Shedding Some (More) Light in Bourdieu's Habitus and Doxa: A Socio-Phenomenological Approach

In this paper, I attempt to shed more light in Bourdieu's habitus and doxa, by drawing on phenomenological and Bourdieusian-based literature, social theory and some findings from sociological research. Despite the fact that there is a vast work concerning the examination of these two concepts, there are still some misunderstandings about them. For that reason, I have tried to draw a clearer picture of habitus, by linking it with phenomenological “being-in-the-world” and describing its elements. As for doxa, I discuss its conceptual relation with habitus and phenomenology's natural attitude. Also, attention is given to some aspects of both habitus and doxa, which have not addressed in detailed fashion yet, but they are nevertheless theoretically useful for empirical qualitative research.     

The two stories of the habitus/structure relation and the riddle of reflexivity: A meta-theoretical reappraisal

This article argues that two key puzzles arising from the theories of Bourdieu are inter-related. One is the question of how Bourdieu analyses the relationship between structure and habitus, and the other is the place of reflexivity in Bourdieu's work. We contend that it is only by carefully analysing Bourdieu's theoretical structure to grasp the relationship between these elements that one can understand whether or not his work offers useful resources for analysing the relation between routine action and self-reflection. This paper argues that there are two narrations of the structure/habitus relation in Bourdieu's work, and that the concept of self-reflective subjectivity is a residual element of the first narration and does not appear in the second. We then contend that this residual and under-developed concept of self-reflective subjectivity should not be confused with Bourdieu's analysis of epistemic reflexivity. These moves allow us to contribute to ongoing debates about the relation between routine action and self-reflection by arguing that the concept of the “reflexive habitus” – which some have argued is characteristic of social agents in high/late modernity – is both conceptually confused and is not a logical extension of Bourdieu's theories. In this way we try to clear the ground for more productive ways of thinking about routine action and self-reflection.     

Toward Defining the Causal Role of Consciousness: Using Models of Memory and Moral Judgment from Cognitive Neuroscience to Expand the Sociological Dual‐Process Model

What role does “discursive consciousness” play in decision‐making? How does it interact with “practical consciousness?” These two questions constitute two important gaps in strong practice theory that extend from Pierre Bourdieu's habitus to Stephen Vaisey's sociological dual‐process model and beyond. The goal of this paper is to provide an empirical framework that expands the sociological dual‐process model in order to fill these gaps using models from cognitive neuroscience. In particular, I use models of memory and moral judgment that highlight the importance of executive functions and semantic memory. I outline each model as it pertains to the aforementioned gaps in strong practice theory. I then use the models from cognitive neuroscience to create an expanded dual‐process model that addresses how and when conscious mental systems override and interact with subconscious mental systems in the use of cultural ends for decision‐making. Finally, using this expanded model I address the sociological debate over the use of interview and survey data. My analysis reveals that surveys and interviews both elicit information encoded in declarative memory and differ primarily in the process of information retrieval that is required of respondents.     

The Social as Heaven and Hell: Pierre Bourdieu's Philosophical Anthropology

Many authors have argued that all studies of socially specific modalities of human action and experience depend on some form of “philosophical anthropology”, i.e. on a set of general assumptions about what human beings are like, assumptions without which the very diagnoses of the cultural and historical variability of concrete agents' practices would become impossible. Bourdieu was sensitive to that argument and, especially in the later phase of his career, attempted to make explicit how his historical‐sociological investigations presupposed and, at the same time, contributed to the elaboration of an “idea of the human being”. The article reconstructs Bourdieu's philosophical anthropology, starting with his genetic sociology of symbolic power, conceived as a form of critical theory (latu sensu), and concluding with an account of the conditio humana in which recognition (“symbolic capital”) appears as both the fundamental existential goal through which human agents strive to confer meaning on their lives and the source of the endless symbolic competition that keeps society moving. The agonistic vision of the social universe that grounds his sociological studies returns in his philosophical anthropology under the guise of a singular synthesis between Durkheim's thesis that “Society is God” and Sartre's idea that “hell is other people”.     

Micro‐situational Foundations of Social Structure: An Interactionist Exploration of Affective Sanctioning

Micro‐interaction dynamics of affective sanctioning have been widely acknowledged but rarely related to the emergence of social phenomena. This paper aims to highlight the constitutive force of interaction activity by critically analysing two sociological models, Bourdieu's theory of practice and Barnes's Performative Theory of Social Institutions (PTSI). Such a comparison allows me to reveal two differing models of social phenomena currently operating in sociological debates: an extrinsic structuralist model which tacitly conveys macro‐structural phenomena as prior and determinant of individuals and their micro‐interactions, and an intrinsic structuralism model which prioritizes individuals’ interactions and conceives them as constituting both the individual and the structural. I argue that the latter's emphasis on the dynamics of mutual susceptibility to affective sanctioning as underpinning consensus among inherently heterogeneous individuals provides a platform to further support the tenets of Interactionism and helps to expose Bourdieu's over‐deterministic methodological individualism prevalent in most sociological theory. I conclude that by conceiving emotions as causal, rather than the effect of social forces, sociological theory can provide an explanation of both individual practices and systemic phenomena which resolves macro‐structural tensions. In doing so, I suggest an ontological understanding of the “social” which supports the Interactionist central tenet that the local takes priority over wider structural phenomena.     

Connecting sleep,the neurocognitive memory system,and Bourdieu's habitus concept: Is sleep a generative force of the habitus?

Bourdieu's habitus theory has been criticized for allegedly being static and deterministic. This is partly due to insufficiently elaborated microstructural aspects of the habitus. Previous works have tried to elaborate the habitus' individual side by drawing on neuropsychological and neuroscientific concepts including the neuropsychological memory system. Despite its relevance for several social processes, sleep has not been considered in this context. The present work investigates the interrelatedness of habitus, sleep, and the memory system with particular focus on the determinism and staticity critique. It shows that the neuropsychological memory system overlaps largely with implicit memory and sleep plays an important role in the formation of habitus‐relevant memory. Moreover, sleep enhances processes such as memory consolidation, reflexivity, associative creativity, and dream‐associated simulation of unknown situations which counter the determinism and staticity critique. The present article argues that habitus, memory, and sleep are closely related and memory and sleep represent operational micro‐structures of the habitus. Moreover, sleep‐related processes represent a generative force that renders the habitus more dynamic. Finally, strengths and weaknesses of the habitus‐memory‐sleep nexus are discussed and further lines of research are outlined.     

Moody habitus: Bourdieu with existential feelings

This paper proposes a way of integrating the concepts of habitus and mood. The purpose of this conceptual move is to enrich Pierre Bourdieu's treatment of habitus with a better recognition of its affective aspects. The paper draws on phenomenological studies of psychic disorders and applies the concept of existential feeling to specify what moods are and do. The framing proposed distinguishes between dispositions that function in the foreground and in the background of habitus. Thereby it is possible to regard moods as background dispositions of habitus. This paper also discusses what this idea of moody habitus can do for research in habitus and human practice.     

Kinesthesia,Synesthesia and Le Sacre du Printemps: Responses to Dance Modernism

ABSTRACT

“Kinesthesia, Synesthesia and Le Sacre du Printemps: Responses to Dance Modernism” discusses the reception of Vaslav Nijinsky's controversial choreography to Igor Stravinsky's Le Sacre du Printemps (1913) in the light of kinesthesia, or movement sense, and synesthesia or the merging of the senses. Dr. Järvinen argues that the invention of kinesthetic sense and particularly the theory of expression linked with this notion, kinesthetic sympathy, were historically and culturally specific responses to increasing abstraction as a goal in the arts, also seen in Le Sacre du Printemps, a work aiming to produce synesthetic experiences in the spectators.     

The Meaning of Meaning in Sociology. The Achievements and Shortcomings of Alfred Schutz's Phenomenological Sociology

Phenomenological sociology was founded at the beginning of 1930s by Alfred Schutz. His mundane phenomenology sought to combine impulses drawn from Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and Weber's action theory. It was made famous at the turn of 1960s and 1970s by Garfinkel's ethnomethodology and Berger & Luckmann's social constructionism. This paper deals with the notable accomplishments of Schutz and his followers and then proceeds to a shared shortcoming, which is that the phenomenological approach is unable to understand meaning in any other way but as actors's knowledge. Therefore, phenomenological sociologists are forced to describe the actor's interpretations of meaning as transparent to the actor him/herself, even if they sometimes make heroic attempts to escape the limitations of the phenomenological conception. The limitation is apparent in Husserl's and Schutz's definition of meaning as a “reflective intentional act”, Garfinkel's use of the term “accounting” to refer to a signifying effect, and the way Berger and Luckmann describe their social theory as “sociology of knowledge”. Today, similar confusions are present in Michael Polanyi's “tacit knowledge”and in Giddens' structuration theory.     

Siting Praxeology. The Methodological Significance of “Public” in Theories of Social Practices

The concept of “site” is at the center of current debates in theories of social practices as well as in cultural anthropology. It is unclear, however, how to assess the associated methodological assumption that overriding social structures or cultural formations can manifest themselves in sites. The article draws on the conception of social practices and introduces the notion of “publicness” in order to explicate how and why sociality and social structures can be accessed through “siting”. Sites as well as social practices, it is claimed, have to be conceptualized as essentially public and thus principally observable phenomena. This assumption of publicness implicit to both site ontology and theories of social practices is unfolded on the basis of a praxeological reformulation of the paradigm of joint attention elaborated in developmental psychology. To avoid presentist misinterpretations, we then conceptualize sociality as chains of practices across time and space, drawing on the works of Theodore Schatzki, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Anthony Giddens and Bruno Latour. The public carriers of practices (artifacts, symbols, media, bodies) and the translocal structures they establish acquire particular significance in these approaches. In a further step, we present some methodological consequences of the “publicness assumption” and support our arguments by referring to Pierre Bourdieu's study on Distinction.     

Social Representations and Repression: Examining the First Formulations of Freud and Moscovici

The English edition of Moscovici's classic work on the social representation of psychoanalysis enables us to reflect on the historical origins of psychoanalytic ideas and of social representation theory itself. Moscovici claimed that science was both univocal and abstract and, in these respects, it differs from the social representations of commonsense. This paper explores these notions, especially in relation to Moscovici's claim that psychoanalytic theory is to be found in Freud's first formulations. It is suggested that some of the processes, which Moscovici attributes to the passage of psychoanalytic ideas to commonsense, can be found occur in the early history of psychoanalysis. This can be seen in Freud's criticisms of the way Jung used the concept of “complex”. Moreover, psychoanalytic theory could never be univocal for it incorporated the voices of patients and their representations of the world. An examination of Studies on Hysteria reveals further multivocality as Freud uses both the “action” language of ordinary life and the reified, nominalized language of science. Examples are given in relation to the first formulations of the key psychoanalytic concept of “repression”. Some comparisons are made between Freud's first formulations of “repression” and Moscovici's first formulations of “social representation”.     

Changing preferences towards redistribution: How deliberation shapes welfare attitudes

The article departs from the argument that research on welfare attitudes is, so far, dominated by large‐scale survey‐studies, which allow for generalizable insights into citizens' preferences and evaluations, but are necessarily limited in their ability to capture the dynamic and contextual aspects of attitude formation. In order to broaden the horizon of welfare attitudes' research, this article introduces a new qualitative method, namely deliberative forums. In these large group discussions—originally developed for participatory decision‐making—attitudes, opinions, and preferences are core aspects of the deliberation process, and the article argues that by observing deliberation, we can observe attitude construction “in vivo ”. The evidence from a two‐day German deliberation event illustrates in an exploratory manner how information, reasoning, and group processes can influence people's evaluations and expressed policy preferences with regard to redistribution. By linking participants' answers from a survey before and after the event to their statements during the discussions, the article not only shows that the preferences for redistribution people expressed in the survey answers are often higher after the deliberative event, but also seeks to make sense of attitudinal dynamics on the basis of the qualitative material by pointing towards the role of information, reasoning, and group processes.     

Institutions and Social Structures1

This paper clarifies the terms “institutions” and “social structures” and related terms “rules”, “conventions”, “norms”, “values” and “customs”. Part one explores the similarities between institutions and social structures whilst the second and third parts explore differences. Part two considers institutions, rules, habits or habitus and habituation, whilst part three critically reflects on three common conceptions of social structures. The conclusion comments upon reflexive deliberation via the internal conversation.     

Learning from parents: A qualitative interview study on how parents experience their journey through the Dutch child protection system

The quality of parents' experiences with the child protection system (CPS) is related to the outcomes of their family's process in the system. The importance of collaboration with parents in child protection is underpinned by human and children's rights conventions addressing the right for family life and parents being first responsible in fulfilling children's rights. We interviewed 20 parents about their experiences with the Dutch CPS. Our thematic analysis shows that a CPS serving the best interests of their children is most important to parents. To realize this, professionals should (1) “not let it happen but do something,” (2) “get a clear picture of the family's situation,” and (3) “take parents seriously.” Parents emphasize that a system providing sufficient “money, time, and knowledge” is needed to facilitate professionals. Their experiences seem to influence their trust in the system and their attitude towards it. This study shows new insights in parents' experiences, such as their advice to professionals to determine the truth and to be decisive. This deepened knowledge about parents' experiences is essential for evaluating and improving the CPS.     

Signature Scents

ABSTRACT

Perfume critique is an underdeveloped academic field, and this includes considerations of perfume as a theme within other art forms such as literature. In this article, Angela Carter's Wise Children and Monika Fagerholm's Wonderful Women by the Sea are read alongside perfume blogs in order to analyze the significance of perfume references in the novels. It is demonstrated that the authors' choice of perfumes for their characters plays a crucial part in their characterization, especially in relation to the theme of identity change. Using Alfred Gell's analysis of perfume use as bound up with “the transcendence of the sweet life,” it is argued that female characters use perfume to become someone else, sometimes a past self. Furthermore, the use of perfume as a literary device in these novels is shown serve as the vehicle for a feminist critique of the division between “masculine” “high” and “feminine” “low” culture.     

“惯习”与社会工作实践的再思考

通过阐释布迪厄的实践意义与“惯习”理论的价值，对社会工作的实践进行具体分析，充分解读。提倡社会工作者的意识与思想形态及工作方法要秉承布迪厄的实践逻辑与“惯习”的优秀品质，随着时期的更替、目标的不同、要求的求新而不断地改变。并从中挖掘社会工作者的潜质，即采用“优势视角”来给予社会工作者以认可，从而调动社会工作者的积极性，提高社会工作者的工作质量，提升社会工作者的思想信念。     

Beyond Husserl and Schütz. Hermann Schmitz and Neophenomenological Sociology

Phenomenological sociology is one of the most recognized approaches for explaining the constitution of social behaviour and the construction of social reality. To this day, phenomenological sociology usually belongs to the tradition of Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and to Alfred Schütz's mundane phenomenology, thus generally presenting itself as sociology of lifeworld, sociology of everyday life, and sociology of knowledge. In contrast to this, this paper intends to outline an alternative kind of phenomenological sociology that finds its philosophical foundation in Hermann Schmitz's “New Phenomenology”. With regards especially to Schmitz's theory of the felt body (“Leib”) and his theory of situation, the basic principles of Neophenomenological Sociology (NPS) will be introduced. Their main components are (1) felt body and affective involvement as the pre-personal apriori of sociality, (2) felt-bodily communication as the basic unit of sociality, and (3) joint situations as the socio-ontological foundation and empirical manifestation of sociality. With these specific key concepts, NPS proves itself to be a socio-theoretical approach whose foremost strength is that it can identify and properly analyse the pathic dimensions of social behaviour and social situations that social sciences tend to overlook.     

Fully Unconscious and Prone to Habit: The Characteristics of Agency in the Structure and Agency Dialectic

While the human agent must have the capacity for reflexivity, intentionality and consciousness, the same agent must also be affected by the social world in which she lives: herein lies the essence of the structure and agency dialectic. This paper argues that while some realists are in principle committed to a dialectical relationship between structure and agency, there is some dissonance between this commitment and the concepts of agency that they develop. I highlight the exclusion of the unconscious and habit from realist notions of agency and argue that this oversight serves to unbalance the dialectic between structure and agency thereby leading to the over‐empowerment of agency. The concepts of agency developed by Margaret Archer, Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu are discussed in this paper. Archer's concept of agency is argued to focus exclusively on reflexivity whilst neglecting to include the unconscious and habit. Giddens is shown to develop a much improved concept of agency, which includes the unconscious, however, his rejection of the independent causal powers of structure and agency problematises his commitment to the dialectic. A much improved approach to theorising agency, developed within a critical realist framework, is offered drawing on Bourdieu's concept of habitus. The paper concludes with a discussion of gender, and considers how the unconscious and habit can help to better understand the myriad ways in which gender functions in society.     

A quantum leap for social theory

I discuss the revolutionary implications of Alexander Wendt's Quantum Mind and Social Science for social theory. These center on the significance given to society as a possibility space in which observable social reality amounts to quantum decoherent states in the system. I discuss how Wendt radicalises social constructivism and goes considerably beyond Bourdieu's conceptions of society as a field. A signature feature in Wendt's theory, the state as a hologram, comports well with the implied view of the social order in much public opinion and market research. In this respect, Wendt's theory is very attuned to the spirit of our times.