Assessing the Height of Mobility Barriers: A Methodology and an Empirical Test in the UK Retail Grocery Industry1

A profitable niche will have few entrants if the presence of significant mobility barriers impedes entry and, hence, reduces the expected rents for entrants. Identifying sources of mobility barriers is critical in explaining how incumbents can sustain competitive advantage and obtain supranormal profits (excess rents). While much of strategic management research (and strategic group research, in particular) focuses on the pursuit of sustainable performance advantages, there is relatively little empirical research exploring the dynamics of firm movement and the impact of mobility barriers on performance. The paper analyses mobility dynamics and, most importantly, develops a method to identify the location and severity of mobility barriers. The method is illustrated on a database of large multiples in the UK retail grocery industry for the period 1982–1986. It appears that there are two dimensions of strategic change that facilitate movement into profitable niches. Implications for competition and profitability are discussed.     

Strategic Sourcing in the Presence of Uncertain Supply and Retail Competition

This study develops an analytical model to evaluate competing retail firms' sourcing strategies in the presence of supply uncertainty. We consider a common supplier that sells its uncertain supply to two downstream retail firms engaging in price competition in a horizontally differentiated product market. The focal firm has a dual‐sourcing option, while the rival firm can only source from the common supplier. We assess the system‐wide effects of supply uncertainty on the focal firm's incentive to pursue the dual‐sourcing strategy. We find that the focal firm's dual‐sourcing strategy can create a win–win situation that leads to increased retail prices and expected profits for both firms. Furthermore, under certain conditions, we show that it is beneficial for the focal firm to strategically source from the common supplier, even if its alternative supplier offers a lower wholesale price. Overall, we identify two types of incentives for adopting the dual‐sourcing strategy: the incentive of mitigating supply risk through supplier diversification and the incentive of strategic sourcing for more effective retail competition.     

管理层权力与企业价值：基于产品市场竞争的视角

以2005－2011年上海证券交易所A股市场为研究对象,将个人和机构投资者情绪的影响进行对比研究以明确两种情绪在市场中扮演的角色。以往的相关研究大多关注两者的相互影响或其中一种对市场的影响,本文将两者同时考虑,并利用滚动回归方法从量化股票收益对投资者情绪变化的敏感度这一新视角深入到个股层面。研究表明:机构投资者情绪可以帮助预测个人投资者情绪,反之不成立;另外,机构投资者在市场上表现得更为理性,他们的情绪能够预测后市,而个人投资者情绪不具有预测性;进一步研究后发现,投资者关注度越高的股票,其收益对投资者情绪变化的敏感度越高,这种现象无论是在对个人还是对机构投资者情绪变化的敏感度上均表现出一致性。     

汽车市场中租赁渠道对传统零售渠道的影响

在零售与租赁混合渠道供应链中,占主导地位的单个汽车制造商向单个零售商和单个租赁商分别销售产品,然后零售商在零售市场销售产品,租赁商在租赁市场出租产品。在两周期设置下根据制造商是否向租赁商提供回购合同,将渠道结构划分为独立式、冲突式和回购式三类,并分析了租赁渠道对传统零售渠道的影响以及对制造商的启示。     

发电侧电力市场竞价策略的演化博弈分析

本文应用演化博弈方法分析了发电企业竞价策略的自发演化模式,指出了政府对电力市场进行监管和调控的必要性与可能性,分析了我国制定电力市场竞价上网规则的思路。     

Nonexclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons

A seller can trade an endowment of a perfectly divisible good, the quality of which she privately knows. Buyers compete by offering menus of nonexclusive contracts, so that the seller can privately trade with several buyers. In this setting, we show that an equilibrium exists under mild conditions and that aggregate equilibrium allocations are generically unique. Although the good for sale is divisible, in equilibrium the seller ends up trading her whole endowment or not trading at all. Trades take place at a price equal to the expected quality of the good, conditional on the seller being ready to trade at that price. Our model thus provides a novel strategic foundation for Akerlof's (1970) results. It also contrasts with competitive screening models in which contracts are assumed to be exclusive, as in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Latent contracts that are issued but not traded in equilibrium play an important role in our analysis.     

市场竞争结构与银行稳健

国际上,尤其是发展中国家频频发生的银行危机引起了学术界和决策层对银行稳健这一问题的广泛关注,运用微观经济学的厂商理论对市场结构影响银行稳健的机制进行理论上的探索,由此论证竞争在金融发展中的必要。     

Retail competition in the fast-moving consumer goods industry: The case of France and the UK

UK retailers in the fast-moving consumer goods industry focus their strategy on building loyalty through quality ‘own’ labels. By contrast, French retailers compete aggressively on price. Judy and Marcel Corstjens, and Rajiv Lal argue that either a ‘two-tier’ or parallel system will evolve in the future or a national industry will tend to oscillate from one strategy to another. Retailers must decide which of the two strategies they will consistently adopt.     

债务契约、破产约束与产品市场竞争行为

根据债务契约所规定的控制权转移特征,运用契约理论构建不同破产约束的债务契约模型,阐述其对产品市场竞争行为的影响,并分析企业可能采取的竞争行为,特别是破产约束软化程度对掠夺性竞争行为的影响.研究发现:随着债务契约破产约束的逐步降低,企业在竞争中会逐步减小均衡产量,导致企业在产品市场上的竞争力度下降,在一定程度上弱化对手掠夺性竞争行为的效果,从而阻碍产品市场优胜劣汰机制的发挥.故我国政府应适当强化企业债务破产约束,而债权人也应力图通过债务重组方式来解决其债务危机.     

信息技术投资对零售市场均衡的影响分析

从一个基本模型出发,考察了没有IT投资的零售市场定价、市场份额和利润.然后考察有IT投资的零售市场,考虑搜索成本变化时的定价、市场份额和利润.最后,考察不同进货成本的零售商IT投资的条件及其市场均衡.     

所有权、市场竞争及人力资本专用性——一个模型的建立及扩展

建立了"剩余控制权与剩余索取权相互关系"模型,认为剩余控制权是连接产权与市场的中介,并通过人力资本专用性对剩余控制权的影响把当事人的工作特征纳入视野。     

市场竞争与价格离散——影响机理与经验证据

价格离散背离了"一价定律",是市场运行效率低的一种反映,但却是一种普遍存在的现象。那么,通过市场竞争机制能否降低某一行业（产品）的市场中的价格离散?本文先是分别在消费者信息搜寻理论和厂商空间竞争理论的框架下,分析市场竞争对价格离散的影响机理。然后,本文收集了我国地级（及以上）城市的车险市场上所有企业的价格和其他相关变量,研究主要发现：即使去除了产品异质性,车险市场仍然存在明显的价格离散,企业之间价格的变异系数的均值和中位数分别为0.472和0.445;市场竞争能够降低车险市场的价格离散,平均而言,企业数目提高10家（市场集中程度降低一单位样本标准差）,企业之间车险价格的标准差将降低其平均水平的约25%（5%~6%）。辅助性分析和稳健性分析支持了本文结论。本文的政策含义在于：应当增进供给侧的竞争,降低需求侧的信息搜寻成本。     

资本结构与产品市场竞争之间的交互作用研究

公司代理成本受到资本结构和产品市场竞争的双重影响,资本结构与产品市场竞争之间还具有关联关系.基于2000年～2006年A股上市公司面板数据的实证研究发现,资本结构和产品市场竞争对代理成本的影响是显著的,影响方式随控股股东性质的不同而不同.资本结构与产品市场竞争之间存在交互作用,股权集中度越高,产品市场竞争的隐性激励效果越弱;产品市场竞争越激烈,股权激励的效果越显著,债务融资的负面效应也越大.产品市场竞争与分散型股权结构、股权激励之间是互补的,与控股型股权结构、债务融资之间相互替代.这一结论对于改善中国上市公司,尤其是国有控股上市公司的公司治理结构具有重要的现实意义.     

进口竞争、产品差异化与企业产品出口加成率

本文借鉴De Loecker等(2016)的方法,测度了企业—产品层面的生产要素投入,度量了我国企业产品出口加成率,并区分产品差异化程度,实证研究产品层面关税降低导致的进口竞争对于企业产品出口加成率的影响。总体上,进口竞争显著提升了企业产品出口加成率,区分产品差异化程度后,发现其对异质性产品出口加成率有显著促进效应,而对同质性产品出口加成率的影响效应不明显;改变关键变量测算方法、样本选择、模型估计方法后研究结论依然稳健。进一步作用机制检验表明,进口竞争对企业产品出口加成率的"价格效应"不明显,但"成本效应"和"质量效应"的作用显著,特别是通过提高异质性产品质量、降低同质性产品边际成本影响出口加成率。相对而言,进口竞争对出口中的外资和民营企业、进口企业、高市场竞争程度产品企业,以及一般贸易产品和资本品的出口加成率有更强的影响效应。本文识别了进口竞争影响出口加成率的差异化机制,发现了进口竞争影响我国企业产品出口加成率的质量升级效应,表明进口竞争有利于提升我国企业产品的国际市场势力。     

品牌区域市场资源竞争及品牌分布规律

本文基于生态学原理,探讨了同类品牌区域市场资源竞争问题以及品牌自由分布规律,给出了同类品牌资源竞争及分布规律对我国企业实施名牌战略的几点启示.     

Supply Chain Coordination in a Market with Customer Service Competition

We consider a market with two competing supply chains, each consisting of one wholesaler and one retailer. We assume that the business environment forces supply chains to charge similar prices and to compete strictly on the basis of customer service. We model customer service competition using game‐theoretical concepts. We consider three competition scenarios between the supply chains. In the uncoordinated scenario, individual members of both supply chains maximize their own profits by individually selecting their service and inventory policies. In the coordinated scenario, wholesalers and retailers of each supply chain coordinate their service and inventory policy decisions to maximize supply chain profits. In the hybrid scenario, competition is between one coordinated and one uncoordinated supply chain. We discuss the derivation of the equilibrium service strategies, resulting inventory policies, and profits for each scenario, and compare the equilibria in a numerical study. We find that coordination is a dominant strategy for both supply chains, but as in the prisoner's dilemma, both supply chains are often worse off under the coordinated scenario relative to the uncoordinated scenario. The consumers are the only guaranteed beneficiaries of coordination.     

多基本面下异质交易者竞争及流动性分析

假设风险资产出清价值由多个基本面组成，比较分析了同质与异质信息结构下交易者策略的相互作用及对市场的影响。结果发现：交易者人数增加所导致的竞争会提高市场流动性及市场信息效率，同时对同质交易者产生挤出效应和对异质交易者产生促进效应；异质知情交易者在私人信息质量方面的竞争则会加剧市场信息不对称程度，降低市场流动性；异质交易者间通过信息质量的竞争决定收益分配。理论上，市场流动性存在最佳状态。     

Managing Slow‐Moving Perishables in the Grocery Industry

We address the value of information and value of centralized control in the context of a two‐echelon, serial supply chain with one retailer and one supplier that provide a single perishable product to consumers. Our analysis is relevant for managing slow‐moving perishable products with fixed lot sizes and expiration dates of a week or less. We evaluate two supply chain structures. In the first structure, referred to as decentralized information sharing, the retailer shares its demand, inventory, and ordering policy with the supplier, yet both facilities make their own profit‐maximizing replenishment decisions. In the second structure, centralized control, incentives are aligned and the replenishment decisions are coordinated. The latter supply chain structure corresponds to the industry practices of company‐owned stores or vendor‐managed inventory. We measure the value of information and value of centralized control as the marginal improvement in expected profits that a supply chain achieves relative to the case when no information is shared and decision making is decentralized. Key assumptions of our model include stochastic demand, lost sales, and fixed order quantities. We establish the importance of information sharing and centralized control in the supply chain and identify conditions under which benefits are realized. As opposed to previous work on the value of information, the major benefit in our setting is driven by the supplier's ability to provide the retailer with fresher product. By isolating the benefit by firm, we show that sharing information is not always Pareto‐improving for both supply chain partners in the decentralized setting.     

UK Competition Policy and Shareholder Value: The Impact of Merger Inquiries

Some previous studies have suggested that competition régimes can destroy shareholder value. This study examines data on 50 mergers in the UK between 1989 and 2002. The study confirms the finding from earlier studies of greater gains to shareholders in target than bidding companies, but does not find evidence supporting overall loss of shareholder value to target company shareholders when a merger is prohibited. It finds evidence that when the regulatory régime is stable and well understood the capital market behaves efficiently in response to new information. However, for a subgroup of the mergers involving companies with a new regulatory régime, where the industry and the stock market had little or no experience with respect to mergers, the capital market operated less efficiently.