Coincidence of role expectations between staff and volunteer members of drug free community coalitions

Community coalitions have proliferated as a means of addressing a range of complex community problems. Such coalitions often consist of a small paid staff and volunteer members. The present study examines one likely contributor to coalition effectiveness: the degree of agreement on role expectations between paid staff and volunteer members. Role confusion occurs when paid staff and volunteers differ in their expectations of who is responsible for accomplishing specific tasks. Staff and volunteer members from 69 randomly selected Drug Free Coalitions in the United States as well as 21 Drug Free Coalitions in Connecticut were asked to respond to an online survey asking about 37 specific coalition tasks critical for effective coalition functioning and the degree to which paid staff and/or voluntary members should be responsible for accomplishing each. Our final sample consisted of 476 individuals from 35 coalitions. Using coalitions as the unit of analysis, we found significant differences between paid staff and volunteer coalition members on nine tasks reflecting four domains: meeting leadership and participation, (2) planning and implementation leadership, (3) publicity/media relations, and (4) logistical functions. Implications of these differences and ways that evaluators could help coalitions deal with differing role expectations were discussed.     

The strategies that bind: NGO coalitions and their influence

Abstract This article examines NGOs as strategic organizations that form coalitions in order to influence other actors, particularly international financial institutions. It has three primary aims: to examine NGOs as strategic organizations; to look at a particular type of NGO network, the coalition, which unlike a network involves more value and commitment; and to assess the factors that contribute to their strategies such as changes to the NGO environment. To do this, the resource dependency perspective is utilized to evaluate the influence of various resources (funding, legitimacy and information) on NGOs’ organizational strategy. Oxfam International, the NGO Working Group on the World Bank, and the Bretton Woods Project are three NGO coalitions examined. I conclude that there are differences between NGO networks and coalitions and that the coalitions strategically act and react to changing resources in their environments.     

Collaborations with faith‐based social service coalitions

Based on the first national survey of faith‐based social service coalitions in the United States, this article presents data on the degree to which these nonprofit organizations collaborate with other specific organizational types, as well as the range and intensity of these collaborations. In general, faith‐based coalitions tend to collaborate most frequently with other faith‐based agencies, a pattern especially characteristic of the more religiously expressive ones. However, collaboration with non‐faith‐based organizations is also quite common. Based on seven organizational characteristics, we are able to predict which faith‐based coalitions are most likely to collaborate with different types of organizations: coalitions that have more explicitly religious policies and practices with reference to clients and staffs are less likely to participate in intense collaborations with some types of secular organizations, and consistently less likely to do so with all types of governmental agencies.     

The evolution of the policy environment for climate change migration in Bangladesh: Competing narratives,coalitions and power

In spite of an enormous increase in attention to climate migration in Bangladesh, institutional weaknesses have meant that unplanned migration has triggered social issues. This situation requires investigation of the main challenges and opportunities in institutional capacity and policy development for climate change induced migration. Drawing on different narratives, networks and power status of stakeholders, this study identifies two competing coalitions: ‘in‐situ’ coalition, which shares the belief that migration is a failure of adaptation, and ‘ex‐situ’ coalition adhering to the emerging slogan of “migration as adaptive strategy.” The differentiated powers of two coalitions to some extent leave the agenda of climate migration in the policy domain as a subject of informal institutional capacity rather than a formal regulatory framework. Consequently, the evolution of the policy environment for climate migration depends on how effectively a greater policy space is determined by narratives, coalitions and power. Through a political economy lens, this article seeks to clarify the potential approaches to extending the policy space regarding climate migration in Bangladesh, first by improving ideological pluralism in international climate change finance, and, second, enhancing the bottom‐up process for resource mobilization. In short, the evolution of the policy environment for climate change largely depends on the political power of the ‘ex‐situ’ coalition.     

Minimum winning versus oversized coalitions in public finance: the role of uncertainty

This paper extends Persson et al.’s (J Polit Econ 108:1121–1161, 2000) simple legislature in the context of public finance with certainty to uncertainty. In our uncertain world, oversized coalitions (OSCs) as well as minimum winning coalitions (MWCs) may arise in equilibrium, and the agenda setter’s proposed policy may fail to receive a majority support. This is in marked contrast to the certain world, in which only MWCs can arise in equilibrium and the agenda setter’s proposal never fails to pass. When OSCs arise, we show that both public good provision and redistribution are likely to achieve their first-best solution, even if the legislature is simple.     

Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games

Riker's size principle for n-person zero-sum games predicts that winning coalitions that form will be minimal in that any player's defection will negate the coalition's winning status. Brams and Fishburn (1995) applied Riker's principle to weighted-majority voting games in which players have voting weights w ₁≥w ₂≥...≥w _n,and a coalition is winning if its members' weights sum to more than half the total weight. We showed that players' bargaining power tends to decrease as their weights decrease when minimal winning coalitions obtain, but that the opposite trend occurs when the minimal winning coalitions that form are “weight-minimal”, referred to as least winning coalitions. In such coalitions, large size may be more harmful than helpful. The present paper extends and refines our earlier analysis by providing mathematical foundations for minimal and least winning coalitions, developing new data to examine relationships between voting weight and voting power, and applying more sophisticated measures of power to these data. We identify all sets of minimal and least winning coalitions that arise from different voting weights for n≤6 and characterize all coalitions that are minimal winning and least winning for every n. While our new analysis supports our earlier findings, it also indicates there to be less negative correlation between voting weight and voting power when least winning coalitions form. In this context, players' powers are fairly insensitive to their voting weights, so being large or small is not particularly important for inclusion in a least winning coalition.     

Coalition-Based Social Change Initiatives

ABSTRACT

This paper presents a model for establishing and maintaining social change coalitions. The model, based on the authors' study of a successful coalition-based social change initiative, highlights the potential contribution of a neutral, external support agency whose goal is to help a group of organizations collaborate in an effort to promote change in social policy in an area of shared concern. The external agency brings knowledge and experience in working with coalitions, needs to be trusted by all the coalition partners, and should be perceived as not competing for recognition or resources, and as having only the common goal in mind. The components of the model and the methodology employed to develop it are presented, followed by assessment of its generalizability to other settings. Experts, from different disciplines, countries and ethnic backgrounds, advised that this model has great potential for solving social problems in many different areas.     

Altered resources, disturbance, and heterogeneity: A framework for comparing urban and non-urban soils

We propose a framework of key concepts useful in understanding how urban soils can contribute to general ecological theory. The major factors that can cause urban soils to be different from soils in non-urban ecosystems are identified and related to the familiar state factor approach. We evaluate directly altered resource availability, and the role of stress in mediating resource availability in urban ecosystems. Modified groundwater and stream flow, and atmospheric deposition of nitrogen and base cations are particularly important resource fluxes to soils in urban ecosystems. Disturbance can be conceptualized in the same way in urban as in non-urban ecosystems. However, in addition to biophysical disturbances familiar to ecologists studying wild lands, demographically and socially mediated changes in ecosystem structure must also be considered. These changes include human migration and population structure, institutional shifts, and the effects of human health. Finally, spatial heterogeneity, including fragmentation and differential connectivity, integrates the effects of resources and disturbance, and has an effect on subsequent resource availability and susceptibility to disturbance. Layers of heterogeneity include not only the geomorphic template, but urban climate, biotic composition, buildings and infrastructure, and demographic-social patterns. The complex layering of natural and social factors that constitute urban heterogeneity permit the continuation of important ecological processes, as well as modify ecological fluxes involving soils. We present a modification of the state factor approach as an expanded framework for the study of urban soils. The understanding of urban soils can contribute to general ecological theory by testing the generality of important ecosystem drivers and their linkage with social processes in an under investigated ecosystem type that is increasing in extent and impact worldwide.     

Anonymity in large societies

In a social choice model with an infinite number of agents, there may occur “equal size” coalitions that a preference aggregation rule should treat in the same manner. We introduce an axiom of equal treatment with respect to a measure of coalition size and explore its interaction with common axioms of social choice. We show that, provided the measure space is sufficiently rich in coalitions of the same measure, the new axiom is the natural extension of the concept of anonymity, and in particular plays a similar role in the characterization of preference aggregation rules.     

Convergence: Finding Collective Voice in Global Civil Society<Superscript>©</Superscript>

This study investigated the question of how civil society groups cross political, cultural, social, economic, and language boundaries to find common ground and to act collectively in coalitions to effect international change. A set of constituents emerged in answer to the research question; Complementarity, Speed and Democracy, Rules of Engagement, Contingent Alliance, and Convergence. Convergence emerged as a central and unifying construct. Convergence is the uniting of people who are different, or even opposed, around a common cause. It is based on the presumption that diversity is critical to coalition success and that it needs be employed to leverage its many potential benefits. The analyses led to the conceptualization of the Convergence System, a model that employs global civil society (GCS) diversity to discern complementarity within GCS coalitions, to discover Points of Convergence, and to facilitate collective action toward shared objectives, thus enabling efficacious action by GCS within the international polity.     

Opportunity,Context, and Action: Understanding the Divergent Strategies of Two Mexican Social Movement Coalitions in a Time of Tremendous Change

Evidence suggests collective action success is aided by organizations working in conjunction. Recent scholarship has refocused attention on what factors foster or impede coalition work. This article builds on the literature to show how the context in which coalitions emerge and act may be multiple and contradictory. Using data from extended field research, we examine two Mexican NGO coalitions to analyze how the intersection of national and local opportunity structures influenced their emergence and strategic action. We find that the impact of such influences may be contradictory. Democratization posed both threats and opportunities for the coalitions, providing impetus for their emergence, but limiting strategic choices as co-optation and neoliberalism undermined the opportunities created by democratization. We argue that the coalition members' interpretation of the local political context explains the divergent paths the two coalitions took over time.     

On hierarchies and communication

Many economic and political organizations have some relational structure, meaning that participating agents do not only differ with respect to certain individual characteristics such as wealth and preferences, but also belong to some relational structure in which they usually take different positions. Two examples of such structures are communication networks and hierarchies. In the literature, the distinction between these two types of relational structures is not always clear. In models of restricted cooperation, this distinction should be defined by properties of the set of feasible coalitions. We characterize the sets of feasible coalitions in communication networks and compare them with sets of feasible coalitions arising from hierarchies.     

Multilateral bargaining with subjective claims under majority vs. unanimity rule: An experiment

We experimentally investigate the effects of subjective claims in a multilateral bargaining game. Claims are induced by having subjects ‘produce’ the surplus to be divided by earning points in a quiz task. We use a Baron–Ferejohn framework. Our main treatment variable is the majority required to pass a proposal. Under unanimity rule, all proposals and agreements constitute convex combinations of the equal split and a division that is proportional to points earned in the productive task. Contrary to our predictions, this pattern largely persists under majority rule. In sharp contrast to prior experiments in which an exogenous surplus is divided using majority rule, few subjects attempt to build minimum winning coalitions in the presence of claims from production.     

Acyclicity and the dispersion of the veto power

Blair and Pollak (Econometrica (1982) 50: 931–943) prove that, if there are more alternatives than individuals, then, for every arrovian binary decision rule that is acyclic, there is at least one individual who has a veto power over a critical number of pairs of alternatives. If the number of individuals is larger than the number of alternatives, there need not be single vetoers but there could be small coalitions endowed with a similar power. Kelsey (Soc Choice Welfare (1985) 2: 131–137) states precise results in this respect. In this paper, we first give a new and much simpler proof of the main result of Blair and Pollak and complete proofs of the generalization of this result by Kelsey. Then we give a precise answer as to the minimum size of the coalitions that must have a veto power under any acyclic binary decision rule and the minimum number of pairs of alternatives on which these coalitions may exercise their power. We also show that, if the veto power of the coalitions of the minimal size attainable under the last objective is limited to the minimum number of pairs of alternatives, then all larger coalitions have a veto power on all pairs. All the results are obtained by appealing to an acyclicity condition found by Ferejohn and Fishburn (J Econ Theory (1979) 21: 28–45). In the case of symmetric and monotonic binary decision rules, proofs are even easier and illustrate clearly the reasons for the veto power.     

Women bankers in black and white: exploring raced,classed and gendered coalitions

ABSTRACT

Black women constitute the majority of the population but they lag significantly behind white women and other groups in their participation in the labour market. Intersectionality requires that we recognise the differences in experience between black women and white women. This is not for the purposes of what some have called the “oppression Olympics” but to research the stratifications of social asymmetries in a manner that allows for an understanding of the complexity of inequality. Based on interview data and observations, we use employment equity discourses to explore the differential positions of black women and white women managers in a major bank’s headquarters in Johannesburg, South Africa. A historical analysis of black women and white women’s experience illustrates the systemic and institutional aspects of intersectionality as well as the difficulties in forming coalitions between black women and white women. In the final analysis we argue that the mutual advancement of women requires historicisation and renewed commitment to partnerships to eradicate sexism and racism.     

Trends in Female Violence, 1960–1977

Abstract

This paper examines the issue of whether levels of female violent crime are rising. Two differing viewpoints, both using the Uniform Crime Reports as their principal data source, are compared. Both viewpoints suffer because of a failure to specify the major questions on female violent crime and because of inappropriate usage of UCR arrest statistics. The central questions about female violent crime are clarified, and arrest rates are computed to determine whether there has been any change in levels of female violent crime since 1960. The effects of the women's movement on female violent crime are also examined. The conclusion is that female levels of violence are rising, but male levels are increasing at an equal pace. The pattern of the data suggests that the upward trend in female violence, which now appears to be leveling off, is not due to the women's movement or to the changing status of women in the United States. Instead it appears that common social forces are operating to affect levels of violence for both sexes.     

Leveling coalitions as network phenomena

The formation of leveling coalitions is discussed as the outcome of a network process. A simplicial complex is used to formalize the concept of a reticulum, and the interlocking of reticulums is naturally analyzed by a Q-analysis. This connective structure of reticulums forms the backcloth for the formation of leveling coalitions. A structure theorem that claims leveling coalitions will fail if the backcloth prohibits them, and may succeed if the blackcloth permits them, is supported by data from two social networks.     

Special interest group coalitions: Ethical standards for broad-based support efforts

Coalitions are an increasingly important tool of special interest group public affairs efforts. While coalitions are not usually formed with the intent to deceive, some groups take shortcuts which amount to buying results and manipulating the public. These “front” groups which deceive or mislead the public or policy-making bodies can undermine the professionalism of public relations and damage the public trust.The author examines case studies of coalitions formed by a for-profit corporation, a trade association and a foreign government. Findings were that: (1) coalitions perform an important role if they represent a broad public interest but if they do not represent a broad base, they may be deceptive, unethical, and potentially damaging to the public interest; (2) media play an important role as diligent watchdogs but don't always rise to this responsibility, and (3) the public relations profession bears the brunt of public and media concern over unethical coalition activity. Ethical guidelines for coalition development are offered.     

Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation

Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they “fall back” on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the players common to them, or kingmakers, determine which fallback coalition will form. The first player(s) acceptable to all other members of a fallback coalition are the leader(s) of that coalition. The effects of different preference assumptions—particularly, different kinds of single-peakedness—on the number of coherent coalitions, their connectedness, and which players become kingmakers and leaders are investigated. The fallback procedure may be used (i) empirically to identify kingmakers and leaders or (ii) normatively to select them. We illustrate the model using data from the U.S. Supreme Court, 2005–2009.     

Infants' ERP Responses to Novel and Familiar Stimuli Change Over Time: Implications for Novelty Detection and Memory

Detection of novelty is an important cognitive ability early in development, when infants must learn a great deal about their world. Work with adults has identified networks of brain areas involved in novelty detection; this study investigated electrophysiological correlates of detection of novelty and recognition of familiarity in 9‐month‐old infants, using event‐related potentials (ERPs). Infants were familiarized with an event in the laboratory, then ERPs were recorded as they viewed repeated presentations of pictures of this familiar event and a novel event, along with single presentations of 30 trial‐unique events. A middle‐latency negative component was sensitive to degree of novelty, differing in amplitude and latency by stimulus condition and across repeated presentations. Long‐latency slow‐wave activity also related to stimulus condition. Findings have implications for our understanding of infants' detection of novel information and the processes that render the novel familiar.