Fertility trends in Australia

Using published data from the Australian vital registration and census systems, several time series are compiled: crude birth rates from the 1860s; fertility rates from the 1880s; age-specific and parity-specific measures from the 191Os; cumulative fertility measures by birth year of parent beginning with the 1890s; and cumulative fertility measures for marriages by year contracted from the 1910s.The decline in fertility to the 1930s, the upswing to 1961, and declines thereafter revealed by annual fertility measures show far more variation than do measures of total generation fertility—2.7 children per woman born in 1893–95, 2.3 1906–10, 2.8 1921–25, and perhaps 3.0 for women born in the 1930s. Both annual and generation measures show a younger age at parenthood, a decrease in childlessness, and progressively fewer large families. In the light of present experience, it seems not unreasonable to project generation fertility of 2.5 children, implying a crude birth rate of about 20 per thousand for the next fifteen years or so.     

External Shocks,Household Consumption and Fertility in Indonesia

This paper examines the impact of idiosyncratic income shocks on household consumption, educational expenditure and fertility in Indonesia, and assesses whether the investment in human capital of children and fertility are used to smooth household consumption. Using four different kinds of self-reported economic hardships, our findings indicate that coping mechanisms are rather efficient for Indonesian households that perceive an economic hardship. Only in case of unemployment do we find a significant decrease in consumption spending and educational expenditure while fertility increases. These results indicate that households that perceive an unemployment shock use children as a means for smoothing consumption. Regarding the death of a household member or natural disaster we find that consumption per person even increases. These results are consistent with the argument that coping mechanisms even over-compensate the actual consumption loss due to an economic hardship. One important lesson from our findings is that different types of income shock may lead to different economic and demographic behavioral adjustments and therefore require specific targeted social insurance programs.     

Fertility trends in Taiwan: Tradition and change

Fertility rates have been falling In Taiwan for several years. The declines appear to be general throughout the island, and are occurring mainly in the age groups above 50, as would be expected if there are beginnings of family limitation. There are indications that the fertility rates are negatively correlated with indices of modernization In local areas. Several pilot studies indicate a consensus in the population on the desirability of a moderate number of children, the desirability of the Idea of family planning, a positive valuation of such traditional Chinese values as the joint family and support of parents by their children In old age. In one urban area studied, a substantial minority of wives 25–29 years old have used a family planning method already. The “pre-pregnancy health program” of the Provincial Health Department has been quite successful in providing service to interested couples, and among these couples the programme is demonstrably effective in reducing birth rates. Data from the various sources are consistent with the speculation that Taiwanese couples want to use modern family planning methods to maintain elements of the traditional Chinese family in a modern setting.     

Fertility trends in Pakistan--the decline that wasn't

The own-child method of fertility estimation was applied to data from 4 successive household surveys in Pakistan--the 1973 Housing, Economic, and Demographic Survey; the 1975 Pakistan Fertility Survey; the 1979 Population, Labor Force, and Migration Survey; and the 1981 Census. Results suggest large fertility oscillations 8-15 years before each survey, a sharp decline during the next 6 years, and a slight upturn in the year preceding the survey. However, when the 4 data sources are analyzed together, it becomes clear that the reported fertility declines are spurious. In fact, the results indicate that Pakistan's total fertility rate actually increased in the 2 decades preceding the 1981 Census, from slightly under to slightly above 7 children/women. This pattern is apparent when fertility data are aggregated over calendar years, allowing the tendency for errors from age misreporting to cancel one another out. Whatever fertility decline may have occurred has been confined to the very small group of Pakistan women with more than a primary education. It appears that births were misplaced away from the survey date, because of a pattern of exaggerations of children's ages that increases with age, thereby underestimating fertility in the 5-year period just before the survey. This analysis points to the value of juxtaposition of trends from multiple data sources. It further suggests a need for serious attention to family planning program performance in Pakistan if the Government's goal of achieving a birth rate of 36/1000 by 1988 is to be achieved.     

Fertility trends in Europe since the second world war

Abstract Before discussing the movements in fertility in Europe since World War II, it is necessary to consider, both as a background and a yardstick for measurement, the general situation around the mid-1930's. This period has been chosen for several reasons. First, it was at about this time that the crude birth rates and other period indices of fertility in most Western and North-Western countries of Europe reached their lowest points. The decline initiated in the 1870's and 1880's had proceeded without interruption except for the years immediately after World War I, and had gathered momentum in the 1920's. Only in France, in which the birth rate had been falling throughout the 19th century, did there appear to be some approach to stabilization. Secondly, pro-natalist policies began to expand in France, Belgium and Italy, and were initiated in Germany with the Nazi takeover. The very expansion of such policies reinforced the feeling of impending depopulation in other Western countries, a feeling made more intense by the increasingly frequent use of period net reproduction rates as indicators of national 'vitality' ('true' rates of natural increase were much less frequently cited: they required more elaborate computations and appeared to be less striking). Such rates were regarded as sophisticated and meaningful measures of replacement tendencies and they were given a semi-official status by inclusion in the League of Nations Statistical Yearbooks. The apparent implications of these rates were made even more sharply visible by the publication of population projections constructed on a component basis, and using essentially the same approach as that embodied in net reproduction rates - that is, with fertility measured in terms of age-specific fertility rates, and with no regard paid to nuptiality. Thirdly, the early thirties saw the great economic depression, with its correlate of mass unemployment, and offering a natural economic explanation for at least part of the apparent demographic depression.     

Fertility in Kenya and Uganda: A comparative study of trends and determinants

Between 1980 and 2000 total fertility in Kenya fell by about 40 per cent, from some eight births per woman to around five. During the same period, fertility in Uganda declined by less than 10 per cent. An analysis of the proximate determinants shows that the difference was due primarily to greater contraceptive use in Kenya, though in Uganda there was also a reduction in pathological sterility. The Demographic and Health Surveys show that women in Kenya wanted fewer children than those in Uganda, but that in Uganda there was also a greater unmet need for contraception. We suggest that these differences may be attributed, in part at least, first, to the divergent paths of economic development followed by the two countries after Independence; and, second, to the Kenya Government's active promotion of family planning through the health services, which the Uganda Government did not promote until 1995.     

Fertility in Kenya and Uganda: a comparative study of trends and determinants

Between 1980 and 2000 total fertility in Kenya fell by about 40 per cent, from some eight births per woman to around five. During the same period, fertility in Uganda declined by less than 10 per cent. An analysis of the proximate determinants shows that the difference was due primarily to greater contraceptive use in Kenya, though in Uganda there was also a reduction in pathological sterility. The Demographic and Health Surveys show that women in Kenya wanted fewer children than those in Uganda, but that in Uganda there was also a greater unmet need for contraception. We suggest that these differences may be attributed, in part at least, first, to the divergent paths of economic development followed by the two countries after Independence; and, second, to the Kenya Government's active promotion of family planning through the health services, which the Uganda Government did not promote until 1995.     

Fertility trends in rural Hebei Province,People's Republic of China

Background: The People's Republic of China (PRC) has conducted several different population policies since its establishment. Although fertility has declined dramatically in the past three decades, the degree to which this was the result of the different population policies is still under debate. Purpose: We attempt to evaluate the effect of the different formal population policies conducted in the PRC by looking at the fertility behavior of rural women. Unlike urban women, rural women experienced less social control (in the absence of a work unit) and received fewer benefits from adhering to the one-child policy. Data: The data analyzed were collected from a stratified sample of households from 288 villages in 9 counties of Hebei Province, PRC, between 1996 and 1999. The number of children ever born was reported by 4,168 ever-married women aged 25 and over who had had at least one birth. Findings: Our analysis indicates that the formal population policies of the PRC had little effect on the number of children ever born to rural women in Hebei. These retrospective data, by cohort, indicate consistently declining fertility since the revolution (1949). Limited child bearing was associated with age and the level of education. Controlling for the effect of age and education, women born after 1960, at whom the one-child policy was directed, actually had more children than older women. Conclusions: The Chinese fertility decline, at least as reflected in the experience of rural women in Hebei Province, derived mainly from secular changes in women's access to education and other social resources rather than from the direct effects of population policies.     

Fertility trends,excess mortality,and the Great Irish Famine

This paper has developed estimates of the age-specific mortality rates prevailing during the Great Irish Famine and has analyzed fertility trends during the 25 years before the Famine. Our calculations confirm that 1 million Irish people perished as a result of this disaster. This figure does not include the deaths among the 1.3 million emigrants who left Ireland during the Famine period. The Famine produced a significant drop in the fertility rate, and we estimate that more than 300,000 births did not take place as a result of the Famine. The effects were especially severe on the very young and the very old, a result echoed in the findings of demographic analyses of other famines. Our procedure permits a reconstruction of the Irish population by age and sex during the period 1821-1841. In addition, it yields year-by-year estimates of the birth rate over this period. We estimate that the rate fell by about 14 percent, a result robust to our assumptions regarding emigration. Economic historians have debated this issue, and we hope that our evidence, although preliminary, will be of assistance. Our analysis also permits year-by-year reconstruction of Irish population totals for the period 1821-1851. Two years are of particular interest. Virtually all recent writers, with the notable exception of Lee (1981), have suggested that the 1831 census returns overestimated the actual population resident in Ireland at that date. Our reconstruction supports the validity of the 1831 census figure. We obtain a total of 7,847,000, which is in good agreement with the disputed census figure of 7,767,000. But perhaps the most interesting figure is the population total for the end of 1845, the highest ever achieved in Ireland. We estimate that the population on the eve of the Great Famine was 8,525,000. Throughout the paper we have tried to highlight those areas in which the data are unreliable, unavailable, or distorted. We have tried to devise cross-checks for consistency and to test the sensitivity of the results to a range of assumptions. A case in point concerns the age-sex profile and volume of emigration to England, Scotland, and Wales. Additional work at the micro level would be helpful here. More solid evidence on Famine births would also be helpful. The parish registers we have sampled certainly provide a clue to trends, but we have only made a start in that respect. A much more comprehensive survey is needed to convey the national picture.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Intergenerational earnings mobility in Japan among sons and daughters: levels and trends

This paper estimates the extent of intergenerational income mobility in Japan among sons and daughters born between 1935 and 1975. Our estimates rely on a two-sample instrumental variables approach using representative data from the Japanese Social Stratification and Mobility surveys, collected between 1965 and 2005. Father’s income is predicted on the basis of a rich set of variables, and we discuss changes in the Japanese earnings structure for cohorts born between the early 1900s and the 1960s. Our main results indicate that the intergenerational income elasticity (IGE) for both sons and daughters in Japan lies around 0.35, which is an intermediate value, by international standards. We discuss the sensitivity of the IGE to using either personal or family income as the income variable for both fathers and children. We also examine changes across cohorts in the IGE. Results indicate that intergenerational mobility has been roughly stable over the last decades.     

论生育文化和生育文明

生育文明中表现了生育文化的种种现象和活动,生育文化也体现了生育文明的历史轨迹、进程和内容。生育文化的发展表现了不同时期人类生育文明的进步与发展,不体现生育文化内涵的生育文明显然是不存在的。然而,严格说来,生育文化和生育文明是既有密切联系,又有一定区别的两个不完全等同的概念。正确认识和理解生育文化和生育文明的概念、内涵、功能及其相互关系,对于推动新时期人口计生工作的深入发展,进一步开展人口和计划生育的理论研究,具有十分重要的意义和作用。     

生育理性和生育决策与我国低生育水平稳定机制的转变

自改革开放以来 ,我国人口生育率水平出现了迅速的转变 ,特别是 1 992年我国确立了市场经济为目标的经济改革以来 ,生育率水平更是进一步降低到更替水平以下。如果说 ,生育率的迅速转变是在国家计划生育政策干预下启动的 ,那么 ,在 1 990年代生育率的下降应该主要是社会和经济发展的结果。以市场经济为导向的经济改革和经济的迅速发展 ,已经为稳定我国城市地区人口低生育率水平提供了必要的经济条件 ,同时 ,制度、技术和文化等因素的变革已经为我国个人生育决策理性化创造了条件 ,低生育水平的稳定机制已经开始从政策控制为主转向群众自我控制为主的转变     

Fertility levels and differentials in Beirut during wartime: an indirect estimation based on maternity registers

In this paper, total fertility estimates for Greater Beirut in the mid-eighties and early nineties are presented, and changes in socio-religious differentials of fertility across time are explored. The baseline information was recorded from registration details for all maternities in Beirut and its inner suburbs in 1984 and 1991: age of mother, number of children ever-born, hospital class, and religion of newborn. An indirect method was used to estimate total fertility from the joint distribution of mothers by age and parity, and, using hospital class as a proxy for social class, differentials in fertility were investigated by Poisson regression. The estimates of total fertility for Beirut shifted from 2.60 in 1984 to 2.52 in 1991, and were higher for Muslims than for Christians in the two periods. The regression analysis showed that: (1) the difference between the two religious groups persisted after control for social class, and in fact applied to the lower social class; (2) fertility dropped between the two dates in the lower social class, and more so for Muslims than for Christians. In comparison with other countries of the region, the decline in Beirut was found to be relatively modest. If the trends assessed in this study were to continue, the religious-based fertility differentials would taper off progressively in the capital city of Lebanon.     

Using survey data to assess neonatal tetanus mortality levels and trends in developing countries

Demographic and health surveys are a useful source of information on the levels and trends of neonatal mortality in developing countries. Such surveys provide data on mortality occurring at 4–14 days of life, which is a sensitive indicator of neonatal tetanus mortality. We analyze birth history data from 37 national surveys in developing countries to assess the quality of neonatal mortality data and to estimate levels and trends in mortality occurring at 4–14 days. It is shown that mortality at 4-14 days has declined considerably during the last decade in most developing countries, concomitant with development and expansion of programs to reduce neonatal tetanus. These declines show that reductions in neonatal tetanus mortality probably have been an important contributor to the decline of neonatal and infant mortality during the 1980s.     

甘肃省居民生育意愿与生育目的的调查研究

文章利用2007年调查数据,分析研究了甘肃省居民的生育意愿和生育目的。调查发现．随着经济的发展和社会的进步,甘肃省居民的意愿生育数量不断减少,已经略低于更替生育水平,男孩偏好的意愿生育性别倾向仍然广泛存在,期望生育一儿一女是大部分甘肃居民最为普遍的愿望,意愿妇女初育年龄不断推迟．生育目的呈现出多元化趋势,但养老送终、传宗接代仍是目前最重要的生育目的。     

中国妇女生育意愿与生育行为的差异及其影响因素

生育行为与生育意愿背离现象广泛存在。在发达国家,普遍的情况是实际生育率大大低于意愿生育率。发展中国家同样出现了生育行为与生育意愿背离的现象,但更多呈现出与发达国家相反的规律。中国也出现了生育行为与生育意愿背离,且实际高于意愿的情况。根据中国2001年全国生殖健康调查,基本完成生育的40~49岁妇女,其平均理想子女数为1.8,而平均实际生育子女数为2.2。利用2001年全国生殖健康调查数据,考察中国妇女生育行为与生育意愿背离的特征和影响因素,并考察个体背景(个人特征和社会经济背景)、生育政策和生育孩子情况(包括孩子的性别结构和存活状况)对生育意愿与生育行为的差异产生的影响。结果表明,这些因素都对生育意愿与生育行为的差异产生显著影响,但性别偏好是造成生育行为大于生育意愿的主要因素。     

Wages and Fertility in Australia

This paper applies a simple economic model to explain short run movements in Australian fertility, abstracting from social and cultural conditions. It shows that Australian fertility can be modelled with some success using only wages and employment data, once we allow for the different effects of changes in men’s and women’s wages for the period 1966–90. The elasticity of the total fertility rate over this period is found to be negative with respect to women’s wages and positive with respect to men’s wages. As well as having the expected sign, the estimated elasticities are similar in magnitude to those for the United States over the period 1948–75.