Globalization and Inequality: A Norwegian Report

Is global inequality increasing? Some authoritative voices—for example, from the United Nations Development Programme—assert unequivocally that it is, and have carried popular belief with them. Others see a more nuanced and on balance a positive picture. Any attempt to answer the question must grapple with many conceptual and measurement difficulties. These are not wholly eliminated even if the inequality in question is narrowed to that among the per capita incomes of countries, ignoring intracountry differences in income. Disagreement about the empirical record has not impeded argument over causes. Globalization—the expansion of trade, investment, and technology flows among states that is making for a more integrated world economy—is invoked on both sides: seen by some as further marginalizing the world's poor, by others as offering a route out of poverty. The starkly different positions surface in the heated debates that have surrounded the World Trade Organization and the proposal for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment. The nature of trends in international inequality and the role in them of globalization are explored in a recent report issued by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Globalisation and Inequality: World Income Distribution and Living Standards, 1960–1998 (October 2000), the summary from which is reproduced below. The report finds that global inequality between countries has decreased over the last four decades. Globalization may or may not have contributed to that outcome, but at least does not appear to work against it. In sum, “not everything has turned out badly; in fact there has—in spite of the setbacks in some regions and in spite of population growth—been considerable global progress during the last decades.” Given the chosen focus on inequality, there is little discussion in the report of that other dimension of global progress: changes in absolute income levels. But in assessing the implications of development for human welfare, the issue of economic growth and its relationship to globalization is clearly pertinent. Footnote 4 offers a passing glimpse of that dimension, referring to changes in absolute poverty. The World Bank's World Development Report 2000/2001 estimates that the number of people in absolute poverty (living on less than $1 a day) changed little between 1987 and 1998: it went from 1.18 billion to 1.20 billion. As the population grew, this meant a modest reduction in the proportion in absolute poverty in the world population (excluding the rich countries): from 28.3 percent to 24.0 percent. But in the East Asia and Pacific region—a region characterized by both rapid overall economic growth and increasing integration into the global economy—the number of poor dropped from 418 million to 278 million during the same period, with the proportion dropping from 26.6 percent to 15.3 percent. The report was commissioned from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), and prepared by Ame Melchior, Kjetil Telle. and Henrik Wiig. It is available online both in its English version and in its original (and longer) Norwegian version—the former at http://odin.dep.no/ud/engelsk/publ/rapporter/index‐b‐n‐a.html , the latter through the Ministry's parallel Norwegian‐language site.     

Frank Fetter on Population Versus Prosperity

How population change affects human welfare was a central concern of economists during the decades that followed publication of Malthus's Essay. But from the middle of the nineteenth century, continuing for some one hundred years, population issues played a marginal role in economics, with leading figures of that discipline, particularly in the New World, turning their attention to the topic only episodically. The presidential address delivered by Frank Fetter to the American Economic Association in 1913 is a notable example of such attention. Frank Albert Fetter (1863–1949), much of whose career was spent as professor on the faculty of Princeton University, was a prominent economic theorist of the early decades of the twentieth century and author, among numerous other works, of the influential texts Principles of Economics (1904) and its two-volume successors, Economic Principles (1915) and Modern Economic Problems (1916 and 1922). Population was an early interest of Fetter's, as is shown by the topic of his doctoral dissertation, which he wrote, after studies at Indiana University, Cornell, and the Sorbonne, at the University of Halle (Versuch einer Bevölkerungslehre ausgehend von einer Kritik des Malthus'schen Bevölkerungsprincips, Jena: G. Fischer, 1894). His address to the AEA recalls that interest, looking back on the decade ending in 1910, a period of rapid population increase in the United States, fueled by heavy immigration. In the first part of the address, Fetter offers insightful comments on Malthus's novel humanitarian and democratic formulation of the population problem and on the contrasting demographic situation between Europe and the United States. But with the closing of the land frontier he sees American exceptionalism coming to an end, as the economic forces—abundant natural resources and progress in science and the “technical arts”—that heretofore counteracted the depressing effect of population growth on wages “have spent themselves.” At a time when the US population was about one-third of its present size, he argued that “we have passed the point of diminishing returns in the relation of our population to our resources.” Therefore “it is high time to revise the optimistic American doctrine of population.” To control “the fate and fortunes of the children of this and future generations,” the US would need a policy of conserving natural resources and retarding the increase of population. Of the two components of population growth—natural increase and immigration—only the latter is “controllable in large measure by legislative action.” Fetter thus devotes the second part of his address to a discussion of the effects of immigration on the American economy. His line of argument closely parallels an influential strand in the contemporary US debate on that issue. In the first decade of the century, the population of the United States grew by some 16 million and the number of immigrants was nearly 9 million. Fetter sees the potential for further immigration as nearly limitless, given an open-door policy. The motive to migrate to the United States would not cease “until real wages in America are leveled down to those of the most impoverished populations permitted to enter our ports.” Yet reducing American prosperity would afford “no permanent relief to the overcrowded lands,” as “natural increase quickly fills the ranks of an impoverished peasantry.” While unrestricted immigration is against the interest of the mass of the people, conflicting interests, ideas, and sentiments paralyze remedial action: individual or class advantage comes before consideration of the “larger national welfare.” Unless immigration is restricted, Americans may find “that they have bartered the peace and security of their children for the pleasures of a brief season.” The text of Fetter's address is reproduced below in full from American Economic Review, vol. 3, no. 1: Papers and Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, March 1913.     

WHO on Health and Economic Productivity

The current issue of the World Health Organization's annual flagship publication, titled The World Health Report 1999: Making a Difference, is the first issued under Gro Harlem Brundtland, WHO's Director-General, who assumed the office in 1998. In her preface to the 121-page report Dr. Brundtland identifies four major challenges to be addressed in order to improve the world's health: the need to reduce the burden of excess mortality and morbidity suffered by the poor; the need to counter potential threats to health resulting from economic crises, unhealthy environments, or risky behavior; the need to develop more effective health systems; and finally the need to invest in expanding the knowledge base that made possible the twentieth-century revolution in health. Chapter 1 of the report discusses health and development; subsequent chapters address the problems of emerging epidemics and infectious diseases and of maternal and child disability and mortality; health systems development; and the challenges of rolling back malaria and combating the tobacco epidemic. Chapter 1 consists of two parts: the first documents the twentieth-century revolution in human health, the second discusses the inadequately explored problem of the relationship between health and economic productivity. This second section of Chapter 1 is reproduced below in full, with the permission of WHO. (The endnotes were renumbered.)     

Book Reviews

Book reviewed in this articles. John F. Kantner and Andrew Kantner The Struggle for International Consensus on Population and Development World Bank World Development Report 2007: Development and the Next Generation Lyla M. Hernandez and Dan G. Blazer (eds .) Genes, Behavior, and the Social Environment: Moving Beyond the Nature/NurtureDebate. World Bank Global Economic Prospects 2007: Managing the Next Wave of Globalization Daniel Jordan Smith A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria Ian Bannon and Maria C. Correia (eds .) The Other Half of Gender: Men's Issues in Development John Broome Weighing Lives Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations The State of Food and Agriculture: Agricultural Trade and Poverty: Can Trade Work for the Poor? John Glad Future Human Evolution: Eugenics in the Twenty‐First Century United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report 2006. Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis     

Major Natural Catastrophes, 1950–2001

The organizations with most interest in recording worldwide disaster statistics are humani‐tarian agencies such as the International Red Cross (see its annual World Disasters Report) and the large reinsurance companies. The latter are likely to be more meticulous. The data and the brief text below come from an annual report on natural disasters, Topics 2001, issued in March 2002 by Munich Reinsurance Company (more familiarly known as Munich Re), and are reproduced by permission. The trend in economic losses from “great catastrophes” (those requiring interregional or international assistance) over the last 50 years is strongly upward, as shown in the annual statistics and decadal comparisons. Both total losses and insured losses have been rising, the latter more sharply. An implication is that insurance premiums calculated on the basis of historical experience will underestimate future risks. The trend in disasters mainly results from greater exposure to risk through thegrowth of economies and populations rather than from changes in natural hazards themselves. One exception noted in the report is an increasing likelihood of “extreme precipitation” during hurricanes and other windstorms, which may be associated with global warming‐a warmer atmosphere can hold more water vapor. (There is no consensus on whether the frequency or intensity of storms is increasing, but there is evidence that they are getting wetter.) Greater allowance will have to be made for flood damage: Hurricane Andrew in the United States in 1992, causing a record $30 billion in estimated total losses, was a relatively “dry” storm‐ and it missed Miami and New Orleans. Munich Re describes 2001 as an “average year” for natural disasters, with an estimated 25,000 fatalities worldwide and total economic losses of some $36 billion. The four events during the year classed as great catastrophes were an earthquake and landslides in El Salvador in January, killing 845 persons; a magnitude 7.7 earthquake in Gujarat in the same month, killing more than 14,000; a hailstorm in Kansas City in April, killing no one but costing the insurance industry $2 billion; and Tropical Storm Allison in June, in which 72 m of rain over 12 hoursjlooded Houston, Texas, causing about $6 billion in total losses‐ “the costliest non‐hurricane of all time.” A recurrent concern of Topics 2001 is the problem of what are termed unidentified loss potentials. These are low‐risk but high‐loss events, exemplified by the 1999 Taiwan earth‐quake, which had an estimated return period of 10,000–100.000 years (or, more exotically, by the remote chance but catastrophic eflect o f a large meteorite impact‐the subject of one section of the report). Other kinds of hard‐to‐calculate loss potentials are related to unanticipated chains of events leading to or following from a disaster. The September terrorist attack on New York's World Trade Center, although unambiguously man‐made and thus not treated in the report, has been a further stimulus to wide‐angled thinking on loss potentials. It demonstrates the broad scope of worst‐case scenarios that now have to be considered by under‐writers who must seek to eliminate “the ‘bare patches’ on the ‘risk landscape.’” The full report is available online at http://www.munichre.com/pdf/topics~2001‐e.pdf     

The US 9/11 Commission on Border Control

The collapse of Europe's Communist regimes and the breakup of the Soviet Union marked the end of the “short twentieth century” and appeared to have opened up an era of accelerating globalization—increasingly free movement of goods and capital and, if not yet free movement of persons, certainly travel less hindered by bureaucratic obstacles. The threat of international terrorism, however, places a major question mark on such expectations. The magnitude of this threat was shown by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on US targets in New York and Washington. The attacks have led to greatly increased security checks on international travel and, especially in the United States, to tightened visa regulations and border controls. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, created by the US Congress and the President in 2002, submitted its final report in July 2004. The analysis of the terrorist threat and the recommendations on how to counter it offered in this 567‐page document suggest that restrictions on crossing US international borders are unlikely to be eased soon and may well be made stricter. The practical inconvenience of such measures, however, may be lessened by improvements in the technological means of identifying persons, such as through use of biological markers. Relevant passages of the 9/11 Commission Report, from Chapter 12, section 4, are reproduced below. Footnotes have been omitted.     

The US National Intelligence Council on Growing Global Migration

The National Intelligence Council, a body reporting to the Director of Central Intelligence, brings together expertise from inside and outside the US government to engage in strategic thinking on national security issues. Some of its reports, known as National Intelligence Estimates, are now issued in unclassified versions. One of these published in December2000, was entitled Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future with Nongovernment Experts. It discussed what it termed the key drivers of global change and presented a generally bleak set of scenarios of the medium‐term future. (See the short review in PDR 27, no. 2, pp. 385–386.) Demographic factors—in particular, mass migration—were seen as one of the drivers. This topic is investigated further in a subsequent NIC report, Growing Global Migration and Its Implications for the United States, issued this year. The initial section of the report, headed Key Judgments, is reprinted below. The report emphasizes the economic advantages of liberal immigration policies to the advanced economies, “despite some initially higher welfare costs and some downward pressure on wages.” Resistance to liberalization in European countries and Japan is seen as putting them at a competitive disadvantage to the United States. Their levels of illegal immigration, however, will inevitably increase in scale. Expectations for the US are for rises in both legal and illegal immigration. Mentioned as one of the “difficult issues” that are minor offsets to the broad gains offered by immigration is its use as a vehicle for “transnational terrorist, narcotrafficking, and organized crime groups.” The full report is available online at http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/index.htm .     

Growth and Development: Critique of a Credo

With so much academic prestige and business and government experience represented on the Commission that produced the World Bank's Growth Report, issued in 2008, the reader comes to it with hopeful expectations. Unfortunately the Report is largely an apologia for globalization, the World Bank, and GDP idolatry. The Report's major failures and fallacies are identified and examined.     

Bertil Ohlin on Population,Trade, and Territorial Expansion

The international economic problems of the 1930s–in the aftermath of World War I and the depression—at first sight have few resonances with the present day. The leading powers of the time protected their industries behind high tariff walls. Most of them possessed colonies or were intent on regaining those lost in the war. Restoration of the free‐trade regime of the decades prior to 1913, and creation of a new financial architecture to support it, seemed a remote prospect. In all kinds of ways the post‐World War II and especially the post‐Cold War world is in vastly better shape. Yet some of the themes of the earlier period remain relevant. The colonies are gone and territorial expansion is virtually inadmissible, but the options for dealing with international imbalances in factor supplies and factor prices are otherwise the same: international trade, capital flows, and migration. The insight that international trade and international movements of productive factors could be substitutes owes much to the work of the Swedish economist Bertil Ohlin. Ohlin's magnum opus. Interregional and International Trade (1933), building on earlier work of Eli Heckscher, developed what became known as the Heckscher–Ohlin model of international trade. In its simplest form it described trade in a two‐region, two‐factor, two‐good economic system. With subsequent generalizations, the theory accommodated not just trade in goods but also movement of factors. Capital flows were principally of interest, but labor flows were formally analogous. The practical differences between the two, of course, were considerable: migration was not an acceptable mode of factor price equalization. Nor is it today, when worries about rapid population growth attach to poor countries rather than (as they did in the 1930s, if speciously) to industrialized states claiming lebensraum. Indeed, it is less so, since the population sizes of the sending countries are multiples of their 1930s levels and high migrant flows encounter resistance in the receiving countries. The passage reproduced below comes from a project on economic reconstruction and financial stabilization organized by the Carnegie Endowment and the International Chamber of Commerce. One output of this project was a volume International Economic Reconstruction: An Economists' and Businessmen's Survey of the Main Problems of Today (Paris: International Chamber of Commerce, 1936), over half of which consisted of a study entitled Introductory Report on the Problem of International Economic Reconstruction, by Ohlin. The excerpt is part of Chapter 7 of this report: The Problem of “Overpopulation,” Colonies, Markets and Raw Materials. Bertil Gotthard Ohlin (1899–1979) had a distinguished career as a politician as well as economist. He was a long‐time member of Sweden's parliament, in which he led the Liberal Party—mostly in opposition. During 1944–45 he was Minister of Trade. In 1977 he received the Nobel prize in economics (together with James Meade) for contributions to the theory of international trade.     

Demographic Trends in Ukraine: Past,Present, and Future

Ukraine, during the first half of the twentieth century, underwent a series of man‐made demographic catastrophes—World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution, the 1932/33 famine linked to land collectivization, the massive deportations and executions of Stalin's Great Terror, and World War II. This article assembles estimates of the demographic impact of these deadly events. In their absence, it is estimated that Ukraine's hypothetical population would have been 87 million on the eve of independence in 1991, instead of its actual 52 million. Pre‐independence demographic losses were episodic and driven by external forces. By contrast, since independence in 1991, Ukraine has experienced a sustained demographic crisis of its own making. Ukraine's population declined from 52 million in 1990 to 45 million by 2013. Fertility, while it has recovered from its lowest point, remains at a TFR of about 1.5—far below replacement. Emigration, although the greatest hemorrhage of young people in the 1990s is over, is still of concern. The loss of Crimea and the unsettled state of affairs in Southeastern Ukraine give further cause for concern.     

Lesbian,Gay, and Bisexual Individuals’ Perceptions of American Religious Traditions

ABSTRACT

The cumulative alienation sexual minorities experience from American mainline religious groups may leave them feeling disillusioned and even hostile toward the religious organizations that have historically rejected them. However, research to date has not explored sexual minorities’ perceptions of religious traditions in the United States. The current study examines the variations between lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults’ (LGB) perceptions of whether religious traditions are friendly/neutral or unfriendly toward the LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) population. Using data from the Pew Research Center 2013 Survey of LGBT Adults, the author conducts separate binary logistic regression analyses examining whether four religious traditions—evangelical Protestantism, the Catholic Church, the Jewish religion, and mainline Protestantism—are generally perceived as friendly/neutral or unfriendly toward LGBT people. The findings from this study offer rare insight on sexual minorities’ perceptions of major religious traditions and illustrates that sexual minorities have a complex relationship with religion.     

Alan Greenspan on the Economic Implications of Population Aging

At the 2004 annual symposium of central bank leaders sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board, devoted his opening remarks on 27 August to a discussion of the economic implications of population aging. The full text of his remarks is reproduced below. Greenspan's high prestige and great influence on US economic policy lend special interest to his views on this much-discussed subject (see also the next Documents item in this issue). He outlines the coming demographic shift in the United States in language that is characteristically cautious and qualified. (The elderly dependency ratio will “almost certainly” rise as the baby boom generation retires, Greenspan says, although elsewhere he terms the process, more accurately, inexorable.) The main factor responsible for population aging he identifies as the decline of fertility. Immigration is an antidote, but, to be effective, its size would have to be much larger than is envisaged in current projections. Greenspan's assessment of the economic consequences of the changing age structure highlights the prospect of a deteriorating fiscal situation in the United States: chronic deficits in the Social Security program over the long haul, assuming that existing commitments for benefits per retiree are met, and even greater difficulties for the health care system for the elderly—Medicare—in which the effects of increasing numbers in old age are amplified by advances in medical technology and the bias inherent in the current system of subsidized third-party payments. The sober outline of policy choices imposed by population aging—difficult in the United States, but less so, Greenspan notes, than in Europe and Japan—underlies the need for counteracting the declining growth of the population of labor force age through greater labor force participation and later retirement. Beyond that, growth of output per worker can provide the key “that would enable future retirees to maintain their expected standard of living without unduly burdening future workers.” This requires continuation of policies that enhance productivity, such as deregulation and globalization, and greater investment. In turn, the latter presupposes greater domestic saving, both personal and by the government, as the United States cannot “continue indefinitely to borrow saving from abroad.” Demographic aging requires a new balance between workers and retirees. Curbing benefits once bestowed is difficult: only benefits that can be delivered should be promised. Public programs should be recalibrated, providing incentives for individuals to adjust to the inevitable consequences of an aging society.     

The United Nations on the Implementation of the Cairo Program of Action

Progress and challenges in implementing strategies on population and development were the focus of a Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly that met at UN headquarters in New York, 30 June-2 July 1999. Participating at the Assembly were representatives of nearly 180 governments, with some 150 of these, and a number of observers and nongovernmental organizations, making statements. The delegates reviewed and appraised the implementation of the Program of Action adopted at the International Conference on Population and Development held at Cairo in 1994. The main topics discussed concerned women's rights, reproductive health issues, and abortion. The Assembly's work culminated in the adoption of a 106-paragraph statement titled Key actions…, formally issued as United Nations Document A/S-21/5. The document is reprinted below in full. It affirms the comprehensive approach to population and development issues articulated at the Cairo conference and identifies needs for further action. Also reproduced below is the address delivered at the Special Session by Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations. According to a popular lapidary characterization of the program adopted at the 1994 conference, that program concluded that “population is not about numbers.” Thus the Secretary-General's address is particularly notable for a clear affirmation of the importance of the quantitative dimension of the population issue. “[W]e have to stabilize the population of this planet. Quite simply, there is a limit to the pressures our global environment can stand.”     

Combining forward and backward mortality estimation

Demographers often form estimates by combining information from two data sources—a challenging problem when one or both data sources are incomplete. A classic example entails the construction of death probabilities, which requires death counts for the subpopulations under study and corresponding base population estimates. Approaches typically entail ‘back projection', as in Wrigley and Schofield's seminal analysis of historical English data, or ‘inverse’ or ‘forward projection’ as used by Lee in his important reanalysis of that work, both published in the 1980s. Our paper shows how forward and backward approaches can be optimally combined, using a generalized method of moments (GMM) framework. We apply the method to the estimation of death probabilities for relatively small subpopulations within the United States (men born 1930–39 by state of birth by birth cohort by race), combining data from vital statistics records and census samples.     

The Effect of Child Mortality on Contraceptive Use and Fertility in Colombia,Costa Rica and Korea

In this paper the question whether reproductive behaviour is consciously altered by the death of a child is answered by using World Fertility Survey data from Colombia, Costa Rica, and Korea. Alternative strategies are proposed by which women replace children who have died. They may choose to contracept for a shorter period following the death of a child, or they may cease using contraception. Each strategy is analysed separately for selected birth intervals and its effect estimated with loglinear techniques. It is found that the timing and nature of the response to child mortality appear to depend on the stage reached in a country's fertility transition.     

The Johannesburg Summit on Health and Sustainable Development

The World Summit on Sustainable Development was held in Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August‐4 September 2002. The meeting was a follow‐up to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) that took place in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 but with a mandate broader than that of the Rio conference: the Summit was to consider strategies toward sustainable development in all its dimensions. According to the opening paragraph of the Plan of Implementation adopted by the Johannesburg Summit, the Rio conference “provided the fundamental principles and the programme of action for achieving sustainable development.” But while reaffirming commitment to the Rio principles, the Plan states that it intends to “further build on the achievements made since UNCED and expedite the realization of the remaining goals.” A topic conspicuously missing from the deliberations of the Rio conference was population, even though rapid population growth has a plausible bearing on sustainable development and specifically on the problem of poverty, an issue at the center of the discussions concerning sustainability. It had been expected that Johannesburg would make amends for that omission. In the ten years between the two conferences, the size of the world's population increased by some 790 million persons. Of this growth, 754 million, or 95 percent, occurred in the countries the United Nations classifies as “less developed.” The population of these countries grew by 18 percent between the two conferences, as compared with a 3 percent growth in the more developed countries. The countries classified as “least developed“—a subset of the less developed countries consisting of 48 countries, predominantly African, with a 2002 population of nearly 700 million—grew during the interconference period by 29 percent. This record of population growth since the Rio conference may be supplemented by the projections of the United Nations up to 2050. The medium variant of these projections for the next 48 years envisages a slight population decline in the more developed countries and an addition of some 2 billion persons to the less developed group. For the least developed countries, the UN projects a population of more than 1.8 billion in 2050, some 164 percent larger than the current population size. Although the magnitudes of past population growth and its likely future dynamics are well known, they attracted very little attention at the Johannesburg meeting. The Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, a concise political document issued at the closing of the conference along with the Plan of Implementation, pledges “to place particular focus on, and give priority attention to, the fight against the worldwide conditions that pose severe threats to the sustainable development of our people.” It then proceeds to specifics: “Among these conditions are: chronic hunger; malnutrition; foreign occupation; armed conflicts; illicit drug problems; organized crime; corruption; natural disasters; illicit arms trafficking; trafficking, in persons; terrorism; intolerance and incitement to racial, ethnic, religious and other hatreds; xenophobia; and endemic, communicable and chronic diseases, in particular HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis” (Paragraph 19 of the Declaration,). The Plan of Implementation, a 27,000‐word document, was the main product of the Johannesburg meeting. Apart from a mention of the Cairo conference on Population and Development, the Plan's treatment of population issues is confined to health. The relevant section—section VI, titled Health and sustainable development—is reproduced below in full. (Paragraph numbers have been retained.) It presents a statement of goals couched in general exhortative terms (“integrate,”“promote,”“provide,”“improve,”“develop”), and specifies some quantitative targets, notably to reduce “by the year 2015, mortality rates for infants and children under 5 by two thirds, and maternal mortality rates by three quarters,” and “reduction of HIV prevalence among young men and women aged 15–24 by 25 per cent in the most affected countries by 2005 and globally by 2010.” The full text of the Plan can be found at http://www.un.org/jsummitlhtmlldocumentslsummit_docsl21Q9_planfinal.htm     

Science,Modernity, and the Making of China's One‐Child Policy

China's one‐child‐per‐couple policy represents an extraordinary attempt to engineer national wealth, power, and global standing by drastically braking population growth. Despite the policy's external notoriety and internal might, its origins remain obscure. In the absence of scholarly research on this question, public discourse in the United States has been shaped by media representations portraying the policy as the product of a repressive communist regime. This article shows that the core ideas underlying the one‐child policy came instead from Western science, in particular from the Club of Rome's world‐in‐crisis work of the early 1970s. Drawing on research in science studies, the article analyzes the two notions lying at the policy's core—that China faced a virtual “population crisis” and that the one‐child policy was “the only solution” to it—as human constructs forged by specific groups of scientists working in particular, highly consequential contexts. It documents how the fundamentally political process of constituting population as an object of science and governance was then depoliticized by scientizing rhetorics that presented China's population crisis and its only solution as numerically describable, objective facts. By probing the human and historical character of population research, this article underscores the complexity of demographic knowledge‐making and the power of scientific practices in helping constitute demographic reality itself.     

Sub‐Saharan Africa's Future: A US National Intelligence Council Conference Report

The US National Intelligence Council's 2020 Report, Mapping the Global Future, was issued in December 2004. It presented an assessment of geopolitical trends and set out some speculative scenarios for global development over the next 15 years. Excerpts were carried in the Documents section of PDR 31, no. 1. A follow‐up conference in 2005 brought together a group of US experts on Africa to explore likely trends and drivers of change in sub‐Saharan Africa over the same period, partly in the light of the Report's treatment of that region. Part of the NIC's summary of the conference discussions is reproduced below. (Omitted sections discuss globalization, terrorism, democratization, foreign influences, and religion. The full summary is available at http://www.odci.gov/nic/confreports_africa_future.html .) It is notable that the topic of population, which once would have figured heavily in such prognostications, nowhere appears in the conference deliberations. Yet the region's population growth is still rapid—and is plausibly a major driver of change. In the UN's medium projections, sub‐Saharan Africa's population, estimated at 906 million in 2005, will more than double by 2050, its share of world population rising from 12 percent to 19 percent. In the 15‐year time frame of the NIC it will likely grow by 200 million. Those numbers are of course tenuous, contingent on the expectations they embody about the timing of the region's transition to low death and birth rates (and specifically in their assessment of the future course of the AIDS epidemic)—which in turn will be influenced by many of the factors that the NIC conferees considered.     

Dudley Kirk on Population Changes and Prospective Power Relations after World War II: A View from 1943

The theory of demographic transition in its best‐known modern formulation was developed in the early 1940s by a small group of researchers associated with Princeton University's Office of Population Research, under the leadership of Frank W. Notestein. A notable early adumbration of the theory in print—in fact preceding the most often cited contemporaneous articles by Notestein and by Kingsley Davis—was by Dudley Kirk, one of the Princeton demographers, in an article titled “Population changes and the postwar world,” originally presented by its author on 4 December 1943 at the 38th Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society, held in New York. It is reproduced below in full from the February 1944 issue of American Sociological Review (Vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 28–35). In the article Kirk, then 30 years old, briefly discusses essential elements of the concept of the demographic transition. He characterizes trends in birth and death rates as closely linked to developmental changes: to the transition “from a peasant, self‐sufficient society to an urban, industrial society.” He sees the countries of the world as arranged on a “single continuum of development” and, correspondingly, on a continuum of demographic configurations. These countries, he suggests, may be divided into three broad groups: the first, with high mortality and high fertility, possessing great potential population growth; the second, “caught up in the tide of industrialization and urbanization,” hence exhibiting birth and death rates that are both declining but in a pattern that generates rapid population growth; and a third, with low fertility and low mortality, pointing toward the prospect of eventual depopulation. He describes the temporal and geographic process of material progress and demographic change as one of cultural and technological diffusion emanating from the West. But Kirk's main interest in this article is the effects of the patterns generated by economic change and the ensuing demographic transition on shifts in relative power—military and economic—within the system of nations, both historically and in the then dawning postcolonial era. On the latter score, even if occasionally colored by judgments reflecting perspectives unsurprising in 1943, such as in his assessment of the economic potential of the Soviet Union, Kirk's probing of the likely consequences of evolving trends in power relationships as shaped by shifting economic and demographic weights—issues now largely neglected in population studies—is often penetrating and remarkably prescient. His views on the implication of these trends for the desirable American stance toward the economic and demographic modernization of less developed countries—friendly assistance resulting in rapid expansion of markets, and trade speeding a social evolution that also brings about slower population growth—represent what became an influential strand in postwar US foreign policy. Dudley Kirk was born 6 October 1913 in Rochester, New York, but grew up in California. After graduating from Pomona College, he received an M.A. in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University in 1935 and a Ph.D. in sociology from Harvard in 1946. He was associated with Princeton's OPR between 1939 and 1947, where he published his influential monograph Europe's Population in the Interwar Years (1946) and, with Frank Notestein and others, coauthored the book The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union (1944). From 1947 to 1954 he was demographer in the Office of Intelligence Research of the US State Department, the first person having that title in the federal government. From 1954 to 1967 he was director of the Demographic Division of the Population Council in New York, and from 1967 until his retirement in 1979 he was professor of population studies at Stanford University. In 1959–60 he was president of the Population Association of America. Dudley Kirk died 14 March 2000 in San Jose, California.