TRANSACTION COST, TWO-PART TARIFFS, AND COLLUSION

When two goods exhibit demand complementarity, the sellers would generally charge lower prices under collusion than under rivalry–a cartel internalizes cross effects that independent firms ignore. For the particular case of "two-part" tariffs consisting of entrance fees and per-unit prices, this paper shows that entrance fees are indeed lower under collusion than under rivalry, but that per-unit prices are unaffected. The demand complementarity arises from transaction costs borne by consumers who enter the market. The policy implication is that collusion can be socially preferable to competition in the presence of such transaction costs.     

THE FAILURE OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED CARTELS AND DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL FARM POLICY

While economists recognize that private cartels are difficult to sustain, they are too sanguine about the prospects for government-assisted cartels. Although the state's coercive power would seem to make it an effective enforcer of cartel agreements, the political costs of enforcement can be high of segments of the industry resist. The government's solution lies in alternative strategies for raising prices. Examining government efforts to organize an orange cartel in the 1930s, we find that farmers' opposition to output cuts and quota assignments because of their distributional effects forced a policy she to purchases of "excess stocks."     

COLLUSION FACILITATING AND COLLUSION BREAKING POWER OF SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING AND DESCENDING PRICE AUCTIONS

This article demonstrates that a robust tacit collusion evolves quickly in a "collusion incubator" environment but is destroyed by the simultaneous descending price auction. Theories of collusion-producing behavior, along with the detail of the states on which strategies are conditioned, lead to a deeper understanding of how tacit collusion evolves and its necessary conditions. These theories explain how the descending price auction destroys the collusion. The experiments proceed by conducting simultaneous ascending price auctions in the collusion incubator. Then, once the tacit collusion developed, changing to the descending auction. The change moved prices from collusive levels to near-competitive levels. ( JEL C71, C92, D43, D44)     

Moral panic,moral regulation and essentialization of identities: Discursive struggle over unethical business practices in the Finnish national media

The study sheds light on the language of moral panic and moral regulation in the Finnish news media over a 9-year period on the subject of cartels and cartel agreements. What makes the case particularly interesting is that the object of the most explicit moral panic was the introduction of new laws (leniency programmes) designed to regulate illegal cartel behaviour. The main argument is that the construction of both moral regulation and moral panic in news media takes place through essentializing discursive claims that contribute to national identity construction. The study contributes to current literature on moral panics as ideologico-discursive phenomena and throws some light on the power-laden discursive processes that work to reconstruct, essentialize and stabilize identities. In addition, there are some suggestions as to why some moral panics fail to develop.     

TACIT COLLUSION IN AUCTIONS AND CONDITIONS FOR ITS FACILITATION AND PREVENTION: EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN LABORATORY EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS

The paper studies bidder behavior in simultaneous, continuous, ascending price auctions. We design and implement a "collusion incubator" environment based on a type of public, symmetrically "folded" and "item-aligned" preferences. Tacit collusion develops quickly and reliably within the environment. Once tacit collusion developed, it proved remarkably robust to institutional changes that weakened it as an equilibrium of a game-theoretic model. The only successful remedy was a non-public change in the preference of participants that destroyed the symmetrically, "folded" and "item aligned" patterns of preferences, creating head-to-head competition between two agents reminiscent of the concept of a "maverick." ( JEL L50, L94, D43)     

THE 1985-86 OIL PRICE COLLAPSE AND AFTERWARDS: WHAT DOES GAME THEORY ADD?

This paper focuses on the strategies used by OPEC to generate cartel profits over the period 1983-90. The evidence supports the hypothesis that OPEC adopted a swing producer strategy from 1983 to 1985. But when Saudi Arabia's profits fell below the level of Coumot profits in the summer of 1985, it abandoned the role of swing producer, driving prices to the Cournot level. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia appears to have adopted a tit-for-tat strategy designed to punish excessive cheating by other OPEC members. Based on these findings, the strengths and limitations of game theory are assessed.     

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON FTC ENFORCEMENT OF THE MERGER GUIDELINES

The Justice Department's 1982/1984: merger guidelines identify various factors – concentration, entry barriers, ease of collusion, efficiency –that would thereafter determine whether the government will challenge a merger. Analysts have criticized enforcement agencies, however, for not following the guidelines, and criticize the guidelines themselves for not identifying the weights attached to the factors. Using a 1982-86 sample of seventy horizontal mergers, we examine which factors influenced Federal Trade Commission decisions to challenge mergers. The relative importance of the guidelines and other factors in merger challenges is measured, and related empirical issues are also explored.     

COLLUSION IN PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS: AN EXPERIMENTAL EXAMINATION

Experimental methods are used to examine the existence and detectability of collusion in environments that exhibit critical parallels to procurement auctions. We find that given the opportunity sellers often raise prices considerably. Moreover, noncollusive Nash equilibrium predictions are insufficient to dismiss "suspicious" behavior as innocuous: in an environment where identical prices are predicted in a noncollusive Nash equilibrium, common prices are observed only when sellers communicate. In a second environment designed to parallel construction procurement contracting, market rotations are observed both with and without collusion, but collusion can often be detected from the pattern of losing bids.     

The production of therapy:the social process of construction of the mother of a sexually abused child

This study qualitatively examined the perspectives of clinical social workers on non-offending mothers of sexually abused children. The study examined whether clinicians still used collusion to explain mothers' behavior, despite research refuting collusion. Findings revealed that, although workers did not use collusion, they still constructed mothers negatively. Multiple contexts of agency practice influenced constructions. Administrative use of authority to implement external constraints led to workers' resistance, which involved humor with gender and ethnic components. The agency's role as a graduate social work teaching site contributed the following: Field instructors transmitted the belief that incest typified severe family difficulties and posed complex assessment and intervention problems. Implications for effective practice are discussed.     

A GUIDE TO THE PITFALLS OF IDENTIFYING PRICE DISCRIMINATION

This paper demonstrates that plausible cost-based explanations exist for what are commonly perceived to be cases of price discrimination. We explain such commonly discussed problems as the price spreads of retail gasoline products, the "high" price of dinners at restaurants, the "high" price of popcorn at movie theaters, and the fact that airline ticket prices vary with how long the ticket is purchased before the flight's departure. Our explanations benefit from not relying on consumer ignorance or implicit collusion among numerous sellers.     

AN EXPERIMENT ON INNOVATION AND COLLUSION

This paper examines the relationship between product innovation and the success of price collusion using novel laboratory experiments. Average market prices in low innovation (LO) experiments are significantly higher than those in high innovation, but otherwise identical experiments. This price difference is attributed to LO experimental subjects' greater common market experience. The data illustrate how collusion can be perceived as the “only way to make it” in LO markets where product innovation is not a viable strategy for increasing profits. They suggest that product homogeneity can be a proximate cause, and product innovation an ultimate cause, of collusion. (JEL L41, L10, C92)     

EMISSION TAXES,CLEAN TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION,AND PRODUCT MARKET COLLUSION: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

We use a laboratory experiment to study the link between cooperative research and development (R&D) in clean technology and collusion in a downstream product market in the presence of a time‐consistent emissions tax. Such a tax creates additional interconnections between firms, in addition to the standard technological spillovers. Our results show a strong link between R&D cooperation and market collusion under symmetric R&D spillovers in a duopoly, but when the spillovers are asymmetric, R&D cooperation does not necessarily result in collusion. With symmetric spillovers, the link between R&D cooperation and collusion remains strong even in three‐ and four‐firm industries. (JEL C90, L5, O30, Q55)     

COLLUSION AND OVERLENDING

This study provides a theoretical background for collusion-induced overlending being the main cause of the 1997 Korean financial crisis. Our model consists of a lending institution, a borrowing chaebol of an unknown type, and an informed politician who can influence lending decision. We show that collusion can be formed between a low-type chaebol and the politician, and it may not be the lending institution's best interest to deter such collusion. This equilibrium, however, is possible only when the economic environment is favorable. When the economy deteriorates, the expectations of the fall of the collusion equilibrium can trigger financial crisis. (JEL G30, D82, O16)     

Kein Kartell, kein Monopol, keine Oligarchie?

In the framework of the excellence programme designed to promote science and research at German universities, a debate broke out as to whether the programme would strengthen existing tendencies toward structures of cartel, monopoly and oligarchy. A most recent study wants to prove that such structures do not show up in the German Research Foundation’s programme of funding individual research projects. This finding is, however, not appropriate to give the all-clear. Among crucial factors supporting structures of cartel, monopoly and oligarchy, the shift from block grants to individual grants based on competition can be identified, just as the shift from funding of single research projects to funding large-scale coordinated programmes and funding institutions, most recently along with the excellence programme. It is exactly these crucial factors that have been excluded completely from the study. Hence, it slips into the tracks of a science of affirmation. This aberration can be explained by the entanglement of interests in research, research funding and research evaluation, which works against free research and is an epistemological barrier to science research.     

POTENTIAL COMPETITION AND POSSIBLE COLLUSION IN FOREST SERVICE TIMBER AUCTIONS

Potential competition significantly affects the size of winning bids in Forest Service sealed-bid timber auctions and has little effect on winning bids in oral auctions. Winning sealed bids depend even more, however, on actual competition, a result suggesting collusion. This explanation is supported using an index representing the likelihood an auction was rigged. Preclusive bidding (a type of collusion) in oral auctions is indicated by a positive relationship between hauling distances and the size of winning sealed bids. Comparisons of winning-bid variances, overbids, and numbers of bidders across auction type support this explanation of oral auction prices.     

INFORMATION SHARING AND TACIT COLLUSION IN LABORATORY DUOPOLY MARKETS

This paper reports 45 laboratory duopoly markets that examine the importance of information sharing in facilitating tacit collusion under conditions of demand uncertainty. Sellers in these repeated laboratory markets generally shared information when possible to reduce their demand uncertainty, which led to output reductions in some demand states. Risk aversion is a likely explanation for this sharing, but some sellers also appeared to employ a strategy of information concealment to punish non-colluding rivals. Nevertheless, output choices were similar in control treatments that forced sellers to share or conceal information, so the information sharing itself did not substantially increase tacit collusion. ( JEL C92, D80, L13)     

Network similarity and collusion

This study focuses on how collusive construction industry cartels structure their bidding patterns to increase their market shares, while preserving an illusion of competition. Using past research on the economics and social organization of bid-rigging and collusion, we examine a key issue related to similarities within bidding structures that are likely tainted by cartels. The study is empirically based on public procurement data to recreate the structure of interactions between construction industry firms in the province of Quebec (Canada) over a 12-year period (2002–2013). Cross-level multivariate analyses demonstrate that our indicator of similarities in bidding patterns, the Jaccard coefficient, is a positive factor of market shares, but particularly in cities that are targeted for collusive practices. We also emphasize the need to develop a monitoring system that allows researchers and analysts to track collusion patterns in various ways so as to prevent an increase of more sophisticated schemes and cartels.     

AN ANALYTIC HISTORY OF DELIVERED PRICE LITIGATION: DO COURTS PROPERLY DISTINGUISH RIVALROUS FROM COLLUSIVE INSTANCES?

The federal judiciary's present, cautious approach to delivered pricing is appropriate. Using court records and recent contributions to the economic literature, this article evaluates the antitrust history of those practices. Delivered pricing can replace mill pricing naturally in some rivalrous settings, but under special circumstances could be collusive. Thus, delivered pricing has sometimes been adjudged a Sherman Act violation, but only given other evidence of collusion. For a time, however, the legal system threatened to treat delivered pricing as a per se violation of the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts. That reflected poor economic understanding.     

Recent ASA Presidents and ‘Top’ Journals: Observed Publication Patterns,Alleged Cartels and Varying Careers

It has been common for studies presented as about American sociology as a whole to rely on data compiled from leading journals (American Sociological Review [ASR] and American Journal of Sociology [AJS]), or about presidents of the American Sociological Association [ASA], to represent it. Clearly those are important, but neither can be regarded as providing a representative sample of American sociology. Recently, Stephen Turner has suggested that dominance in the ASA rests with a ‘cartel’ initially formed in graduate school, and that it favors work in a style associated with the leading journals. The adequacy of these ideas is examined in the light of available data on the last 20 years, which show that very few of the presidents were in the same graduate schools at the same time. All presidents have had distinguished academic records, but it is shown that their publication strategies have varied considerably. Some have had no ASR publications except their presidential addresses, while books and large numbers of other journals not normally mentioned in this context have figured in their contributions, as well as being more prominent in citations. It seems clear that articles in the leading journals have not been as closely tied to prestigious careers as has sometimes been suggested, and that if there is a cartel it has not included all the presidents.