Religious differentials in marital fertility in The Hague (Netherlands) 1860-1909

Previous studies of the marital fertility transition in Europe have found religious differentials. Using data collected from the population registers of The Hague, our aim in this study is to search for answers to the following questions: whether religious differentials result from socio-economic characteristics; to what extent religious ideology explains the behaviour of religious groups; which proximate determinants account for the religious differentials; and whether the Jews were forerunners in the marital fertility transition in Europe. The results provide some evidence of relatively low levels of parity-dependent fertility control among Jews before the transition and among Catholics during the transition. Religious ideology probably accounts for the low level of fertility control among Catholics. The ultimate reason for the relatively high marital fertility among Jews before the transition remains unclear. Our findings do not support the hypothesis that Jews were forerunners in the marital fertility transition.     

Residency differentials in Mormon fertility

Abstract Although one of the most consistent findings of recent fertility studies is the convergence of the religious differentials in fertility, few data have been analysed to discover Mormon fertility trends and differentials. This paper, based on data obtained on 1,001 Mormon couples, is concerned with describing the effects that the dispersion of Mormon families from the Mormon centre in Utah to surrounding areas with various social conditions is having on the fertility of the re-located Mormon families. Data presented clearly show that such families do, on the average, have a lower fertility than do their Mormon contemporaries residing in the homogeneous Mormon society in Utah. They probably compromise their religious obligations to have children with the contradicting demands of their new environment. Their loyalty to these religious beliefs, however, is confirmed by data which show that they tend to have larger families in their new environments than do their non-Mormon neighbours.     

Residency differentials in Mormon fertility

Although one of the most consistent findings of recent fertility studies is the convergence of the religious differentials in fertility, few data have been analysed to discover Mormon fertility trends and differentials. This paper, based on data obtained on 1,001 Mormon couples, is concerned with describing the effects that the dispersion of Mormon families from the Mormon centre in Utah to surrounding areas with various social conditions is having on the fertility of the re-located Mormon families. Data presented clearly show that such families do, on the average, have a lower fertility than do their Mormon contemporaries residing in the homogeneous Mormon society in Utah. They probably compromise their religious obligations to have children with the contradicting demands of their new environment. Their loyalty to these religious beliefs, however, is confirmed by data which show that they tend to have larger families in their new environments than do their non-Mormon neighbours.     

Attitudes toward abortion among catholic Mexican-American women: The effects of religiosity and education

Contrary to observed trends in religious fertility and contraceptive use differentials, Catholic/non-Catholic differentials in attitudes toward abortion have not been converging. This study suggests that this may be due to an interaction between religiosity and education. In a sample of Catholic Mexican-American women in Los Angeles County, the authors found that among respondents brought up in Mexico, education had a liberalizing effect on their attitudes. With the exception of the most devout, the same trend was observed among U.S.-reared respondents. Among the most religious group, however, education had the opposite effect, suggesting that convergence will be delayed.     

A further look at catholic fertility

The purpose of this paper is to determine the extent to which suburbanization has influenced the traditional fertility differences observed between Catholics and Protestants. It is hypothesized that suburbanization has served to decrease religious differences in fertility, since in the more advanced stages of urbanism, that is, suburbanization, the Catholic population is likely to adopt the fertility patterns of the larger and more secularized society. Attention is focused on two objectives: (1) to examine selected aspects of fertility for Catholic8 and Protestants living in metropolitan areas and (2) to analyze religious differentials in fertility among residents in different parts of the metropolitan community.The data, consisting of a sample of households in six metropolitan areas in three population size classes, supported the general findings pertaining to religious differences in fertility that have been reported in the literature. Catholics had larger families, shorter average spacing between children, and longer fertility spans when compared to Protestants, even when a number of control variables were employed. Examining fertility differences between Catholics and Protestants in central city and suburban segments of large and small metropolitan areas, we found that the data indicated that marked Catholic-Protestant differences are still found in central cities. However, fertility differences between the two religious groups tended largely to disappear among suburban residents. The convergence in the fertility patterns of suburbanites is due to combined effects of higher fertility among Protestant suburban residents when compared to central city Protestants and the tendency of suburban Catholics to have fewer children than those who live in the city. The net result is convergence in suburban fertility.     

Religious fertility differentials in Thailand, 1960

Abstract Although the evidence supporting high fertility in Thailand is clear-cut, little is known about fertility differentials within the population. As part of a larger investigation, a special 1 % tabulation of the 1960 Thai census data on number of children ever-born to married women has been analysed to determine the extent of differentials by religion and urban-rural status. The findings point to considerable differentials among Buddhists, Moslems, and Confucianists. Standardizing for age, the number of children ever-born to 12/loslems averaged well below the number born to Buddhists. Confucian fertility was intermediate. Within specific age groups, the number of children ever-born to Moslem women was considerably below the Buddhist average and the differentials were sharper in the higher age groups. By contrast, Confucian fertility was highest of all in the age groups under 35, but lower than the Buddhist averages among older women. Significant urban-rural differentials also exist. For both the Buddhist and the Confucian women, fertility is markedly lower in urban than in rural categories. When controlling for both age and urban-rural status, Buddhist and Confucian differences tend to be minimal. By contrast, Moslem fertility was highest in the most urban category - Bangkok - but was considerably lower and substantially below the fertility levels of Buddhists and Confucianists in all other urban-rural categories. The census data in themselves do not permit adequate analysis of the reasons for the differentials. Later age at marriage in urban places may be a significant factor in accounting for the overall differentials in urban-rural fertility ; but this relation is much less clear for specific religious groups, particularly since Moslems marry at a considerably earlier age. More frequent divorce and remarriage may lower Moslem rates. Poorer health may also be a factor.     

Economic determinants of family size in West Africa

The economic theory of fertility postulates that income and prices, broadly defined, are important determinants of family size. What follows is an attempt to test this theory against the behavior of 717 predominantly urban households in Sierra Leone. Husband's education is used as a proxy for income; the "price" of a child is accounted for by wife's education and wife's wage rate. Other important variables are wife's age, a measure of child "quality," wife's age at first birth, and child mortality. The findings of the study tend to lend support to the economic theory of fertility but contain certain peculiarities which indicate a need for further research.     

Child care arrangements and fertility: An analysis of two-earner households

The determinants of child care arrangements and relations between child care and fertility are examined using data on two-earner households from the 1976 National Survey of Family Growth. We find that the probability of relying on market arrangements is higher among families in which the husband's income, the wife's wage, and the level of the wife's labor supply are high; these households are likely to benefit the most from subsidies to the market forms of care that are small relative to the total cost of care (e.g. the present system of tax credits). In addition, parental education, family size, child's age, race, religion, and place of residence have important influences on the choice of child care mode. When other factors are held constant, reliance on a relative for child care is positively associated with intentions to have further children among couples with infants and preschoolers.     

Fertility differentials as evidence of incipient fertility decline in a developing country

Abstract Age data from the 1960 and earlier censuses of Ghana allow the construction of child-woman ratios which appear to indicate the existence of a substantial urban-rural fertility differential. Plausible assumptions of urban-rural mortality differentials increase the apparent fertility differential. In this paper recently published data for Statistical Areas in the country's larger towns are used to demonstrate that one explanation for the fertility differential is almost certainly the enumeration of some females in the towns, while one or more of their surviving children were enumerated outside. Nevertheless, in 1960 the four largest towns exhibited birth levels which are likely to have been about 11% below those of the population in the surrounding regions. Roughly half the differential can be attributed to a general urban-rural differential and half to socio-economic differentials within the towns. It is shown that most fertility reduction within the towns may be explained by delayed female marriage, and that such delay is associated with extended education. It is also shown that amongst the higher socio-economic status groups a small part of the reduction can probably be attributed to the prevention of pregnancy within marriage, and that the making of such attempts is positively associated with extended education, urban birth, participation in first and monogamous marriages, Protestantism, and the holding of views about the harmful effect of high population growth rates on attempts to raise living standards. It is argued that these fertility differentials are evidence of some fertility decline among key groups in the population and that such declines are likely to become more widespread.     

Fertility Differentials In Early Postwar Malaya

During theearlypostwar years up to1957, the three main races in Malaya-Malays, Chinese, and Indians-experienced some differences in their levels of fertility. The lowest fertility was recorded among the Malays, with Chinese and Indian fertility about 5 percent and 10 percent higher, respectively. The comparatively low fertility of the Malays was owing to the exceptionally high rate of divorce, which meant unstable marriages and shorter periods of exposure to the risk of childbearing.A fairly well-defined pattern of state differences in fertility levels is found to exist in Malaya. Briefly, fertility was on the high side in the northern states of Johore, Malacca, and Negri Sembilan, and on the low side in the northern states of Penanq, Kelantan, Perlis, Kedah, and Trengganu, with the central states of Perak, Selangor, and Pahang in the intermediate position.The usual rural-urban fertility differentials are seen to prevail in Malaya as a whole and in the smaller units at state levels. Finally, the three main races registered higher fertility in rural areas, and the greatest gap between rural and urban rates prevailed among the Chinese.     

Women’s fertility, religion and education in a low-fertility population: Evidence from South Australia

The old issue of religion and fertility is examined in relation to women s level of education. In-depth interviews exploring influences on parity for Adelaide parents in 2003–04 suggest that more frequent attendance at religious services in childhood, and affiliation with particular religious denominations, are related to both higher preferred and higher achieved parity, even for women with university education. For some university-educated women, their religious upbringing appears to play a part in negating the traditional relationship between higher education and lower fertility. Quantitative data on religion, fertility and educational level from the 1996 Census for women aged 40–44 in South Australia show that women with No Religion had lower fertility than those With a religion, while university-educated women in New Protestan-New Christian groups had higher fertility than university-educated women in other denominations. The findings provide an understanding of some social conditions that support higher fertility in a low-fertility population. Future fertility research in developed countries should include consideration of the influence of religious affiliation and religiosity at disaggregated levels of inquiry.     

Adolescent fertility and religion in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in the year 2000: the role of Protestantism

Social transformations in Brazil in recent years have included a substantial increase in adolescent fertility, a dramatic rise in membership of Protestant religious denominations, and an accompanying decline in the number of Catholics. We used the 2000 Brazil Census to examine differentials in fertility and family formation among adolescents living in Rio de Janeiro by the following religious denominations: Catholic; Baptist; other mainline Protestant; Assembly of God Church; Universal Church of the Kingdom of God; other Pentecostal Protestant; and no religion. Results from logistic regression models show that the majority of the Protestants are at a lower risk of adolescent fertility than Catholics, and that among adolescents who have had a child, most Protestants are more likely than Catholics to be in a committed union. Our findings offer some support for the hypothesis that Protestant churches are more effective than the Catholic Church in discouraging premarital sexual relations and childbearing among adolescents.     

Men's influence on the onset and progress of fertility decline in Ghana, 1988-98

While lower fertility is commonly associated with women's reproductive autonomy, we demonstrate that the influence of men's education on reproductive decision-making increased during the first decade of rapid fertility decline in Ghana. Husband's education exerts a stronger influence on wife's fertility intentions than does her own education, and the magnitude of the effect of his education increased significantly from 1988 to 1998. Lower fertility in Ghana seems to be associated more with men's declining fertility desires than with women's increasing reproductive autonomy. Nevertheless, there is some indication that women's education may play a relatively greater role in reproductive decision-making as fertility decline progresses still further.     

Hispanic Fertility,Religion and Religiousness in the U.S.

Is the higher fertility of Hispanics in the United States due to their religion and/or to their greater religiousness? Evidence from national survey data indicates no difference in fertility between Protestant and Catholic Hispanic women but Hispanics are more religious than non-Hispanics in terms of the perceived importance of religion in their personal lives. Religiousness is associated with higher fertility but Hispanic fertility is higher than non-Hispanic fertility regardless of religion or religiousness. Ethnic differences in education and income in turn are more important for fertility than the religious dimension.     

Explaining religious differentials in family-size preference: Evidence from Nepal in 1996

We examine how religio-ethnic identity, individual religiosity, and family members' religiosity were related to preferred family size in Nepal in 1996. Analyses of survey data from the Chitwan Valley Family Study show that socio-economic characteristics and individual experiences can suppress, as well as largely account for, religio-ethnic differences in fertility preference. These religio-ethnic differentials are associated with variance in particularized theologies or general value orientations (like son preference) across groups. In addition, individual and family religiosity are both positively associated with preferred family size, seemingly because of their association with religious beliefs—beliefs that are likely to shape fertility strategies. These findings suggest the need for improvements in how we conceptualize and measure supra-individual religious influence in a variety of settings and for a range of demographically interesting outcomes.     

Fertility patterns among religious groups in Canada

The U shape that has been traced out by the crude birth rate in the United States and Canada is well known. Falling birth rates reached a low point in the mid-1930’s; the rate rose to a peak in 1947 and remained high through the 1950’s. In terms of cohorts, completed family size was smallest for women born around 1910, whose childbearing was concentrated in the 1930’s. With data from the 1961 census of Canada, trends in cohort marital fertility by religion are examined. The U pattern appears for both Protestants and Jews. For Catholics, a reversal in the downward trend of family size had not appeared by 1961, although the U pattern can be discerned for some subgroups such as Catholics living in big cities and persons of Irish ancestry. In the United States, however, changes in family size for all three religious groups and both whites and nonwhites follow the U pattern. Religious differentials in family size in Canada have been decreasing, but they remain much larger than either religious or color differentials in the United States, which show no decrease. The distinctive features of Catholic fertility in Canada are most pronounced among the regionallyconcentrated French Canadians, suggesting an interplay of religious, regional, and ethnic influences.     

Residence background,socioeconomic status,and fertility

Previous research has demonstrated that socioeconomic differentials in fertility are heavily influenced by couples with rural background. These studies show an inverse relationship between fertility and socioeconomic status for couples of rural background, but no relationship for urbanorigin couples. The effect of urban background on rural fertility differentials has not been examined. This study investigates the potential effect of urban-origin couples on socioeconomic differences in fertility in rural areas. Data from the 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity are analyzed to show that rural socioeconomic fertility differences are not influenced by the presence of persons of urban background.     

Relation of marriage and education to fertility in the U.S.S.R

Abstract One-half of the variation in Soviet fertility as measured by the child-woman ratio is attributable to the proportion of married women in the 20-24 age group. The familar sociological hypothesis of an inverse relation between human fertility and education also is fully substantiated with data for the 36 major ethnic groups in the U.S.S.R. The second and third best predicting variables fall into the two extreme age groups: (a) those 16 to 19 years of age with more than seven years of school completed and (b) those men and women aged 60 and over with the equivalent formal education. Results of this study support the modified hypothesis that complements previously publicized findings. It asserts that variations in fertility attributable to the traditionally religious values can be explained in terms of the age-specific marriage and educational differentials known to have existed in the past and still characteristic of the multi-national society in the Soviet Union.     

Migrant women of Mindanao: a differential profile from the 1983 National Demographic Survey

Researchers analyzed 1983 data on 3644 ever married 15-49 year old women living in Mindanao, a traditionally Muslim dominated area, in the Philippines to look at differentials in socioeconomic and demographic factors between migrant and nonmigrant women. When they controlled for other variables, differentials existed only for place of residence, religion, and education. Women living in urban areas were more likely to be migrants than nonmigrants (26.9% vs. 18.6%; p.01). Christians also tended to be migrants (92.3% vs. 7.7%; p/01). Yet the coefficient of the interaction between place of residence and Christian was strongly negative (p.01). Thus the odds of an urban resident being a migrant was reduced from 1.46-1.15 when considering Christians. Among Christians, differences in education between migrants and nonmigrants was small. On the other hand, the more educated a Muslim woman was the less likely she was a migrant (p.05). Further all socioeconomic differentials were consistently significant at either the 1% or 5% level for women who migrated 2 times, but not for primary migrants or return migrants. Women who migrated 3 times and those who migrated back to where they had lived earlier, but not to place of birth, were different than nonmigrants in terms of occupation and education only. In the early 1970s, armed conflicts between Muslims and Christians and between government troops and Muslim groups resulted in considerable displacement of families. Yet this conflict could only account for differentials between the 2 religious groups before 1975, but these data could not infer other reasons for migration. Researchers should explore these reasons. These result indicated that policy makers should focus on religious and place of residence differentials rather than migrant/nonmigrant differentials to promote equality among groups of women.     

Family structure and socio-economic differentials in fertility

Abstract The long standing research on the relation of socio-economic status and fertility has recently given way to a focus on those factors which account for class differentials. Although class differences in fertility seem to be diminishing, the basic relationship remains inverse.(2) In an attempt to explain class differentials in fertility, researchers have begun to look at such variables as age at marriage(3), value orientations(4), and non-fiunilial activity.(5) Bumpass demonstrated that age at marriage is an interaction variable which greatly attenuates the relationship between social class and fertility. He found that the relationship was inverse among women marrying before age 19, but direct among women who were 23 years or older at first marriage. Clifford examined value orientations as an intervening variable in the socio-economic status-fertility relationship. Modern and traditional value orientations did aid in interpreting the relationship, but other factors were also operative. Kupinsky found that the non-familial activity of women decidedly influenced socio-economic differentials infertility. Thelabour force participation of women had a greater effect on reducing fertility among upper-status women than among those of lower status. This relationship was also influenced by the rural-urban background of the women.