Reconstruction of fertility trends for the female population of the U.S.S.R

Abstract The article describes fertility trends among Soviet women during the past 40 years as compared to American women during the same period of time. Period-specific fertility rates were arrived at by relating the annual total of live births to a pattern of age-specific fertility rates estimated for each year and also to the number of women for each single year of age. These rates were then appropriately re-arranged and compressed into five-year age groups to form a series of cohort-specific fertility rates. The findings rest on somewhat conjectural estimates of live births and numbers of women in the U.S.S.R., some of which were originally prepared before the 1959 Soviet census. The tentative evidence shows that changes in the period-specific fertility of Soviet women were far more irregular and dramatic in the past, than among American women. After World War II these rates dropped in the U.S.S.R. below those of the United States, except for women over 30 years of age. On the other hand, the cohort-specific rates of Soviet women, although declining from one cohort to the next, at present show their magnitude in the cumulative series for older ages to be marked by higher than among American women. This experimental investigation of fertility in the Soviet Union makes no claim to high standards of accuracy and validity. Its intended purpose is to stress the desirability of shifting emphasis from the temporal and prognostic type of study, characteristic of present-day demographic research about the U.S.S.R., to the generational and historical approach.     

Reconstruction of Birth Histories from Census and Household Survey Data

In this paper a new procedure for reconstructing birth histories from census or household survey data is developed. Given the number of children ever born, the number of deceased children, and the ‘own children’ birth history of each woman, it is possible to ‘fill in’ probabilistically the missing births of her deceased children and of children not present in the household. Thus, the procedure generates complete birth histories from which such measures as age-specific fertility rates, parity progression ratios, and birth interval measures may be estimated. For purposes of illustration and validation, the method is applied to the household survey data of the 1974 Korean National Fertility Survey, both to the entire sample of households, and to households with women from whom individual birth histories were collected. Age-specific fertility rates and parity progression measures estimated from the reconstructed birth histories are compared with those estimated by applying the ‘own children’ method, for the period 1960–74.     

Expectancy of life at birth in 36 nationalities of the Soviet Union: 1958-60

In the 36 nationalities of the Soviet Union the estimated expectancy of life at birth ranged from 50·0 years for Chechens to 71·1 years for Latvians with a median of about 67·5 years for Russians.

In essence, the life table function e₀ was generated from the child-woman ratios with the use of intricate equations based on empirical data obtained from official Soviet publications. A modified version of Bourgeois-Pichat's model was used to estimate life expectancies at birth among the 36 nationalities on the basis of their crude death rates and the percentage of population aged 65 years and over. The 1959 U.S.S.R. Census of Population provided information pertaining to the older age groups. The crude death rates were estimated separately with the aid of second-degree polynomials fitted to the crude demographic measures for 109 administrative areas of the Soviet Union for 1960.

Information about recent improvements in public health, as well as conjectural evaluations of economic advancement in recent years were examined and related to the past and present level of mortality among the Russian people and the remaining population of minorities.     

Expectancy of life at birth in 36 nationalities of the Soviet Union: 1958-60

Abstract In the 36 nationalities of the Soviet Union the estimated expectancy of life at birth ranged from 50·0 years for Chechens to 71·1 years for Latvians with a median of about 67·5 years for Russians. In essence, the life table function e(0) was generated from the child-woman ratios with the use of intricate equations based on empirical data obtained from official Soviet publications. A modified version of Bourgeois-Pichat's model was used to estimate life expectancies at birth among the 36 nationalities on the basis of their crude death rates and the percentage of population aged 65 years and over. The 1959 U.S.S.R. Census of Population provided information pertaining to the older age groups. The crude death rates were estimated separately with the aid of second-degree polynomials fitted to the crude demographic measures for 109 administrative areas of the Soviet Union for 1960. Information about recent improvements in public health, as well as conjectural evaluations of economic advancement in recent years were examined and related to the past and present level of mortality among the Russian people and the remaining population of minorities.     

The centenarian question and old-age mortality in the Soviet Union, 1959–1970

Are claims of extraordinarily low mortality levels in the USSR justifiable? Applying a recently developed methodology appropriate for nonstable populations to 1959 and 1970 census data from the Soviet Union, we find that mortality is generally understated for the country as a whole and for various regions and republics. This is particularly so for the republics composing the Central Asian region and the Caucasus. Age overstatement appears to be extremely pronounced in the oldest segments of the population. Using the new methodology, we can derive the age distribution that is uniquely implied by a given life table and a set of age-specific rates of growth obtained from two censuses. When we use the official Soviet life tables in this procedure, we find that the reported number of centenarians is at least 28.9 percent overstated for males and 7.5 percent for females. If one were to posit that Soviet mortality during 1959 to 1970 was, in fact, no better than the Swedish mortality experience during roughly the same time period, then the true number of centenarians could be no more than 2 percent of that reported.     

The Pattern of Age-Specific fertility rates

A study of the pattern of age-specific fertility rates by five-year age-groups has revealed the possibility of using the Pearsonian type I curve as a graduating equation. Such distinctions have been examined for fifty countries having high, medium, and low fertility rates. Results have been found to be quite satisfactory, even when, for purposes of simplicity, the parameters have been restricted to depend on the first two moments, instead of the first four. The number of independent parameters has thus been reduced to only three, and method shave been suggested for their estimates, using ancillary information which is usually provided in the census reports. The findings seem to be particularly useful for countries lacking effective registration systems of vital events such as births related, as they are, to the age of the mother.In short, the determination of a series of age-specific fertility rates depends primarily on the modal fertile age (a1) and on one of the two exponents (m, or m2) of the type I distribution. It has been shown that the proportions of women married in the age groups 20-24 years and 25-29 years can be used for approximate evaluations of both of these parameters. While estimates of a, and m, are sufficient to generate a relative distribution of age-specific fertility rates, actual values can be obtained if, in addition, the annual number of births is either known or can be estimated from census age distributions of children.Modal distributions of relative values of age-specific fertility rates (such that the sum of these rates adds up to 100.0) have also been obtained for different combinations of al and m1, but are not shown here for lack of space. Once the estimates of al and m, have been made, the modal tables can always be referred to for the corresponding distributions of age-specific fertility rates.     

Family planning achievements as suggested by changes of total fertility and party birth rate]

The dynamic characteristics of China's 5 distinct stages of population development since the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, namely, 1950-1958, 1959-1963, 1964-1970, 1971-1981, and 1982-present, are outlined and discussed. By tracing both the overall rate of population growth and age-specific fertility rates for women aged 15-45 (5-year groups), a clear pattern emerges which indicates that the rates of early and late fertility (ages groups 15-19 and 30-45) are significantly declining. This is interpreted as a key factor in the overall decline in fertility rate. Annual statistics showing the number of children per woman of childbearing age and interval between 1st marriage and 1st birth are compared and discussed. It is concluded that the overall decline in birth rate and fertility rate since the 1970's is attributable to China's successful family planning campaign.     

Estimation of vital rates by means of monte carlo simulation

Monte Carlo simulation has been used to estimate age-specific fertility and mortality rates for a small population,the French-derived isolate of Northside on St. Thomas, U. S. Virgin Islands. Estimates were based on data collected in a household census and genealogical survey and on birth, death, and marriage records for the years 1916to 1966. During this 50-year period (in which the population size increased from 202 to 657), the numbers of births and deaths were too, small to estimate age-specific rates directly, and in addition, death registration was incomplete. Mortality rates were estimated using a simulation program in which mortality was the only stochastic variable. A model mortality schedule was chosen which most accurately reproduced the growth pattern of the population over the 50-year period. To estimate fertility rates, a more complex simulation model was used in which fertility, nuptiality, and mortality were random variables with probability distributions. Preliminary estimates of fertility were made from the birth records and used as input to this simulation program. Birth probabilities were adjusted empirically from one set of simulation runs to the next, until population growth rates, as well as other demographic characteristics, were similar in the real and simulated populations. The birth rates which produced the best fit to the real population data were taken as the estimated age-specific fertility schedule. To reproduce the real population age structure more closely, secular changes in birth probabilities were applied.     

Estimating russification of ethnic identity among non-Russians in the USSR

Many scholars have asserted that extensive ethnic russification has occurred in Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, but little effort has been devoted to making quantitative estimates of the extent of assimilation or of the differences among ethnic groups in tendencies to assimilate. A method of estimating ethnic reidentification in the USSR is described and evaluated. The expected number of survivors to the second census date for each age cohort of a given ethnic group is compared to the reported number of cohort members at the second census date to determine the net number who have changed their ethnic self-identification between censuses. The method establishes relative differences in the propensity to reidentify ethnically among 26 Soviet ethnic groups. Many small ethnic groups in European Russia are found to have very high estimated rates of ethnic russification; non-Russian Slavs—Ukrainians and Belorussians—are found to have fairly low estimated rates of ethnic russification. The implications of the Russian gain in population through ethnic reidentification also are assessed.     

The Soviet Union: population trends and dilemmas

Focus in this discussion of population trends and dilemmas in the Soviet Union is on demographic problems, data limitations, early population growth, geography and resources, the 15 republics of the Soviet Union and nationalities, agriculture and the economy, population growth over the 1950-1980 period (national trend, regional differences); age and sex composition of the population, fertility trends, nationality differentials in fertility, the reasons for fertility differentials (child care, divorce, abortion and contraception, illegitimacy), labor shortages and military personnel, mortality (mortality trends, life expectancy), reasons for mortality increases, urbanization and emigration, and future population prospects and projections. For mid-1982 the population of the Soviet Union was estimated at 270 million. The country's current rate of natural increase (births minus deaths) is about 0.8% a year, higher than current rates of natural increase in the U.S. (0.7%) and in developed countries as a whole (0.6%). Net immigration plays no part in Soviet population growth, but emigration was noticeable in some years during the 1970s, while remaining insignificant relative to total population size. National population growth has dropped by more than half in the last 2 decades, from 1.8% a year in the 1950s to 0.8% in 1980-1981, due mostly to declining fertility. The national fertility decline masks sharp differences among the 15 republics and even more so among the some 125 nationalities. In 1980, the Russian Republic had an estimated fertility rate of 1.9 births/woman, and the rate was just 2.0 in the other 2 Slavic republics, the Ukraine and Belorussia. In the Central Asian republics the rates ranged up to 5.8. Although the Russians will no doubt continue to be the dominant nationality, low fertility and a relatively higher death rate will reduce their share of the total population by less than half by the end of the century. Soviet leaders have launched a pronatalist policy which they hope will lead to an increase in fertility, at least among the dominant Slavic groups of the multinational country. More than 9 billion rubles (U.S. $12.2 billion) is to be spent over the next 5 years to implement measures aimed at increasing state aid to families with children, to be carried out step by step in different regions of the country. It is this writer's opinion that overall fertility is not likely to increase markedly despite the recent efforts of the central authorities, and the Russian share of the total population will probably continue to drop while that of Central Asian Muslim peoples increases.     

Fertility trends in Australia

Using published data from the Australian vital registration and census systems, several time series are compiled: crude birth rates from the 1860s; fertility rates from the 1880s; age-specific and parity-specific measures from the 191Os; cumulative fertility measures by birth year of parent beginning with the 1890s; and cumulative fertility measures for marriages by year contracted from the 1910s.The decline in fertility to the 1930s, the upswing to 1961, and declines thereafter revealed by annual fertility measures show far more variation than do measures of total generation fertility—2.7 children per woman born in 1893–95, 2.3 1906–10, 2.8 1921–25, and perhaps 3.0 for women born in the 1930s. Both annual and generation measures show a younger age at parenthood, a decrease in childlessness, and progressively fewer large families. In the light of present experience, it seems not unreasonable to project generation fertility of 2.5 children, implying a crude birth rate of about 20 per thousand for the next fifteen years or so.     

Comment on 'expectancy of life at birth in 36 nationalities of the Soviet Union: 1958-60'

Abstract In D. Peter Mazur's recent article, 'Expectancy of Life at Birth in 36 Nationalities of the Soviet Union: 1958-1960', crude rates of death and expectancies of life for nationalities are derived from a scant base of data that includes crude rates of natural increase for administrative units and various ratios of composition of the populations of both administrative units and nationalities. Students of Soviet demography genuinely appreciate Mazur's attempt to derive rich results from meagre data. Of course, to do this strong assumptions are required and Mazur warns that 'the quantitative results ... are valid only to the extent that the underlying methodology is theoretically sound'. One way to test the quantitative results is to examine how well the crude death rates for the nationalities calculated by Mazur reproduce the crude death rates for administrative units with which Mazur started. Mazur feels that the estimated death rates for nationalities closely agree with the death rates for administrative areas. The present author is sceptical. Application of the method described below does not show close correspondence, and this matter, which is crucial in the evaluation of Mazur's results, seems problematical.     

Vital rates in India 1961-71 estimated from 1971 census data

Abstract In the last decade the increase in the population of India, while, of course, very large, was smaller than predicted by official forecasts. With the use of recent census and sample registration data - in the absence of age-specific rates and adequate vital statistics - this paper provides estimates of fertility and mortality through the reverse-survival and forward-projection methods. Birth rates are estimated as 40·5-42, death rates as 18-20, and life expectancy at birth as 45-46 years. Mortality decline had been smaller than forecast but more than during any comparable period in the past, even though current mortality levels, particularly infant mortality, are still high. Males continue to have a longer life expectation than females, with a difference that has widened in the past decade. The decline of between seven and ten per cent in the crude birth rate is largely due to changes in marital fertility and to some extent to changes in age and marital composition. Because of greater decline in death rates than birth rates, the 1961-71 decade shows a higher rate of population growth than previous periods.     

Developing strategies for deriving small population fertility rates

Many agencies require population estimates and projections by ethnic group. These projections need ethnic-specific, age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) but their inclusion is challenging since ethnicity is not recorded at birth registration. In this paper maternity data are used in a case study of electoral wards in Bradford, West Yorkshire, to develop fertility rates for small populations for a 1991 based projection. The challenge is to capture local variations in fertility by ethnic group when data are sparse. Small areas were grouped together using cluster analysis to define combinations with similar sociodemographic and fertility experiences so that sparse data could be aggregated to estimate reliable ethnic-specific fertility rates. For comparison, the data were aggregated into the 1991 Office for National Statistics area type classification. Fertility rates by single year of age for all area types were smoothed using the Hadwiger function. For the White ethnic group there were sufficient births to create ethnic-specific, ward-level ASFRs. For other ethnicities grouping of areas was necessary. The accuracy of the ASFRs in predicting births was assessed using mean absolute percentage error. Results show that for some minority groups district-level ethnic-specific fertility rates produced the most accurate birth estimates even though they were based on a larger area. This implies that rates created may be informative about the local area for White ethnic type but not in the same way for smaller ethnic groups. In terms of grouping strategies we recommend that existing classifications are assessed to determine how well variations in rates are stratified before embarking on a custom scheme. Where population sub-groups are small in some areas, it may be more reliable to use rates derived for larger areas and apply these to local populations. Inevitably, the rates used in a projection are a compromise but hopefully will still capture important dimensions of population change.     

Annual fertility rates from census data on own children: Comparisons with vital statistics data for the United States

This paper begins by describing the procedure and data requirements for calculating annual fertility rates from census data on own children. Then, using data from the United States Censuses of 1960 and 1970, fully adjusted estimates are presented and compared with recorded vital statistics rates. Total fertility estimates derived from own children data for whites average less than two percent lower than the recorded rates- a difference that can be attributed partially to the fact that the estimates are adjusted for net census undercount but the recorded rates are not. Even without adjustments for mortality, children not living with their mothers, and net census undercount, the own children data estimates accurately replicate recorded trends (even though the levels are misspecified). The utility of own children data for the study of differential fertility is discussed.     

Characteristics of age composition of China's population]

The age composition of Chinese population is analyzed via data collected in the 1982 census, which has been the basis for planning the social and economic life of 1 billion people. The census reflected complete population age composition, by birth, mortality and growth rates, from the time of the Liberation in 1949. The 10% sample, based on the national age composition, did not include the 4,240,000 people in military service which, as .42% of the total population, did not constitute a large differential. The population has grown rapidly since 1949. A few years before and after 1960, growth was reduced due to economic conditions, but the overall growth trend remained unchanged. The census showed that since 1970, growth has experienced a downturn, but the decrease was not related to the sudden drop before and after 1960. The census also showed China's population had changed from 1964's primarily young population to an adult population, but the process of population aging is only beginning, with a still relatively young population. China's population is not a stable one. This increase and decrease were greatly influenced by the changes in social and economic conditions. The disparity in age composition caused by these changes has created problems in social life, education, employment, marriage, housing, health, transportation, and cultural facilities. There are large differences in age composition between regions and ethnic groups. The decreases in birth and growth rate of the eastern coastal provinces were more rapid than those of the southwest and northwest regions. The age composition of minority nationalities is considerably younger than the Han people. Factors that influenced age composition characteristics included reduction of the neonatal mortality rate, the rises and falls of economic development, and the work in planned fertility.     

Relation of marriage and education to fertility in the U.S.S.R

Abstract One-half of the variation in Soviet fertility as measured by the child-woman ratio is attributable to the proportion of married women in the 20-24 age group. The familar sociological hypothesis of an inverse relation between human fertility and education also is fully substantiated with data for the 36 major ethnic groups in the U.S.S.R. The second and third best predicting variables fall into the two extreme age groups: (a) those 16 to 19 years of age with more than seven years of school completed and (b) those men and women aged 60 and over with the equivalent formal education. Results of this study support the modified hypothesis that complements previously publicized findings. It asserts that variations in fertility attributable to the traditionally religious values can be explained in terms of the age-specific marriage and educational differentials known to have existed in the past and still characteristic of the multi-national society in the Soviet Union.     

A decomposition of trends in the nonmarital fertility ratios of blacks and whites in the united states, 1960–1992*

We use a method of standardization and decomposition developed by Das Gupta to update Smith and Cutright’s analysis of demographic factors responsible for increases in the nonmarital fertility ratio (illegitimacy ratio) among blacks and whites in the United States. We create standardized rates for each year between 1960 and 1992, and consistent, exhaustive decompositions of the nonmarital fertility ratio for any interval during this period in terms of four components: (1) the age distribution of women of reproductive age, (2) the proportion of women unmarried at each age, (3) the age-specific birth rates of married women, and (4) the age-specific birth rates of unmarried women. Nonmarital fertility ratios are much higher among blacks than among whites, but both increased monotonically from 1960 to 1992. During the last 10 years, each increased by nearly 10 percentage points. Increases in the proportion of women not married, at all ages, account for the preponderance of the increase in black nonmarital fertility ratios. Increasing rates of unmarried childbearing, however, have played a role during the most recent decade (1983–1992). For whites, from 1960 until 1975, declines in marital fertility were most important in producing increases in the proportion of children born out of wedlock. Since then, these proportions have increased primarily because of increases in unmarried women s birth rates, and secondarily because of declines in the proportion of women who are married. These trends are consistent with arguments that emphasize declining economic incentives to marry and reduced access to, and acceptability of, abortion.     

Comment on ‘expectancy of life at birth in 36 nationalities of the Soviet Union: 1958–60’

In D. Peter Mazur's recent article, ‘Expectancy of Life at Birth in 36 Nationalities of the Soviet Union: 1958–1960’, crude rates of death and expectancies of life for nationalities are derived from a scant base of data that includes crude rates of natural increase for administrative units and various ratios of composition of the populations of both administrative units and nationalities. Students of Soviet demography genuinely appreciate Mazur's attempt to derive rich results from meagre data. Of course, to do this strong assumptions are required and Mazur warns that ‘the quantitative results ... are valid only to the extent that the underlying methodology is theoretically sound’. One way to test the quantitative results is to examine how well the crude death rates for the nationalities calculated by Mazur reproduce the crude death rates for administrative units with which Mazur started. Mazur feels that the estimated death rates for nationalities closely agree with the death rates for administrative areas. The present author is sceptical. Application of the method described below does not show close correspondence, and this matter, which is crucial in the evaluation of Mazur's results, seems problematical.