净化美化优化亲商安商富商--营口市投资环境概述

近期,在辽宁经贸代表团赴日赴韩赴港招商中,营口市成绩斐然,分别名列全省第二至三位,一时成为热点亮点彩点.这与营口的优越的投资环境密不可分.     

Essentialism, Culture, and Power: Representations of Social Class

This article argues that beliefs about social class are influenced by power and social location. Using an essentialist theory of power this study explores the asymmetries in the representations of social class among Brahmins ( N = 99) and Dalits (former "Untouchables," N = 100) in India. The results show that a significantly higher number of Brahmins believed that a poor man's brain transfer to a rich man would not affect his actions, whereas they believed the poor man's actions would be affected by the brain transplant from the rich man. Dalits did not selectively endorse essentialist notions of identity. The implications of the findings are discussed in conjunction with current empowerment and affirmative action programs for Dalits in India .     

Social Representations and Individual Actions: Misunderstandings, Omissions and Different Premises

Wolfgang Wagner (1994) has submitted a logically ordered and well phrased chain of arguments. But his paper contains, at least in concern of our research which he uses for illustration (Thommen et al , 1988, 1992), a number of misinterpretations. Furthermore, and what is more important, it ignores relevant scientific developments and tries to monopolize the field of social representations for one single, namely Wagner's own, viewpoint and level of analysis.¹ For these reasons, I can not accept some of his statements.     

Messiahs, Pariahs, and Donors: The Development of Social Representations of Organ Transplants

This longitudinal, qualitative study investigated the genesis and transformation of the social representations of organ transplants. A search of the West Australian newspaper, from 1954 to 1995 found 672 articles pertaining to organ transplants. Two distinct, but conflicting, representations emerged in the analyses. In the first representation, found from 1967/68, the surgeon was paramount and organ transplants were iconised as 'spare part surgery'. In the second representation, found from 1984/85, the role of the donor was emphasised and transplants iconised as a 'gift of life'. Both representations were discernible in 1994/95. We consider the question whether there are now two conflicting representations or one representation with two conflicting sets of beliefs at its core. The results are discussed in terms of anchoring, objectification, transformation, and structure, as well as Moscovici's (1993) notion of canonic themata.     

Sensitising Concept, Themata and Shareness: A Dialogical Perspective of Social Representations

This article aims at clarifying some critical, yet under-explored, conceptual issues of social representations from a dialogical perspective. The article recasts the notion of social representations as a sensitising, rather than a definitive, concept, based on the distinction between dialogical and monological epistemologies. It is argued that the introduction of the concept of themata into the theory suggests the dialogical interdependence between common thinking and social morphology, between the genesis and structure of social representations, and between implicit underlying themata and their pragmatic manifestations in structuring social representations. At the same time, the concept of themata implies that a social representation may be, at one and the same time, shared and communicated in hegemonic, emancipated and polemical ways in a complementary manner. These three ways of "sharing" are dialogically interrelated to each other.     

The Rehabilitation of Common Sense: Social Representations,Science and Cognitive Polyphasia

In Psychoanalysis, its image and its public (PIP) Moscovici introduced the theory of social representations and took further the project of rehabilitating common sense. In this paper I examine this project through a consideration of the problem of cognitive polyphasia, and the continuity and discontinuity between different systems of knowing. Focusing on the relations between science and common sense. I ask why, despite considerable evidence to the contrary, the scientific imagination tends to deny its relation to common sense and believe that can displace it. I argue that the psychosocial dynamic between common sense and science is revealing of how heavily they are entangled in, and indeed indebted to each other. Even more, this dynamic allows for a full appreciation of what the theory of social representations calls states of cognitive polyphasia. Different systems of thinking and knowing do not displace each other but live side by side, co‐existing in a variety of ways, fulfilling different functions and answering different needs in social life.