Birth delays skew developing world's fertility figures

This article explains that birth delays skew developing world's fertility figures. When successive groups of women who have delayed childbearing start having children, the rapid fertility decline stalls. Such change in the timing of childbearing skews the total fertility rate (TFR). Analysis of the tempo component of TFR trends in Taiwan suggests that tempo effects reduced its TFR by about 10% in the late 1970s and early 1990s and by about 19% in the late 1980s. In Colombia, on the basis of increasing mean maternal age at childbirth between the 1970s and the late 1980s, tempo distortions of the TFR during the most of the 1980s seem likely. Moreover, many developing countries are now experiencing rapid fertility declines that are in part attributable to tempo changes. These changes have accelerated past fertility transitions, but they also make these countries vulnerable to future stalls in fertility when the delays in childbearing end. Since fertility reductions caused by tempo effects lead to real declines in birth rates and hence in population growth, countries that wish to reduce birth rates can take actions that encourage women to delay marriage and the onset of childbearing.     

The fertility impact of changes in the timing of childbearing in the developing world

This study examines the role of tempo effects in the fertility declines of less developed countries. These effects temporarily inflate the total fertility of a population during periods when the age at childbearing declines and deflate it when childbearing is postponed. An analysis of data from the World Fertility Surveys and the Demographic and Health Surveys demonstrates that fertility trends observed in many less developed countries are likely to be distorted by changes in the timing of childbearing. In most countries women are delaying childbearing, which implies that observed fertility is lower than it would have been without tempo changes. This pattern is most clearly documented in Taiwan, where accurate birth statistics from a vital registration system make it possible to estimate the tempo components of fertility annually from 1978 to 1993. The small but unexpected rise in the total fertility of Colombia in the early 1990s is attributed to a decline in the negative tempo distortion that prevailed in the 1980s. Similar interruptions of ongoing fertility declines may occur in the future in other countries when existing negative tempo effects are removed.     

Timing effects and the interpretation of period fertility

Low fertility levels and later childbearing in many developed countries have reinvigorated the debate between period and cohort perspectives on fertility and on the meaningfulness of the period total fertility rate (TFR). Here, fertility-timing effects are defined as level changes in period fertility that do not reflect level changes in the completed fertility of cohorts. That definition leads to the average cohort fertility (ACF) as a measure of period fertility adjusted for timing effects. In an influential paper, Bongaarts and Feeney (1998) presented an alternative approach and a different measure, TFR*, to adjust for timing effects. Here, the two measures are compared. In the context of model populations, the ACF performs well, reflecting an average of the fertility of the active cohorts. The Bongaarts-Feeney TFR*, however, is frequently unreliable and can be erratic when there are cycles in period timing. When applied to twentieth-century U.S. experience, the TFR* behaves like a period measure and yields adjustments that are often wide of the mark. The ACF shows the stability associated with cohort measures and quantifies the substantial impact that timing effects had during the "birth dearth" of the 1970s. The period TFR reached a low of 1.74 in 1976, but the ACF never went below 2.06 during the 1970s.     

A demographic explanation for the recent rise in European fertility

Between 1998 and 2008 European countries experienced the first continent-wide increase in the period total fertility rate (TFR) since the 1960s. After discussing period and cohort influences on fertility trends, we examine the role of tempo distortions of period fertility and different methods for removing them. We highlight the usefulness of a new indicator: the tempo- and parity-adjusted total fertility rate (TFRp*). This variant of the adjusted total fertility rate proposed by Bongaarts and Feeney also controls for the parity composition of the female population and provides more stable values than the indicators proposed in the past. Finally, we estimate levels and trends in tempo and parity distribution distortions in selected countries in Europe. Our analysis of period and cohort fertility indicators in the Czech Republic, Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden shows that the new adjusted measure gives a remarkable fit with the completed fertility of women in prime childbearing years in a given period, which suggests that it provides an accurate adjustment for tempo and parity composition distortions. Using an expanded dataset for ten countries, we demonstrate that adjusted fertility as measured by TFRp* remained nearly stable since the late 1990s. This finding implies that the recent upturns in the period TFR in Europe are largely explained by a decline in the pace of fertility postponement. Other tempo-adjusted fertility indicators have not indicated such a large role for the diminishing tempo effect in these TFR upturns. As countries proceed through their postponement transitions, tempo effects will decline further and eventually disappear, thus putting continued upward pressure on period fertility. However, such an upward trend may be obscured for a few years by the effects of economic recession.     

Low fertility due to delay in -- not dearth of -- births

Population Council demographer John Bongaarts and his colleague Griffith Feeney argue that recent concern about a lack of births overlooks the fact that many women in developed countries are simply choosing to bear children later than women used to. So-called birth dearths are often caused by temporary delays in childbearing. The two demographers have designed a new way for demographers to account for the timing, or tempo, of childbearing in estimates of fertility. Their tempo-adjusted total fertility rate (TFR) allows demographers to correct skewed fertility trends, such as those leading to projections of birth dearths. The new measure provides a better indication of women's true propensity to bear children. Standard measures of fertility are distorted by changes in tempo. Such changes occur when large numbers of couples delay or accelerate their initiation of family building. The authors used historical data and theoretical arguments to validate the tempo-adjusted TFR, which improves upon the two common measures of fertility. Flaws in the TFR and the completed fertility rate (CFR) are corrected by Bongaarts and Feeney's new measure. To demonstrate their new tool, they examined the below-replacement fertility seen in recent decades in the US. By the mid-1990s, the TFR in almost every developed country had fallen below the replacement level of 2.1 births/woman, and in Italy, Spain, and Germany it fell below 1.5. If such fertility persists, declining population size, extreme population aging, and financial pressure upon social security systems may result. However, if fertility preferences hold at current levels, the very low fertility rates observed in the developed world will approach 2 children/couple.     

Economic recession and fertility in the developed world

This article reviews research on the effects of economic recessions on fertility in the developed world. We study how economic downturns, as measured by various indicators, especially by declining GDP levels, falling consumer confidence, and rising unemployment, were found to affect fertility. We also discuss particular mechanisms through which the recession may have influenced fertility behavior, including the effects of economic uncertainty, falling income, changes in the housing market, and rising enrollment in higher education, and also factors that influence fertility indirectly such as declining marriage rates. Most studies find that fertility tends to be pro-cyclical and often rises and declines with the ups and downs of the business cycle. Usually, these aggregate effects are relatively small (typically, a few percentage points) and of short durations; in addition they often influence especially the timing of childbearing and in most cases do not leave an imprint on cohort fertility levels. Therefore, major long-term fertility shifts often continue seemingly uninterrupted during the recession—including the fertility declines before and during the Great Depression of the 1930s and before and during the oil shock crises of the 1970s. Changes in the opportunity costs of childbearing and fertility behavior during economic downturn vary by sex, age, social status, and number of children; childless young adults are usually most affected. Furthermore, various policies and institutions may modify or even reverse the relationship between recessions and fertility. The first evidence pertaining to the recent recession falls in line with these findings. In most countries, the recession has brought a decline in the number of births and fertility rates, often marking a sharp halt to the previous decade of rising fertility rates.     

Tempo and the TFR

Tempo effects in period fertility indicators are widely regarded as a source of bias or distortion. But is this always the case? Whether tempo change results in bias depends, in the view advanced here, on the measure used, the meaning of bias/distortion, and the objective of analysis. Two ways of construing bias in period measures are suggested, and their relevance is discussed in the context of five broad purposes for measuring period fertility: describing and explaining fertility time trends, anticipating future prospects, providing input parameters for formal models, and communicating with nonspecialist audiences. Genuine timing effects are not biasing when period fertility is the explanandum but are distorting when the aim is to estimate cohort fertility. Alternatives to tempo adjustment are available that are a more defensible solution to the issue of timing change. Tempo adjustment could be more fruitfully considered a form of modeling rather than empirical measurement. The measurement of period fertility could be improved by relying more on a statistical approach and less on indicators based on stable assumptions. Future progress will depend on integrating research on measurement with substantive investigation.     

The Emergence of Lowest‐Low Fertility in Europe During the 1990s

Lowest‐low fertility, defined as a period total fertility rate at or below 1.3, has rapidly spread in Europe during the 1990s. This article traces the emergence of this new phenomenon to the interaction of five factors. First, tempo and compositional distortions reduce the total fertility rate below the associated level of cohort fertility. Second, socioeconomic changes—including increased returns to human capital and high economic uncertainty in early adulthood—have made late childbearing a rational response for individuals and couples. Third, social interaction effects reinforce this behavioral adjustment and contribute to large and persistent postponement in the mean age at birth. Fourth, institutional settings favor an overall low quantum of fertility. Fifth, postponement–quantum interactions amplify the consequences of this institutional setting when combined with ongoing delays of child‐bearing. The article concludes with speculations about future trends in current and prospective lowest‐low‐fertility countries.     

Policies Addressing the Tempo Effect in Low‐Fertility Countries

The possible negative consequences of current low fertility levels are causing increasing concern, particularly in countries where the total fertility rate is below 1.5. Social inertia and self‐reinforcing processes may make it difficult to return to higher levels once fertility has been very low for some time, creating a possible “low‐fertility trap.” Policies explicitly addressing the fertility‐depressing effect of increases in the mean age at child‐bearing (the tempo effect) may be a way to raise period fertility to somewhat higher levels and help escape the “low‐fertility trap” before it closes. Reforms in the school system may affect the timing of childbearing by lowering the age at completion of education. A more efficient school system, which provides the same qualifications with a younger school‐leaving age, is potentially capable of increasing period fertility and hence exerting a rejuvenating effect on the age composition, even if the levels of cohort fertility remain unchanged. Such policies may also have a positive effect on completed cohort fertility.     

China's Below‐Replacement Fertility: Recent Trends and Future Prospects

Between 1970 and 1990, China experiencoed a rapid and sharp fertility decline—from total fertility rates of approximately six births to two. The degree to which Chinese fertility has continued to fall after 1990 is controversial. We use survey data from the 1997 National Population and Reproductive Health Survey and from the 2001 Reproductive Health and Family Planning Survey to document recent trends in Chinese fertility. Our estimates provide further evidence that China's fertility is well below‐replacement level at the turn of the twenty‐first century—with TFR levels of approximately 1.5 children per woman. Trends in parity‐specific cohort fertility by age also suggest below replacement completed fertility for cohorts still in the childbearing years. In the article's second section, we identify key components of low period fertility in order to frame our discussion of two questions: 1) in what ways is Chinese low fertility different from/similar to that in other low‐fertility countries? And 2) what are the likely future trends in Chinese fertility?     

Understanding stalling demographic transition in high-fertility countries: a case study of Guatemala

The debate surrounding the use of period, cohort, and tempo-adjusted measures has framed most of the recent studies evaluating the utility of macro-level fertility indicators. Period measures are susceptible to distortions, due to birth timing changes, but there is currently no universally accepted adjustment technique. Recent comparative analyses have offered some insights but only as applied to the low-fertility developed world setting. The utility of different types of measures in the high fertility context is unclear. Furthermore, regional variation in the pace of fertility transition is characteristic of many less developed countries and is rarely incorporated into macro-level analyses. The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate macro-fertility indicators at the regional and national levels in a high-fertility country, Guatemala, using the four most recent survey data sets. The results support the use of macro-level period indicators and adjusted period indicators of fertility in developing country contexts.     

生育进度效应调整指标研究的新进展

随着经济和社会的不断发展,生育推迟现象在全世界范围内日益普遍。由于生育推迟所产生的进度效应会对生育水平造成影响,因此,如何测度生育进度效应便成了人口学界研究的重要内容。自Bongaarts和Feeney的去进度效应总和生育率提出以来,各种新的改进方法与指标不断出现。本文对生育进度效应调整指标的新进展及具体指标进行梳理与比较。从时期角度出发,主要包括方差效应调整后的TFR、PATFR*、调整后的TFRSUV_N和ITFR四种指标;从队列角度出发,主要包括TFRp*、TFR†和ACF三种指标,这些指标有各自的优缺点。研究发现:首先,由于不同去进度效应改进指标的假设、适用条件、研究角度、改进方向都不同,很难有一套数据同时适用于多种去进度方法,因此,生育进度效应的诸多改进指标并没有哪个指标“更好”,只有“更合适”;其次,绝对的去进度效应只能停留在理论层面,而实际上却很难做到,种种去进度方法都只是一种“相对的去”,而不是“绝对的去”。过去我们所熟悉的进度效应是生育推迟,而目前世界范围内生育推迟速度开始逐渐放缓,未来我们甚至不能排除生育推迟在某个时期或某些区域会发生逆转,届时可能会出现与目前影响方向相反的进度效应,这可能是下一步关于生育进度效应研究应该注意的新方向。     

New Cohort Fertility Forecasts for the Developed World: Rises,Falls, and Reversals

With period fertility having risen in many low‐fertility countries, an important emerging question is whether cohort fertility trends are also reversing. We produce new estimates of cohort fertility for 37 developed countries using a new, simple method that avoids the underestimation typical of previous approaches. Consistent with the idea that timing changes were largely responsible for the last decades' low period fertility, we find that family size has remained considerably higher than the period rates of 1.5 in many “low‐fertility” countries, averaging about 1.8 children. Our forecasts suggest that the long‐term decline in cohort fertility is flattening or reversing in many world regions previously characterized by low fertility. We document the marked increase of cohort fertility in the English‐speaking world and in Scandinavia; signs of an upward reversal in many low‐fertility countries, including Japan and Germany; and continued declines in countries such as Taiwan and Portugal. We include in our forecasts estimates of statistical uncertainty and the possible effects of the recent economic recession.     

The End of “Lowest‐Low” Fertility?

Total fertility rates fell to previously unseen levels in a large number of countries beginning in the early 1990s. The persistence of TFRs below 1.3 raised the possibility of rapid population aging and decline. We discuss the recent widespread turnaround in so‐called lowest‐low‐fertility countries in Europe and East Asia. The number of countries with TFRs below 1.3 fell from 21 in 2003 to five in 2008. Moreover, the upturn in the TFR was not confined to lowest‐fertility countries, but affected the whole developed world. We explore the demographic explanations for the recent rise in TFRs stemming from fertility timing effects as well as economic, policy, and social factors. Although the current economic downturn may suppress TFRs in the short run, we conclude that formerly lowest‐low‐fertility countries will continue to see increases in fertility as the transitory effects of shifts to later childbearing become less important.     

Immigration to the UK from High‐Fertility Countries: Intergenerational Adaptation and Fertility Convergence

The fertility of immigrants' children increasingly shapes the ethnic diversity of the population in Western Europe. However, few data are available on the fertility patterns of immigrants and their offspring. This article provides new fertility estimates of immigrants and immigrants' children by ethnic group in the United Kingdom that may provide better‐informed fertility assumptions for future population projection models. The impact of migration‐specific tempo effects on the period TFR of immigrants is analyzed. Among the results, intergenerational fertility transitions strongly contribute both to fertility convergence between ethnic groups and to fertility “assimilation” or “intergenerational adaptation” to the UK mainstream childbearing behavior. Ethnic fertility convergence, particularly marked for populations originating from high‐fertility countries, reflects in part decreasing fertility in sending countries and in part intergenerational adaptation to the UK mainstream. Higher educational enrollment of the daughters of immigrants may partly explain their relatively lower fertility.     

Divergent Patterns in the Ethnic Transformation of Societies

The uneven timing of the demographic transition in different countries of the world will lead to divergence between countries in ethnic and religious homogeneity. Developed‐country populations that began their fertility transitions relatively early are becoming increasingly diverse with respect to the ethnic origin and religion of their inhabitants, primarily as a result of high recent levels of immigration. Many demographic patterns of the developed world, such as low death and birth rates, are becoming universal. It might be expected that less developed countries will also turn from emigration to experiencing immigration, as their populations age and their economies develop. This essay suggests, however, that future ethnic diversity arising from immigration may be less marked in many of those developing countries than in the West, especially among latecomers to the fertility transition. Five reasons are advanced as impediments to the globalization of ethnic heterogeneity arising from immigration: demographic, economic, political, and factors related to resource constraints, and climate change. The essay considers what social, economic, and political consequences might arise if high levels of ethnic diversity, and possibly ethnic replacement, remained an idiosyncratic peculiarity of today's developed countries, which would therefore diverge in important ways from the rest of the world as the twenty‐first century unfolds.     

Another Child? Fertility Ideals,Resources and Opportunities

Low fertility in most developed countries has prompted policy concern in relation to labour market supply, pensions, and expenditure on health and welfare services as well as policy debate about both the cost of children and the opportunity costs of parenthood. The extent to which family policy interventions can be effective in slowing or reversing fertility decline is much debated. This paper, based on a fertility module of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2005, examines the current fertility, and ideal and expected fertility of a nationally representative sample of 455 parents of reproductive age and focuses on whether they plan to have another child. It compares the characteristics of those who intend to have another child with those who do not, and how parents with one child differ from those with more children. It addresses three questions about family size: (1) fertility ideals, (2) resources and the economic implications of childbearing, and (3) opportunities for childbearing and the effects of a late start on fertility expectations. It concludes that, despite a sustained period of low fertility in Scotland, childbearing ideals are robust and explanations of low fertility must derive from difficulties in realising those ideals. Difficulties in realising fertility aspirations are associated less with resources than with opportunities for childbearing, especially the timing of first birth. Those who delay their first birth are less likely to realise their ideal family size, and their lower fertility is associated with the opportunity costs of childbearing in terms of foregone qualifications, careers and earnings.     

经济增长、生育政策与生育率——基于跨国面板数据的实证研究

文章基于不同发展水平、采取不同生育政策分布在不同地区的十个国家1970—2009年的面板数据对经济增长、生育政策与生育率之间的关系进行实证分析,对近年来部分学者提出的经济增长与生育率之间的U形关系,采取选择不同样本、加入政策变量和其他与生育率相关的重要经济指标如妇女的教育程度、城镇化率、工业化率等进行再检验,结果支持该假说,经济增长在经济发展程度整体较低的阶段与生育率呈现较高的负相关,但当经济增长达到一定程度时,收入效应取代替代效应对生育率起主要推动作用,如果再辅之以相关的激励政策和措施,生育率会出现轻微的反弹。因此,对于已采取生育控制政策的国家,可以结合经济社会发展指标权衡利弊,适时调整政策。     

East Asian childbearing patterns and policy developments

Childbearing behavior in East Asian countries has changed rapidly during the past half century from an average of five to seven children per family, to replacement-level fertility, and subsequently to unprecedentedly low levels, the lowest in the world. This article analyzes fertility trends in Hong Kong, Japan, singapore, south Korea, and Taiwan using cohort fertility data and methods, then examines social and economic causes of the childbearing trends, and surveys policies pursued to reverse the fertility trends. Postponement of childbearing started in the 1970s with continuously fewer delayed births being "recuperated," which resulted in ultra-low fertility. A rapid expansion of education and employment among women in a patriarchal environment has generated a stark dilemma for women who would like to combine childbearing with a career. Policy responses have been slow, with a more serious attempt to address issues in recent years. Thus far public and private institutions are not devoting sufficient attention to generating broad social change supportive of parenting.     

The threshold hypothesis: evidence from less developed Latin American countries, 1950 to 1980

Historical research among European countries finds large differences in the level of social, economic or demographic development among countries, or regions within countries at the time marital fertility rates began their decline from traditional high levels. This research tests a threshold hypothesis which holds that fertility will decline from traditional high levels if threshold levels of life expectancy and literacy are surpassed. Using a pooled regression analysis of 1950, 1960, 1970 and 1980 crude births rates (CBRs) in 20 less developed Latin American countries, in conjunction with 10-year lagged measures of social, economic and family planning program development, analyses reveal statistically significant effects of passing Beaver's (1975) threshold levels of 1950 literacy, or 1950 life expectancy, that are independent of levels of lagged literacy (or lagged life expectancy), economic and family planning program development, as well as measures that control period effects.