Educational Inequality

Abstract. This paper develops a theoretical model of the inequality in wages and salaries associated with differences in years of schooling (educational inequality, for short). Our model assumes that in the long run individual decisions to become more educated equalize the lifetime earnings of more educated workers and comparable less educated workers. Given this assumption, our model implies that innovations that increase the relative demand for more educated labor, and which cause short‐run increases in educational inequality, in the long run induce offsetting increases in the relative supply of more educated labor. But our model also has the novel implication that innovations that increase differences between the wages and salaries received by workers with the same years of education who are more or less able (ability premiums, for short) cause a smaller fraction of workers to choose to become more educated. Consequently, innovations that increase ability premiums in the long run also cause educational inequality to be larger than otherwise. In applying our theory to recent changes in educational inequality in the USA, we suggest that, to the extent that innovations that increase ability premiums are contributing to educational inequality, the increases in educational inequality during the 1980s and 1990s are unlikely to be reversed soon.     

Wage Flexibility for Skilled and Unskilled Workers: New Evidence on the Norwegian Wage Curve

Empirical evidence is provided in favour of a hypothesis that wages for unskilled workers are more responsive to unemployment than wages for skilled workers. The results imply vigorous wage responsiveness to low levels of unemployment for both groups, while the wage curves become almost entirely flat for unemployment rates above 1.7 percent. One interpretation of this result is that firms have strong incentives to increase wages in order to recruit and retain workers when unemployment is below some critical level. Since unemployed workers will certainly find work, the expected costs of a job loss are small, as are costs associated with an egalitarian wage policy.     

The Impact on Inequality of Raising the Minimum Wage: Gap‐narrowing and Reranking Effects

Raising the minimum wage may reduce inequality by increasing the wages of low‐skill workers, but it may also increase inequality due to negative impacts on employment that produce wage losses. Using previous estimates of the elasticities of wages and employment to changes in the minimum wage in Colombia and Brazil, we show that the net impact on inequality of increasing the minimum wage may depend on the distributional weights used for inequality measurement. The results are obtained by decomposing the Gini index into reranking and gap‐narrowing effects. Inequality‐increasing reranking effects, which are associated with job losses, may dominate inequality‐decreasing gap‐narrowing effects, which are associated with wage gains, when high weights are placed on workers with low earnings. For standard distributional weights, however, the likely net impact is a reduction in wage inequality.     

Does Immigration Raise Blue and White Collar Wages of Natives? The Case of Italy

This paper analyses both theoretically and empirically the effects of immigration on the wage rate of native workers. There is rare evidence in empirical literature that immigration generates a fall in the wages of manual workers. By hypothesizing an economic system where advanced firms buy an intermediate good from traditional firms, which employ manual workers in both clean and dirty tasks, the latter being more disliked by native workers, we present a theoretical model that justifies these results. We conclude that native skilled wages always increase whereas native unskilled wages can both increase or decrease with immigration. An empirical analysis of the Italian labour market follows, showing that native workers' wages always rise with immigration.     

Directed Search for Equilibrium Wage–Tenure Contracts

I construct a theoretical framework in which firms offer wage–tenure contracts to direct the search by risk‐averse workers. All workers can search, on or off the job. I characterize an equilibrium and prove its existence. The equilibrium generates a nondegenerate, continuous distribution of employed workers over the values of contracts, despite that all matches are identical and workers observe all offers. A striking property is that the equilibrium is block recursive; that is, individuals' optimal decisions and optimal contracts are independent of the distribution of workers. This property makes the equilibrium analysis tractable. Consistent with stylized facts, the equilibrium predicts that (i) wages increase with tenure, (ii) job‐to‐job transitions decrease with tenure and wages, and (iii) wage mobility is limited in the sense that the lower the worker's wage, the lower the future wage a worker will move to in the next job transition. Moreover, block recursivity implies that changes in the unemployment benefit and the minimum wage have no effect on an employed worker's job‐to‐job transitions and contracts.     

The Determinants and Some Consequences of Unemployed Workers' Wage Demands

This paper studies the determinants and consequences in the early stages of the hiring process of unemployed workers' wage demands using direct data on workers' wage requests. We show that most unemployed workers want a wage close to their previous wage, and thus much more than they get in unemployment benefits. However, some groups, such as women, tend to demand lower wages. Moreover, we find that workers with high wage demands are contacted by firms less often than otherwise similar workers with lower wage demands. Thus, our results suggest that too high wage demands may contribute to high unemployment.     

Reasons for Wage Rigidity in Germany

Abstract. This study investigates institutional and economic reasons for downward wage rigidity regarding three occupational skill groups. Based on a survey of 801 firms in Germany and an econometric analysis, we find strong support for explanations based on the effects of labour union contracts and efficiency wages that differ between skill groups. Survey respondents indicate that labour union contracts and implicit contracts are important reasons for wage rigidity for the (less) skilled. Specific human capital and negative signals for new hires are causes of the stickiness of wages for the highly skilled. Compared with US evidence, German firms seem to attach more importance to labour union contracts and specific human capital.     

SORTING AND THE OUTPUT LOSS DUE TO SEARCH FRICTIONS

We analyze a general search model with on‐the‐job search (OJS) and sorting of heterogeneous workers into heterogeneous jobs. For given values of nonmarket time, the relative efficiency of OJS, and the amount of search frictions, we derive a simple relationship between the unemployment rate, mismatch, and wage dispersion. We estimate the latter two from standard micro data. Our methodology accounts for measurement error, which is crucial to distinguish true from spurious mismatch and wage dispersion. We find that without frictions, output would be about 9.5% higher if firms can commit to pay wages as a function of match quality and 15.5% higher if they cannot. Noncommitment leads to a business‐stealing externality which causes a 5.5% drop in output.     

Firing Costs,Efficiency Wages and Unemployment

This paper uses a Shapiro–Stiglitz efficiency wage model to analyse the effects of firing costs on wages, employment, expected utility and profits. It considers that the probability of a non–shirker being fired depends on an exogenous shock which follows a two–state Markov process. It finds that higher severance payments give rise to lower wages, a lower unemployment rate, an increase in firms’ profits and a decrease in the utility of both workers and the unemployed. These conclusions derive from the finding that a greater probability of keeping one’s job, because of higher firing costs, raises the value of the job and reduces the worker’s incentives to behave opportunistically; this enables firms to reduce wages. Hence, if firms pay efficiency wages, a higher degree of labour market flexibility increases unemployment.     

Unions,Firing Costs,and Unemployment

Abstract. We study the effects of firing costs in unionized economies with heterogeneous workers. We consider an overlapping generations model where workers participate in the labour market both when young and when old. All workers belong to the same union that sets wages unilaterally. We find that at given wages firing costs increase youth unemployment and decrease old‐age unemployment. However, once the wage response is considered, firing costs increase both youth and old‐age unemployment. Indeed, knowing that when firing costs are higher firms refrain from firing, the union increases the wage of old workers, and, therefore, old‐age unemployment increases.     

High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms

We study a longitudinal sample of over one million French workers from more than five hundred thousand employing firms. We decompose real total annual compensation per worker into components related to observable employee characteristics, personal heterogeneity, firm heterogeneity, and residual variation. Except for the residual, all components may be correlated in an arbitrary fashion. At the level of the individual, we find that person effects, especially those not related to observables like education, are a very important source of wage variation in France. Firm effects, while important, are not as important as person effects. At the level of firms, we find that enterprises that hire high-wage workers are more productive but not more profitable. They are also more capital and high-skilled employee intensive. Enterprises that pay higher wages, controlling for person effects, are more productive and more profitable. They are also more capital intensive but are not more high-skilled labor intensive. We find that person effects explain about 90% of inter-industry wage differentials and about 75% of the firm-size wage effect while firm effects explain relatively little of either differential.     

Knowledge Spillovers and Wage Inequality: An Empirical Analysis of Dutch Manufacturing

The introduction of new technologies and technical change is associated mainly with high‐skilled and high‐wage workers. In addition, many studies have found a positive correlation between the introduction of new technologies and technical change and skill upgrading. In these studies no attention has been paid to spillovers from one sector to the other. In this paper we not only use measures of technical change but also knowledge spillovers to explain wage inequality in Dutch manufacturing in the period 1986–95. Using this more elaborate measure of technical change, our findings are twofold. First, we confirm that workers employed in knowledge‐intensive manufacturing sectors receive a higher wage than workers in less knowledge‐intensive sectors. Secondly, the wages paid to high‐skilled workers relative to low‐skilled workers in knowledge‐intensive sectors are higher than those in less knowledge‐intensive sectors. However, the coefficients using the elaborate measure of technological advancement are much lower and sometimes even insignificant. This suggests a premium for high‐skilled labour in sectors both applying and developing technology. But the wage premium is highest in technology‐developing sectors, as suggested by the measures used in previous studies.     

Inequality and Unemployment in a Global Economy

This paper develops a new framework for examining the determinants of wage distributions that emphasizes within‐industry reallocation, labor market frictions, and differences in workforce composition across firms. More productive firms pay higher wages and exporting increases the wage paid by a firm with a given productivity. The opening of trade enhances wage inequality and can either raise or reduce unemployment. While wage inequality is higher in a trade equilibrium than in autarky, gradual trade liberalization first increases and later decreases inequality.     

The Skilled Wage Premium and the Growth of Small Firms in UK Manufacturing

We document the role of small firms in explaining the growth of the skilled/unskilled wage premium in UK manufacturing over the 1980s. Our major findings are (i) the share of manufacturing employment in small firms' (0–99) employees has risen by 35 percent over this period; (ii) small firms pay more unequal wages than do large firms: the non-manual/manual wage premium is 1.53 in small firms and 1.50 in firms of over 1,500 workers; (iii) the growth in small firms over the period explains about 20 percent of the rise in the skilled/unskilled wage premium.     

Efficiency Wage,Fixed Employment Costs,and Dual Labour Markets

The standard efficiency wage‐based explanation of labour market dualism hinges on the existence of differences in monitoring across sectors. The paper proposes fixed employment costs as an alternative source of wage differentials for homogeneous workers. It shows that firms with larger fixed costs pay higher wages in order to elicit more effort from their workers, and tend to have higher capital/labour ratio and labour productivity. The model generates both involuntary unemployment and involuntary confinement in the secondary sector: high effort–high wage jobs are preferred to low effort–low wage jobs and either are preferred to unemployment. The proposed framework can also account for the various types of treatment of marginal jobs in primary sector firms envisaged by Doeringer and Piore (Internal Labour Markets and Manpower Analysis, 1971). In particular, an increase in fixed costs beyond a certain level may induce primary sector firms to restructure, segment production, and enter the secondary sector, thus converting their jobs into secondary jobs. From a welfare point of view, we cannot state in general the desirability of subsidizing fixed employment costs; however, we show that an employment subsidy financed by a wage tax is able to increase employment with no loss in terms of production.     

The Effects of Gain Sharing on the Basic Wage: The Case of IMPROSHARE

Although gain-sharing plans are typically promoted to workers as a way of increasing total compensation, workers are often concerned that gain-sharing bonuses may become substitutes for future wage increases that would have occurred in the absence of the plan. I examine the theoretical and empirical interaction among wages, bonuses, effort, and productivity in firms that implemented IMPROSHARE, a well-known gain-sharing plan. Using longitudinal data obtained from a detailed survey questionnaire, I find that one can usually reject both the perfectly competitive model in which effort is held constant (in which case bonuses are a perfect substitute for wages) and the “pure gravy” model (in which bonuses completely complement the wage rate). There is no evidence that higher bonuses lead to higher relative wages. The results, however, are not very robust. Although the net effect of the bonuses on the wage rate is usually negative, it is not always statistically significant.     

‘Investment’ in Union Membership: A Managerial Approach

This paper concerns wage formation in a unionized economy when union membership is endogenous and determined by employment. A union is run by a leadership which has as an objective to strengthen the union’s position in the labour market. This is achieved by building up membership. Among the results, it is found that since membership is determined by employment, the inclusion of the leadership’s preferences into a union’s objective function produces lower real wages than a static version would predict. It is also shown that an increase in the union’s rate of time preference increases the natural rate of unemployment, while an increase in the speed at which workers enter/leave a union has an opposite effect.     

Educational Attainment and Wage Inequality in Turkey

This paper analyses the relationship between wage distribution and educational attainment of the workforce. Wage inequality in Turkey decreased over 2002–10; a period over which it also saw an increase in the supply of educated workers. Our findings suggest that decreasing inequality in the bottom half of the distribution was largely due to decreasing returns to education and experience; whereas the moderate decline in inequality in the upper tail of the wage distribution is explained by a fall in returns to the ‘routine’ occupational tasks. The effect of changes in the composition of workers was found to be moderate.     

Preference Change and Increasing Wage Inequality

Abstract. This paper argues that preference change could explain, in part, the growth of within‐group wage inequality in the USA and the UK in the 1980s. The absence of such preference change in continental European countries might also help explain why their wage inequality did not rise in the same way. The argument relies on evidence from the World Values Surveys and uses an efficiency wage model of within‐group wage inequality where there are differences in the degree of discretion at work across firms and workers value not just the wage but also the degree of discretion on the job.