Religious differentials in marital fertility in The Hague (Netherlands) 1860-1909

Previous studies of the marital fertility transition in Europe have found religious differentials. Using data collected from the population registers of The Hague, our aim in this study is to search for answers to the following questions: whether religious differentials result from socio-economic characteristics; to what extent religious ideology explains the behaviour of religious groups; which proximate determinants account for the religious differentials; and whether the Jews were forerunners in the marital fertility transition in Europe. The results provide some evidence of relatively low levels of parity-dependent fertility control among Jews before the transition and among Catholics during the transition. Religious ideology probably accounts for the low level of fertility control among Catholics. The ultimate reason for the relatively high marital fertility among Jews before the transition remains unclear. Our findings do not support the hypothesis that Jews were forerunners in the marital fertility transition.     

Short-term fluctuations in fertility and economic activity in Israel

This paper investigates the relation between fluctuations in fertility and in economic activity in Israel over the period 1950–1970. The paper opens with some comments on the theoretical basis for expecting procyclical behavior of fertility. This is followed by analysis of annual data of total fertility, unemployment, GNP and an index of industrial production. Total fertility tends to respond to the cyclical indicators among Jews from Europe and America, those born in Israel and those from Asian and African countries, but the response is larger among the former. Cyclical response can be discerned also in the fertility of the non-Jewish population. The performance of the alternative cyclical indicators is compared. Some examination of data on marriage suggests that the cyclical response of birth is not just a reflection of the cyclical response of marriage. In the annual data there is a tendency for.Jewish fertility to be more related to the contemporaneous cyclical indicator than the lagged indicator, while the reverse is true for the non-Jewish population. Examination of quarterly and monthly data for a shorter period corroborates this finding. Many factors are involved in determining the lag between an observed cyclical indicator and observed birth; it is being conjectured that the prevalence of abortions in the Jewish population is one contributing factor to the difference in the lag between.Jews and Arabs.     

Family structure and socio-economic differentials in fertility

Abstract The long standing research on the relation of socio-economic status and fertility has recently given way to a focus on those factors which account for class differentials. Although class differences in fertility seem to be diminishing, the basic relationship remains inverse.(2) In an attempt to explain class differentials in fertility, researchers have begun to look at such variables as age at marriage(3), value orientations(4), and non-fiunilial activity.(5) Bumpass demonstrated that age at marriage is an interaction variable which greatly attenuates the relationship between social class and fertility. He found that the relationship was inverse among women marrying before age 19, but direct among women who were 23 years or older at first marriage. Clifford examined value orientations as an intervening variable in the socio-economic status-fertility relationship. Modern and traditional value orientations did aid in interpreting the relationship, but other factors were also operative. Kupinsky found that the non-familial activity of women decidedly influenced socio-economic differentials infertility. Thelabour force participation of women had a greater effect on reducing fertility among upper-status women than among those of lower status. This relationship was also influenced by the rural-urban background of the women.     

[An inquiry into causes of county-level specific fertility differences in Gansu province].]

Fertility differentials among the 78 counties of Gansu province, China, are analyzed using data from the 1982 census. Three alternative methods of analysis are applied to the data to identify the social, political, and economic factors that affect fertility differentials. The author also notes that changes in population characteristics are associated with fertility differentials.     

Changing patterns of Internal Migration 1970–1990: A comparative analysis of jews and whites in The United States

Independently conducted yet complementary sets of data from the 1970/1971 and 1990 National Jewish Population Surveys and the U.S. censuses of the same changes in the internal migration of Jews and whites during the periods 1965–1970(1971) and 1985–1990. Interstate lifetime and five-year migration rates among Jews increased to levels significantly surpassing those of whites. Adjusting Jewish migration rates for the educational achievement of their white counterparts did not have much of an effect on lifetime migration or on the recent migration of the 1970/1971 Jewish population; however, it accounted meaningfully for the migration propensities of Jews in the period 1985–1990. These findings suggest that socioeconomic status has begun to play a larger role in promoting different migration patterns than in promoting ethnic group differences. Further, the direction of Jewish migrations followed those of whites (i.e., from the Northeast and Midwest to the South and West); and due to their higher migration rates, Jews have considerably narrowed the regional distribution differences between themselves and whites. I interpret these results as evidence of the weakening role of ethnicity in present-day America.     

Fertility levels and differentials in Beirut during wartime: an indirect estimation based on maternity registers

In this paper, total fertility estimates for Greater Beirut in the mid-eighties and early nineties are presented, and changes in socio-religious differentials of fertility across time are explored. The baseline information was recorded from registration details for all maternities in Beirut and its inner suburbs in 1984 and 1991: age of mother, number of children ever-born, hospital class, and religion of newborn. An indirect method was used to estimate total fertility from the joint distribution of mothers by age and parity, and, using hospital class as a proxy for social class, differentials in fertility were investigated by Poisson regression. The estimates of total fertility for Beirut shifted from 2.60 in 1984 to 2.52 in 1991, and were higher for Muslims than for Christians in the two periods. The regression analysis showed that: (1) the difference between the two religious groups persisted after control for social class, and in fact applied to the lower social class; (2) fertility dropped between the two dates in the lower social class, and more so for Muslims than for Christians. In comparison with other countries of the region, the decline in Beirut was found to be relatively modest. If the trends assessed in this study were to continue, the religious-based fertility differentials would taper off progressively in the capital city of Lebanon.     

The role of smoking in the explanation of the Israeli Jewish pattern of sex differentials in mortality

The difference in life expectancy between women and men among Israeli Jews is very low relative to the difference in other developed countries, and the reasons for this are not fully understood. This paper explores the contribution of smoking to the observed patterns of sex-specific mortality among Israeli Jews, and to the sex difference in mortality exhibited by this population. The results show that the mortality of Israeli Jewish men is low owing to the relatively weak impact of smoking-related mortality, and that this also contributes to an explanation of the small sex difference. The result is explained by the high level of health-protective behaviour of Israeli Jewish men, including a low intensity of smoking (though not a low prevalence). The findings could have implications for some debates on the determinants of divergences and convergences in mortality, and research into the relationship between mortality and the Mediterranean diet.     

Residency differentials in Mormon fertility

Abstract Although one of the most consistent findings of recent fertility studies is the convergence of the religious differentials in fertility, few data have been analysed to discover Mormon fertility trends and differentials. This paper, based on data obtained on 1,001 Mormon couples, is concerned with describing the effects that the dispersion of Mormon families from the Mormon centre in Utah to surrounding areas with various social conditions is having on the fertility of the re-located Mormon families. Data presented clearly show that such families do, on the average, have a lower fertility than do their Mormon contemporaries residing in the homogeneous Mormon society in Utah. They probably compromise their religious obligations to have children with the contradicting demands of their new environment. Their loyalty to these religious beliefs, however, is confirmed by data which show that they tend to have larger families in their new environments than do their non-Mormon neighbours.     

Protracted national conflict and fertility change: Palestinians and Israelis in the twentieth century

This article examines atypical trends of birth rates and fertility—their irregular time trends and relatively high levels—among Palestinians and Israelis in light of the protracted conflict between them and related political developments. Migration, in itself a major dimension of the conflict, has been formative in contrasting evolutions of fertility: convergence among the Jews, originating from various countries but gradually coalescing in Jewish Israeli society, as opposed to divergence for the Palestinians, members of the same initial society but dispersed by the conflict and subjected to political and socioeconomic conditions varying with their place of residence. Demography is at stake in the conflict, and pronatalism becomes a dimension of nationalism, for Palestinians as well as for Israelis. Political and civil institutions influence fertility through redistribution of resources that subsidize procreation. For both sides, it seems that belligerence has produced excess fertility.     

Residency differentials in Mormon fertility

Although one of the most consistent findings of recent fertility studies is the convergence of the religious differentials in fertility, few data have been analysed to discover Mormon fertility trends and differentials. This paper, based on data obtained on 1,001 Mormon couples, is concerned with describing the effects that the dispersion of Mormon families from the Mormon centre in Utah to surrounding areas with various social conditions is having on the fertility of the re-located Mormon families. Data presented clearly show that such families do, on the average, have a lower fertility than do their Mormon contemporaries residing in the homogeneous Mormon society in Utah. They probably compromise their religious obligations to have children with the contradicting demands of their new environment. Their loyalty to these religious beliefs, however, is confirmed by data which show that they tend to have larger families in their new environments than do their non-Mormon neighbours.     

Patterns of american jewish fertility

The 1971 National Jewish Population Survey provides cross-sectional data on achieved fertility, detailed birth histories, and other information on family formation for a countrywide representative sample of 5,303 ever-married women. Cohort analysis shows that—although at lower levels—Jewish fertility has followed the general trends of American population.     

中国人口的迁移转变——基于迁移率的考察

经典人口转变理论侧重死亡和生育转变过程的测量、描述和解释,地理学家将迁移转变纳入人口转变框架,以完善人口转变理论。不过与死亡和生育转变研究不同,中国的迁移研究侧重基于对迁移流动人口规模和结构的考察分析,少有采用人口学意义上的迁移率指标的研究。文章利用2010—2015年历次中国综合社会调查的合并数据,通过人口学方法和泊松回归模型,计算和分析了1950—2015年中国人口迁移率趋势及社会经济差异。中国的迁移转变在宏观趋势上与中国的政治经济变迁高度一致。与死亡和生育转变相比,其波折性更强,说明更易受到经济社会政策变化的冲击。同时也观察到逢“0”和逢“5”年份的申报偏好。另外,迁移的社会经济差异明显。男性迁移率高于女性,但是两性差异在不断缩小;乡城迁移和未婚迁移大幅度增长;而越来越多受教育程度较高人群加入迁移,使得受教育程度越高的人群具有越高的迁移率。可以认为基于迁移率的考察揭示了中国迁移转变更具体生动的过程。     

Israel's population: the challenge of pluralism

This Bulletin describes the interplay of demographic and sociopolitical processes in Israel since the founding of the state in May 1948 and projects what it might be until the year 2015. Heavy Jewish immigration, especially during the mass immigration of 1948-51, has balanced the high natural increase of Moslems, who comprise the majority of Israeli Arabs, so that the proportion of Jews in Israel's population at the end of 1982 (83% of 4.1 million) was little changed from June 1948 (81% of 806,000). Even with Jewish immigration now low, this proportion is likely to be no lower than 76% in 2015, the Jewish proportion could be only 50% in a Greater Israel as Israel annexes the Occupied Areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip where 1.2 million Arabs now live. Oriental Jews from less developed North African and Asian countries, 15% of Israel's Jewish population in 1984, with their largescale immigration to the mid-1960s and initially higher fertility, have managed to outnumber European-American Jews by 1970. This was an important factor in the 1977 shift of political dominance from the leftwing Labor parties, supported by the better educated, socialist leaning European-American Jews, to the rightwing Likud bloc, espousing economic policies based on more private initiative and Israel's historic rights to Judea and Samaria (West Bank). Western oriented Jews of European or American origin, although still the country's establishment, comprised only 40% of Israel's population by 1981. By 2015, their share is likely to be down to 30% within Israel's present boundaries and would be only 22% of the population of a Greater Israel. First raised by 19th century Zionists in Europe who set off the drive for the reestablishment of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine, the quesions of whether or not Israel will be a Jewish state and remain a Western society will continue salient into the 21st century.     

The Soviet Union: population trends and dilemmas

Focus in this discussion of population trends and dilemmas in the Soviet Union is on demographic problems, data limitations, early population growth, geography and resources, the 15 republics of the Soviet Union and nationalities, agriculture and the economy, population growth over the 1950-1980 period (national trend, regional differences); age and sex composition of the population, fertility trends, nationality differentials in fertility, the reasons for fertility differentials (child care, divorce, abortion and contraception, illegitimacy), labor shortages and military personnel, mortality (mortality trends, life expectancy), reasons for mortality increases, urbanization and emigration, and future population prospects and projections. For mid-1982 the population of the Soviet Union was estimated at 270 million. The country's current rate of natural increase (births minus deaths) is about 0.8% a year, higher than current rates of natural increase in the U.S. (0.7%) and in developed countries as a whole (0.6%). Net immigration plays no part in Soviet population growth, but emigration was noticeable in some years during the 1970s, while remaining insignificant relative to total population size. National population growth has dropped by more than half in the last 2 decades, from 1.8% a year in the 1950s to 0.8% in 1980-1981, due mostly to declining fertility. The national fertility decline masks sharp differences among the 15 republics and even more so among the some 125 nationalities. In 1980, the Russian Republic had an estimated fertility rate of 1.9 births/woman, and the rate was just 2.0 in the other 2 Slavic republics, the Ukraine and Belorussia. In the Central Asian republics the rates ranged up to 5.8. Although the Russians will no doubt continue to be the dominant nationality, low fertility and a relatively higher death rate will reduce their share of the total population by less than half by the end of the century. Soviet leaders have launched a pronatalist policy which they hope will lead to an increase in fertility, at least among the dominant Slavic groups of the multinational country. More than 9 billion rubles (U.S. $12.2 billion) is to be spent over the next 5 years to implement measures aimed at increasing state aid to families with children, to be carried out step by step in different regions of the country. It is this writer's opinion that overall fertility is not likely to increase markedly despite the recent efforts of the central authorities, and the Russian share of the total population will probably continue to drop while that of Central Asian Muslim peoples increases.     

A further look at catholic fertility

The purpose of this paper is to determine the extent to which suburbanization has influenced the traditional fertility differences observed between Catholics and Protestants. It is hypothesized that suburbanization has served to decrease religious differences in fertility, since in the more advanced stages of urbanism, that is, suburbanization, the Catholic population is likely to adopt the fertility patterns of the larger and more secularized society. Attention is focused on two objectives: (1) to examine selected aspects of fertility for Catholic8 and Protestants living in metropolitan areas and (2) to analyze religious differentials in fertility among residents in different parts of the metropolitan community.The data, consisting of a sample of households in six metropolitan areas in three population size classes, supported the general findings pertaining to religious differences in fertility that have been reported in the literature. Catholics had larger families, shorter average spacing between children, and longer fertility spans when compared to Protestants, even when a number of control variables were employed. Examining fertility differences between Catholics and Protestants in central city and suburban segments of large and small metropolitan areas, we found that the data indicated that marked Catholic-Protestant differences are still found in central cities. However, fertility differences between the two religious groups tended largely to disappear among suburban residents. The convergence in the fertility patterns of suburbanites is due to combined effects of higher fertility among Protestant suburban residents when compared to central city Protestants and the tendency of suburban Catholics to have fewer children than those who live in the city. The net result is convergence in suburban fertility.     

Causes of fertility decline in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union II

Abstract The first part of this study (which appeared in the preceding issue of Population Studies) assessed the extent of the decline in fertility in the countries of the area during the last 10-15 years, and analyzed the purely demographic aspects ofthis phenomenon. Part II examines the socio-economic differentials in fertility, with regard to such variables as urban-rural residence, socio-occupational and employment status of women, educational attainment, income and housing conditions, and the consequent impact of structural changes in these characteristics of the population on observed fertility trends. The broad conclusion is that the fertility differentials usually found in western societies are also relevant to the socialist countries of eastern Europe, and that the dramatic falls in fertility in the 1950's and the 1960's have largely been the outcome ofthe deep and rapid structural changes, particularly those associated with urbanization, educational attainment and the incidence of female employment. The last part of the study is concerned with the impact on post-war fertility trends of social legislation and of general economic policies, particularly in the fields of employment and income. An appraisal of the extent of family planning is followed by a discussion of the recent pro-natalist measures introduced in most countries of the area and of their effectiveness.     

The longevity of Jews in Canada, 1940–1942

A life table for the Jewish population of Canada, based upon their mortality experience during 1940–2, yielded an average length of life (expectation of life at birth) of 67–53 years for males and 69·89 years for females. These figures are greater than those for the general population of Canada by 4·58 years for males and 3·60 years for females. These margins decrease with advance in age; the expectations of life for Jews and for the total Canadian population are equal at age 25 in the case of females, and at age 35 in the case of males.

Jewish infants in Canada start life with a mortality rate, in the first year, only two-fifths of that for the general population. This advantage for Jews is observed through childhood, adolescence, and early maturity. However, the margin between the Jewish and total populations decreased with advance in age until, shortly after age 50, the Jews begin to show the higher mortality rates.

The Jewish populations of the United States and of Canada have great similarities in their social and economic structures. They also share, very largely, in their European origins, and they have come to North America during the same period. It is, therefore, a fair assumption that the longevity and mortality characteristics of the relatively small Jewish population of Canada may be indicative of what might be found for the millions of Jews in the United States, for whom such information is not available.     

Thank God it's Friday: The weekly cycle of mortality in Israel

The purpose of this study was to explore the weeklycycle of mortality among Jews in Israel. Drawing onprevious research on the association between holy-daysand the timing of death, we hypothesized thatmortality of Jews declines on Sabbath (Saturday), andrises to a peak on Sundays. We analysed daily numbersof deaths of Jewish men and women aged 5 and above inIsrael from 1983 to 1992, and found a clear andsignificant dip-peak pattern in the number of deathsaround the Sabbath. This pattern was found for allcauses of death, was stronger for men than for women,and was not found among young Jewish children, oramong the non-Jewish population.     

Religious fertility differentials in Thailand, 1960

Abstract Although the evidence supporting high fertility in Thailand is clear-cut, little is known about fertility differentials within the population. As part of a larger investigation, a special 1 % tabulation of the 1960 Thai census data on number of children ever-born to married women has been analysed to determine the extent of differentials by religion and urban-rural status. The findings point to considerable differentials among Buddhists, Moslems, and Confucianists. Standardizing for age, the number of children ever-born to 12/loslems averaged well below the number born to Buddhists. Confucian fertility was intermediate. Within specific age groups, the number of children ever-born to Moslem women was considerably below the Buddhist average and the differentials were sharper in the higher age groups. By contrast, Confucian fertility was highest of all in the age groups under 35, but lower than the Buddhist averages among older women. Significant urban-rural differentials also exist. For both the Buddhist and the Confucian women, fertility is markedly lower in urban than in rural categories. When controlling for both age and urban-rural status, Buddhist and Confucian differences tend to be minimal. By contrast, Moslem fertility was highest in the most urban category - Bangkok - but was considerably lower and substantially below the fertility levels of Buddhists and Confucianists in all other urban-rural categories. The census data in themselves do not permit adequate analysis of the reasons for the differentials. Later age at marriage in urban places may be a significant factor in accounting for the overall differentials in urban-rural fertility ; but this relation is much less clear for specific religious groups, particularly since Moslems marry at a considerably earlier age. More frequent divorce and remarriage may lower Moslem rates. Poorer health may also be a factor.