Reconstruction of fertility trends for the female population of the U.S.S.R

Abstract The article describes fertility trends among Soviet women during the past 40 years as compared to American women during the same period of time. Period-specific fertility rates were arrived at by relating the annual total of live births to a pattern of age-specific fertility rates estimated for each year and also to the number of women for each single year of age. These rates were then appropriately re-arranged and compressed into five-year age groups to form a series of cohort-specific fertility rates. The findings rest on somewhat conjectural estimates of live births and numbers of women in the U.S.S.R., some of which were originally prepared before the 1959 Soviet census. The tentative evidence shows that changes in the period-specific fertility of Soviet women were far more irregular and dramatic in the past, than among American women. After World War II these rates dropped in the U.S.S.R. below those of the United States, except for women over 30 years of age. On the other hand, the cohort-specific rates of Soviet women, although declining from one cohort to the next, at present show their magnitude in the cumulative series for older ages to be marked by higher than among American women. This experimental investigation of fertility in the Soviet Union makes no claim to high standards of accuracy and validity. Its intended purpose is to stress the desirability of shifting emphasis from the temporal and prognostic type of study, characteristic of present-day demographic research about the U.S.S.R., to the generational and historical approach.     

Cohort estimates of nonmarital fertility for U.S. Women

Historical trends in U.S. nonmarital fertility have been compiled almost exclusively from vital statistics on births. This paper complements this historical record by providing cohort estimates of nonmarital fertility for cohorts of U.S. women spanning approximately 50 years of cohort experience. Life table estimates using retrospective marital and fertility histories in the June 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995 Current Population Surveys reveal nonnegligible levels of nonmarital fertility historically. For women born between 1925 and 1929, nearly 1 in 10 had at least one nonmarital birth by age 30. For women born between 1965 and 1969, more than 1 of 4 had one or more nonmarital births by age 30, with roughly 1 of5 white, 3 of 5 black, and 1 in 3 Hispanic women having at least one nonmarital birth by age 30. Life table estimates reveal a twofold increase between ages 20 and 30 in the percentage of women with at least one child outside of formal marriage for all cohorts of white and Hispanic women, and an increase of roughly two-thirds for all cohorts of black women. I also document qualitative differences in nonmarital fertility by race/ethnicity, with the percentage of nonmarital births following a divorce or marital separation for white women approximately twice that for black or Hispanic women. Finally, I introduce a new measure, the cohort nonmarital fertility ratio (CNMFR), which provides a cohort complement to the standard period nonmarital fertility ratio. Conservative estimates reveal a roughly threefold increase in the CNMFR for women born from 1925-1929 to 1950-1954 for both whites and blacks, despite substantially higher levels of nonmarital fertility among black women. Overall, these findings reveal surprisingly high levels of nonmarital fertility for women born since the 1920s and confirm that nonmarital fertility has become an increasingly substantial component of overall U.S. fertility.     

Language usage and fertility in the Mexican-origin population of the United States

This article examines the effects of English proficiency and female education on cumulative and recent fertility within the Mexican-origin population in the U.S. To ascertain whether the cultural or the human capital aspects of linguistic variables have the greater salience for fertility behavior, fertility patterns of bilingual women are compared with those of monolingual women speaking English or Spanish. Using the 1980 U.S. Census 5 percent Public Use Microdata Sample for ever-married Mexican-origin women aged 15-44, we find that for almost all age cohorts, the effects of English proficiency are negative and increase with rising education. The strength of the interaction is greater in younger age groups. Greater English proficiency is also associated with a more negative impact of education for native- than foreign-born women. Overall, the influence of "opportunity cost," as opposed to cultural factors, is more important in shaping the fertility behavior of these women.     

Female status and fertility behaviour in a Metropolitan Urban area of Bangladesh

The paper examines hypotheses that certain aspects of status of married women such as (i) decision-making power; (ii) employment status and (iii) educational status, are positively associated with use of contraception and inversely related to fertility performance. The study is based on 1,130 women of reproductive age (15-49) who are currently married and living with their husbands and reported to be fecund. The data are drawn from a cross-section of working and non-working women of Dacca City. The hypothesis that each of the above status variables is related to fertility behaviour (measured as current use of contraception and number of children ever-born) is confirmed, with the sole exception of the relationship between female employment status and fertility behaviour. Female participation in the labour force has little or no effect on use of contraception, particularly among those who belong to higher education and income groups. However, in the lower education and income groups, fertility and use of contraception vary with work experience. The findings clearly point out the need to improve the status of women in order to achieve a breakthrough in the use of contraception and a reduction in fertility.     

How female education affects reproductive behavior in urban Pakistan

Although Pakistan remains in a pretransitional stage (contraceptive prevalence of only 11.9% among married women in 1992), urban women with post-primary levels of education are spearheading the gradual move toward fertility transition. Data collected in the city of Karachi in 1987 were used to determine whether the inverse association between fertility and female education is attributable to child supply variables, demand factors, or fertility regulation costs. Karachi, with its high concentration of women with secondary educations employed in professional occupations, has a contraceptive prevalence rate of 31%. Among women married for less than 20 years, a 10-year increment in education predicts that a woman will average two-fifths of a child less than other women in the previous 5 years. Regression analysis identified 4 significant intervening variables in the education-fertility relationship: marriage duration, net family income, formal sector employment, and age at first marriage. Education appears to affect fertility because it promotes a later age at marriage and thus reduces life-time exposure to the risk of childbearing, induces women to marry men with higher incomes (a phenomenon that either reduces the cost of fertility regulation or the demand for children), leads women to become employed in the formal sector (leading to a reduction in the demand for children), and has other unspecified effects on women's values or opportunities that are captured by their birth cohort. When these intervening variables are held constant, women's attitude toward family planning loses its impact on fertility, as do women's domestic autonomy and their expectations of self-support in old age. These findings lend support to increased investments in female education in urban Pakistan as a means of limiting the childbearing of married women. Although it is not clear if investment in female education would have the same effect in rural Pakistan, such action is important from a human and economic development perspective.     

Correlates of divorce in the U.S.S.R.

The theoretical rationale of this study is that conditions associated with divorce reside outside the family within a broader social system where the family finds itself located. The absence of major differences in divorce law from one place to another within the Soviet Union makes it possible to explore this hypothesis by examining areal differentials in divorce rates. Crude divorce rates and crude marriage rates for 1960 have been published in Vestnik Statistiki for 109 political-administrative areas in the Soviet Union. Several indicators of modernization are available for the same areas from the 1959 U.S.S.R. Census of Population. About 80 per cent of the variation among areas with respect to the crude divorce rate is accounted for by six variables: the crude marriage rate, the percentage of urban population, and the employee-worker ratio in the labor force, each of which is positively associated with the divorce rate; and the proportion of poorly educated women, the ratio of children to adult males, and the mean household-family size, each of which is negatively associated with the divorce rate.     

Marriage markets and nonmarital fertility in the United States

We merge census microdata with vital statistics data to examine the effect of women's marriage opportunities on nonmarital fertility rates and ratios across 75 U.S. metropolitan areas. Measures of the quantity and "quality" of marriageable men simultaneously specific for women's age, race, education, and place of residence reveal especially poor marriage prospects for highly educated black women. The effect of mate availability on nonmarital fertility is generally modest. Among white women, marriage opportunities are associated inversely with the nonmarital fertility rate, perhaps reflecting an increased likelihood that a premarital conception will be legitimated. Marriage opportunities also reduce nonmarital fertility ratios for young black and white women. The nonmarital fertility rate is lower among women whose marriage pool includes a large percentage of nonemployed males. Only a small proportion of the racial difference in nonmarital fertility appears attributable to differences in the marriage markets of black and of white women.     

Female status among soviet central Asian nationalities: The melding of Islam and Marxism and its implications for population increase

Summary Marxist ideology has emphasized the rights of women to a degree perhaps unparalleled among political movements, whereas Islamic ideology has confined women to the traditional role of wife and mother. In Soviet Central Asia these two ideologies have clashed for more than 50 years. Data from the 1959 and 1970 censuses of the U.S.S.R. are used to show three aspects of the position of Soviet women of Islamic nationality as compared with the position of Soviet women of non-Islamic nationality, namely, educational attainment relative to men, non-agricultural labour force participation relative to men, and the burden of child dependency. The hypothesis is put forward that the status of women among Soviet Islamic nationalities should be lower than among Soviet non-Islamic nationalities, but that the difference between the two groups in the various aspects of female status should diminish over time. The position of women among the Soviet Islamic nationalities was also compared with that of women in various Islamic nations with the hypothesis that female status should be higher among the former than the latter. The predictions were upheld, with the notable exception of two of the three pedictions concerning the burden of child dependency occasioned by the finding that child dependency increased substantially, from 1959 to 1970 for Islamic nationalities but not for non-Islamic, and by 1970 was higher for Soviet Islamic nationalities than for the Islamic nations of the Middle East and North Africa. Several possible explanations are advanced for the above-mentioned unpredicted findings.     

Marriage Patterns And Cumulative Fertility In West Malaysia: 1966–1967

Differentials in age at first marriage and being married more than once are discussed for a probability sample of West Malaysian currently married women 15-44 years of age. Both marriage ages and the incidence of multiple marriages vary greatly by race, place of current residence, wife's education, and husband's occupation; and the marriage variables are shown to have significant effects on the cumulative fertility of West Malaysian women. Early marriage leads to higher cumulative fertility and multiple marriages lead to lower cumulative fertility. Since the social groups with the highest proportions of early marriages are also those with the highest incidence of multiple marriages, the marriage variables explain some but not all of the variance in cumulative fertility for West Malaysian social groups. After adjustment for the effects of the marriage variables, rural Indian or Pakistani women still have the highest cumulative fertility and urban Chinese women with more than five years of schooling still have the lowest cumulative fertility.     

Constructing fertility tables for Soviet populations

Because the 1970 Soviet Union census does not provide information on the age structure of men and women separately by sex and according to their ethnic affiliation, the 1959 USSR census data serve as the basis to infer knowledge about ethnic fertility. The model takes into account (1) the total number of births in 1960, estimated from the child-woman ratio in 1959, (2) the age structure of women in 1959, and (3) the assumed pattern of age-specific birth rates structured in terms of the modal age at childbearing and the length of the fertility age span. The results show that Ukrainians among the Slav populations ranked as the lowest with 2.07 children born per woman. Their total fertility contrasts with that of Kazakhs native to Central Asia, who reportedly according to Soviet sources had 7.46 children per woman in 1958-1959, and whose estimated rate is around 8.59 children. Extreme variations appear in the estimates of fertility among nationalities of the Caucasus region, Volga Basin, and to a lesser degree in Siberia. Official Soviet calculations of crude birth rates and age-specific rates for 15 Union Republics in 1967-1968 are transcribed and compared with the estimates for nationalities in 1959-1960. The same theoretical model used to generate the Soviet rates may be adapted under different assumptions to non-Soviet populations in other situations where the data are scanty or incomplete.     

Migration and fertility in the Philippines: Hendershot's selectivity model revisited

A demographer compared 1983 data on 5092 currently married migrant and nonmigrant women living in the Philippines to determine whether migration was still selective in terms of fertility behavior or not. Fertility was basically the same between migrant and nonmigrant women in their early reproductive years, but clear differences existed between older migrants and nonmigrants as indicated by children ever born (CEB). In fact, migration did not significantly affect cumulative fertility at all (correlation ratio=.03). Moreover its effect was further reduced when the researchers controlled for age and duration of marriage. Besides level of education and contraceptive use status contributed more to explanations of fertility differentials (correlation ratio=.09 for both) than did migration. The mean number of CEB adjusted for all variables fell with level of education from 4.18 for those with primary education to 3.63 to those with college education. This result identified education as a means to reduce high fertility in the Philippines. On the other hand, the mean was higher among women who ever used contraception than it was for those who never used it (4.21 vs. 3.72). Apparently considerable family size motivated mothers to use contraception. Since women who migrated to cities tended to be in the beginning of their reproductive period, considerable natural increase could occur in urban areas. Therefore the Philippines needed to devise a strategy for reducing fertility among migrant women as well as strategies for other groups such as professional/career oriented women and women who remained at home to tend to children and/or the home.     

Diverging fertility among U.S. women who delay childbearing past age 30

In this paper I examine the evolving association between educational attainment and the timing of births. In the late 1970s, women with four-year college degrees had lower first birth rates before age 30 than women with less education, but rates of first births were similar for the two groups after age 30. From the 1970s to the 1990s, first birth rates decreased before age 30 for all women, but increased after age 30 only for women with four-year college degrees. Parity 2 birth rates also increased for college graduates with a first birth after age 30. These results document widening educational differences in fertility timing between 1975 and 1995, which may reflect period changes at later ages in women's work and family lives.     

Worldwide fertility declines do not rely on stopping at ideal parities

A key demographic hypothesis has been that fertility declines rely on stopping at target parities, but emerging evidence suggests that women frequently reduce fertility without specific numeric targets. To assess the relative importance of these two paths to fertility decline, we develop a novel mixture model to estimate: (1) the proportion of women who stop at a target parity; and (2) mean completed fertility among those who do not. Applied to Demographic and Health Survey data from women aged 45–49 in 84 low- and middle-income countries, and to United States Census cohorts, the model shows considerable variation in the proportion stopping at specific parities (1–84?per cent). The estimates also show that declines in completed fertility are largely attributable to women who do not stop at target parities, suggesting that stopping at ideal parities may be less important than parity-independent decisions for a wide range of fertility transitions.     

The Soviet Union: population trends and dilemmas

Focus in this discussion of population trends and dilemmas in the Soviet Union is on demographic problems, data limitations, early population growth, geography and resources, the 15 republics of the Soviet Union and nationalities, agriculture and the economy, population growth over the 1950-1980 period (national trend, regional differences); age and sex composition of the population, fertility trends, nationality differentials in fertility, the reasons for fertility differentials (child care, divorce, abortion and contraception, illegitimacy), labor shortages and military personnel, mortality (mortality trends, life expectancy), reasons for mortality increases, urbanization and emigration, and future population prospects and projections. For mid-1982 the population of the Soviet Union was estimated at 270 million. The country's current rate of natural increase (births minus deaths) is about 0.8% a year, higher than current rates of natural increase in the U.S. (0.7%) and in developed countries as a whole (0.6%). Net immigration plays no part in Soviet population growth, but emigration was noticeable in some years during the 1970s, while remaining insignificant relative to total population size. National population growth has dropped by more than half in the last 2 decades, from 1.8% a year in the 1950s to 0.8% in 1980-1981, due mostly to declining fertility. The national fertility decline masks sharp differences among the 15 republics and even more so among the some 125 nationalities. In 1980, the Russian Republic had an estimated fertility rate of 1.9 births/woman, and the rate was just 2.0 in the other 2 Slavic republics, the Ukraine and Belorussia. In the Central Asian republics the rates ranged up to 5.8. Although the Russians will no doubt continue to be the dominant nationality, low fertility and a relatively higher death rate will reduce their share of the total population by less than half by the end of the century. Soviet leaders have launched a pronatalist policy which they hope will lead to an increase in fertility, at least among the dominant Slavic groups of the multinational country. More than 9 billion rubles (U.S. $12.2 billion) is to be spent over the next 5 years to implement measures aimed at increasing state aid to families with children, to be carried out step by step in different regions of the country. It is this writer's opinion that overall fertility is not likely to increase markedly despite the recent efforts of the central authorities, and the Russian share of the total population will probably continue to drop while that of Central Asian Muslim peoples increases.     

Social and economic factors affecting China fertility transition]

China's fertility rate, affected by various economic, cultural and social factors, is in a state of flux. In analyzing the major factors affecting the change, and in determining a fixed ratio for the degree of effectiveness of each factor, it is possible to improve birth policy in terms of predicting trends in fertility changes. Based on data gathered in 1981, the following observations were made: 1) A look at gross output value for industry and agriculture by geography shows that the more economically developed an area is, the lower is the fertility rate, and that the less economically developed an area is, the higher is the fertility rate. For example, Yunnan, with an average gross output value per person of 406.5 yuan, has a total fertility rate of 3.814, whereas Shanghai's average gross output value per person is 5566.4 yuan, and its total fertility rate is 1.316. 2) Figures comparing educational levels with total fertility rates show that cities with a greater number of women with a middle school education tend to have a lower fertility rate than cities with fewer such women. For example, Beijing's 516,000 middle school educated women have a total fertility rate of 1.589, compared to Anhui's 186,000 middle school educated women who have a total fertility rate of 2.799. Also, among college educated women, the fertility rate is 41.5/1000, the 1 child rate is 88.6%, and the multiple child rate is 1.2%, whereas those women with a primary school education have a fertility rate of 86.4/1000, a 1 child rate of 44.3%, and a multiple child rate of 26.7%. 3) As towns become urbanized, the fertility rate of those towns tend to decline. For example, Sichuan, with an Urbanization Index of 14.3 has total fertility rate of 2.650; Tianjin's Urbanization Index is 68.7, and its total fertility rate is 1.645. 4) A comparison of women engaged in physical labor to those in non-physical jobs shows that the former tend to have a higher fertility rate: women working at physical labor have a fertility rate of 86.7/1000, compared to a fertility rate of 65/1000 for those in non-physical jobs. 5) China's family planning programs advocating late marriage, late births and 1 child per couple in itself does not influence fertility rates, but taken with economic factors, it will have far reaching consequences. For example, cities with high gross output value tend to have a higher rate of 1 child per couple. 6) As the average age at marriage for women rose from 18 years in 1949 to 23 years in 1981, the rate of women having multiple children has declined in all age groups since 1964.     

Migrant Selection and the Health of U.S. Immigrants From the Former Soviet Union

Few prior studies have investigated the health of U.S. immigrants from the former Soviet Union (FSU). Utilizing data from the 2000 U.S. census and the 2000–2007 National Health Interview Survey (NIHS), we compare levels of disability of FSU immigrants with U.S.-born whites (ages 50–84). Our findings suggest an “epidemiologic paradox” in that FSU immigrants possess higher levels of education compared with U.S.-born whites, but report considerably higher disability with and without adjustment for education. Nonetheless, FSU immigrants report lower levels of smoking and heavy alcohol use compared with U.S.-born whites. We further investigate disability by period of arrival among FSU immigrants. Changes in Soviet emigration policies conceivably altered the level of health selectivity among émigrés. We find evidence that FSU immigrants who emigrated during a period when a permission to emigrate was hard to obtain (1970–1986) displayed less disability compared with those who emigrated when these restrictions were less stringent (1987–2000). Finally, we compare disability among Russian-born U.S. immigrants with that of those residing in Russia as a direct test of health selectivity. We find that Russian immigrants report lower levels of disability compared with Russians in Russia, suggesting that they are positively selected for health despite their poor health relative to U.S.-born whites.     

Growth of U.S. population, 1940–1971, in the light of an interactive two-sex model

Since it is logically impossible to hold constant both male and female age-specific fertility rates, the intrinsic growth rates or the net reproduction rates for males and females, based on that assumption, are internally inconsistent. The interactive two-sex model presented in this paper holds constant a set of bivariate age-specific fertility rates by age of men and women and allows the male and female age-specific fertility rates to adjust themselves to achieve stability. The model gives the same intrinsic growth rate for both sexes and generates intrinsic age-specific fertility rates and intrinsic net reproduction rates for males and females which are consistent and can operate simultaneously on a population. The model is applied to the U.S. data for 1940–1971, and the results are compared with those obtained from the one-sex models.     

U.S. women at work

Women made up 43% of the U.S. labor force in 1980, up from 29% in 1950, and 52% of all women 16 and over were working or looking for work compared to 34% in 1950. The surge in women's employment is linked to more delayed marriage, divorce, and separation, women's increased education, lower fertility, rapid growth in clerical and service jobs, inflation, and changing attitudes toward "woman's place." Employment has risen fastest among married women, especially married mothers of children under 6, 45% of whom are now in the labor force. Some 44% of employed women now work fulltime the year round, but still average only $6 for every $10 earned by men working that amount. This is partly because most women remain segregated in low paying "women's jobs" with few chances for advancement. Among fulltime workers, women college graduates earn less than male high school dropouts. Working wives were still spending 6 times more time on housework than married men in 1975 and working mothers of preschool children are also hampered by a severe lack of daycare facilities. Children of working women, however, appear to develop normally. Equal employment opportunity and affirmative action measures have improved the climate for working women but not as much as for minorities. The federal income tax and social security systems still discriminate against 2 income families. Woman's position in the U.S. labor force should eventually improve with the inroads women are making in some male-dominated occupations and gains in job experience and seniority among younger women who now tend to stay in the labor force through the years of childbearing and early childrearing, unlike women in the 1950s and 1960s.     

Evolving Fertility Goals and Behaviors in Current U.S. Childbearing Cohorts

In the post-Recession era, U.S. fertility rates have continued to fall. It is unclear if these declines are driven by shifts in fertility goals or growing difficulty in achieving goals. In this paper, we construct synthetic cohorts of men and women to examine both cross-cohort and within-cohort changes in fertility goals using multiple cycles of the National Survey of Family Growth. Although more recent cohorts exhibit lower achieved fertility at younger ages than earlier cohorts at the same age, intended parity remains around two children, and intentions to remain childless rarely exceed 15 percent. There is weak evidence of a growing fertility gap in the early 30s, suggesting more recent cohorts will need considerable childbearing in the 30s and early 40s to “catch up” to earlier goals, yet low-parity women in their early 40s are decreasingly likely to have unfulfilled fertility desires or intentions to have children. Low-parity men in their early 40s, though, are increasingly likely to intend children. Declines in U.S. fertility thus seem to be largely driven not by changes in early-life fertility goals so much as either a decreasing likelihood of achieving earlier goals or, perhaps, shifts in the preferred timing of fertility that depress period measures.     

Nuptiality, fertility, use of contraception, and family policies in Uzbekistan

With more than 22 million inhabitants, Uzbekistan is the most populous of the Central Asian republics of the former USSR. Using data from a retrospective survey conducted in 1992 among women of reproductive age, the paper examines fertility trends and determinants during the twentieth century. The analysis shows that the absence of a government-supported birth control programme and the strong pro-natalist policies of the Soviet authorities during most of the century did not affect either the onset, nor the progress of the fertility transition. The results indicate, however, that the social development programmes undertaken by the Soviet government did play a very active part in the transition as shown by the impact of education on reproductive behaviour, as well as on the very specific contraceptive mix adopted by the population after the mid-1970s.