Global Warming: New Scenarios from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was set up in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme to review the state of knowledge about human‐induced climate change and assess possible responses. Most of its activities are conducted by three working groups, concerned respectively with scientific aspects of the climate system, with the vulnerability of human and natural systems to climate change, and with options for mitigating that change. The major IPCC reports have been highly detailed statements of scientific consensus on changes in the climate system, issued at roughly five‐year intervals. These reflect the input of some hundreds of scientists, with drafts scrutinized by expert reviewers, revised to attain consensus, and eventually approved (or “accepted”) by the full Panel. The first such assessment, published in 1990, was influential in formulating the Framework Convention on Climate Change adopted at the 1992 Rio conference. The second assessment report (SAR), Climate Change 1995, produced the widely cited estimate that global warming would raise average temperatures by 1°–3.5°C by 2100, with a “best estimate” of 2°C, and produce a sea‐level rise of 0.13 – 0.94 meters. That report took the further step of explicitly linking the warming to anthropogenic (human‐caused) emissions of greenhouse gases. Its cautious conclusion: “The balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on global climate.” Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis is Working Group I's contribution to the third IPCC assessment. The document was finalized at the Group's meeting in Shanghai in January 2001. A brief (18‐page) “Summary for Policymakers” was also released at this meeting, distilling the findings of the full report and putting them in more accessible language. Two sections of this summary document, presenting the Group's projections of atmospheric temperature trends and sea‐level rises, are reproduced below. The procedure followed was to assemble hypothetical alternative combinations of future greenhouse gas emissions in the form of emission scenarios, which were fed into large‐scale climate models to produce estimates of future temperature and sea‐level trends. For the third assessment report the scenarios used were set out in the IPCC Working Group Ill's Special Report on Emission Scenarios (March 2000), and are referred to below as the “SRES scenarios.” There are 35 of them in all. They fall into six groups, detailed in the text box, from each of which an illustrative case is plotted in the charts. (The shaded areas in the charts are envelopes spanning the 35 scenarios. Some additional details shown in the original charts have been omitted here for clarity.) The SAR scenarios are referred to as IS92. The major difference from the second assessment is in the projected temperature increase, which is now put at 1.4°–5.8°C (or in Fahrenheit degrees, 2.5°–10.4°). The projected sea‐level rise is slightly smaller, at 0.09 – 0.88 meters. There is also a strengthening of the statement on anthropogenic causes, which now reads: “There is new and stronger evidence that most of the [atmospheric] warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities.” The report notes that even with stabilization of greenhouse gas emissions, there may be continuing climate effects beyond the twenty‐first century. One such effect is the “weakening of ocean thermohaline circulation “—the ocean currents that, for example, transport heat into high northern‐hemisphere latitudes and moderate the coastal climates of those regions. The summary report is available online at the IPCC's website, www.ipcc.ch . The complete third assessment report, covering also the conclusions of Working Groups II and III (particularly on the social and economic costs of forecast climate change), will be released shortly.     

The Johannesburg Summit on Health and Sustainable Development

The World Summit on Sustainable Development was held in Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August‐4 September 2002. The meeting was a follow‐up to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) that took place in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 but with a mandate broader than that of the Rio conference: the Summit was to consider strategies toward sustainable development in all its dimensions. According to the opening paragraph of the Plan of Implementation adopted by the Johannesburg Summit, the Rio conference “provided the fundamental principles and the programme of action for achieving sustainable development.” But while reaffirming commitment to the Rio principles, the Plan states that it intends to “further build on the achievements made since UNCED and expedite the realization of the remaining goals.” A topic conspicuously missing from the deliberations of the Rio conference was population, even though rapid population growth has a plausible bearing on sustainable development and specifically on the problem of poverty, an issue at the center of the discussions concerning sustainability. It had been expected that Johannesburg would make amends for that omission. In the ten years between the two conferences, the size of the world's population increased by some 790 million persons. Of this growth, 754 million, or 95 percent, occurred in the countries the United Nations classifies as “less developed.” The population of these countries grew by 18 percent between the two conferences, as compared with a 3 percent growth in the more developed countries. The countries classified as “least developed“—a subset of the less developed countries consisting of 48 countries, predominantly African, with a 2002 population of nearly 700 million—grew during the interconference period by 29 percent. This record of population growth since the Rio conference may be supplemented by the projections of the United Nations up to 2050. The medium variant of these projections for the next 48 years envisages a slight population decline in the more developed countries and an addition of some 2 billion persons to the less developed group. For the least developed countries, the UN projects a population of more than 1.8 billion in 2050, some 164 percent larger than the current population size. Although the magnitudes of past population growth and its likely future dynamics are well known, they attracted very little attention at the Johannesburg meeting. The Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, a concise political document issued at the closing of the conference along with the Plan of Implementation, pledges “to place particular focus on, and give priority attention to, the fight against the worldwide conditions that pose severe threats to the sustainable development of our people.” It then proceeds to specifics: “Among these conditions are: chronic hunger; malnutrition; foreign occupation; armed conflicts; illicit drug problems; organized crime; corruption; natural disasters; illicit arms trafficking; trafficking, in persons; terrorism; intolerance and incitement to racial, ethnic, religious and other hatreds; xenophobia; and endemic, communicable and chronic diseases, in particular HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis” (Paragraph 19 of the Declaration,). The Plan of Implementation, a 27,000‐word document, was the main product of the Johannesburg meeting. Apart from a mention of the Cairo conference on Population and Development, the Plan's treatment of population issues is confined to health. The relevant section—section VI, titled Health and sustainable development—is reproduced below in full. (Paragraph numbers have been retained.) It presents a statement of goals couched in general exhortative terms (“integrate,”“promote,”“provide,”“improve,”“develop”), and specifies some quantitative targets, notably to reduce “by the year 2015, mortality rates for infants and children under 5 by two thirds, and maternal mortality rates by three quarters,” and “reduction of HIV prevalence among young men and women aged 15–24 by 25 per cent in the most affected countries by 2005 and globally by 2010.” The full text of the Plan can be found at http://www.un.org/jsummitlhtmlldocumentslsummit_docsl21Q9_planfinal.htm     

The impact of immigration on the Social Security System

In 1992, the estimated deficit of the entire Social Security System attributable to the foreign born was $2.7 billion (i.e., payments the foreign born payed to and received from the system). Also in 1992, there was an estimated surplus of $19.0 billion for the native born population. During the 1993–2002 decade, the $2.7 billion annual deficit attributable to the current stock of immigrants is projected to grow by about one percent annually in present value terms, reaching $2.98 billion yearly in 2002.The ten-year deficit for the 1993–2002 decade would amount to nearly $30.0 billion in 1993 dollars. In policy terms, the addition of large numbers of less skilled foreign workers to the labor force (which will occur if there is no change in immigration law or enforcement policy) in the hope of bolstering the solvency of the Social Security System would in fact have the opposite effect.     

Globalization and Inequality: A Norwegian Report

Is global inequality increasing? Some authoritative voices—for example, from the United Nations Development Programme—assert unequivocally that it is, and have carried popular belief with them. Others see a more nuanced and on balance a positive picture. Any attempt to answer the question must grapple with many conceptual and measurement difficulties. These are not wholly eliminated even if the inequality in question is narrowed to that among the per capita incomes of countries, ignoring intracountry differences in income. Disagreement about the empirical record has not impeded argument over causes. Globalization—the expansion of trade, investment, and technology flows among states that is making for a more integrated world economy—is invoked on both sides: seen by some as further marginalizing the world's poor, by others as offering a route out of poverty. The starkly different positions surface in the heated debates that have surrounded the World Trade Organization and the proposal for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment. The nature of trends in international inequality and the role in them of globalization are explored in a recent report issued by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Globalisation and Inequality: World Income Distribution and Living Standards, 1960–1998 (October 2000), the summary from which is reproduced below. The report finds that global inequality between countries has decreased over the last four decades. Globalization may or may not have contributed to that outcome, but at least does not appear to work against it. In sum, “not everything has turned out badly; in fact there has—in spite of the setbacks in some regions and in spite of population growth—been considerable global progress during the last decades.” Given the chosen focus on inequality, there is little discussion in the report of that other dimension of global progress: changes in absolute income levels. But in assessing the implications of development for human welfare, the issue of economic growth and its relationship to globalization is clearly pertinent. Footnote 4 offers a passing glimpse of that dimension, referring to changes in absolute poverty. The World Bank's World Development Report 2000/2001 estimates that the number of people in absolute poverty (living on less than $1 a day) changed little between 1987 and 1998: it went from 1.18 billion to 1.20 billion. As the population grew, this meant a modest reduction in the proportion in absolute poverty in the world population (excluding the rich countries): from 28.3 percent to 24.0 percent. But in the East Asia and Pacific region—a region characterized by both rapid overall economic growth and increasing integration into the global economy—the number of poor dropped from 418 million to 278 million during the same period, with the proportion dropping from 26.6 percent to 15.3 percent. The report was commissioned from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), and prepared by Ame Melchior, Kjetil Telle. and Henrik Wiig. It is available online both in its English version and in its original (and longer) Norwegian version—the former at http://odin.dep.no/ud/engelsk/publ/rapporter/index‐b‐n‐a.html , the latter through the Ministry's parallel Norwegian‐language site.     

The United Nations on World Population in 2300

The Population Division of the United Nations biennially issues detailed population estimates and projections covering the period 1950–2050. The most recent revision of these estimates and projections, the 2002 assessment, was released in February 2003. At irregular intervals, the Population Division also publishes long‐range projections. The most recent of these, covering the period up to 2150, was issued in 2000, based on the 1998 assessment. On 9 December 2003, the Population Division released the preliminary report on a new set of long‐range projections, dovetailing with the 2002 assessment, that extend over a much longer time span: up to 2300 ( http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/longrange2/longrange2.htm ). Unlike previous long‐range projections, which, apart from China and In‐dia, were prepared for large regional groupings only, the new projections are elaborated separately for 192 countries. Given the enormous uncertainties of the character of demographic trends over such an extended period, the information content of these projections is somewhat elusive. However, they are expected to be used to provide the demographic input for long‐range models of global climate change. Long‐range population projections also serve to demonstrate the unsustainability of certain seemingly plausible assumptions as to the future course of particular demographic parameters. In the present case, for example, the high‐fertility projection, reflecting a sustained total fertility rate at the relatively modest level of 2.35, by 2300 would yield a population of some 32 billion in the countries now classified as less developed. Or, in a yet more extreme exercise 0/reductio ad absurdum, maintaining constant fertility at present rates would result in a population size of some 120 trillion in the countries now classified as least developed. Apart from the “high fertility” and “constant fertility” models just cited, the projections are calculated for three additional instructive variants: “low fertility,”“medium fertility,” and “zero growth.” Underlying each of the five variants is a single assumption on mortality change: expectation of life at birth creeping up, country‐by‐country, to a 2300 level ranging between 88 and 106 years. International migration is set at zero throughout the period 2050‐2300 in each variant. Thus the projections are unabashedly stylized and surprise‐free, providing a simple demonstration of the consequences, in terms of population size and age structure, of clearly stated assumptions on the future course of demographic variables. Reproduced below is the Executive Summary of the preliminary report on the UN long‐range projections presented to a UN technical working group on long‐range projections at its December 2003 meeting in New York and slightly revised afterward. A full final report on this topic by the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat will be published later in 2004.     

Environmental Degradation and Human Well‐Being: Report of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment

The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, an elaborate international project set up in 2001 under UN auspices, aims “to assess the consequences of ecosystem change for human well‐being and to establish the scientific basis for actions needed to enhance the conservation and sustainable use of ecosystems and their contributions to human well‐being.” It involves over 1,000 experts as panel and working group members, authors, and reviewers. Numerous reports are planned, covering the global and regional situations, scenarios of the future, and options for sustainable management. The first of these, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Synthesis Report, was issued in March 2005. The Report is organized around four main findings. The first two concern the past: what has happened and what it has meant for human welfare. The other two concern the future: what may happen and what might be done to improve matters. The time frame is the last 50 years and the next 50. Ecological change is assessed in terms of ecosystem services—the benefits humans receive from ecosystems. These include: provisioning services (supplying food, fresh water, timber, etc.); regulating services (climate regulation, erosion control, pollination); cultural services (recreation, aesthetic enjoyment); and supporting services (soil formation, photosynthesis, nutrient cycling). Of24 services examined in the assessment, 15 are determined to be in decline or are being drawn on at an unsustainable rate. The welfare costs of these changes are disproportionately borne by the poor. Four world scenarios are developed to explore plausible ecological futures, varying in degrees of regionalism and economic liberalization and in approaches to ecosystem management. Under all of them the outlook is for continued pressure on consumption of ecosystem services and continued loss of biodiversity. In particular, ecosystem degradation “is already a significant barrier to achieving the Millennium Development Goals agreed to by the international community in September 2000 and the harmful consequences of this degradation could grow significantly worse in the next 50 years.” Remedy will be demanding: “An effective set of responses to ensure the sustainable management of ecosystems requires substantial changes in institutions and governance, economic policies and incentives, social and behavior factors, technology, and knowledge.” Such changes “are not currently under way.” The excerpt below, covering Findings #1 and #2 of the Assessment, is taken from the section of the report titled Summary for Decision‐makers. Most of the charts are omitted. Parenthetical levels of certainty correspond to the following probabilities: very certain, ≥98%; high certainty, 85–98%; medium, 65–85%; low, 52–65%. The full report is available at http://www.millenniumassessment.org . Finding #1: Over the past 50 years, humans have changed ecosystems more rapidly and extensively than in any comparable period of time in human history, largely to meet rapidly growing demands for food, fresh water, timber, fiber and fuel. This has resulted in a substantial and largely irreversible loss in the diversity of life on Earth.     

New Evidence on the Urbanization of Global Poverty

One‐quarter of the world's consumption poor live in urban areas, and that proportion has been rising over time. Over 1993–2002, the count of the “$1 a day” poor fell by 150 million in rural areas but rose by 50 million in urban areas. The poor have been urbanizing even more rapidly than the population as a whole. By fostering economic growth, urbanization helped reduce absolute poverty in the aggregate. There are marked regional differences: Latin America has the most urbanized poverty problem, East Asia has the least; there has been a “ruralization” of poverty in Eastern Europe and Central Asia; in marked contrast to other regions, Africa's urbanization process has not been associated with falling overall poverty.     

On the Socioeconomic Impact of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic

The UN General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS met 25–2 7 June 2001 and adopted a Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS. The Declaration, in 103 paragraphs, sets out a comprehensive response strategy for governments and UN agencies, supports establishment of a global HIV/AIDS and health fund, and calls for an annual progress report to be reviewed by the Assembly. As part of the Special Session, four “round tables” were conducted on substantive topics: prevention and care, human rights, socioeconomic impact, and international funding. Round Table 3, Socioeconomic impact of the epidemic and the strengthening of national capacities to combat HIV/AIDS, was led by the United Nations Development Programme. The background document prepared for it is reproduced in full below. It argues that the brunt of the epidemic's impact on human development has been borne by households, communities, and civil society organizations. The emphasis of national and international action has been on prevention and care rather than on counteracting that impact. “Extraordinary efforts” are now required to intensify poverty‐reduction measures, to assist caregivers and orphaned children, to prevent the collapse of public services, and to promote workplace tolerance and flexibility. “While HIV/AIDS must be seen as an emergency of the highest order, steady progress in reducing poverty is still the long‐term and sustainable solution to the health crisis in the developing world. In the long run, prevention and care will only succeed if people and nations can lift themselves out of poverty.” (The Declaration was not much influenced by such arguments. It devotes two paragraphs to socio‐economic impact, both setting diffuse goals: “By 2003, evaluate the economic and social impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and develop multisectoral strategies [on poverty alleviation, etc.]” and “By 2003, develop a national legal and policy framework that protects in the workplace the rights and dignity of persons living with and affected by HIV/AIDS.…”) The Millennium Summit referred to in the document was the meeting on the role of the UN in the twenty‐first century held in September 2000 as part of the 55th session of the General Assembly. The Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS and the Round Table 3 document can both be found at http://www.unaids.org/ungass/index.html .     

The European Commission on Factors Influencing Labor Migration

A controversial issue in discussions on enlargement of the European Union beyond its existing membership of 15 countries is the migration flows that admission of new members could generate. Given major differences in income and wage levels between the EU states and the candidates for membership, casual theorizing suggests that the potential for massive international migration is very high. The fact that such migration has thus far been of modest size by most plausible criteria is attributed to the restrictive policies of the potential destination countries, policies that reflect national interests, in particular protection of labor markets, as perceived by voting majorities. With accession to membership in the EU this factor is removed: a cardinal principle of the Union, established by treaty, is the free movement of persons, including persons seeking gainful employment. The factors governing migratory movements between member states then come to resemble those that shape internal migration. This should facilitate analysis and forecasting. A clear sorting‐out of the relevant forces affecting such “internal” migration remains of course an essential precondition for success in that task. An “Information note,” entitled The Free Movement of Workers in the Context of Enlargement, issued by the European Commission, the EU's Executive Body, on 6 March 2001, presents extensive discussion of relevant information, opinion, and policy options concerning its topic. (The document is available at « http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlarge‐ment/docs/pdf/migration_enl.pdf ».) An Annex to the document. Factors Influencing Labour Movement, is a lucid enumeration of the factors migration theory considers operative in determining the migration of workers and, by extension, of people at large, that is likely to ensue upon EU enlargement. This annex is reproduced below. As is evident from the catalog of factors and their likely complex interactions, making quantitative forecasts of future migration flows, envisaged primarily as originating from countries to be newly admitted to the EU and destined for the countries of the current EU15, is exceedingly difficult. This is reflected in disparities among the existing studies that have made such forecasts. Yet there appears to be a fair degree of agreement that major increases in migration are unlikely, suggesting that the overall effect on the EU15 labor market should be limited. Typical forecasts (detailed in the Information note cited above) anticipate that in the initial year after admission, taken to be 2003, total migration from the eight prime candidate countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania: the “CC8”) might amount to around 200,000 persons, roughly one‐third of which would be labor migration. According to these forecasts, the annual flow will gradually diminish in subsequent years. After 10 to 15 years the stock of CC8 migrants in the EU15 might be on the order of 1.8 to 2.7 million. The longer‐run migration potential from the candidate countries would be on the order of 1 percent of the present EU population, currently some 375 million. (The combined current population of the CC8 is 74 million.) Such predictions are in line with the relatively minor migratory movements that followed earlier admissions to the EU of countries with then markedly lower per capita incomes, such as Spain and Portugal. The geographic impact of migration ensuing from enlargement would, however, be highly uneven, with Germany and Austria absorbing a disproportionately large share. Accordingly, and reflecting a prevailing expectation in these two countries that enlargement would have some short‐run disruptive effects on labor markets, some of the policy options discussed envisage a period of transition following enlargement—perhaps five to seven years—during which migration would remain subject to agreed‐upon restrictions.     

Population in the UN Environment Programme's Global Environment Outlook 2000

Most specialized agencies in the United Nations system have taken to compiling a periodic status report on their field. The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) issued the first in a proposed biennial series in 1998, titled Global Environment Outlook‐1 or GEO‐1. The second in the series, Global Environment Outlook 2000, was published in 1999. GEO‐2000 is described by the UNEP's Executive Director, Klaus Töpfer, in the foreword as “a comprehensive integrated assessment of the global environment at the turn of the millennium… [and] a forward‐looking document, providing a vision into the 21st century.” Its status, however, is rendered uncertain by the printed caution that “The contents of this volume do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of UNEP or contributory organizations.” GEO‐2000 paints a generally bleak picture of environmental trends. It evidences a wide array of particulars (“In the Southern Ocean, the Patagonian toothfish is being over‐fished and there is a large accidental mortality of seabirds caught up in fishing equipment”), but perhaps of more import are its statements about the root causes of environmental problems and what must be done. The excerpts below reflect some of these general views as they pertain to population. They are taken from the section entitled “Areas of danger and opportunity” in Chapter 1 of the report, and from the section “Tackling root causes” in Chapter 5. High resource consumption, fueled by affluent, Western lifestyles, is seen as a basic cause of environmental degradation. Cutting back this consumption will be required, freeing up resources for development elsewhere. Materialist values associated with urban living are part of the problem, given the concentration of future population growth in cities. And “genuine globalization” will entail free movement of people as well as capital and goods, thus optimizing “the population to environmental carrying capacity.” Some of these positions are at least questionable: the supposed “innate environmental sensitivity of people raised on the land or close to nature,” or the aim of “globalization of population movements.” The latter does not appear in the recommendations, perhaps because of an implicit assumption that the effect of open borders on environmental trends is unlikely to be favorable. (For an earlier statement of the same sentiment—from 1927—see the comments by Albert Thomas, first director of the ILO, reproduced in the Archives section of PDR 9, no. 4.)     

The US National Intelligence Council on the Changing Geopolitical Landscape

The National Intelligence Council, a body reporting to the Director of National Intelligence, draws on expertise from within and outside the US intelligence community to assess strategic developments bearing on national security. In addition to its classified reports (notably the National Intelligence Estimates) the Council also issues unclassified versions of some of its work. In December 2004 it released a report, Mapping the Global Future, the outcome of a year‐long study known as the 2020 Project, looking at geopolitical trends in the world over the medium term. Robert L. Hutchings, the NIC's then chairman, writes in a preface that this report “offers a range of possibilities and potential discontinuities, as a way of opening our minds to developments we might otherwise miss.” It differs from a preceding NIC exercise, Global Trends 2015 (2000), in the wider range of experts consulted—preparatory workshops were conducted in a number of countries—and in the heavier store it places on formal scenario development. While the underlying scenario‐building techniques employed are not spelled out in the document (some are described elsewhere on the NIC's website), four specific “fictional scenarios” are selected to enliven the report: Davos World—illustrating “how robust economic growth, led by China and India, … could reshape the globalization process”; Pax Americana—“how US predominance may survive the radical changes to the global political landscape and serve to fashion a new and inclusive global order”; A New Caliphate—“how a global movement fueled by radical religious identity politics could constitute a challenge to Western norms and values as the foundation of the global system”; and Cycle of Fear—proliferation of weaponry and terrorism “to the point that large‐scale intrusive security measures are taken to prevent outbreaks of deadly attacks, possibly introducing an Orwellian world.” (The quotes are from the report's executive summary.) The excerpt reproduced below comprises the section of the report headed “Rising Powers: The Changing Geopolitical Landscape,” omitting text boxes and charts. The summary table appended is taken from the beginning of the document. The full report is available at http://www.cia.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020.html .     

The UN Population Division on Replacement Migration

The most salient demographic trend pictured by the influential set of population projections prepared by the Population Division of the United Nations (a unit in the UN's Department of Economic and Social Affairs) is the continuing substantial increase—albeit at a declining rate—of the global population during the coming decades. According to the “medium” variant of the most recent (1998) revision of these projections, between 2000 and 2050 the expected net addition to the size of the world population will be some 2.85 billion, a figure larger than that of the total world population as recently as the mid‐1950s. All of this increase will occur in the countries currently classified as less developed; in fact, as a result of their anticipated persistent below‐replacement levels of fertility, the more developed regions as a whole would experience declining population size beginning about 2020, and would register a net population loss of some 33 million between 2000 and 2050. A report prepared by the UN Population Division and released on 21 March 2000 addresses some of the implications of the changes in population size and age structure that low‐fertility countries will be likely to experience. The 143‐page report, issued under the eyecatching title Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?, highlights the expected magnitude of these changes by the imaginative device of answering three hypothetical questions. The answer to each of these questions is predicated on the assumption that some specified demographic feature of various country or regional populations would be maintained at the highest level that feature would exhibit, in the absence of international migration, in the United Nations' medium population projections (as revised in 1998) during the period 1995–2050. The selected demographic features are total population size, the size of the working‐age population (15–64 years), and the so‐called potential support ratio: the ratio of the working‐age population to the old‐age population (65 years and older). The illustrative device chosen for accomplishing the specified feats of preserving the selected demographic parameters (i.e., keeping them unchanged up to 2050 once their highest value is attained) is international migration. Hence the term “replacement migration.” Given the low levels of fertility and mortality now prevailing in the more developed world (and specifically in the eight countries and the two overlapping regions for which the numerical answers to the above questions are presented in the report), and given the expected future evolution of fertility and mortality incorporated in the UN population projections, the results are predictably startling. The magnitudes of the requisite compensatory migration streams tend to be huge relative both to current net inmigration flows and to the size of the receiving populations; least so in the case of the migration needed to maintain total population size and most so in the case of migration needed to counterbalance population aging by maintaining the support ratio. Reflecting its relatively high fertility and its past and current record of receiving a large influx of international migrants, the United States is a partial exception to this rule. But even for the US to maintain the support ratio at its highest—year 1995—level of 5.21 would require increasing net inmigration more than tenfold. The country, the report states, would have to receive 593 million immigrants between 1995 and 2050, or a yearly average of 10.8 million. The extreme case is the Republic of Korea, where the exercise calls for maintaining a support ratio of 12.6. To satisfy this requirement, Korea, with a current population of some 47 million, would need 5.1 billion immigrants between 1995 and 2050, or an average of 94 million immigrants per year. (In the calculations, the age and sex distribution of migrants is assumed to be the same as that observed in the past in the main immigration countries. The fertility and mortality of immigrants are assumed to be identical with those of the receiving population.) The “Executive Summary” of the report is reproduced below, with the permission of the United Nations. Chapters of the full report set out the issues that prompted the exercise; provide a selective review of the literature; explain the methodology and the assumptions underlying the calculations; and present the detailed results for the eight countries and two regions selected for illustrative purposes. A brief discussion of the implications of the findings concludes the report. As is evident even from the figures just cited, immigration is shown to be at best a modest potential palliative to whatever problems declining population size and population aging are likely to pose to low‐fertility countries. The calculations, however, vividly illustrate that demographic changes will profoundly affect society and the economy, and will require adjustments that remain inadequately appreciated and assessed. The criteria specified in the UN calculations—maintenance of particular demographic parameters at a peak value—of course do not necessarily have special normative significance. Past demographic changes, with respect notably to the age distribution as well as population size, have been substantial, yet they have been successfully accommodated under circumstances of growing prosperity in many countries. But the past may be an imperfect guide in confronting the evolving dynamics of low‐fertility populations. As the report convincingly states, the new demographic challenges will require comprehensive reassessments of many established economic and social policies and programs.     

WHO on Health and Sustainable Development

Ten years after the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, also known as the “Earth Summit,” held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, the United Nations will convene another summit of world governments and other major actors to assess global change during the last decade. The meeting will be held in Johannesburg, 2–11 September 2002. One of the reports prepared for the 30 April–2 May 2001 session of the preparatory committee for the Johannesburg meeting discusses developments in global health. The report, prepared by the World Health Organization with “contributions from other United Nations agencies and international organizations” and formally presented as a Report of the Secretary‐General (E/CN. 17/2001 /PC/6), is reproduced below in full. It notes some of the remarkable gains in health during the past decade and, in greater detail, enumerates the major problem areas and outlines future trends and challenges. The document is available at « http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/health.htm#doc ».     

The European Defence Agency on Europe's Future in a Globalizing World

For a number of years the European Union has been building a common European security and defense policy. The European Defence Agency (EDA) was established in 2004 “to support the Member States and the Council [of Ministers of the EU] in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European Security and Defence Policy.” A report prepared by EDA under the title An Initial Long‐Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs was submitted to the Agency's Steering Board (the decisionmaking body on which the Defense Ministers of the Agency's 24 participating member states sit) on 3 October 2006. The report was endorsed by the Board “as a reasonable foundation for the EDA's medium‐to‐long‐term agendas.” The 28‐page document addresses its topic with a 20‐year perspective in a global setting. It finds the perspective “sobering, with the central predictions of demography and economics foreshadowing a Europe which, two decades hence, will be older, less pre‐eminently prosperous, and surrounded by regions (including Africa and the Middle East) which may struggle to cope with the consequences of globalisation.” Excerpts from the report are reproduced below. Paragraph numbers have been omitted. The full report is accessible at « http://www.eda.europa.eu/ltv/ltv.htm ».     

Community-Wide Job Loss and Teenage Fertility: Evidence From North Carolina

Using North Carolina data for the period 1990–2010, we estimate the effects of economic downturns on the birthrates of 15- to 19-year-olds, using county-level business closings and layoffs as a plausibly exogenous source of variation in the strength of the local economy. We find little effect of job losses on the white teen birthrate. For black teens, however, job losses to 1 % of the working-age population decrease the birthrate by around 2 %. Birth declines start five months after the job loss and then last for more than one year. Linking the timing of job losses and conceptions suggests that black teen births decline because of increased terminations and perhaps also because of changes in prepregnancy behaviors. National data on risk behaviors also provide evidence that black teens reduce sexual activity and increase contraception use in response to job losses. Job losses seven to nine months after conception do not affect teen birthrates, indicating that teens do not anticipate job losses and lending confidence that job losses are “shocks” that can be viewed as quasi-experimental variation. We also find evidence that relatively advantaged black teens disproportionately abort after job losses, implying that the average child born to a black teen in the wake of job loss is relatively more disadvantaged.     

The World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization: On the Cross‐Border Movement of People

The globalization of the world economy can be measured in terms of increases in international trade, greater levels of foreign investment and technology transfers, and the liberalization of financial markets. Accompanying and facilitating these trends have been institutional innovations and reforms, creating regimes under which international economic relationships can be managed and disputes resolved. The role of the World Trade Organization is an evident case in point. The rising scale of international migration can also be seen as a globalizing trend. Here, however, with the exception of the special case of refugees, there is no governance regime in place or in prospect at the international level. Occasional past efforts by UN agencies to stimulate formal discussion of what such a regime might look like have led nowhere: countries are simply unwilling to contemplate any weakening of their sovereign right to control entry. Proposing how to fill this perceived lacuna in the international system is one of the tasks on the agenda of the Global Commission on International Migration. The Commission, an independent body set up in 2003 by a small group of UN member states, plans to present a report to the UN Secretary‐General in mid‐2005. In the meantime, the subject has been explored by another group—the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization. This commission was set up by the International Labour Office in 2002. It was co‐chaired by Tarja Halonen, president of Finland, and Benjamin William Mkapa, president of Tanzania. Its 24 other members included economists (among them Deepak Nayyar, Hernando de Soto, and Joseph Stiglitz), politicians, and business and labor leaders, as well as a number of ex‐officio ILO representatives. After several meetings and an extensive series of consultations held during 2002 and 2003, its report, A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All, was issued in February 2004. The report argues that the benefits of globalization must be more equitably distributed. To this end, the globalizing trends in the world economy should be matched by similar advances in social and political institutions. One of the features of the existing imbalance is that “goods and capital move much more freely across borders than people do.” In addition to the many other recommendations the Commission has for what it terms the governance of globalization are proposals on the management of international migration. “Fair rules for trade and capital,” the Commission argues, “need to be complemented by fair rules for the movement of people.” The long‐run objective should be “a multilateral framework for immigration laws and consular practices˙˙˙that would govern cross‐border movement of people,” paralleling “the multilateral frameworks that already exist, or are currently under discussion, concerning the cross‐border movement of goods, services, technology, investment and information.” The Commission's thinking on migration is in some respects reminiscent of the views of the ILO's first director, Albert Thomas, in the days of the League of Nations. Writing in 1927, Thomas envisioned, if only as a distant ideal, “some sort of supreme supernational authority which would regulate the distribution of population on rational and impartial lines, by controlling and directing migration movements and deciding on the opening‐up or closing of countries to particular streams of immigration.” (See the Archives section of PDR 9, no. 4.) The excerpt below consists of §428–§446 of the report, a section titled The cross‐border movement of people.     

Consequences of Family Policies on Childbearing Behavior: Effects or Artifacts?

This article argues for a more careful consideration of theoretical and methodological approaches in studies of the effects of public policies, labeled here as family policies, on childbearing behavior. We employ elements of comparative welfare‐state research, of the sociology of “constructed categories,” and of “the new institutionalism” to demonstrate that investigations into policy effects need to contextualize policies and need to reduce their complexity by focusing on “critical junctures,”“space,” and “uptake.” We argue that the effects of family policies can only be assessed properly if we study their impact on individual behavior. Event‐history models applied to individual‐level data are the state‐of‐the‐art of such an approach. We use selected empirical studies from Sweden to demonstrate that the type of approach that we advocate prevents us from drawing misleading conclusions.     

Abortion,Family Planning,and Population Policy: Prospects for the Common‐Ground Approach

For the past several decades those engaged in shaping the Program of Action documents at international conferences on population have muted their voices when the topic of abortion has been raised. In a desire to side‐step entanglement in a bitter debate over the morality of abortion, great care has been taken to define “family planning” in ways that explicitly exclude abortion. The “common‐ground” approach to treating abortion can be summarized in two directives found in all contemporary international population documents: “in no case should abortion be promoted as a method of family planning”; and all governments should work “to reduce the recourse to abortion through expanded and improved family‐planning services.” This article has three goals: first, to examine the appropriateness of these directives with respect to what is currently known about the relationship between abortion, family planning, and population policy; second, to trace how this “contraception‐only” definition of family planning became de rigueur at international population conferences; and third, to discuss the prospects for the emergence of a more appropriate “common‐ground” approach to abortion and population policy.     

Reinstatement of the US “Mexico City Policy”

On 22 January 2001, the third day of the new US administration (the day that also marked the twenty‐eighth anniversary of Roe v. Wade, the US Supreme Court decision that liberalized abortion). President Bush issued an executive order, taking the form of a memorandum addressed to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development on the subject of “Restoration of the Mexico City Policy.” The executive order reinstates the US policy promulgated at the International Conference on Population held in Mexico City in 1984 (see “Documents” in the September 1984 issue of this journal). The Mexico City policy was rescinded on 22 January 1993 when President Clinton took office (see “Documents” in the March 1993 issue of this journal). The full text of President Bush's memorandum as released by the White House is reproduced below.