The effect of stepchildren on childbearing intentions and births

This article reports on a study of the effect of stepchildren (children from previous unions) on couples' fertility intentions and childbearing behavior using longitudinal data from the National Survey of Families and Households. The results indicated that stepchildren negatively affect childbearing intentions and childbearing risks. Intentions to have a child are weakened by one's own previous biological children and the previous biological children of one's current spouse or partner. This effect varies by the parenting configuration of the couple and gender of the respondent. Among couples with stepchildren, intentions remain high until each partner has had a biological child. Unlike women, men's previous biological children do not affect their intentions of having a child. Stepchildren exert a weak negative effect on couples' childbearing risks, and this effect is mediated by the couples' childbearing intentions. The findings suggest that stepchildren should be incorporated into future models of fertility.     

The Correspondence Between Fertility Intentions and Behavior in the United States

Using data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, we describe the correspondence between intended family size and observed fertility for US men and women in the 1957–64 birth cohorts. Mean fertility intentions calculated from reports given in the mid‐20s modestly overstate completed fertility. But discrepancies between stated intent and actual fertility are common—the stated intent at age 24 (for both women and men) is more likely to miss than to match completed fertility. We focus on factors that predict which women and men will have fewer or more children than intended. Consistent with life‐course arguments, those unmarried, childless, or (for women) still in school at approximately age 24 were most likely to underachieve their intended parity (i.e., had fewer children than intended at age 24). We discuss how such discrepancies between intentions and behavior may cumulate to produce sizable cross‐group fertility differences.     

Old Habits Die Hard? Lingering Son Preference in an Era of Normalizing Sex Ratios at Birth in South Korea

South Korea was among the first countries to report both an abnormally high sex ratio at birth (SRB) and its subsequent normalization. We examine the role of son preference in driving fertility intentions during a period of declining SRB and consider the contribution of individual characteristics and broader social context to explaining changes in intentions. We employ data from the National Survey on Fertility, Family Health and Welfare that span 1991–2012. We find that reported son preference declined to a great extent but remained substantial by the end of the observation period, and that the intention to have a third child still differed by sex of existing children. Change in individual-level factors does not explain the decline in son preference, suggesting that broad social changes were also important. This study provides a better understanding of how son preference evolves in the post-transitional context of very low fertility.     

Sex preference versus number preference: the case of Korea

The author argues that the effect of sex preference must be disentangled from the effect of number preference in Korea. This study tests--with hazard models--the effect of the number of previous children on the next birth according to the sex composition of previous children. Data were obtained from the 1974 Korean Fertility Survey. This paper also analyzes the timing of childbearing in recent periods in order to determine whether replacement-level fertility is temporary or permanent. The ideal number of children declined from 3.9 children in 1965 to 2.1 in 1991. The age-specific fertility rates for ages 20-24 years declined rapidly during the late 1980s. The fertility rates among women aged 25-29 years and 30-34 years increased during 1985-90. The proportion of fertility among women aged 20-29 years increased from 67.9% in 1975 to 86.6% in 1984. Women born in the late baby boom period of the late 1950s to mid-1960s reached prime reproductive age during the late 1980s and 1990s, but the crude birth rate remained about the same during 1985-92. A higher percentage of women (22.4%) born during 1955-59 remained single in 1990. During 1960-90, the percentage of women aged 20-24 years who were married declined. These trends indicate later age at childbearing and an explanation for the temporary nature of below-replacement fertility in the late 1980s. Korean women did not want to have more than 2 children, and the interval between first and second births increased since 1985. Among pregnancies of parity 2 conceived since 1985, over 90% of women with at least one son ended subsequent pregnancies by abortion compared to only 59% without sons. Hazard models of 1974 data reveal that son preference had an important effect on fertility. Fertility was higher among women with only daughters. Findings suggest that the value of sons must be measured at the societal and not at the individual level.     

Evolving Fertility Goals and Behaviors in Current U.S. Childbearing Cohorts

In the post-Recession era, U.S. fertility rates have continued to fall. It is unclear if these declines are driven by shifts in fertility goals or growing difficulty in achieving goals. In this paper, we construct synthetic cohorts of men and women to examine both cross-cohort and within-cohort changes in fertility goals using multiple cycles of the National Survey of Family Growth. Although more recent cohorts exhibit lower achieved fertility at younger ages than earlier cohorts at the same age, intended parity remains around two children, and intentions to remain childless rarely exceed 15 percent. There is weak evidence of a growing fertility gap in the early 30s, suggesting more recent cohorts will need considerable childbearing in the 30s and early 40s to “catch up” to earlier goals, yet low-parity women in their early 40s are decreasingly likely to have unfulfilled fertility desires or intentions to have children. Low-parity men in their early 40s, though, are increasingly likely to intend children. Declines in U.S. fertility thus seem to be largely driven not by changes in early-life fertility goals so much as either a decreasing likelihood of achieving earlier goals or, perhaps, shifts in the preferred timing of fertility that depress period measures.     

Sex preference and fertility: what is the link?

It is argued that investment in programs for changing attitudes toward sex preference may not have the greatest impact on reducing fertility or increasing fertility control. Arnold's new method of analysis of determining sex preference was applied to data from a 1977 Egyptian survey of 36,000 rural households in Menoufia Governorate. Findings indicated that couples increased their use of modern contraceptives in direct proportion to an increase in the number of sons. Arnold determined that a large majority of all couples would have at least one boy early in their childbearing years. Thus sex preference would not have a large effect on fertility. Arnold's analysis among 27 countries found that without any sex preference, contraceptive usage would increase by an average of less than 3.7 percentage points. Arnold found that sex preference was strongest in Asia, particularly in South Korea and Taiwan that already have reduced fertility levels. In Africa, where fertility is high, the total elimination of sex preference would have only a 2.9 percentage point difference in contraceptive use. Sex preference had small effects on the percent of women who practice contraception, the percent who desire no more children, and the average number of additional children wanted. For example, in Bangladesh having no sex preference would show a percentage difference of 1.6 percentage points for contraceptive use, 4.7 percentage points difference for women desiring no more children, and -0.1 percentage point difference for the average number of additional children wanted. The effect of having no sex preference was strongest in India compared with Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, Thailand, Ghana, Kenya, Costa Rica, Haiti, Paraguay, and Peru. The effect of no sex preference in India would have the respective percentage point effect of 3.7, 8.9, and -0.2. Public policy should be directed to information, education, and communication with other social goals.     

The Predictive Validity Of Reproductive Intentions

On the basis of data collected in the 1975 National Fertility Study (NFS) in which continuously married white women interviewed in the 1970 NFS were reinterviewed five years later, the aggregate and individual validity of reported fertility intentions is evaluated. The main finding about aggregate prediction is that 1970 intentions overestimated 1971–1975 fertility to the same extent as the conventional 1970 total fertility rate. The conclusion is that intentions suffer all of the same vulnerabilities as other period measures. At the individual level, the validity of intentions is considerable in comparison with most other indicators.     

Missing the Target? Correspondence of Fertility Intentions and Behavior in the U.S.

Building on a framework suggested by Bongaarts (2001)and using data from the 1979 National LongitudinalSurvey of Youth, we describe the correspondencebetween intended family size and observed fertilityfor the 1957 to 1961 birth cohorts of U.S. women andmen. Over an 18-year period (1982–2000), we showthat while aggregate intentions are quite stable,discrepancies are very common at the individual level.Women and men were more likely to err in predictingnumber of additional births in the period 1982–2000 thanto hit their target number. A very strong predictor of over-and underachieving fertility is initial intended parity. Thosewho intended more than two children tended to have fewerchildren than intended, while those who intended fewer thantwo children tended to have more children than intended. Inaddition and consistent with life course arguments, thoseunmarried in 1982, childless in 1982, and (for women) stillin school in 1982 were most likely to underachieve their 2000intended parity (i.e., have fewer children than intended). Weconclude by reflecting on how the circumstances that allowdiscrepancies between intentions and behavior to almost``balance'' in the U.S. may cumulate differently elsewhere toproduce much lower fertility.     

The Intergenerational Effect and Second Childbirth: Survey Findings from the Shaanxi Province of China

Traditionally, the fertility behaviors of Chinese people have been deeply influenced by the entrenched patriarchal, patrilineal, and patrilocal systems. Women’s fertility decisions and behaviors are significantly influenced by their parents and parents-in-law. Given the current social changes with low fertility levels and intentions in China, it is still unclear about the actual link between the fertility behavior and the intergenerational effect. Therefore, we utilize data from 1577 questionnaires, conducted in 2013 in the Shaanxi Province of northwest China about fertility intentions and behaviors, and use the event history analysis method and the Cox proportional hazard model to explore the association between intergenerational effects and women’s second childbirths. “The number of the parental generation’s children” and “the living arrangements of the parental generation” are employed to measure the intergenerational effect. The findings show that there is an existence of intergenerational transmission of fertility between women of childbearing age and their parents-in-law, rather than their biological parents when considering the effects of their parents-in-law. In addition, the study finds a significant correlation between women’s second childbirth and the living arrangements of their parents-in-law, but no significant association with the living arrangements of their biological parents. These results support that the patriarchal, patrilineal, and patrilocal systems play a role in women’s fertility behaviors in contemporary China.     

The Effect of Childhood Family Size on Fertility in Adulthood: New Evidence From IV Estimation

Although fertility is positively correlated across generations, the causal effect of children’s experience with larger sibships on their own fertility in adulthood is poorly understood. With the sex composition of the two firstborn children as an instrumental variable, we estimate the effect of sibship size on adult fertility using high-quality data from Norwegian administrative registers. Our study sample is all firstborns or second-borns during the 1960s in Norwegian families with at least two children (approximately 110,000 men and 104,000 women). An additional sibling has a positive effect on male fertility, mainly causing them to have three children themselves, but has a negative effect on female fertility at the same margin. Investigation into mediators reveals that mothers of girls shift relatively less time from market to family work when an additional child is born. We speculate that this scarcity in parents’ time makes girls aware of the strains of life in large families, leading them to limit their own number of children in adulthood.     

High Sex Ratios at Birth in the Caucasus: Modern Technology to Satisfy Old Desires

During the 1990s, the sex ratio at birth increased considerably and simultaneously in the three independent Caucasian countries, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. At the end of the first decade of the twenty‐first century, levels remain abnormally high in Armenia and Azerbaijan (above 114 male births per 100 female births) and show erratic trends in Georgia. Analyzing data from demographic surveys carried out around 2005, we confirm the persistence of high sex ratios in these three countries and document significant differences in fertility intentions and behavior according to the sex of the previous child or children that constitute evidence of the practice of sex‐selective abortion. These countries combine societal features and medical systems that make this phenomenon possible: son preference in a context of low fertility and the possibility of prenatal sex selection given easy access to ultrasound screening and induced abortion. Why high sex ratios are observed only in these three countries of the sub‐region remains, however, an open question.     

Intention and uncertainty at later stages of childbearing: the united states 1965 and 1970

While births may be dichotomous, fertility intentions are not inherently so. Intentions are predictions about the future and, as such, are couched in considerable uncertainty. Ignoring this uncertainty hides much of what could be learned from data on fertility intentions. This paper presents a model which allows analysis of the full range of intentions. After selecting a sample of women in the later stage of childbearing (e.g., those who intend fewer than two additional children) from the 1965and 1970 National Fertility Studies, it is shown that: (1) substantial portions of women at this stage of the reproductive life cycle were indeed uncertain of their parity-specific intention; (2) this certainty, like more firm intentions, varies by age and parity as the model predicts; and (3) there were significant shifts in the level of certainty between 1965 and 1970. Specifically, while intentions for third, fourth, and fifth births declined, more women “didn’t know” if they intended to have another child or not. Among those not intending another child, more seemed uncertain of this intention in 1970 than did comparable women in 1965. In contrast, those intending another child seemed more certain. These changes in intention and uncertainty indicate that the observed decline in intended parity was tentative. Post-1970 evidence suggests that this tentative decline has become an unequivocal one.     

Intended and Ideal Family Size in the United States, 1970–2002

Cross‐nationally, observed fertility is well below mean levels of reported ideal family size and also usually well below survey respondents' fertility desires and intentions. The United States is an exception. In this article we: (1) discuss the importance of fertility ideals and intentions for understanding observed fertility levels, (2) propose a model that can account for variable attitude‐behavior consistency, and (3) use this model as a framework to examine trends in American women's fertility ideals, intentions, and actual fertility. Our study uses data from the General Social Surveys and the Current Population Surveys. We ask whether preferences and intentions for moderate family sizes have eroded with time. The answer is remarkably clear: the dominant American ideals and intentions are for two or three children, and these preferences have persisted across the last three decades. The unusual aggregate correspondence between fertility intentions and behavior in the United States is explained by an apparent offsetting of factors that increase/decrease fertility relative to intentions.     

一孩与二孩家庭育龄妇女生育意愿比较

基于江苏苏南某农村790户家庭的抽样调查数据,比较一孩与二孩家庭育龄妇女的生育意愿,并运用回归模型对影响两类家庭育龄妇女生育意愿的因素进行研究。结果显示,两类家庭育龄妇女的意愿生育数量、意愿生育性别和意愿生育间隔没有显著差异,仅在对"女性生育的最大年龄"的认识上二孩妇女明显低于一孩妇女。但两类家庭育龄妇女在生育意愿的影响因素上存在着较大的差异。     

独生子女家庭育龄妇女生育意愿及其影响因素——基于湖北省鄂州、黄石、仙桃市的调查

文章基于2 421位独生子女家庭育龄妇女的调查数据,对18～45岁育龄妇女的二孩生育意愿进行了分析。结论表明,生活压力大及抚养成本高是制约育龄妇女生育二孩的重要因素;采用logit模型对独生子女家庭育龄妇女生育意愿影响因素进行的实证研究表明,个人、家庭、观念和政策是影响独生子女家庭育龄妇女生育意愿的主要因素。     

Economic Insecurity and the Fertility Intentions of Italian Women with One Child

The present study addresses the issue of economic insecurity and its relationship with the reproductive plans of 5,358 Italian women in couples who have recently had their first child. Data were sourced from the ISTAT Sample Survey on Births, 2005 edition. This article’s originality lies in the conceptualization of economic insecurity and the investigation of its effects on fertility intentions. We propose to capture economic insecurity by considering both the insecurity associated to the two partners’ employment status and a variety of aspects that contribute to the household’s ability to cope with possible unpredictable future events. Then, we investigate whether and how economic insecurity shapes the fertility intentions of women over their entire reproductive life span. With specific respect to women who intend to have one additional child only, we also observe the effect of economic insecurity on their intention to give birth sooner (i.e., within the next 3 years) or later. Our data show the existence of a critical factor in the passage from the generic fertility intentions to the contingent plan to have a child in the next 3 years: only half of women with one child who intend to follow the two-child family model feel ready to plan to have a second child in the next 3 years. The study also reinforces an argument that is frequently made: fertility intentions over the entire lifetime are less conditioned upon contingent constraints, and are often more closely related to individual traits and/or preferences.     

Employment first,then childbearing: Women's strategy in post-socialist Poland

Poland experienced a rapid fertility decline after the end of the socialist regime in 1989. At the same time, it became much more difficult, especially for women, to act on their determination to find and keep paid employment. To investigate whether women postponed childbearing until they found a job, we undertook a simultaneous estimation of transitions to childbirth and entry to and exit from employment. The results reveal a strong incompatibility between childbearing and employment, but also that employment does not function as a barrier to childbearing but rather that it is an important precursor when women plan how to reconcile their intentions to work and to have children. We conclude that better prospects for women's employment could result in increased fertility.     

Is Stepfamily Status Associated With Cohabiting and Married Women’s Fertility Behaviors?

Children from prior relationships potentially complicate fertility decision-making in new cohabitations and marriages. On the one hand, the “value of children” perspective suggests that unions with and without stepchildren have similar—and deliberate—reasons for shared childbearing. On the other hand, multipartnered fertility (MPF) research suggests that childbearing across partnerships is often unintended. Using the 2006–2010 National Survey of Family Growth and event-history models, I examine the role of stepfamily status on cohabiting and married women’s fertility and birth intendedness, with attention to union type and stepfamily configuration. Adjusting for covariates, women in stepfamily unions are more likely to have a first shared birth in a union than women in unions in which neither partner has children from past relationships, but stepfamily births are less likely to be intended than unintended. Further, this association varies by union type: married women have similar birth risks across stepfamily status, but births are less likely to be intended in marital stepfamilies. For cohabitors, women in a stepfamily are more likely to have a birth than women in nonstepfamily unions, with no differences in intendedness. Configuration (whose children and how many) also matters; for instance, women with one child from a past relationship are more likely to have a birth and to have an intended than unintended birth than women with other stepfamily configurations. It appears that children from either partner’s prior relationships influences subsequent fertility decision-making, undermining the utility of the “value of children” perspective for explaining childbearing behaviors in complex families.     

中国妇女生育意愿与生育行为的差异及其影响因素

生育行为与生育意愿背离现象广泛存在。在发达国家,普遍的情况是实际生育率大大低于意愿生育率。发展中国家同样出现了生育行为与生育意愿背离的现象,但更多呈现出与发达国家相反的规律。中国也出现了生育行为与生育意愿背离,且实际高于意愿的情况。根据中国2001年全国生殖健康调查,基本完成生育的40~49岁妇女,其平均理想子女数为1.8,而平均实际生育子女数为2.2。利用2001年全国生殖健康调查数据,考察中国妇女生育行为与生育意愿背离的特征和影响因素,并考察个体背景(个人特征和社会经济背景)、生育政策和生育孩子情况(包括孩子的性别结构和存活状况)对生育意愿与生育行为的差异产生的影响。结果表明,这些因素都对生育意愿与生育行为的差异产生显著影响,但性别偏好是造成生育行为大于生育意愿的主要因素。