加强我国地方政府债务管理的对策建议——基于中央政府、地方政府和金融机构的三方博弈分析

近年来,地方政府债务问题已成为影响中国经济长期稳定增长不可忽视的重要因素。中央政府、地方政府和金融机构在地方政府债务问题上已形成博弈之势。在这种情况下,要防范和化解政府债务风险应建立偿债机制和风险预警体系、加强金融机构的监管、改变现行的政绩评估机制、修改现行《预算法》等。     

地方债:怎么借?怎么管?怎么还?

<正>10月2日,国务院发布《加强地方政府性债务管理的意见》(以下简称《意见》),落实新预算法相关规定,建立借、用、还相统一的地方政府性债务管理机制,坚决制止违规举债,切实防范化解财政金融风险。《意见》的一大亮点,是明确了举债主体、举债方式、举债规模以及举债程序,进一步规范了地方政府债务资金的使用,     

当代中国地方政府债务风险管理研究——以广西壮族自治区政府债务信用风险为例

市场经济条件下,随着金融市场和政府行为的日益融合,地方政府债务风险和金融风险的联动关系越来越明显.防控地方政府风险不仅能够促进地方政府收支的合理化,而且可以减弱地方政府债务风险向金融风险转化的风险.文章选取防控金融风险这一视角研究地方政府债务风险管理,并以广西壮族自治区为例,运用KMV模型进行实证分析,从具体机制层面提出了建立政府债务风险双重评估体制、建立有效的风险预警机制和改革金融业的管理体制等建议.     

出口退税分担机制下地方政府间博弈行为分析:一个经济学解释

现行出口退税分担机制背景下,地方政府间产生了一系列博弈行为.文章在分析地方政府间博弈行为成因的基础上,通过建立数理模型,对博弈行为长期存在的客观性作了相应的经济学解释,认为出口退税分担机制作为一个过渡性的临时制度安排具有内在的不稳定性,需要通过机制优化加以缓解；从远期来看,应由中央财政负担全部出口退税,以有效减少地方政府的恶性博弈行为.     

基于Petri网模型的府际利益均衡分析

府际之间的利益均衡问题一直是政治与经济等社会科学领域的重要课题。府际关系是政府体制的重要组成部分,府际关系的主要内容之一是中央与地方以及地方之间的利益均衡关系。如何调整政府间的利益达到均衡,使政府的治理水平更好,是中央政府面临的难题,也是提高政府能力建设的关键。本文针对中央与地方以及地方之间的利益均衡问题,运用Petri网建立理论模型分析府际之间存在的问题及其原因,并对如何调整府际关系做出分析,对深刻理解及保障中国政府间关系向着科学合理的方向发展具有一定的理论意义。     

From administering administrative divisions to regional public administration： a game analysis of evolution in the pattern of governance by the government

区域公共管理实质上是政府治理方式上的制度变迁,即打破原有行政区行政的制度安排,重塑利益格局的制度演变过程。在这一过程中,始终贯穿着不同利益主体的博弈,从而最终形成新的制度——相关因素充分博弈后的契约格局。这些博弈关系主要包括中央政府与地方政府的博弈、地方政府之间的博弈等。对可能出现的博弈困境提出树立合作的“重复博弈”思维,建立良好的信息沟通以及双边或多边协商机制,进一步转变政府职能、斩断地方政府与社会经济主体的利益连带关系,强化中央政府的宏观调控职能,是建立区域公共管理制度、实现政府治理形态嬗变的有效引导性对策。     

房地产周期、人口流动与地方债风险防控

基于城投债交易数据构建了地方政府债务风险指标,从房地产周期和人口流动视角对地方政府债务风险的影响因素进行了研究。结果显示,房地产周期与地方政府债务风险之间存在着“逆周期”关系,促进人口流入有助于降低地方政府债务风险。进一步的异质性分析发现,具有较好工业基础的城市能够更加充分地利用流动人口带来的外溢效应,而对“土地财政”具有更强依赖度的城市受房地产周期的影响更明显。认为要防范化解地方政府债务风险,须适时动态监测房地产周期走向;增加城市对流动人口的吸引力和留城意愿;解决好吸引人才和发展本地经济的问题;要处理好土地财政依赖与地方政府债的关系。     

资源约束条件下企业发展低碳经济的博弈分析

面对资源约束与环境压力,发展低碳经济是企业兼顾资源、经济和环境矛盾的最佳选择,由于企业和政府之间不同利益边界的存在,低碳经济发展的过程必然是双方多次博弈和理性选择的结果.本文通过构建企业和政府发展低碳经济的博弈模型并进行均衡分析,发现企业新增成本、伪装成本和信誉损失代价,政府的惩罚力度、监管成本和效率是影响均衡的关键因素.提高监管效率,降低监管成本,完善低碳经济的法律法规,加强环境教育,提倡低碳的生活方式和消费模式加强技术创新,建立发展低碳经济的资金投入机制是推动企业自觉发展低碳经济的有效办法.     

农村金融制度供给决定的博弈分析

在我国农村金融制度变迁的历程中,利益主体呈现多样性的特点,相应地农村金融每一次改革都受到各种力量的约束,可以将我国农村金融制度的供给概括为一个基于多方非平等主体的制度博弈,中央政府与地方政府通过利益博弈,最终决定了农村金融制度供给的形式.要解决农村金融面临的困境,必须彻底转变各博弈主体的收益矩阵.     

论经济安全运行与政策取向:基于欧债危机的视角

欧债危机表面上是人口老龄化和高福利政策导致的政府债务负担问题,实质上是美欧两大经济体核心利益冲突的必然结果,是部分欧洲国家在经济增长方式选择、经济可持续发展与社会福利政策的关系协调方面产生了严重的问题。虽然次贷危机是欧债危机的主要外因,但区域经济发展不平衡、产业结构不合理、欧元区统一的货币政策与分散的财政政策的矛盾、老龄化趋势导致高福利政策难以持续、缺乏有效的监管是导致和加剧欧债危机的内在因素。欧债危机对我国加强经济安全运行有诸多启示:要审慎、协调使用宏观调控政策,合理把握经济刺激政策的力度;应加强地方政府债务的管理,通过多种手段防范地方政府债务风险;要通过发展实体经济,夯实经济增长的基础;通过产业结构调整,实现经济增长方式转变;富民是保持社会稳定的基础,加快福利制度建设和增加社会福利支出要把握合理的尺度,应充分借助市场和社会力量构建多重社会保障体系。     

The size and structure of China's government debt

This paper analyzes the size and structure of China's government debt. In addition to explicit government debt, we consider three types of government contingent liabilities: local government debt, university debt, and state banks’ nonperforming loans. The size of each types of debt is estimated and the reasons for the emergence of each type of debt are analyzed. International comparisons are made and it is found that China's government debt is larger than many other developing countries. To insure fiscal sustainability and to leave rooms for future expansionary fiscal policies, the government should reduce contingent liabilities.     

Fiscal sustainability in the aftermath of the great pause

Faced with a global natural catastrophe, countries must spend to deal with the immediate crisis, and to reduce longer-term economic scarring. Sustained infrastructure and education spending can help counter headwinds to the long-term outlook. However, the fact that government borrowing rates are at extremely low levels does not imply that the very high debt, especially short-term borrowing, is a free lunch. Real borrowing rates are likely below long-term trend, and there is no guarantee that any future adverse shock can only lower interest rates. Massive underfunded old-age transfer and support programs are a form of hidden non-market “junior” debt.     

中国农村土地运行"悖论"的经济学解析

目前,在我国农村土地运行中,出现了土地“抛荒”、“过度征用”、“农民利益受损”等偏离制度预期的悖论现象;其内在深层原因是土地职能的多重性、矛盾性、演进性;而直接原因则是中央政府、地方政府、农户的效用在一定的制度框架中博弈的结果;调整现有制度安排的不当并促进各项制度均衡协调,促使参与农地利益博弈的各方力量形成恰当的张力架构,是克服悖论的现实选择。     

Welfare municipalities: economic resources or party politics? Norwegian local government social programs of the 1920s

This article analyses the introduction of Norwegian local government social security programs for the elderly, disabled persons, widows and single mothers in the 1920s. The role of local government as an agent and initiator of welfare state development has been for the most part neglected within the welfare state literature. Indeed, the first social security programs in Norway were introduced by local governments, affecting nearly half of the population. Even if these programs were not very generous compared with the social security programs of our time, many of them were equal to, or even more generous than, the national pension scheme introduced in 1936. This article examines what distinguished the social security municipalities from those that did not implement such programs, and the variation in generosity profiles. The conclusion is that the main determinant regarding the implementation and generosity of the local social security programs is the political strength of the two Norwegian socialist parties at the time – the Social democratic party and the Labour party – both being too impatient to wait for a national social security plan, and both being willing to mobilise economic resources through taxation and borrowing.     

美、日地方政府债务管理及其对我国的启示

地方财政困难和债务危机是当前我国财政领域的一个突出问题,通过分析我国当前地方政府债务管理的现状,详细阐释美国和日本的地方政府债务管理特点和方式,认为我国应该从制度上建立健全完善的地方政府债务管理组织架构、债务预算管理模式和债务信息公开披露制度等。     

Central versus Local Service Regulation: Accounting for Diverging Old-age Care Developments in Sweden and Denmark, 1980–2000

In Sweden and Denmark, the development of old‐age care has followed markedly divergent paths over the past 20 years. In both countries, the level of old‐age care universalism was exceptionally high in the early 1980s. Since then it has dropped sharply in Sweden, while remaining constantly high in Denmark. These divergent trends are clearly irreconcilable with the common image of a coherent Scandinavian welfare state model, and they seem hard to explain with reference to traditional approaches of comparative social policy. This article attempts to account for the divergent developments by focusing on the balance of old‐age care regulation between central and local government. The main finding is that only in Sweden has the central regulation of old‐age care been weak and unspecific. As a consequence, Swedish municipalities have enjoyed sufficient autonomous, regulatory competence to exercise certain local retrenchment measures in times of austerity, thereby eventually causing a nationwide weakening of old‐age care universalism. By contrast, municipalities in Denmark have been much more tightly bound by central state regulations which have prevented them from imposing similar retrenchment measures in the old‐age care sector; consequently, Denmark's level of old‐age care universalism has remained comparatively high.     

Are government deficits the prime cause of inflation?

We argue in this article that if government bonds are counted as part of private wealth, government budget deficits are a major cause of inflation, and the method chosen to finance the deficits (e.g., borrowing or monetary expansion) is of secondary importance. To illustrate this point we use a simple portfolio model that is then incorporated into a model of the Australian economy. The full model is specified in continuous time, and it is estimated by the full information maximum likelihood method (FIML) it is then used to simulate a number of fiscal shocks.     

财政收入垂直分配关系及其均衡增长效应(英文)

不断扩大的地区间差异困扰着中国发展,并成为社会稳定的重要隐患。为了缓解地区间差距可能引发的各种矛盾,中国政府在1994年分税体制改革之后确立了具有集权倾向的财政收入垂直分配关系。通过财政资金的大规模双向流动,这种财政收入垂直分配关系促进了财政资金的跨区域配置和财政能力的地区间均等。但作为分权体制的重要制度安排,其在均衡地区间经济增长方面的作用却很有限,主要表现为大规模收入集中对经济发达地区的增长抑制。财政收入垂直分配关系的这些影响与地方财政非税收入依赖程度以及中央专项补助水平存在明显交互作用,前者显著弱化了财政收入过度集中的不利增长效应,后者却显著弱化了中央补助的增长激励。