上市公司股权结构与公司价值关系的探讨

本文在对股权结构与公司绩效关系进行理论分析的基础上，描述了我国上市公司股权结构的现状及特征，对股权结构影响上市公司价值的因素进行了分析，并提出优化融资结构，完善资本市场的具体措施，以使上市公司完善治理结构，进而保证公司取得良好的经营绩效，提升公司价值。     

中国上市公司股权结构和公司绩效关系的实证分析

为了研究股权结构对公司绩效的影响,本文以企业资本回报率为公司绩效的度量,对上市公司股权结构与公司绩效的相关关系进行了分析。实证结果表明,股权结构对公司绩效有显著的影响。主要体现在:股权集中度与公司绩效间呈现显著的正相关关系。国家股比例与公司绩效间显著的正相关关系,法人股及流通股比例与公司绩效间具有负相关关系。     

资本结构研究述评

从管理者持股、股权结构、专用性资产、战略选择、动态环境对资本结构的影响,以及资本结构与企业绩效之间的关系6个方面,总结了国内外学者们的研究,分析了研究存在的分歧和不足,试图为我国资本结构研究提供借鉴.     

资本结构治理效应:中国上市公司的实证研究

资本结构影响公司治理的结果最终会体现在公司绩效的变化上。本文通过对1992-2004年间我国上市公司资本结构影响公司绩效的实证分析发现:资产主营业务净利润率、经营费用率和资产利用率三个指标比股票价值能更好地解释资本结构对公司绩效的影响;国家股比例对公司绩效的负向影响越来越不显著;法人股比例和负债融资比例对公司绩效有不显著的正向影响等。这些结论表明,完善资本结构是完善我国上市公司治理结构从而提高公司绩效的重要途径之一。     

公司治理与资本结构对上市公司价值创造能力综合影响的实证研究

董事会特征、股权结构、资本结构、公司财务、公司价值等都是不可直接观测的潜变量,为定量研究其内在关系带来了挑战。本文在分析公司治理与资本结构对上市公司价值创造能力影响机理的基础上构建结构方程模型,通过因子分析对潜变量进行计量,通过路径分析讨论潜变量之间的依赖关系,并建立上市公司价值创造能力影响因素的综合分析框架,从整体上评估董事会特征、股权结构、资本结构、公司财务等因素对上市公司价值创造能力的直接和间接影响效果。结果表明:董事会特征与股权结构对上市公司价值创造能力的直接影响都不显著,只是存在间接影响;资本结构既存在直接影响,也存在间接影响;公司财务存在直接影响;进一步,按照对上市公司价值创造能力总体影响程度大小依次排序为:资本结构、股权结构、公司财务、董事会特征。     

论股权结构与公司绩效的关系--对中国部分上市公司的实证研究

以托宾Q值为被解释变量、股权结构为解释变量,从公司治理的角度考察了股权结构对公司业绩的影响.从电子、化工和公用事业三个行业中选取140家上市公司为样本,在将其划分为国有和民营两大类后,利用这些公司的数据进行实证分析.此研究的政策意义在于为提高公司绩效,国有企业的国有股减持应继续进行;增大民营企业的股权集中度将有利于其提高绩效;适度增大社会法人股对于改善治理结构意义重大;增大流通股比重对于提高公司绩效具有积极作用.     

基于资本结构的国内钢铁企业成长性分析

公司的资本结构对于公司成长性的影响主要体现在公司通过不同融资策略,影响资本结构中的负债结构和股权结构,进一步对公司治理结构、产品竞争策略产生影响,最终影响到公司成长性.本文首先从产业的角度出发,引用资本结构理论研究成果,对我国钢铁企业的资本结构从多个角度进行了较为详细的数据分析;其次,本文试图借鉴计量经济学的思想,利用我国钢铁上市公司的财务数据,选用不同的财务变量,利用因子分析法筛选出公司成长因子,确定成长性良好的公司;最后对本文假设进行了实证分析.     

我国上市公司的实证研究：股权结构和高层梯队与公司绩效的关系

分析了股权结构和高层梯队对公司绩效的影响并进行了实证研究。股权结构与公司绩效的实证结果显示,流通股对公司绩效有显著负面影响,而法人股则与之呈弱的正相关关系。在国有股权控股的企业中,股权一定程度上的集中对公司是有利的,且政府直接控股比间接控股更有利于企业的整体价值。在论证高层梯队与公司绩效关系上,从团队的传记性特征方面作了实证分析,初步得出了公司绩效与高层梯队平均年龄和平均受教育状况正相关,而与年龄和教育背景的差异性呈负相关关系这一结论。此外,在不同股权结构下,高层梯队对公司绩效影响具有差异性。     

资本结构与股权结构对商业银行综合绩效的影响

依据商业银行三性原则及骆驼评价体系,采用主成分分析法构建了商业银行综合绩效指标,选用我国14家银行2007～2011年的面板数据研究了资本结构与股权结构对我国商业银行绩效的影响。结果表明:资本充足率及股权集中度能显著地影响商业银行的绩效;国有属性对商业银行综合绩效有正向影响,但不显著。     

上市公司股权结构与公司绩效关系的实证分析

(一)股权结构对公司绩效的作用机制公司股权结构对公司经营绩效的影响是通过股权结构对公司治理效率和公司行为的影响而体现出来的。不同的股权结构安排对公司治理效率和公司行为产生不同的影响。股权结构从股东治理能力和动力、治理内容、治理功能的发挥及治理模式的选择等方面对公司治理效率产生影响,而公司治理效率对公司绩效具有重要影响作用。同时,股权结构影响着公司的经营目标、行为取向,并对公司的决策机制、投资行为、交易行为和分配行为产生影响,进而对公司绩效产生影响。不同性质的股东由于治理偏好、治理能力及行为取向的不同,…     

Capital structure,managerial ownership and firm performance: evidence from Egypt

This paper focuses on an important issue, which has generally received less attention in corporate governance literature, being the effect of managerial ownership on the relationship between debt and firm performance. By employing a sample of Egyptian listed firms, the generalized least squares method, as a panel data technique, is used to examine the joint effect of debt and managerial ownership on various measures of firm performance (i.e., Tobin’s q and ROA). The results reveal that managerial ownership moderates the relationship between debt and firm performance, with the relationship being negative (positive) in presence (absence) of managerial ownership concentration. The implication of this finding is that the optimal capital structure is more likely to be contingent on contextual variables as well as the roles, power, and stakes of key internal and external actors. Put simply, the effectiveness of one corporate governance mechanism (i.e., debt) is more likely to be contingent on the effect of other existed corporate governance mechanisms, and hence, there is not one best arrangement of either capital structure or ownership structure, but different arrangements are not equally good.     

股权结构、高管持股与公司绩效——来自民营上市公司的证据

本文以1999年至2003年的民营上市公司为研究对象,回避国有上市公司的非市场因素,研究股权结构、高管持股对绩效的影响。实证研究显示:第一大股东绝对控股时,其持股比例越高公司绩效越好,这时高管的股权激励无法发挥作用;当第一大股东持股比例低于20％时,高管的股权激励也无法发挥作用;当第一大股东持股比例在20％至40％之间时,其持股比例和绩效呈现倒U型关系,这时高管的股权激励发挥显著的作用。不同的股权结构对股权激励和绩效产生不同的影响,设计公司治理机制时应充分考虑这一因素。     

Does strategic corporate performance depend on corporate financial architecture? Empirical study of European,Russian and other emerging market’s firms

Performance of the firm depends on its structural dimensions: capital structure, ownership structure and corporate governance. Their interactions are known as corporate financial architecture according to S. Myers. In this paper we analyze financial architecture which is a mix of ownership structure, capital structure, control and board’s composition, and therefore, provides the given framework for improving corporate performance. We contribute to the literature by different attributes of our study. In contrast to most empirical papers on performance, we develop integrated rather than segmented approach combining the intrinsic components of corporate financial design in one research model. We introduce new variable to capture the structure of ownership for the purpose of performance analysis. Our third contribution is based on comparative analysis of the influence of financial architecture over corporate performance in rather different capital market environment: developed European and emerging (developing) capital market’s countries. We start with a classic empirical model of the impact of ownership structure, capital structure and other components of financial architecture on the corporate performance. Further we verify the validity of exogenous nature of key variables of the classic model when applying it to companies in developed and emerging market environment. Our results could have some important policy implications for the firms in normal economic environment as well as in the period of global economic crisis. We found that the higher proportion of related ownership which indicates investors with significant voting power and the board’s composition affect firm performance positively. The related shareholders and independent directors seem to add more value to firms while the impact of government ownership differs depending on the country. The emerging market’s sample versus the one from developed countries proves the stronger influence of corporate financial architecture over performance.     

Ownership structure,investors’ protection and corporate valuation: the effect of judicial system efficiency in family and non-family firms

Research on the effect of ownership structure on firm performance shows no convergent evidence concerning the sign and form of the above-mentioned relationship. Similarly, there is no homogeneous evidence documenting family ownership concentration is always positively or negatively correlated with firm value, or irrelevant. This paper analyses whether and how the de facto investor protection provided by the judicial system affects the relationship between corporate performance and ownership structure in 1314 firms operating in four European countries (Germany, France, Italy, and Spain) over a five-year period, 2010–2014. Moreover, we analyse whether judicial system efficiency influences if and how family firms in the controlling coalition collude for expropriating minority shareholders. Our findings show that the level of shareholder protection, derived from judicial efficiency, is relevant to the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance, thus corroborating literature in that institutional contexts matter in explaining such relations. The results suggest the need for more efficient external mechanisms of corporate governance to facilitate investment in equity capital, thus decreasing the country risk perceived by investors.     

Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from Israel

The study examines the effect of ownership structure on firm performance. We distinguish between family firms, firms controlled by partnerships of individuals, concern controlled firms, and firms where blockholders have less than 50% of the vote. The empirical work analyzes data on 280 Israeli firms and employs the technique of Data Envelopment Analysis. It is found that owner-manager firms are less efficient in generating net income than firms managed by a professional (non-owner) manager, and that family firms run by their owners perform (relatively) the worst. This evidence suggests that the modern form of business organization, namely the open corporation with disperse ownership and non-owner managers, promotes firm performance.     

民营上市公司股权结构特征分析

本文以2001年末完成上市的112家民营上市公司为研究样本,运用非参数检验、回归分析等统计方法对民营上市公司的股权结构特征进行了实证分析,结果发现,民营上市公司与非民营上市公司股权结构存在显著差异性,并且民营上市公司业绩与股权结构呈非线性关系。     

金字塔结构、融资替代与资本结构——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据

基于对"内部资本市场融资替代效应"的分析,本文以金字塔结构复杂性衡量内部资本市场规模,采用2005年我国270家民营上市公司为样本,实证检验金字塔结构对上市公司资本结构的影响。结果表明,金字塔结构复杂性与上市公司全部非银行借款率、短期非银行借款率显著正相关。这表明金字塔结构越复杂,上市公司越倾向利用内部资本市场提供的非银行借款。研究结论从"内部资本市场融资替代效应"角度解释了我国民营上市公司广泛隶属于金字塔结构的合理性。     

财务困境、财务困境间接成本与公司业绩

本文研究了上市公司财务困境、财务困境间接成本及其与公司业绩之间的关系.通过实证研究企业陷入财务困境以后业绩变化的情况,本文认为,我国上市公司的间接财务困境成本显著为正,从总体来看,公司的间接困境成本大约为企业价值总额的25%-36.5%之间,资本结构对这种业绩的变化所引起的困境间接成本具有显著影响.负债率越高的企业,在困境期内将损失越大的市场份额和利润.     

CEO Duality,Agency Costs,and Internal Capital Allocation Efficiency

This study examines the impact of CEO duality on firms’ internal capital allocation efficiency. We observe that when the CEO is also chair of the board, diversified firms make inefficient investments, as they allocate more capital to business segments with relatively low growth opportunities over segments with high growth opportunities. The adverse impact of CEO duality on investment efficiency prevails only among firms that face high agency problems, as captured by high free cash flows, staggered board structure and low board independence. Depending on the severity of the agency problem, CEO duality is associated with a decrease in industry‐adjusted investment in high‐growth segments of 1% to 2.1% over the following year, relative to that in low‐growth segments. However, CEOs’ equity‐based compensation curbs the negative effect of CEO duality on internal capital allocation efficiency. Overall, the findings of this study offer strong support for the agency theory and postulate the internal capital allocation policy as an important channel through which CEO duality lowers firm value in diversified firms.