Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates

In this paper we focus on strategic voting behavior when both an election and a signaling motivation affect voters' behavior. We analyze a model of elections with two candidates competing on a one‐dimensional policy space. Voters are privately and imperfectly informed about a common shock affecting the electorate's preferences. Candidates are assumed to choose policy in response to information gleaned from election results and according to exogenous factors that may lead to polarization in candidates' policy choices. We analyze a subset of symmetric equilibria in which strategies are symmetric to candidates' names and private signals (CSS equilibria). We show that signaling and election motivations pull voters to vote in different directions. We provide conditions that show the relation between the amount of information aggregated in the election and the motivation that influences voting behavior the most. Finally, we show that when candidates are responsive and polarized, all CSS equilibria are inefficient in the limit.     

Competition for a Majority

We define the class of two‐player zero‐sum games with payoffs having mild discontinuities, which in applications typically stem from how ties are resolved. For such games, we establish sufficient conditions for existence of a value of the game, maximin and minimax strategies for the players, and a Nash equilibrium. If all discontinuities favor one player, then a value exists and that player has a maximin strategy. A property called payoff approachability implies existence of an equilibrium, and that the resulting value is invariant: games with the same payoffs at points of continuity have the same value and ɛ‐equilibria. For voting games in which two candidates propose policies and a candidate wins election if a weighted majority of voters prefer his proposed policy, we provide tie‐breaking rules and assumptions about voters' preferences sufficient to imply payoff approachability. These assumptions are satisfied by generic preferences if the dimension of the space of policies exceeds the number of voters; or with no dimensional restriction, if the electorate is sufficiently large. Each Colonel Blotto game is a special case in which each candidate allocates a resource among several constituencies and a candidate gets votes from those allocated more than his opponent offers; in this case, for simple‐majority rule we prove existence of an equilibrium with zero probability of ties.     

Social Indeterminacy

An extension of Condorcet's paradox by McGarvey (1953) asserts that for every asymmetric relation R on a finite set of candidates there is a strict‐preferences voter profile that has the relation R as its strict simple majority relation. We prove that McGarvey's theorem can be extended to arbitrary neutral monotone social welfare functions that can be described by a strong simple game G if the voting power of each individual, measured by the Shapley–Shubik power index, is sufficiently small. Our proof is based on an extension to another classic result concerning the majority rule. Condorcet studied an election between two candidates in which the voters' choices are random and independent and the probability of a voter choosing the first candidate is p>1/2. Condorcet's jury theorem asserts that if the number of voters tends to infinity then the probability that the first candidate will be elected tends to one. We prove that this assertion extends to a sequence of arbitrary monotone strong simple games if and only if the maximum voting power for all individuals tends to zero.     

Stable and Coordinating Contracts for a Supply Chain with Multiple Risk‐Averse Suppliers

We analyze a decentralized supply chain with a single risk‐averse retailer and multiple risk‐averse suppliers under a Conditional Value at Risk objective. We define coordinating contracts and show that the supply chain is coordinated only when the least risk‐averse agent bears the entire risk and the lowest‐cost supplier handles all production. However, due to competition, not all coordinating contracts are stable. Thus, we introduce the notion of contract core, which reflects the agents' “bargaining power” and restricts the set of coordinating contracts to a subset which is “credible.” We also study the concept of contract equilibrium, which helps to characterize contracts that are immune to opportunistic renegotiation. We show that, the concept of contract core imposes conditions on the share of profit among different agents, while the concept of contract equilibrium provide conditions on how the payment changes with the order quantity.     

POLITICAL COMPETITION WITH CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND INFORMATIVE ADVERTISING

This paper presents a theory of political competition with campaign contributions and informative political advertising. Policy‐motivated parties compete by selecting candidates and interest groups provide contributions to enhance the electoral prospects of like‐minded candidates. Contributions are used to finance advertising campaigns that provide voters with information about candidates' ideologies. Voters update their beliefs rationally given the information they have received. The paper uses the theory to analyze the welfare economics of contribution limits. Such limits are shown to redistribute welfare from ordinary citizens to members of interest groups. (JEL: D72, H40)     

One Person,Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation

This paper shows that information imperfections and common values can solve coordination problems in multicandidate elections. We analyze an election in which (i) the majority is divided between two alternatives and (ii) the minority backs a third alternative, which the majority views as strictly inferior. Standard analyses assume voters have a fixed preference ordering over candidates. Coordination problems cannot be overcome in such a case, and it is possible that inferior candidates win. In our setup the majority is also divided as a result of information imperfections. The majority thus faces two problems: aggregating information and coordinating to defeat the minority candidate. We show that when the common value component is strong enough, approval voting produces full information and coordination equivalence: the equilibrium is unique and solves both problems. Thus, the need for information aggregation helps resolve the majority's coordination problem under approval voting. This is not the case under standard electoral systems.     

Market‐Triggered Changes in Capital Structure: Equilibrium Price Dynamics

We analyze the internal consistency of using the market price of a firm's equity to trigger a contractual change in the firm's capital structure, given that the value of the equity itself depends on the firm's capital structure. Of particular interest is the case of contingent capital for banks, in the form of debt that converts to equity, when conversion is triggered by a decline in the bank's stock price. We analyze the problem of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium values for a firm's liabilities in this context, meaning values consistent with a market‐price trigger. Discrete‐time dynamics allow multiple equilibria. In contrast, we show that the possibility of multiple equilibria can largely be ruled out in continuous time, where the price of the triggering security adjusts in anticipation of breaching the trigger. Our main condition for existence of an equilibrium requires that the consequences of triggering a conversion be consistent with the direction in which the trigger is crossed. For the design of contingent capital with a stock price trigger, this condition may be interpreted to mean that conversion should be disadvantageous to shareholders, and it is satisfied by setting the trigger sufficiently high. Uniqueness follows provided the trigger is sufficiently accessible by all candidate equilibria. We illustrate precise formulations of these conditions with a variety of applications.     

A co-utility approach to the mesh economy: the crowd-based business model

We explore the mesh economy applications of co-utility, a new concept describing self-enforcing and mutually beneficial interactions among self-interested agents. We show that the crowdsourcing market is naturally co-utile (without additional incentives). Furthermore, we analyze the investment crowdfunding industry and propose solutions that can neutralize the fear and mistrust effects underlying its market in order to make it strictly co-utile. Up on our analysis under the co-utility framework, we corroborate that collaboration is always rationally sustainable, as long as the system is co-utile and that all co-utile outcomes are Pareto-optimal; but not all Pareto-optimal outcomes are co-utile. In addition, reciprocity and hybridity equilibrium are compatible with co-utility in specific cases at which they provide Pareto-optimal outcomes. This methodology of analysis within the framework of co-utility can be extended beyond the crowd-based business models and promises to significantly contribute to economic theory.     

Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons

We study a dynamic setting in which stochastic information (news) about the value of a privately informed seller's asset is gradually revealed to a market of buyers. We construct an equilibrium that involves periods of no trade or market failure. The no‐trade period ends in one of two ways: either enough good news arrives, restoring confidence and markets reopen, or bad news arrives, making buyers more pessimistic and forcing capitulation that is, a partial sell‐off of low‐value assets. Conditions under which the equilibrium is unique are provided. We analyze welfare and efficiency as they depend on the quality of the news. Higher quality news can lead to more inefficient outcomes. Our model encompasses settings with or without a standard static adverse selection problem—in a dynamic setting with sufficiently informative news, reservation values arise endogenously from the option to sell in the future and the two environments have the same equilibrium structure.     

Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics With Many Firms

We propose an approximation method for analyzing Ericson and Pakes (1995)‐style dynamic models of imperfect competition. We define a new equilibrium concept that we call oblivious equilibrium, in which each firm is assumed to make decisions based only on its own state and knowledge of the long‐run average industry state, but where firms ignore current information about competitors' states. The great advantage of oblivious equilibria is that they are much easier to compute than are Markov perfect equilibria. Moreover, we show that, as the market becomes large, if the equilibrium distribution of firm states obeys a certain “light‐tail” condition, then oblivious equilibria closely approximate Markov perfect equilibria. This theorem justifies using oblivious equilibria to analyze Markov perfect industry dynamics in Ericson and Pakes (1995)‐style models with many firms.     

INFORMATION GATHERING IN ORGANIZATIONS: EQUILIBRIUM,WELFARE, AND OPTIMAL NETWORK STRUCTURE

We model an organization as a game in which all agents share a common decision problem and some level of coordination is necessary between individual actions. Agents have individual private information concerning the task they have to perform, and they share this private information through pairwise channels of communication. We analyze how this communication pattern, modeled by means of a network structure, affects individual behavior and aggregate welfare. In the unique equilibrium of this Bayesian game, each agent's optimal action depends on a properly defined knowledge index that measures how the aggregation of information helps him to infer higher‐order beliefs about other's information after communication. Adding communication channels is not always beneficial for the organization because it can lead to mis‐coordination. We single out the geometry of interagent communication links that the manager could implement in order to improve the organization's performance.     

On Forward Induction

A player's pure strategy is called relevant for an outcome of a game in extensive form with perfect recall if there exists a weakly sequential equilibrium with that outcome for which the strategy is an optimal reply at every information set it does not exclude. The outcome satisfies forward induction if it results from a weakly sequential equilibrium in which players' beliefs assign positive probability only to relevant strategies at each information set reached by a profile of relevant strategies. We prove that if there are two players and payoffs are generic, then an outcome satisfies forward induction if every game with the same reduced normal form after eliminating redundant pure strategies has a sequential equilibrium with an equivalent outcome. Thus in this case forward induction is implied by decision‐theoretic criteria.     

STAKEHOLDERS AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: THE CASE OF ISO 14001

This paper integrates a stakeholder perspective into the resource‐based view of the firm, to analyze the mechanisms that link the adoption of the international Environmental Management Standard ISO 14001 to firms' competitive advantage. This paper shows that the perceived competitiveness impact of the standard depends mostly on the involvement of firms' external stakeholders (distributors, customers, community members, and regulatory agencies) in its design. ISO 14001 is a process standard, and it is difficult for stakeholders to get credible information on the effectiveness of the standard if they are not involved in its design. Stakeholders' involvement in a firm's ISO 14001 standard becomes a valuable organizational capability, which is difficult to imitate by competitors. The analysis is supported by primary data collected from a questionnaire mailed to 152 firms, resulting in 55 observations representing 30% of the total number of firms certified in the U.S. in August 1998.     

Reputation for Quality

We propose a model of firm reputation in which a firm can invest or disinvest in product quality and the firm's reputation is defined as the market's belief about this quality. We analyze the relationship between a firm's reputation and its investment incentives, and derive implications for reputational dynamics. Reputational incentives depend on the specification of market learning. When consumers learn about quality through perfect good news signals, incentives decrease in reputation and there is a unique work–shirk equilibrium with ergodic dynamics. When learning is through perfect bad news signals, incentives increase in reputation and there is a continuum of shirk–work equilibria with path‐dependent dynamics. For a class of imperfect Poisson learning processes and low investment costs, we show that there exists a work–shirk equilibrium with ergodic dynamics. For a subclass of these learning processes, any equilibrium must feature working at all low and intermediate levels of reputation and shirking at the top.     

Signaling to Partially Informed Investors in the Newsvendor Model

We analyze a signaling game between the manager of a firm and an investor in the firm. The manager has private information about the firm's demand and cares about the short‐term stock price assigned by the investor. Previous research has shown that under continuous decision choices and the Intuitive Criterion refinement, the least‐cost separating equilibrium will result, in which a low‐quality firm chooses its optimal capacity and a high‐quality firm over‐invests in order to signal its quality to investors. We build on this research by showing the existence of pooling outcomes in which low‐quality firms over‐invest and high‐quality firms under‐invest so as to provide identical signals to investors. The pooling equilibrium is practically appealing because it yields a Pareto improvement compared to the least‐cost separating equilibrium. Distinguishing features of our analysis are that: (i) we allow the capacity decision to have either discrete or continuous support, and (ii) we allow beliefs to be refined based on either the Undefeated refinement or the Intuitive Criterion refinement. We find that the newsvendor model parameters impact the likelihood of a pooling outcome, and this impact changes in both sign and magnitude depending on which refinement is used.     

Cursed Equilibrium

There is evidence that people do not fully take into account how other people's actions depend on these other people's information. This paper defines and applies a new equilibrium concept in games with private information, cursed equilibrium, which assumes that each player correctly predicts the distribution of other players' actions, but underestimates the degree to which these actions are correlated with other players' information. We apply the concept to common‐values auctions, where cursed equilibrium captures the widely observed phenomenon of the winner's curse, and to bilateral trade, where cursedness predicts trade in adverse‐selections settings for which conventional analysis predicts no trade. We also apply cursed equilibrium to voting and signalling models. We test a single‐parameter variant of our model that embeds Bayesian Nash equilibrium as a special case and find that parameter values that correspond to cursedness fit a broad range of experimental datasets better than the parameter value that corresponds to Bayesian Nash equilibrium.     

基于RFM分析的促销组合策略优化模型

促销在企业的营销战略中占有重要地位,但企业在制定促销策略时,往往只是孤立的考虑单个促销活动,并且在选择促销目标群体时也常带有一定的盲目性。针对上述问题本文提出了基于RFM分析的促销组合策略优化模型,该模型综合考虑计划期内的多个待选促销方案,在满足相应约束的前提下,合理的进行促销活动和促销目标群体的选择,以保证促销组合的整体响应率和预期收益的最大化。     

Leverage and Default in Binomial Economies: A Complete Characterization

Our paper provides a complete characterization of leverage and default in binomial economies with financial assets serving as collateral. Our Binomial No‐Default Theorem states that any equilibrium is equivalent (in real allocations and prices) to another equilibrium in which there is no default. Thus actual default is irrelevant, though the potential for default drives the equilibrium and limits borrowing. This result is valid with arbitrary preferences and endowments, contingent or noncontingent promises, many assets and consumption goods, production, and multiple periods. We also show that only no‐default equilibria would be selected if there were the slightest cost of using collateral or handling default. Our Binomial Leverage Theorem shows that equilibrium Loan to Value (LTV) for noncontingent debt contracts is the ratio of the worst‐case return of the asset to the riskless gross rate of interest. In binomial economies, leverage is determined by down risk and not by volatility.     

Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena in a perfectly competitive, general equilibrium framework. Perfect competition eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates. It also makes for a simple equilibrium refinement, which we propose in order to rule out irrational pessimism about deliveries of untraded assets. We show that refined equilibrium always exists in our model, and that default, in conjunction with refinement, opens the door to a theory of endogenous assets. The market chooses the promises, default penalties, and quantity constraints of actively traded assets.     

EQUILIBRIUM INCENTIVE CONTRACTS AND EFFICIENCY WAGES

We analyze the optimal (efficiency) wage contract when output is contractible but firms neither observe the workers' effort nor their match‐specific productivity. Firms offer wage contracts that optimally trade off effort and wage costs. As a result, employed workers enjoy rents, which in turn creates unemployment. Nonetheless, the incentive power of the equilibrium wage contract is constrained efficient in the absence of taxes and unemployment benefits. We also show that more high‐powered incentive contracts tend to be associated with higher equilibrium unemployment rates. (JEL: E24, J30, J41)