EMPLOYMENT AND OUTPUT EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING: IS GOVERNMENT SIZE IMPORTANT?

The efects of government spending on employment and output may depend on government size and the persistence of spending. The empirical results suggest that permanent (or persistent) changes in government consumption have a greater impact on output and employment than temporary (or cyclical) changes. This implies a negative wealth effect and reduces the stabilization potency of government spending. The findings also support the hypothesis that the output elasticity of government consumption is positive but declines with increases in government size. Using the estimated equations, I calculate the optimal government size for the representative country as around 20 percent of GDP.     

AUTOCRATIC, DEMOCRATIC, AND OPTIMAL GOVERNMENT

All types of government face two major fiscal decisions: the level of government services and the average tax rate. This paper develops models of autocratic, democratic, and optimal government. The effects of alternative government structures are estimated using a common set of parameters based on US. data. Output and government services are higher in u democracy than in an autocracy, but the tax rate is lower. Output is even higher with an optimal government and both government services and the tax rate are lower. The relative outcomes in any government depend strongly on the fiscal horizon of those who govern. (JEL H11)     

A MACROECONOMIC MODEL ON THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

We determine the relative rewards to producers, private rent‐seekers, and bureaucrats and allocation of talent between them in a general equilibrium model. Unproductive activity creates a negative externality on the relative rewards to producers. If the size of bureaucracy is exogenously given, among the multiple equilibria, the one with fewer private rent‐seekers yields higher welfare. By choosing a small size of bureaucracy, the government can establish the superior equilibrium as the unique outcome, which also achieves the constrained optimum. If the population of bureaucrats is endogenously determined, however, a larger bureaucracy enhances production and welfare. The size of government and economic performance are jointly determined, and their relationship depends on the quality of government. Our result supports the view that the size of government may not matter much; what is important is the quality of government. (JEL E60, E61, H00)     

WOMEN PREFER LARGER GOVERNMENTS: GROWTH,STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION,AND GOVERNMENT SIZE

The increase in income per capita is accompanied, in virtually all countries, by two changes in economic structure: the increase in the share of government spending in gross domestic product (GDP), and the increase in female labor force participation. We argue that these two changes are causally related. We develop a growth model based on Galor and Weil (1996) where female participation in market activities, fertility, and government size, in addition to consumption and saving, is endogenously determined. Rising incomes lead to a rise in female labor force participation as the opportunity cost of staying at home and caring for the children increases. In our model, higher government spending decreases the cost of performing household chores, including, but not limited to, child rearing and child care, as in Rosen (1996) . We also use a wide cross‐section of data for developed and developing countries and show that higher market participation by women is positively and robustly associated with government size. We then investigate the causal link between participation and government size using a novel unique data set that allows the use of the relative price of productive home appliances as an instrumental variable. We find strong evidence of a causal link between female market participation and government size. This effect is robust to the country sample, time period, and a set of controls in the spirit of Rodrik (1998) . (JEL O4, E62, H11)     

ELECTORAL POLITICS, INTEREST GROUPS, AND THE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT

This paper considers how government size responds to a change in the influence of interest groups. First, an election model is developed that has an equilibrium and in which interest groups have unequal influence. The authors then show that an increase in a group's influence per se does not cause government size to increase but does cause its size to increase when the government (1) cannot change tax shares or (2) provides a good benefiting one (untaxed) group, whose sole interest is in maximizing its consumption of the good. The paper concludes with a discussion of some of the normative implications.     

GROWTH, WELFARE, AND THE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT

Using an endogenous growth model in which government purchases directly affect aggregate productivity and utility, fiscal policy experiments conducted here indicate that the macroeconomic effects of changes in fiscal policy are at least as sensitive to the mix of spending cuts as they are to the mix of tax cuts. In fact, reducing the size of the government actually reduces growth and welfare freductions in government expenditures are heavily weighted towards reductions in public capital or if the proceeds are not used to reduce capital taxation. In addition, across-the-board spending cuts are not likely to significantly improve growth and welfare. ( JEL E62, 041)     

ARE GOVERNMENT BONDS NET WEALTH? EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES

This paper investigates whether government bonds are viewed as net wealth. If they are, the nominal interest rate in steady-state equilibrium should be an increasing function of the government debt and of government spending. Using forward interest rates realized during World War II, this paper finds no evidence of such a relationship. These data afford an especially powerful test because the federal debt rose from 29 to 106 percent of trend output during the war. This enormous increase in government debt actually appears to have reduced forward interest rates by a statistically significant, but small, amount.     

TAXATION, GOVERNMENT SPENDING, AND LABOR SUPPLY A DIAGRAMMATIC EXPOSITION

The effects of a change in the level of taxation on labor supply are examined under the assumption that the government budget balances. The government spends tax revenues either on redistributions (which are assumed to have an income effect on labor supply) or on other government goods (which are assumed not to influence labor supply). In order for a rise in the tax rate to increase the quantity of labor supplied, it must be that (i) the labor-supply function bends backward, and (ii) sufficiently little of the increased tax revenues are redistributed. The quantity of labor supplied must fall if all marginal tax revenues are redistributed.     

FRIEDMAN TAX CUTS VS. BUCHANAN DEFICIT REDUCTION AS THE BEST WAY OF CONSTRAINING GOVERNMENT

Does a tax cut reduce government spending by reducing government revenue or does it increase government spending by lowering the perceived price of government services? Some economists, including Milton Friedman, take the former position, while others, including James Buchanan, think the latter is true. The question seems to resist an empirical answer, with some studies supporting Friedman's view and others supporting Buchanan's. In this paper, each position is shown to be a special case in a simple model of taxation and deficit determination.     

SALIENCE AND THE GOVERNMENT PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS

This paper examines how behavioral biases caused by salient events affect the government provision of public goods. We develop a theory in which competing communities lobby the government for allocations of a local public good. Salient events bias community demands for the good, which results in inefficient allocations. We empirically test this theory using salient wildfires and government projects to reduce wildfire risk. Wildfires reduce risk to nearby communities, but may increase demand for fuels management projects because of biases induced by salient wildfires. We find that communities experiencing recent nearby fires are more likely to receive fuels management projects. (JEL D03, H41, Q24)     

FISCAL RULES AND GOVERNMENT BORROWING COSTS: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE

We find that the adoption of numerical fiscal rules reduces government borrowing costs in a sample of 101 advanced and developing countries for 1985–2010. We apply a variety of propensity score matching methods to address the self‐selection problem of policy adoption and find strong evidence that fiscal rules have large and significant treatment effects on lowering government borrowing costs in both international and domestic financial markets. The results are robust to changes in country sample and alternative estimation methodology, and are consistent with fiscal rules helping to build policy credibility by reducing the probability of default and the “risk premium” on government debt that compensates lenders for this possibility. (JEL E43, G12, H60)     

A POSITIVE THEORY OF DISCRETIONARY POLICY, THE COST OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT AND THE BENEFITS OF A CONSTITUTION

We offer an explanation of government's preference for discretionary policy action. The main elements are asymmetric information and the ability and desire of governments to maximize reelection prospects. Discretionary policy imposes a social cost. We show that the cost is eliminated if all voters have the same information as the government. An optimal, state contingent policy rule that precommits government through a constitution eliminates the cost by removing government's opportunities to exploit its informational advantage. Rules of this kind, and constitutional restrictions, are difficult to enforce in the presence of uncertainty and different information available to government and the public.     

THE OPTIMAL TAXATION OF ASSET INCOME WHEN GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION IS ENDOGENOUS: THEORY,ESTIMATION AND WELFARE

This paper derives the Ramsey optimal fiscal policy for taxing asset income in a model where government expenditure is a function of net output or the inputs that produce it. Extending work by Kenneth L. Judd, I demonstrate that the canonical result that the optimal tax on capital income is zero in the medium to long term is a special case of a more general model. Employing a vector error correction model to estimate the relationship between government consumption and net output or the factor inputs that generate it for the United States between 1948Q1 and 2015Q4, I demonstrate that this special case is empirically implausible, and show how a cointegrating vector can be used to determine the optimal tax schedule. I simulate a version of the model using the empirical estimates to measure the welfare implications of changing the tax rate on asset income, and contrast these results with those generated in a version of the model where government consumption is purely exogenous. The shifting pattern of welfare measurements confirms the theoretical results. I calculate that the prevailing effective tax rate on net asset income in the United States between 1970 and 2014 averaged 0.449. Hence abolishing the tax completely does generate welfare improvements, though only by the equivalent of between 1.103% and 1.616% permanent increase in consumption—well under half the implied welfare benefit when the endogeneity of the government consumption is ignored. The maximum welfare improvement from shifting part of the burden of tax from capital to labor is the equivalent of a permanent increase in consumption of between only 1.491% and 1.858%, and is attained when the tax rate on asset income is lowered to between 0.148 and 0.186. Allowing the tax rate to vary over time raises the maximum welfare benefit to 1.865%. All the results are very robust to a wide range of elasticities of labor supply. (JEL E62, H21, H50)     

THE POLITICALLY OPTIMAL TARIFF: LEVELS OF TRADE RESTRICTIONS ACROSS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

The degree to which countries restrain international trade varies significantly. This paper explains the pattern of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers for developed countries, in the context of politically optimal redistribution. The degree of trade restriction across countries is shown to be determined by differences in such factors as per capita income, the size of the government, and the size of the country.     

ASYMMETRY IN THE EFFECTS OF MONETARY AND GOVERNMENT SPENDING SHOCKS: CONTRASTING EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS

Using quarterly data for the United States, demand contraction exceeds expansion in the face of monetary and government spending shocks. Demand contraction in the face of government spending shocks, is absorbed in nominal wage and price deflation. The variability of government spending shocks decreases average wage and price inflation. In contrast, the upward flexibility of price appears in sharp contrast to its downward rigidity in the face of monetary shocks. Furthermore, output contraction is notably larger relative to expansion in the face of monetary shocks. Monetary variability accelerates average price inflation and decreases average output and real wage growth.     

THE DISTRIBUTION SECTOR AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: ARE THERE PATTERNS? YES

Using an increasing returns specification for distribution, an inverted U pattern between the share of distribution in gross domestic product and the level of development is shown to arise. A cross-section time-series data set is constructed and merged with one used to analyze the service sector. In contrast to the rising pattern found for services, an average time-series relation that exhibits an inverted U pattern is established. The empirical results are robust, for example, to choice of functional form and country and time period coverage. A similar pattern is found in the average cross-section (country) relation between distribution and development.     

IQ IN THE PRODUCTION FUNCTION: EVIDENCE FROM IMMIGRANT EARNINGS

We show that a country’s average IQ score is a useful predictor of the wages that immigrants from that country earn in the United States, whether or not one adjusts for immigrant education. Just as in numerous microeconomic studies, 1 IQ point predicts 1% higher wages, suggesting that IQ tests capture an important difference in cross‐country worker productivity. In a cross‐country development accounting exercise, about one‐sixth of the global inequality in log income can be explained by the effect of large, persistent differences in national average IQ on the private marginal product of labor. This suggests that cognitive skills matter more for groups than for individuals. (JEL J24, J61, O47)     

INFLATION AND GOVERNMENT DEFICITS

There is a pronounced positive correlation of inflation and government deficits in the United States since World War II. The purpose of this paper is to test the three leading explanations of this correlation. These three explanations are: (a) a deficit increases prices through a wealth effect; (b) a deficit results in the Federal Reserve purchasing debt, thus increasing the money supply and prices; and (c) expected inflation increases the deficit (which is the change in the nominal value of bonds). No support is found for either of the first two hypotheses. The results indicate that expected government deficits have no significance for future inflation.     

GOVERNMENT DEBT, CAPITAL ACCUMULATION, AND THE TERMS OF TRADE IN A MODEL OF INTERDEPENDENT ECONOMIES

This paper extends Diamond's overlapping generations model into a two-good, two-country setting to analyze the impact of an increase in domestic government debt on the terms of trade, the current account, and capital accumulation at home and abroad. It is found that, while the direction of change in the terms of trade is indeterminate in the short run, for stability it must agree with that in the steady state, which in turn is dependent on the initial debt status in trade of the home country. The higher level of government debt leads unambigously to lower levels of capital stocks, however.     

CAN GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT PERMANENTLY ALTER FERTILITY? THE CASE OF CHINA

We quantitatively assess the main sources of fertility fluctuations in China and find that only preference ships, involving education, health care and the employment and social status of women, can generate a statistically significant long-run decline in fertility growth. However, the government's enforcement power can explain some short-run movements infertility. To examine the effect of key variables, we modify a growth model with endogenous fertility to represent the average rural household's fertility decisions under government imposed constraints. The model provides the structure necessary to econometrically identify shocks to government enforcement ability, agricultural output and preferences toward fertility.