一孩与二孩家庭育龄妇女生育意愿比较

基于江苏苏南某农村790户家庭的抽样调查数据,比较一孩与二孩家庭育龄妇女的生育意愿,并运用回归模型对影响两类家庭育龄妇女生育意愿的因素进行研究。结果显示,两类家庭育龄妇女的意愿生育数量、意愿生育性别和意愿生育间隔没有显著差异,仅在对"女性生育的最大年龄"的认识上二孩妇女明显低于一孩妇女。但两类家庭育龄妇女在生育意愿的影响因素上存在着较大的差异。     

An Econometric Investigation of Easterlin's ‘Synthesis Framework’: The Philippines and the United States

In this paper we estimate a fertility model based on Easterlin's synthesis framework. The model assumes that not all couples are able to achieve their desired number of living children because of supply constraints and that, for other couples, the number of living children may exceed desired fertility, depending upon child mortality, the level of fertility in the absence of control, and the degree of contraceptive regulation practised. Estimates of the model for samples of women with completed fertility taken from the Philippines (1973) and the United States (1965) indicated that a higher proportion of Filipino women than women in the U.S. were unable to achieve desired fertility because of supply constraints, that levels of fertility control of Filipino women not supply-constrained were lower, and that excess fertility of Filipino women was much higher. Demand-for-children equations based on the constraints model were quite different from those not taking into account the possibility that some women were supply-constrained, or that some women may have had more children than desired.     

Fertility and desired fertility: Longitudinal evidence from Thailand

Summary The validity and usefulness of 'desired additional children' and 'ideal family size' as predictors of fertility are analysed in this paper on the basis of longitudinal survey data from Thailand. First, the extent of measurement error in these variables is considered, and it is concluded that the error variance and the true variance are of similar orders of magnitude. Secondly, the changes in attitudes subsequent to births and deaths of children are investigated. It is found that the number of additional children desired is decreased by births and increased by deaths, but less than would be expected if 'desired additional children' represented an unchanging target family size. 'Ideal family size' is almost unaffected by births and deaths. Thirdly, the contribution of attitudinal variables to behavioural models is examined. It is found that desired fertility is explained no better than fertility in a standard economic model. A birth function separating desired children from identifiable physiological factors as explanatory variables indicated that the former was just significant. A model of contraceptive acceptance also found desired fertility to be a significant determinant. Thus, desired fertility can be successfully integrated into behavioural models. But on the whole, its explanatory power was weak, and it was concluded that the independent use of this variable does not significantly improve on models which relate fertility to socio-economic variables directly.     

Fertility desires and fertility outcomes

Over the last 30 years Australian fertility rates have fallen more than could have been predicted from changes in the numbers of children desired by women when they first married. This paper charts changes in desired and completed fertility in Australia, matches originally desired fertility with that ultimately achieved and explores some factors which may affect the relation between fertility desires and fertility outcomes.     

儿童照料与二孩生育意愿 ——来自上海的证据

本文围绕一项针对上海市育龄女性的生育意愿调查,分别使用二分和有序Logit方法分析儿童照顾对上海市育龄女性的二孩生育意愿的影响。研究发现当育龄女性能够从家庭内和社会中获得更多孩子照料的时间支持时,她们有更高的二孩生育意愿,也会伴有更明确的二孩生育规划;双独家庭能够从父辈获得更多的经济、时间上的帮助,因此他们要比单独家庭和双非家庭更愿意再生一个孩子;居住于上海市城区的女性从某种程度上更易获得孩子的照料资源,有更多的优质教育资源可供选择,因此她们的二孩生育意愿高于居住于郊区的女性。此外,本文通过是否采用了避孕措施对二孩生育的意愿程度做了进一步区分,结果发现当第一个孩子主要是由孩子父母承担照料工作的时候,女性存在二孩生育意愿的程度是最低的,祖辈照料对二孩生育意愿程度的积极影响也明显低于社会性照料,此现象在上海市户籍的女性中体现尤为明显。最后为纠正自选择偏差问题,本文使用倾向值匹配方法(PSM)进一步验证了与首孩性别相比,首孩的抚养成本与接受照料情况显然对二孩生育意愿的影响程度更大。因此,本文认为加大公共托育服务的供给、为育龄女性提供高质量的0-3岁婴幼儿社会照料支持是提高二孩生育意愿的最有效政策。     

Fertility desires and fertility: Hers,his, and theirs

The relationship between desired and achieved fertility may be misspecified by excluding husbands' fertility desires or by confounding effects of shared desires with the resolution of conflicting desires. Using couple data from the classic Princeton Fertility Surveys, we find relatively large husband effects on fertility outcomes as well as unique effects of spousal disagreement. Wives and husbands were equally likely to achieve fertility desires, and disagreeing couples experienced fertility rates midway between couples who wanted the same smaller or larger number of children. These conditions do not hold, however, when we include willingness to delay births for economic mobility as part of the measure of fertility desires. Among couples who both wanted a third child, only husbands' willingness to delay births had significant negative effects on birth rates.     

Some estimates of the reliability of survey data on family planning

An opportunity to estimate the reliability of survey data on family planning is afforded by a longitudinal study of fertility in metropolitan areas of the United States. A probability sample of mothers was interviewed six months after the birth of their second child. Data were collected on a number of pregnancies, use of contraception, methods used, and the planning status of each pregnancy, in addition to a wide variety of social and psychological characteristics. Three years after the first interview, the same women were interviewed again and identical questions were asked about the same pregnancies. This paper reports an analysis of the consistency of responses in the basic fertility and contraceptive histories. Given the simplicity of the pregnancy histories, the relatively sophisticated sample interviewed, and the intensive preparation of the research, the reliabilities of data on family planning estimated here are assumed to approximate to an upper limit for such data at the present stage of development of survey techniques. Some suggestions for possible future improvement are included.     

Aiming at a moving target: Period fertility and changing reproductive goals

Summary Common sense suggests that changes over time in aggregate period fertility rates should be closely, related to changes in desired completed fertility after controlling for contraceptive failure, and desired spacing and timing; the nature of the relationship is, however, far from clear. This paper shows that when desired completed fertility undergoes swings, like those in the United States in recent decades, the turning points in period fertility will precede those in desired completed fertility by as much as five years and the amplitude of the swings in period fertility will be more than twice as great. Cumulated fertility, on the other hand, will lag behind reproductive goals. Period fertility rates will exceed desired completed fertility when desires are increasing and fall below it when desires are decreasing. These theoretical results help to explain some salient features of the American baby boom and bust. It is also shown that during a demographic transition, period fertility will fall more rapidly than desired completed fertility, and that towards the end of the transition, period fertility will increase.     

Family limitation among the Old Order Amish

Summary This paper shows that the Indiana Amish, a high-fertility Anabaptist population, regulate their marital fertility according to their family finances. We linked demographic data from the Indiana Amish Directory with personal property tax records at 5, 15 and 25 years after marriage and found fertility differences by occupation and wealth. Correlations between family size and wealth at the beginning, middle and end of childbearing years were positive. Wealthier women exhibited higher marital fertility, had longer first birth intervals, were older at the birth of their last child, and had larger families than poorer women. Over the past 30 years, marital fertility has remained constant among older women; but birth rates among younger women have been rising rapidly.     

Preference for Sons,Family Size,and Sex Ratio: An Empirical Study in Korea

This study investigates the effects of son preference on sex ratio and fertility at the family level, utilizing World Fertility Survey data for Korea, whose population is known to have a strong preference for sons and a fairly high level of contraceptive use. The sex ratio (number of males per 100 females) of siblings in small families is considerably higher than in large families. The sex ratio of last-born children in families of any size is markedly higher than that of the previous children. The sex distribution of children for a given family size, if less than five, deviates significantly from the Bernoulli sequence. The observed frequency of all-girl families is especially small in comparison with the expected value. The sex of the last child strongly influences couples' decision making regarding additional births in all steps of family building except for bearing a second child. In increasing their families to moderate size, parents appear to take into consideration the sex distribution of all earlier births.     

生育一孩弱化二孩生育意愿吗？——基于北京市“单独”家庭的考察

本文使用北京市西城区2013年生育意愿调查数据,基于不同的生育意愿测度指标,采用描述分析和回归分析方法检验城市＂单独＂家庭中生育一孩对二孩生育意愿的作用,并借助倾向值分析方法控制生育状况的自选择问题,从而使得研究结论更具稳健性和可靠性。结果表明,城市＂单独＂家庭的二孩生育意愿并不低迷,生育一孩能够强化育龄妇女的二孩生育意愿,而且生育状况的作用在生育意愿的众多影响因素中较为突出。上述结果需要在生育意愿的评估和生育政策的制定中有所关注。     

独生子女和非独生子女生育意愿差异的比较研究——基于江苏省生育意愿和生育行为调查

根据“江苏省生育意愿和生育行为”基线调查数据,本文使用交叉分析,多元线性回归等方法,探讨独生子女和非独生子女生育意愿的差异。结果表明,在意愿生育数量、意愿生育性别和意愿生育时间方面独生子女和非独生子女没有显著差异。     

Male sterilization as a contraceptive method in Canada an empirical study

Abstract In 1851-61, the crude birth rate in Canada was 45. In 1972, it was approximately 16. Not only have birth rates decreased but the average family size has declined from five or six children per family at the turn of the century to two or three children in the 1970'S. In addition, women are completing their childbearing at an earlier age. 50 years ago, it was not uncommon for a woman to have a child in her late thirties or early forties. To-day, this is a relatively rare event. In fact, it is estimated that approximately 80% of all families have the number of children desired before the woman is 30 years of age. This new demographic pattern creates an important and crucial situation for Canadian couples. At age 30, with all the desired children and 15 more years of potential childbearing ahead of them, what can they do to prevent the occurrence of additional pregnancies?     

How female education affects reproductive behavior in urban Pakistan

Although Pakistan remains in a pretransitional stage (contraceptive prevalence of only 11.9% among married women in 1992), urban women with post-primary levels of education are spearheading the gradual move toward fertility transition. Data collected in the city of Karachi in 1987 were used to determine whether the inverse association between fertility and female education is attributable to child supply variables, demand factors, or fertility regulation costs. Karachi, with its high concentration of women with secondary educations employed in professional occupations, has a contraceptive prevalence rate of 31%. Among women married for less than 20 years, a 10-year increment in education predicts that a woman will average two-fifths of a child less than other women in the previous 5 years. Regression analysis identified 4 significant intervening variables in the education-fertility relationship: marriage duration, net family income, formal sector employment, and age at first marriage. Education appears to affect fertility because it promotes a later age at marriage and thus reduces life-time exposure to the risk of childbearing, induces women to marry men with higher incomes (a phenomenon that either reduces the cost of fertility regulation or the demand for children), leads women to become employed in the formal sector (leading to a reduction in the demand for children), and has other unspecified effects on women's values or opportunities that are captured by their birth cohort. When these intervening variables are held constant, women's attitude toward family planning loses its impact on fertility, as do women's domestic autonomy and their expectations of self-support in old age. These findings lend support to increased investments in female education in urban Pakistan as a means of limiting the childbearing of married women. Although it is not clear if investment in female education would have the same effect in rural Pakistan, such action is important from a human and economic development perspective.     

The TFR and birth control]

Total fertility rate if (TFR) is a simple an straight forward measure of women's fertility. However, it is difficult to use the TFR as a target measure in FP programs. If TFR level is set as a target for a particular year, how can women's fertility be regulated to achieve this target? The following analysis suggests a simple model to control the proportion of birth parity. First, the TFR is decomposed into a parity- specific TFR. The parity-specific TFR can be worked out using coefficients of the regression models calculated from data of previous fertility surveys. Once the TFR is given, the parity-specific total fertility can be calculated using a model with coefficients from empirical data. Then the number of births of each parity may be calculated from the parity-specific TFR using the female age structure in a particular year, the survival probability, and the standard fertility model for each parity. When the number of surviving children of each women at child-bearing age is known, the desired proportion of births of each parity can be calculated using the standard birth probability during a years. From these models, it would be possible to calculate how many women can have their first child/year, and how many can have the second. Thus, family planning organizations would be in a position to formulate a birth quota on the basis of the above information.     

Union Instability as an Engine of Fertility? A Microsimulation Model for France

Opportunities for conceiving and bearing children are fewer when unions are not formed or are dissolved during the childbearing years. At the same time, union instability produces a pool of persons who may enter new partnerships and have additional children in stepfamilies. The balance between these two opposing forces and their implications for fertility may depend on the timing of union formation and parenthood. In this article, we estimate models of childbearing, union formation, and union dissolution for female respondents to the 1999 French Etude de l’Histoire Familiale. Model parameters are applied in microsimulations of completed family size. We find that a population of women whose first unions dissolve during the childbearing years will end up with smaller families, on average, than a population in which all unions remain intact. Because new partnerships encourage higher parity progressions, repartnering minimizes the fertility gap between populations with and those without union dissolution. Differences between the two populations are much smaller when family formation is postponed—that is, when union formation and dissolution or first birth occurs after age 30, or when couples delay childbearing after union formation.     

Sex ratio at birth: Values,variance, and some determinants

This paper examines the values, variance and some possible determinants of sex ratios for the first child and for all children in expected and desired families. For adults in Tallahassee, Florida, it was found that a large majority of respondents within sixty demographic categories chose males for their first child. Of those who actually had girls for their first child, a plurality would, nevertheless, prefer a first boy in their desired family. It was hypothesized and demonstrated that sex-role ideologies were a strong predictor of variance in first-child sex preferences. Sex ratios for all children in expected and desired families were 116 and 113, respectively. If people could choose the sex of their future children, these data suggest that several population parameters might be significantly altered; a preliminary model is outlined which might project some of these changes.     

Sex preference and fertility: what is the link?

It is argued that investment in programs for changing attitudes toward sex preference may not have the greatest impact on reducing fertility or increasing fertility control. Arnold's new method of analysis of determining sex preference was applied to data from a 1977 Egyptian survey of 36,000 rural households in Menoufia Governorate. Findings indicated that couples increased their use of modern contraceptives in direct proportion to an increase in the number of sons. Arnold determined that a large majority of all couples would have at least one boy early in their childbearing years. Thus sex preference would not have a large effect on fertility. Arnold's analysis among 27 countries found that without any sex preference, contraceptive usage would increase by an average of less than 3.7 percentage points. Arnold found that sex preference was strongest in Asia, particularly in South Korea and Taiwan that already have reduced fertility levels. In Africa, where fertility is high, the total elimination of sex preference would have only a 2.9 percentage point difference in contraceptive use. Sex preference had small effects on the percent of women who practice contraception, the percent who desire no more children, and the average number of additional children wanted. For example, in Bangladesh having no sex preference would show a percentage difference of 1.6 percentage points for contraceptive use, 4.7 percentage points difference for women desiring no more children, and -0.1 percentage point difference for the average number of additional children wanted. The effect of having no sex preference was strongest in India compared with Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, Thailand, Ghana, Kenya, Costa Rica, Haiti, Paraguay, and Peru. The effect of no sex preference in India would have the respective percentage point effect of 3.7, 8.9, and -0.2. Public policy should be directed to information, education, and communication with other social goals.     

Family composition preferences in a developing culture: The case of Taiwan, 1973

Abstract As fertility comes increasingly under voluntary control in a developing society, it can be argued that individual desires or preferences about children will become more salient and more significant for eventual fertility. Hence, the study of preferences is increasingly important as contraceptive use is extended and results in decreasing the number of unwanted births.(1) Further changes in fertility then depend on changes in preferences. The assumption is that people will at least try to achieve the families they want, if the means to do so are available. The fact that contraception is used at all is some evidence of the soundness of this assumption, although it should be recognized that family size desires operate in a complex of preferences, under varying degrees of conflict and control. To expect a one-to-one relationship between attitudes or preferences and overt behaviour would be simplistic.     

Intensive Parenting: Fertility and Breastfeeding Duration in the United States

Using 30 years of longitudinal data from a nationally representative cohort of women, we study the association between breastfeeding duration and completed fertility, fertility expectations, and birth spacing. We find that women who breastfeed their first child for five months or longer are a distinct group. They have more children overall and higher odds of having three or more children rather than two, compared with women who breastfeed for shorter durations or not at all. Expected fertility is associated with initiating breastfeeding but not with how long mothers breastfeed. Thus, women who breastfeed longer do not differ significantly from other breastfeeding women in their early fertility expectations. Rather, across the life course, these women achieve and even exceed their earlier fertility expectations. Women who breastfeed for shorter durations (1–21 weeks) are more likely to fall short of their expected fertility than to achieve or exceed their expectations, and they are significantly less likely than women who breastfeed for longer durations (≥22 weeks) to exceed their expected fertility. In contrast, women who breastfeed longer are as likely to exceed as to achieve their earlier expectations, and the difference between their probability of falling short versus exceeding their fertility expectations is relatively small and at the boundary of statistical significance (p = .096). These differences in fertility are not explained by differences in personal and family resources, including family income or labor market attachment. Our findings suggest that breastfeeding duration may serve as a proxy for identifying a distinct approach to parenting. Women who breastfeed longer have reproductive patterns quite different than their socioeconomic position would predict. They both have more children and invest more time in those children.