Life expectancy as a constructed belief: Evidence of a live-to or die-by framing effect

Life expectations are essential inputs for many important personal decisions. We propose that longevity beliefs are responses constructed at the time of judgment, subject to irrelevant task and context factors, and leading to predictable biases. Specifically, we examine whether life expectancy is affected by the framing of expectations questions as either live-to or die-by, as well as by factors that actually affect longevity such as age, gender, and self-reported health. We find that individuals in a live-to frame report significantly higher chances of being alive at ages 55 through 95 than people in a corresponding die-by frame. Estimated mean life expectancies across three studies and 2300 respondents were 7.38 to 9.17 years longer when solicited in a live-to frame. We are additionally able to show how this framing works on a process level and how it affects preference for life annuities. Implications for models of financial decision making are discussed.     

Stability of risk preferences and the reflection effect of prospect theory

Are risk preferences stable over time? To address this question we elicit risk preferences from the same pool of subjects at two different moments in time. To interpret the results, we use a Fechner stochastic choice model in which the revealed preference of individuals is governed by some underlying preference, together with a random error. We take cumulative prospect theory as the underlying preference model (Kahneman and Tversky, Econometrica 47:263–292, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5:297–323, 1992). We observe that the aggregate pattern of preferences is very similar in both sessions, and it matches the results reported in the literature. Most subjects are risk averse for gains, and risk seeking for losses. However, the subjects that jointly agree with the reflection effect of prospect theory are around 50%. The percentage of individuals that change their responses across sessions is quite high, 63%. Estimating the stochastic choice model we find that 72% of the subjects have an underlying preference which agrees with the reflection effect of prospect theory. The remaining 28% are mainly classified as risk averse for both gains and losses. The results reinforce the empirical validity of the reflection effect. Deviations from the reflection effect can be attributed to noise, as well as to the existence of a fraction of risk averse subjects.     

Rationality on the rise: Why relative risk aversion increases with stake size

How does risk tolerance vary with stake size? This important question cannot be adequately answered if framing effects, nonlinear probability weighting, and heterogeneity of preference types are neglected. We show that the observed increase in relative risk aversion over gains cannot be captured by the curvature of the value function. Rather, it is predominantly driven by a change in probability weighting of a majority group of individuals who weight probabilities of high gains more conservatively. Contrary to gains, no coherent change in relative risk aversion is observed for losses. These results not only challenge expected utility theory, but also prospect theory.     

Education and anomalies in decision making: Experimental evidence from Chinese adult twins

We estimate the effects of education on two dimensions of decision making behavior—risk and time—beyond those considered to be normal-ranged to encompass behavioral anomalies with respect to expected utility as well as time consistency. We conduct a number of incentivized choice experiments on Chinese adult twins to measure decision making behavior, and use a within-twin-pair fixed-effects estimator to deal with unobservable family-specific effects. The estimation results show that a higher education level tends to reduce the degree of risk aversion towards moderate prospects, moderate hazards, and longshot prospects. For anomalies under risk and uncertainty, college graduates exhibit significantly more Allais-type behavior compared to high school dropouts, while high school graduates exhibit more ambiguity aversion as well as a familiarity preference relative to high school dropouts. For decision making involving time, a higher education level tends to reduce the degree of impatience, and to reduce behavioral anomalies including hyperbolic discounting, dread, and hopefulness. The experimental observations suggest that people with a higher education level tend to exhibit more behavioral anomalies in risk attitudes but fewer behavioral anomalies involving time, hence implying that education has multi-functions in preference formation and human capability building. This study contributes to the understanding of the nature of these behavioral anomalies and the roles of education in human decision making.     

School environment and risk preferences: Experimental evidence

Using a field experiment with high school students, we evaluate the development of risk preferences. Examining the impact of school characteristics on preference development reveals both peer and quality effects. For the peer effect, individuals in schools with a higher percentage of students on free or reduced lunches (hence a higher proportion of low-income peers with whom to interact) are significantly more risk averse. For the quality effect, individuals in schools with smaller class sizes and a higher percentage of educators with advanced degrees have higher, more moderate levels of risk aversion. We further discuss economic, cognitive and emotional development theories of risk preferences. Data show demographic-related patterns: girls are more risk averse on average, while taller and nonwhite individuals are more risk tolerant.     

Expected utility with ambiguous probabilities and ‘irrational’ parameters

Savage's expected utility theory has been criticized for various reasons. Two of these are: (1) Subjective probabilities may be more or less ambiguous; this may affect the preference order. Savage's theory rules out any such effect. (2) Savage's theory rules out any influence of certain parameters of a probability distribution on the preference order. Such parameters are fractiles or pairs of fractiles, e.g., which have gained widespread attention as risk measures.This paper generalizes expected utility theory to include effects of ambiguity and those parameters on the preference order. Basic to this generalization is the classic paper by Herstein/Milnor.     

Preference Reversals and Induced Risk Preferences: Evidence for Noisy Maximization

We combine two research lines: preference reversal research (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971) and research on lottery-based risk preference induction (Roth and Malouf, 1979). Our results are informative for both research lines. We show that inducing risk preferences in preference reversal experiments has dramatic effects. First, while our subjects still display reversals, they do not display the usual pattern of predicted reversals suggested by the compatibility hypothesis. By inducing risk averse and risk loving preferences, we can dramatically reduce reversal rates and even produce the opposite pattern of reversals. Our results are consistent with the assumption that subjects maximize expected utility with error. This provides evidence that Camerer and Hogarth's (1999) framework for incentive effects can be extended to include the risk preference induction reward scheme.     

Deterrence, expected cost, uncertainty and voting: Experimental evidence

We conduct laboratory experiments to investigate the effects of deterrence mechanisms under controlled conditions. The effect of the expected cost of punishment of an individual’s decision to engage in a proscribed activity and the effect of uncertainty on an individual’s decision to commit a violation are very difficult to isolate in field data. We use a roadway speeding framing and find that (a) individuals respond considerably to increases in the expected cost of speeding, (b) uncertainty about the enforcement regime yields a significant reduction in violations committed, and (c) people are much more likely to speed when the punishment regime for which they voted is implemented. Our results have important implications for a behavioral theory of deterrence under uncertainty.     

Nader voters in the 2000 Presidential Election: what would they have done without him?

This research estimates the likely voting behavior of Nader voters if he had not been a candidate in the presidential race. Bivariate analysis of ANES data suggests that Nader voters fit the profile of likely voters and have a distinct preference for Democratic candidates. We utilize multinomial logit analysis to include the possibility of abstention as well as the option of voting for Gore, Bush, or another third-party candidate. The results suggest that Nader voters closely resembled the typical voter in educational achievement, and therefore it is likely that a majority of these individuals would have participated in the 2000 election if Nader had not been a candidate. In addition, it is likely that these individuals would have voted for Al Gore over George Bush. However, these Nader voters were younger, less partisan, and were more likely to express feelings of political alienation, so it is quite possible that the absence of the Nader candidacy would have kept a sizeable minority of them at home on election day.     

Heterogeneity in life-duration preferences: Are risky recreationists really more risk loving?

We conduct multiple price list experiments that elicit life duration risk preferences from amateur auto racers, technical rock climbers, SCUBA divers, and a student control group. We posit a preference function that allows for risk aversion and probability weighting. We are particularly interested in whether the behavior of risk takers, such as risky recreationists or smokers, is best explained by a risk-tolerant utility function or if immunity to possibility bias arising from overweighting of low probabilities is a more important motivator of the choice to engage in risky activities. We find that amateur auto racers are more rational than either students or other risky recreationists because they are less likely to overemphasize low-probability events. Women, older subjects, and rock climbers are more susceptible to possibility bias than others, making them likely to overinvest in disease treatments that have a low probability of success.     

Major League Baseball Players' Life Expectancies*

Objective. We examine the importance of anthropometric and performance measures, and age, period, and cohort effects in explaining life expectancies among major league baseball (MLB) players over the past century. Methods. We use discrete time hazard models to calculate life tables with covariates with data from Total Baseball, a rich source of information on all players who played in the major league. Results. Compared to 20‐year‐old U.S. males, MLB players can expect almost five additional years of life. Height, weight, handedness, and player ratings are unassociated with the risk of death in this population of highly active and successful adults. Career length is inversely associated with the risk of death, likely because those who play longer gain additional incomes, physical fitness, and training. Conclusions. Our results indicate improvements in life expectancies with time for all age groups and indicate possible improvements in longevity in the general U.S. population.     

Are risk preferences stable? Comparing an experimental measure with a validated survey-based measure

We examine the stability of risk preference within subjects by comparing measures obtained from two elicitation methods, an economics experiment with real monetary rewards and a survey with questions on hypothetical gambles. The survey questions have been validated by numerous empirical studies of investment, insurance demand, smoking and alcohol use, and recent studies have shown the experimental measure is associated with several real-world risky behaviors. For the majority of subjects, we find that risk preferences are not stable across elicitation methods. In interval regression models subjects’ risk preference classifications from survey questions on job-based gambles are not associated with risk preference estimates from the experiment. However, we find that risk classifications from inheritance-based gambles are significantly associated with the experimental measure. We identify some subjects for whom risk preference estimates are more strongly correlated across elicitation methods, suggesting that unobserved subject traits like comprehension or effort influence risk preference stability.     

Investigating Risky Choices Over Losses Using Experimental Data

We conduct a battery of experiments in which agents make choices from several pairs of all-loss-lotteries. Using these choices, we estimate a representation of individual preferences over lotteries. We find statistically and economically significant departures from expected utility maximization for many subjects. We also estimate a preference representation based on summary statistics for behavior in the population of subjects, and again find departures from expected utility maximization. Our results suggest that public policies based on an expected utility approach could significantly underestimate preferences and willingness to pay for risk reduction.JEL Classification: C91, D81     

An expected utility maximizer walks into a bar...

We conducted field experiments at a bar to test whether blood alcohol concentration (BAC) correlates with violations of the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) and the independence axiom. We found that individuals with BACs well above the legal limit for driving adhere to GARP and independence at rates similar to those who are sober. This finding led to the fielding of a third experiment to explore how risk preferences might vary as a function of BAC. We found gender-specific effects: Men did not exhibit variations in risk preferences across BACs. In contrast, women were more risk averse than men at low BACs but exhibited increasing tolerance towards risks as BAC increased. Based on our estimates, men and women’s risk preferences are predicted to be identical at BACs nearly twice the legal limit for driving. We discuss the implications for policy-makers.     

Learning from mistakes: What do inconsistent choices over risk tell us?

We implement a risk experiment that allows for judgment errors to investigate who makes mistakes and whether it matters. The experiments are conducted with a random sample of the adult population in Rwanda, and data on financial decisions are collected. We find a high proportion of inconsistent choices, with over 50% of the participants making at least one mistake. Importantly, errors are informative. While risk aversion alone does not explain financial decisions, risk aversion and inconsistent choices interact in significant and sensible ways. As we would expect, risk-averse individuals are more likely to belong to a savings group and less likely to take out an informal loan. For those more likely to make mistakes, however, as they become more risk averse, they are less likely to belong to a savings group and more likely to take up informal credit, suggesting that mistakes correlate with less than optimal behavior.

The law of large numbers and the attractiveness of compound gambles

A compound of many independent replicas of a gamble may be chosen by a risk averter even if the single gamble would be rejected given any initial wealth level. Samuelson has shown that such choices are impossible if the expected utility theory of preference is adopted. But they are consistent with more general theories of preference. Consequently, the intuition suggested by the law of large numbers can be supported.     

Risk-induced discounting

We establish a direct connection between time preference and risk about an attribute (health) of the instantaneous utility function. In doing so, we derive a risk-induced discount function that corresponds to a normalized expectation of that attribute. We provide several results characterizing this risk-induced discount function depending on the stochastic properties of the risk, which we model as a discrete Markov process. When it is well-defined, which we refer to as full approximation, the risk-induced discount function coincides with exponential discounting if the Markov process is stationary. However, a slight perturbation of the beliefs can trigger time-inconsistent discounting. When considering non-stationary Markov processes, time-inconsistency also emerges in situations where individuals’ beliefs change in a non-anticipated fashion over time, as exemplified by quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Results are illustrated via several applications.     

Eliciting beliefs

We develop an algorithm that can be used to approximate a decisionmaker’s beliefs for a class of preference structures that includes, among others, α-maximin expected utility preferences, Choquet expected utility preferences, and, more generally, constant additive preferences. For both exact and statistical approximation, we demonstrate convergence in an appropriate sense to the true belief structure.     

Expected utility: An anniversary and a new era

During the past generation, expected utility theory has been widely accepted as the normative standard for decision making under risk and under uncertainty. However, it is now known that reasonable people often violate its assumptions, and a number of generalizations of the theory have been developed to accommodate some of the more common violations. This essay recalls the origins of expected utility in the early 1700s, notes its axiomatizations on the basis of preference comparisons in the mid-1900s, describes violations of those axioms uncovered since then, outlines new theories stimulated by the violations, and suggests where the field might be headed in the next few decades.