareto improving region whereby both the supplier and the retailers prefer the agency model to the wholesale model. Our main qualitative insight regarding the agency model still holds even when we consider the presence of the printed books in the marketplace. Thus, contrary to current press presaging the negative impact of the agency model on the e‐books industry, we find the agency model to be superior to the traditional wholesale contracts for publishers, retailers and consumers in this digital goods industry.     

Designing Distribution Systems to Support Vendor Strategies in Supply Chain Management*

The interactions among a firm's distribution strategy, market share, and distribution costs are an important consideration in the design of supply chain networks. However, these interactions are largely ignored by existing distribution system design methodologies, which assume demand is constant regardless of the firm's distribution strategy. This paper describes a multidisciplinary framework that considers these interactions in the design of “profit maximizing” distribution networks. The framework employs two major decision support methodologies: (1) binary logit models for estimating market share considering various demand-influencing parameters such as product price and distribution service, and (2) a mixed-integer programming (MIP) model for finding optimal distribution network designs. We applied the framework to an actual design problem facing a national distributor of industrial chemical products. The test results verify the framework's large-scale capability and the potential benefit of the integrated solution methodology.     

Channel Strategies and Stocking Policies in Uncapacitated and Capacitated Supply Chains*

A supply chain consisting of a single supplier distributing two independent products through multiple retailers is analyzed in this paper. The supplier needs to incentivize its retailers to adopt stocking policies that are mutually advantageous and that result in the optimal level of market coverage. The focus is on determining the optimal stocking policies for retailers and the resulting distribution strategy given that the supplier has either unlimited or limited capacity. The results provide insights on the optimal distribution strategy and stocking policies for the supply chain. In general, the paper shows that it is optimal for the supplier to use an intensive distribution strategy (i.e., the products are stocked by all retailers). Selective or exclusive strategies are optimal only when retailers are risk averse, stocking synergies exist, and there are differences in demand or supply uncertainties across products. The analysis also shows that retailers hold larger stocks of a product which generates higher supplier margins but only when the supplier has unlimited capacity. If the supplier has limited capacity, then their margins have no effect on retailers' stocking decisions. Contrary to conventional wisdom, retailers hold larger stocks of a product that has less demand uncertainty as compared to one that has more demand uncertainty.     

Role of Random Capacity Risk and the Retailer in Decentralized Supply Chains with Competing Suppliers

This research considers a supply chain under the following conditions: (i) two heterogeneous suppliers are in competition, (ii) supply capacity is random and pricing is endogenous, (iii) consumer demand, with and without an intermediate retailer, is price dependent. Specifically, we examine how uncertainty in supply capacity affects optimal ordering and pricing decisions, supplier and retailer profits, and the incentives to reduce such uncertainty. When two suppliers sell through a monopolistic retailer, supply uncertainty not only affects the retailer's diversification strategy for replenishment, but also changes the suppliers’ wholesale price competition and the incentive for reducing capacity uncertainty. In this dual‐sourcing model, we show that the benefit of reducing capacity uncertainty depends on the cost heterogeneity between the suppliers. In addition, we show that a supplier does not necessarily benefit from capacity variability reduction. We contrast this incentive misalignment with findings from the single‐supplier case and a supplier‐duopoly case where both suppliers sell directly to market without the monopolistic retailer. In the latter single‐supplier and duopoly cases, we prove that the unreliable supplier always benefits from reducing capacity variability. These results highlight the role of the retailer's diversification strategy in distorting a supplier's incentive for reducing capacity uncertainty under supplier price competition.     

Asymmetric Forecast Information and the Value of Demand Observation in Repeated Procurement

In many supply chain relationships that continue over multiple periods, information about the hidden properties of the supply chain partners can be revealed throughout the course of the relationship. This article examines how the availability of such information affects the contracting scheme between a supplier and his manufacturer in a relationship that persists over several selling seasons. At the beginning of the first selling season, the manufacturer observes private information about the demand distribution, whereas the supplier who is less familiar with the market is endowed only with a prior belief about the market condition. When the supplier cannot observe the demand realization during the first selling period, she offers a contract that induces the manufacturer to reveal the market condition in the first selling season. However, the opportunity for the supplier to observe demand realization can result in the supplier offering the manufacturer a simple contract that does not induce the manufacturer to reveal his private information during the first selling season. In the latter case, the supplier observes the demand realization and designs the second period contract based on this information. We show that when the supplier chooses to offer such a contract, the manufacturer becomes worse‐off, and it has an ambiguous effect on the performance of the supply chain.     

Bargaining within the Supply Chain and Its Implications in an Industry

Our main objective is to investigate the influence of the bargaining power within a chain on its industry. As a building block, we first discuss the implications of bargaining within a single chain by considering an asymmetric Nash bargaining over the wholesale price (BW). We show that both Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) and vertical integration (VI) strategies are special cases of the BW contract. We then develop the Nash equilibrium in an industry with two supply chains that use BW. We identify the profit‐maximizing (coordinating) bargaining power within this industry. We show that when a chain is not monopolistic, VI does not coordinate the chain and that the MS contract, where the manufacturer has all the bargaining power, is coordinating when competition is intense. We find that the main determinant of the equilibrium in mature industries is to respond well to the actions of the competing chain rather than to directly maximize the profit of each chain. That is, the equilibrium does not necessarily maximize the profit of the entire industry. While a coordination of the industry could then increase the profitability of both chains, such a coordination is likely against antitrust law. Moreover, if one chain cannot change its actions, the other chain may unilaterally improve its profitability by deviating from the equilibrium. Our results lead to several predictions supported by empirical findings, such as that in competitive industries chains will work “close to” the MS contract.     

An Analysis of Manufacturer‐Retailer Supply Chain Coordination in Cooperative Advertising*

In the literature of cooperative (co‐op) advertising, the focus of the research is on a relationship in which a manufacturer is the leader and retailers are followers. This relationship implies the dominance of the manufacturer over retailers. Recent market trends have shown a shift in power from manufacturers to retailers. Retailers, as a result, may now possess equal or even greater power than a manufacturer in some instances when it comes to retailing. Based on this new market phenomenon, we intend to explore the role of co‐op advertising in a manufacturer‐retailer supply chain through brand name investments, local advertising expenditures, and sharing rules of advertising expenses. Two co‐op advertising models are developed and compared. The first co‐op advertising model is based on the traditional leader‐follower relationship of a manufacturer and a retailer. The second model incorporates partnership into co‐op advertising coordination. Business examples and managerial implications of the models have been discussed. A cooperative bargaining technique is utilized to implement the partnership co‐op advertising model.     

On the Issuing Policies for Perishable Items such as Red Blood Cells and Platelets in Blood Service

Red blood cells (RBCs) and platelets are examples of perishable items with a fixed shelf life. Recent studies show that transfusing fresh RBCs may lead to an improvement of patient outcomes. In addition, to better manage their inventory, hospitals prefer to receive fresh RBCs and platelets. Therefore, as well as minimizing outdates and shortages, reducing the average age of issue is a key performance criterion for blood banks. The issuing policy in a perishable inventory system has a substantial impact on the age of issue and outdate and shortage rates. Although several studies have compared the last in first out (LIFO) and the first in first out (FIFO) policies for perishable products, only a few studies have considered the situation of blood banks where replenishment is not controllable. In this study, we examine various issuing policies for a perishable inventory system with uncontrollable replenishment, and outline a modified FIFO policy. Our proposed modified FIFO policy partitions the inventory into two parts such that the first part holds the items with age less than a threshold. It then applies the FIFO policy in each part and the LIFO policy between the parts. We present two approximation techniques to estimate the average age of issue, the average time between successive outdates and the average time between successive shortages of the modified FIFO policy. Our analysis shows in several cases that where the objective function is a single economic function, or it is formulated as a multiobjective model, the modified FIFO policy outperforms the FIFO and LIFO policies.     

Complexity and Adaptivity in Supply Networks: Building Supply Network Theory Using a Complex Adaptive Systems Perspective*

Supply networks are composed of large numbers of firms from multiple interrelated industries. Such networks are subject to shifting strategies and objectives within a dynamic environment. In recent years, when faced with a dynamic environment, several disciplines have adopted the Complex Adaptive System (CAS) perspective to gain insights into important issues within their domains of study. Research investigations in the field of supply networks have also begun examining the merits of complexity theory and the CAS perspective. In this article, we bring the applicability of complexity theory and CAS into sharper focus, highlighting its potential for integrating existing supply chain management (SCM) research into a structured body of knowledge while also providing a framework for generating, validating, and refining new theories relevant to real‐world supply networks. We suggest several potential research questions to emphasize how a CAS perspective can help in enriching the SCM discipline. We propose that the SCM research community adopt such a dynamic and systems‐level orientation that brings to the fore the adaptivity of firms and the complexity of their interrelations that are often inherent in supply networks.     

A Purchasing Framework for B2B Pricing Decisions and Risk‐sharing in Supply Chains*

This paper presents a common modelling structure for (i) the implementation of operational policies by individual purchasing managers of risk‐sharing agreements among supply‐chain partners, and (ii) the integration of brick and click purchasing policies in a B2B. The problem of price uncertainty created within these two environments is modelled as a stochastic repetitive‐sales problem, applicable to any probability distribution. The model identifies sufficient conditions for regenerative ordering cycles, which allows for the use of the renewal reward theorem. The end result is a two‐price purchasing policy, which may substantially ease implementation problems across a global corporation's purchasing managers world‐wide and across B2B markets.     

A Risk-sharing Approach to Transfer Pricing and Incentive Compensation Problems under Exchange Rate Uncertainty*

This study examines the transfer pricing and incentive compensation problems in a multinational enterprise facing currency risk. It is shown that, in the presence of diverse risk preferences among managers, the Hirshleifer (1956) transfer pricing rule results in inefficient resource allocation decisions by division managers. Following the approach developed by Kanodia (1979), two transfer pricing and compensation systems are proposed. The proposed systems enable central management to achieve efficient resource allocation and partial or global risk sharing. It is also argued that the proposed plans can be implemented in conjunction with existing transfer pricing systems that primarily serve tax and tariff concerns.     

Special Research Focus on Supply Chain Linkages: Challenges for Design and Management in the 21st Century*

Supply chain management is a central and important area for academic research due to its impact on firms competing in today's global economy. Managing the flow of materials from supply sources to the ultimate customer represents a major challenge for today's managers. To assist managers, the concept of supply chain management has been adopted by many business leaders as an important way to assist in designing, planning, and controlling the network of facilities and tasks that comprise the many stages of the supply chain. In turn, the flow of academic research in the area has increased to provide a better set of guidelines for effective implementation and execution. This article sets the stage for recently completed research concentrating on supply chain management issues. First, a definition of supply chain management is provided and compared to recent usage in this area and logistics management. Also, a framework is provided that structures this dynamic and complex management task. Second, a review of past research is presented to illustrate the many paths supply chain management has traveled, and important contributions to supply management understanding and decision making. Third, recently completed research articles are introduced that have been selected to be part of this special issue of Decision Sciences. And fourth, future research directions for supply chain management that need to be pursued by interested investigators are discussed.     

A Test of the Cross-Sectional Robustness of the Arbitrage Pricing Model Using Foreign Exchange Rates*

This paper tests the cross-sectional robustness of the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) model using foreign exchange rate data to determine if the model is robust with respect to the various random samples and various factor analytic techniques. Factor scores are developed using various samples and factor analytic techniques to explain the returns for other samples and groupings. The APT model is found to be robust across samples and techniques.     

Dynamic Pricing and Demand Estimation for a Single Unique Asset*

We address the situation of a firm that needs to dispose of a large, expensive asset (e.g., car, machine tool, earth mover, turbine, house, airplane), with or without a given deadline (and either known or unknown to the buyer). If a deadline exists, the asset is salvaged at a known value which may be zero, or even negative if there is a disposal cost. The asset has a known holding cost and may also have an initial nominal (undiscounted) price. The question is how, if at all, the price should be discounted as time progresses to maximize the expected proceeds. We use a dynamic recursion where each decision stage can be optimized based on classic economic monopoly pricing theory with a demand intensity function estimated from sales data, and show that the model is well‐behaved in the sense that the optimal price and optimal expected revenue monotonically decline as the deadline approaches. We test the model by comparing its optimal price pattern to the official pricing policy practiced at a used‐car dealer. We then extend the model to situations where the buyer knows the seller's deadline and thus may alter his behavior as the deadline approaches.     

A Transaction‐Efficiency Analysis of an Internet Retailing Supply Chain in the Music CD Industry*

The emergence of the Internet may have fundamentally altered the mechanisms underlying information exchanges between sellers and end consumers. However, little attention has been given to the impact these mechanisms have on the efficiency of supply chain operations. This paper begins to address this deficiency in the literature by evaluating supply chain transaction efficiency effects from Internet purchases by consumers. It develops and empirically tests a theoretical framework examining the role Internet purchases have in establishing transaction‐efficiency levels in product exchanges involving sellers, placed at different supply chain echelons, and consumers. The theoretical framework integrates the transaction‐cost and internet economics, inter‐organizational information systems, and supply chain management literatures. Empirical testing, via structural equation modeling, is based on archival data in the Internet music CD market. The results show that Internet‐mediated purchases by consumers allow for greater transaction efficiencies when inventory ownership is postponed farther upstream in the supply chain and supply chain echelons are disintermediated. The results also indicate that channel structure configuration, defined by the supply chains' Internet retailing echelon, moderates these transaction efficiency effects.     

Optimal Design of the Online Auction Channel: Analytical,Empirical, and Computational Insights*

The focus of this study is on business‐to‐consumer (B2C) online auctions made possible by the advent of electronic commerce over an open‐source, ubiquitous Internet Protocol (IP) computer network. This work presents an analytical model that characterizes the revenue generation process for a popular B2C online auction, namely, Yankee auctions. Such auctions sell multiple identical units of a good to multiple buyers using an ascending and open auction mechanism. The methodologies used to validate the analytical model range from empirical analysis to simulation. A key contribution of this study is the design of a partitioning scheme of the discrete valuation space of the bidders such that equilibrium points with higher revenue structures become identifiable and feasible. Our analysis indicates that the auctioneers are, most of the time, far away from the optimal choice of key control factors such as the bid increment, resulting in substantial losses in a market with already tight margins. With this in mind, we put forward a portfolio of tools, varying in their level of abstraction and information intensity requirements, which help auctioneers maximize their revenues.