经评审最低价中标的实施环境

本文通过对建筑市场招标过程采用经评审最低价中标的评标方法中存在问题的剖析 ,提出通过明确价格和质量的关系 ,加强合同管理 ,建立良好的信用制度是实施经评审最低价中标的必要环境。     

对低价中标工程的利弊分析与探讨

在成熟市场经济体制下,最低价中标法作为一种国际上通行的评标方式,无论在国外的政府采购还是工程建设招标中均得到广泛的运用。低价中标法最大的特点是它通过市场竞争形成建筑产品的价格,彻底颠覆了依赖国家定额决定工程造价的传统模式。本文对低价中标工程的利弊进行了分析,并提出了几点看法和建议。     

浅谈“最低价中标”及其实践

最低价中标法是国外普通采用的一种评标办法,但是在国内的实践过程中却遇到了一系列的问题。本文主要从几个方面分析了“最低价中标法”在国内难以顺利实行的原因。     

最低价中标法在工程项目建设中的利弊探析

最低价中标法，就是在招标投标过程中，由报价最低的单位来中标的一种评标方法。本文对最低价中标法在工程项目建设中的利弊及发展趋势并进行了分析，结合自己工作实践提出了相应的对策和改进建议，供大家参考。     

浅谈最低价中标的危害及防范措施

低价中标在市场体系健全的情况下它能够有效的降低成本,减少投资,淘汰落后的企业即淘汰落后的生产方式和管理方式,由于我国市场体系不太健全,各项保障措施不到位,信用体系没有真正确立,建筑市场的激烈竞争等等,目前还不完全适应最低价中标。本文结合我单位实况,谈一谈最低价中标在工程建设工程中的危害与对策。     

低价中标的利与弊

本文主要阐述低价中标的利与弊。叙述低价中标弊端在操作中如何克服,使最低价中标法能顺利的实施,并能真正发挥其全部作用、不失初衷的意义。     

浅谈经评审的最低投标价法

自2000年1月1日颁布《中华人民共和国招标投标法》，至今已经实施了8年。经评审的最低投标价法也在招投标的工作中使用了8年。在这几年中，经评审的最低投标价法在施工评标领域得到了广泛的应用，出现了一大批价格低廉但优质的工程，节省了业主的资金。但是还存在一些“低价低质”、“低价中标，高价索赔”的问题给经评审的最低投标价法的应用带来困难。本文从经评审的最低价投标价法的特点、存在问题、解决方法等几个方面展开论述。     

对招标控制价的几点思考

招标控制价是评定国有投资项目中标价格的基础。它与标底的区别,在实际运用中应注意的一些问题和解决对策。积极利用招标控制价的杠杆,推进招投标程序的规范化。     

基于货物招标评标方法的最低评标价法和综合评价法对比分析

在招标采购迅猛发展的今天,越来越多的人们开始关注货物招标采购的评标方法,继而推动了相关法律和法规的颁布和实施,极大地提高了招标人与投标人的个人素养和法律素质。招标人和投标人都是采购活动的具体参与者,同时投标人也是招标活动的监督者,包括投标人在内的公众对中标结果继续高度关注度的同时,对整个招标评标的过程也越来越在意,其中最为关注的应是公开开标后的评标方法和评标过程。结合对最低评价法和综合评价法的具体分析,指出各自的优势和缺点,从而得出面对不同的招标项目,应该因地制宜,合理地采用不用的评标方法的结论,为货物招标评标方法的选择和具体标准的制定提供有力的支持。     

建筑工程项目招标低价中标现象的不完全信息博弈理论分析

本文针对5·12汶川地震暴露出的我国在公共建筑工程的项目建设管理方面存在的问题,在现有的最底价格密封报价招标的理论模型基础上,进一步考虑了质量和施工技术因素,运用不完全信息博弈理论分析了我国建筑招标市场上存在的低价中标现象,由于中标企业的施工质量无法被业主完全观察到,那么以过低价格中标的施工企业在利润驱动下,必然产生施工质量低劣的道德风险问题,以及在整个建筑市场产生逆向选择现象。通过委托-代理模型可以得出克服低价中标上述缺陷的一些措施和在一定的理论限制条件下最优招标设计方案:作为独立参与博弈的第三方,引进施工监理部门;通过重复博弈建立工程承包商的定级和评价机制。     

“短板”淘汰式评标方法及其应用研究

国内外主要的评标方法是从综合评价的角度来选择优秀的投标人,忽略了中标人的劣势可能隐含的风险;最优秀的投标人应该是不能顺利完成工程建设的风险最小;不能顺利完成工程建设的风险常常取决于投标人的"短板"。本文提出基于识别个体劣势来发现投标人"短板"的方式,并依此形成一种"短板"淘汰式评标方法。本方法主要由整体挑剔和挑剔个体两个环节构成:通过整体挑剔,按照工程的目标价值取向,客观确定各指标的权重,对投标人进行排名;通过挑剔个体,剔除"短板"短的个体。本文还模拟了大伙房水库输水工程水源地堤防工程的评标。理论和模拟表明本方法具有科学性和可操作性,并能够降低工程的履约风险。     

R&D联盟条件下基于FMGTS评价的R&D项目合作成员选择

针对如何从多个候选R&D联盟成员中选择最理想的R&D项目合作成员问题,提出了一种操作性较强的选择方法。首先通过静态博弈得到了候选R&D联盟成员进行某R&D项目合作时竞标价格的可行区间,在考虑专家采用模糊多粒度语言(fuzzy multi-granularity term sets,FMGTS)进行期望获利度评价的状况下,运用基本语言转换函数将评价信息进行集结,据此确定候选R&D联盟成员的期望获利度和优化的竞标价格。在给出价格满意度与工期满意度公式的基础上,利用效用值法将基于不同满意度下的排名决策信息进行一致化处理,最后采用互补判断矩阵中的排序公式来选择理想的R&D项目合作成员。     

Bidding under auctioneer default risk

In a financially turbulent economy, participants of a procurement auction should consider in their bids the event of default of the auctioneer, which may result to substantial damages for the winning bidder. We examine a sealed bid auction, with private cost values and interdependence among the beliefs of the bidders about the auctioneer׳s default risk. The probability of payment of the bid price by the auctioneer is estimated by each bidder. For a first and a second price auction, we derive equilibrium bidding strategies, which address the risk of default and optimally adjust the bid price, introducing a risk premium in the form of an additional mark-up. A numerical illustration of the proposed strategies is provided. The effect of auctioneer׳s risk of default on the procurement project cost is examined. Financial arrangements that may be used to relax or eliminate the effect of the risk of default, such as early payment methods, third party guarantees or insurance programs are discussed and evaluated in comparison with the approach of risk premium on bid price.     

Up Then Down: Bid‐Price Trends in Revenue Management

In the classic revenue management (RM) problem of selling a fixed quantity of perishable inventories to price‐sensitive non‐strategic consumers over a finite horizon, the optimal pricing decision at any time depends on two important factors: consumer valuation and bid price. The former is determined exogenously by the demand side, while the latter is determined jointly by the inventory level on the supply side and the consumer valuations in the time remaining within the selling horizon. Because of the importance of bid prices in theory and practice of RM, this study aims to enhance the understanding of the intertemporal behavior of bid prices in dynamic RM environments. We provide a probabilistic characterization of the optimal policies from the perspective of bid‐price processes. We show that an optimal bid‐price process has an upward trend over time before the inventory level falls to one and then has a downward trend. This intertemporal up‐then‐down pattern of bid‐price processes is related to two fundamental static properties of the optimal bid prices: (i) At any given time, a lower inventory level yields a higher optimal bid price, which is referred to as the resource scarcity effect; (ii) Given any inventory level, the optimal bid price decreases with time; that is referred to as the resource perishability effect. The demonstrated upward trend implies that the optimal bid‐price process is mainly driven by the resource scarcity effect, while the downward trend implies that the bid‐price process is mainly driven by the resource perishability effect. We also demonstrate how optimal bid price and consumer valuation, as two competing forces, interact over time to drive the optimal‐price process. The results are also extended to the network RM problems.     

向下降价秒杀中顾客秒杀策略以及卖方期望收益分析

本文以流星秒杀网采用的向下降价秒杀规则为研究对象,分析了顾客参与秒杀的均衡策略以及卖方获得的期望收益;在此基础上,将向上加价秒杀与向下降价秒杀进行了对比;最后,讨论了秒杀起始价、价格下降幅度以及投标费用对卖方期望收益的影响,并得到了一些结论。     

An Analysis of Scoring and Buyer‐Determined Procurement Auctions

In procurement auctions, the object for sale is a contract, bidders are suppliers, and the bid taker is a buyer. The suppliers bidding for the contract are usually the current supplier (the incumbent) and a group of potential new suppliers (the entrants). As the buyer has an ongoing relationship with the incumbent, he needs to adjust the bids of the entrants to include non‐price attributes, such as the switching costs. The buyer can run a scoring auction, in which suppliers compete on the adjusted bids or scores, or, he can run a buyer‐determined auction, in which suppliers compete on the price, and the buyer adjusts a certain number of the bids with the non‐price attributes after the auction to determine the winner. Unless the incumbent has a significant cost advantage over the entrants, I find that the scoring auction yields a lower average cost for the buyer, if the non‐price attributes are available. If the non‐price attributes are difficult or expensive to obtain, the buyer could run a buyer‐determined auction adjusting only the lowest price bid.     

Predicting the Winner's Curse

If quantity uncertainty exists in a first price auction that specifies a fixed bid, a participant must answer two questions when evaluating a candidate bid: “What are my chances of winning?” and “What is the effect of the winner's curse on my quantity estimate?” The winner's curse is the tendency of the winner of a first-price sealed-bid auction to be the bidder that most overvalues the items being offered. When value uncertainty is due to quantity uncertainty, the winner's curse implies that the bidder that most overestimates the quantity tends to win. Thus, if there is quantity uncertainty, a participant must adjust its bid for this tendency to overestimate quantities. This paper presents an empirical method to answer the above questions by estimating a predictive distribution of the highest competing bid and the quantity bias caused by the winner's curse. The method is developed for timber auctions but is general to auctions where a fixed bid is called for and there is uncertainty in the mix and quantities of items being offered. An example that uses data from timber auctions is used to demonstrate the method.     

具有高投标成本的多属性逆向拍卖博弈模型

越来越多像GE这样的大型企业在利用多属性逆向拍卖选择新的供应商采购产品时,通常会设定较高的固定投标成本。针对此情况,建立了三阶段的非合作博弈模型,并利用求解子博弈纳什均衡策略的方法,推导出了供应商的最优投标价格。并得到以下两个主要结论:一是供应商的最优投标策略是按照生产产品真实的质量和交货期进行投标,且投标价格为最优投标价格;二是采购商的最优策略是选择投标价格最高的供应商作为拍卖获胜者,这一违反直觉的结论。这是合理的,因为投标价格最高的供应商也是类型最优的供应商,也即投标质量和投标交货期组合最优的供应商。最后,利用数值实验验证了模型的有效性,并显示出设定相对较高的固定投标成本对采购商来说是有利的。     

Incentive Contracts for Managing a Project with Uncertain Completion Time

We examine two time‐related incentive project management contracts (C1 and C2 contracts) when the manager conducts a reverse auction. Under the C1 contract, the contractor with the lowest bid price wins; however, the manager imposes a linear and symmetric incentive/disincentive for early/late completion according to a pre‐specified due date. Under the C2 contract, the winning contractor has the lowest composite score that is based on the quoted price and the quoted due date; however, in addition to the linear and symmetric penalty/incentive, the contractor is subject to an additional penalty for late completion. While the C2 contract is more sophisticated than the C1 contract (in terms of the number of decisions that each party has to make), our analysis reveals that, unless the project is truly urgent, the more complicated C2 contract adds no value to the manager— the simple C1 contract will suffice.     

Optimal Reserve Prices in Name‐Your‐Own‐Price Auctions with Bidding and Channel Options

Few papers have explored the optimal reserve prices in the name‐your‐own‐price (NYOP) channel with bidding options in a multiple channel environment. In this paper, we investigate a double‐bid business model in which the consumers can bid twice in the NYOP channel, and compare it with the single‐bid case. We also study the impact of adding a retailer‐own list‐price channel on the optimal reserve prices. This paper focuses on achieving some basic understanding on the potential gain of adding a second bid option to a single‐bid system and on the potential benefits of adding a list‐price channel by the NYOP retailer. We show that a double‐bid scenario can outperform a single‐bid scenario in both single‐channel and dual‐channel situations. The optimal reserve price in the double‐bid scenario is no less than that in the single‐bid case. Furthermore, the addition of a retailer‐own list‐price channel could push up the reserve prices in both single‐bid and double‐bid scenarios.