中小制造企业在线直销与传统分销双渠道定价决策研究

针对传统渠道中处于非主导地位的中小制造企业开展双渠道销售时存在的价格冲突问题,考虑产品数字属性对渠道需求的影响,构建了制造商与零售商独立决策和制造商占非主导地位两种情况下的双渠道定价决策模型,给出了两种情况下的双渠道最优定价,并分别考察了产品数字属性变化以及决策权利结构不同对最优定价的影响。研究结果表明,处于非主导地位的中小制造企业应采用依从强势零售商的定价策略,该策略有利于制造商和零售商以及渠道整体收益的增加;随着产品数字属性的增大,制造商的最优定价相应地提高,而零售商的最优定价则相应地降低;制造商占非主导地位时的双渠道最优定价高于制造商与零售商独立决策时的双渠道最优定价。     

Hedging through index-based price contracts in commodity-based supply chains

This paper studies the optimal hedging strategy of risk-neutral firms in supply chain settings. We model a retailer procuring goods through index-based price contracts from two commodity processors. The processors’ input commodity prices are random and correlated. The retailer faces price-sensitive demand curves; therefore, it controls product demand through retail pricing in the final product market. We characterize the optimal contracting terms for the processors and show that they prefer to hedge part of their exposure to the commodity price risk. The optimal contract for processor comprises a processing margin independent of the commodity price volatility and a hedge ratio that is a function of the commodity price volatility and the products substitution factor. We uncover a new rationale for hedging in settings where downstream firms have pricing power; both processors and the retailer benefit from the retailer’s pricing power when their margins are linked to input prices; an index-based price contract is a means to link the processors’ and the retailer’s margins. We further investigate how different market parameters affect the optimal hedge ratios and extend our model to settings with random market sizes and asymmetric substitution for final products.     

零售商主导下生鲜农产品供应链的定价策略对比研究

运用RFID技术来监控与管理产品,零售商可以依据记录、传递的产品实时价值信息制定更为灵活的定价和订货策略,提升自身以及供应链的利润。针对生鲜农产品在价值损耗及消费者需求等方面进行特征分析,分别在固定定价、动态定价以及带有降价时点考虑的定价三种不同模式下,构建了单周期零售商的决策模型,得到各自的最优定价与订货策略,通过分析最优策略与关键参数之间的关系,发现:价值衰减系数越大,库存成本参数越大,三种模式下的总体零售价格都越小,价格的下调幅度越大;而两个参数对降价折扣时间点的影响却截然相反。进一步,着力在最优销售价格、订货总量与利润值三个方面对三种定价策略进行对比分析,结果显示基于RFID技术的灵活定价模式有助于零售商获取更大的市场需求量及更大的收益。数值实验进一步验证了理论研究的结果,为生鲜农产品供应链中对RFID技术的应用以及相应定价模式的选择提供了参考依据。     

考虑广告影响下的新产品垄断动态定价研究

针对垄断零售商的新产品定价问题,提出了一个新产品动态定价策略。在顾客对以往的价格和广告具有"学习"能力的条件下,提出了具有"学习"功能的需求函数。在给定各周期广告水平下,给出了零售商最优的动态定价策略,分析了零售商定价规律,发现其定价规律具有"振荡"性,并趋近于一定值。在零售商要同时决策零售价格和广告水平的条件下,给出了各周期最优的零售价格和广告水平。在一定条件下,当周期数趋近无穷大时零售价格趋近于顾客的保留价格或者单位成本。     

展厅现象下的双渠道供应链定价策略

针对双渠道供应链中展厅现象将加剧传统渠道与电子渠道的价格竞争问题，利用消费者效用理论，以存在展厅现象的差异化定价策略为基准，分别设计能够消除展厅现象的一致性定价策略和限价策略。研究结果显示相比差异化定价策略，一致性定价策略可以减轻传统渠道与电子渠道的价格竞争，并总是对零售商有利，但当顾客到传统渠道麻烦成本较高和批发价格较低时，也将有利于制造商；此外，双渠道供应链成员是否选择限价策略，依赖于传统渠道与电子渠道的价差，随着价差的降低制造商与零售商的利润都将提高，特别当两个渠道的价差较小时，限价策略可以有效降低价格竞争，从而促进双渠道供应链成员达到双赢状态。     

双渠道零售商和传统零售商的定价策略

在单制造商和两个具有竞争行为零售商的供应链系统中，本文研究了双渠道零售商和传统零售商的定价决策问题。首先，在零售商间进行Stackelberg博弈假设前提下，分别针对双渠道零售商和传统零售商作为领导者的情况，构建了两种模式下的零售商定价决策模型，给出了零售商的最优定价策略；其次，分析了零售商在特定情形下的定价策略；最后，用数值算例分析了模型参数对最优结果的影响。通过对比研究和数值算例分析发现：对于零售商来说，作为Stackelberg的领导者时的总利润要比作为追随者时的总利润大；对于供应商而言，传统渠道的零售商做主导者时的总利润要比双渠道零售商做主导者时的总利润大。     

基于合同理论的逆向供应链定价策略研究

利用合同理论的方法,借鉴类似回购合同的假设,研究"制造商-零售商"二级供应链中3种不同质量水平的产品回收最优定价问题,以最大化零售商、制造商和供应链的利润。该闭环供应链中只有一个制造商和零售商,零售商负责产品的回收。从分析可知,通过调整参数值,在回收率确定或随机的情况下供应链都可以达到协调,也都可以找到最优订货量和回收价格。研究发现,零售商的最优价格与最优订货量紧密相关,制造商的回收价格并不影响供应链的总体利润。     

考虑策略性消费者的生鲜农产品定价和库存决策

消费者的策略性行为使零售商的生鲜农产品的定价和库存决策面临更大挑战。本文基于报童模型,综合考虑消费者的策略性行为,对生鲜农产品价值下降进行离散化处理。刻画策略性消费者的决策行为,构建零售商的单阶段和两阶段定价及库存决策模型,分析了产品价值剩余率对消费者行为、零售商最优定价、最优库存水平以及零售商利润的影响机理。研究发现,在单阶段模型中零售商最优价格和最优库存水平均随产品价值剩余率的递增而递增;而在两阶段模型中,第二阶段最优价格随价值剩余率的变化趋势可能存在阈值。     

全渠道零售下“Showrooms”对需求分布、定价和收益的影响研究

作为一种新兴的线下体验、线上购买的商业运作模式,展厅（Showrooms）在全渠道零售领域发展迅速。基于消费者效用分别建立单一网络渠道和"网络+实体"渠道下零售商开设Showrooms前后的利润模型,对比分析固定销售价格和优化定价两种情形下Showrooms对定价、市场需求、利润和退货率的影响。研究表明：（1）单一网络渠道下,网络渠道价格固定时,开设Showrooms可使市场总需求增加,总利润在展厅运营成本较低时增加;网络渠道价格优化时,开设Showrooms可使网络渠道价格、总需求和总利润在展厅运营成本较低时增加,但固定价格情形下总利润的增幅更大。（2）"网络+实体"渠道下,开设Showrooms可使总需求和总利润均在展厅运营成本较低及网络退货率和网购不便利成本较高时增加,而且仅优化网络渠道价格时的增幅最大,网络和实体渠道价格均固定时次之;价格优化的最终趋势是全渠道同款同价。（3）开设Showrooms可使零售商总的网络退货率和退货量都下降。     

基于制造商建议零售价的供应链定价策略

为了阐述制造商建议零售价格对供应链定价策略的影响,以其作为消费者的参照价格,引入到供应链系统中。采用博弈论的方法进行研究,结果表明：当制造商建议零售价格较低时,零售商将采用最低参照价格策略,当制造商建议零售价格较高时,零售商将采用最高参照价格策略,当制造商建议零售价格介于两者之间时,零售商将采用价格保持策略。在此基础上,研究了相关参数对上述三种策略的影响,以及三种策略之间的差异。不仅指出最低参照价格策略或者最高参照价格策略都有可能使制造商的收益最大化,还给出了选择的条件。最后,用数值分析比较了不同策略下的供应链系统收益,指出在最高参照价格策略下的系统收益是最优的。相关结论为制造商建议零售价格制定提供了理论依据。     

Two-period pricing and ordering policy for the dominant retailer in a two-echelon supply chain with demand uncertainty

Retailing channels are increasingly being dominated by ‘power’ retailers who are in a position to dictate prices and ordering schedules to manufacturers and suppliers. A dominant retailer, such as Wal-Mart, has the ‘power’ to decide retail prices of products because there are so many manufacturers who are keen to sell their products through or to such a large and powerful retailer. Several products, such as electronic products, can be sold in the market for some periods during their lifecycles before they retreat, except when they are not popular with consumers after been introduced. Therefore, in case of such products, the retailer should not just consider a single-period pricing and ordering policy. It should make dynamic pricing and ordering decisions based on market demand forecast, in order to obtain maximum cumulative profit from the product during its lifecycle. In this study, we consider this scenario and construct a two-period model to discuss pricing and ordering problems for a dominant retailer with demand uncertainty in a declining price environment. We show that the maximum expected profit function is continuous concave, so the optimal solution to pricing and ordering policy exists and it is the one and only. We also analyze sensitivity of retailer's expected profit to the effects of parameters of price-discount sharing scheme and market demand.     

Committed Versus Contingent Pricing Under Competition

Should capacitated firms set prices responsively to uncertain market conditions in a competitive environment? We study a duopoly selling differentiated substitutable products with fixed capacities under demand uncertainty, where firms can either commit to a fixed price ex ante, or elect to price contingently ex post, e.g., to charge high prices in booming markets, and low prices in slack markets. Interestingly, we analytically show that even for completely symmetric model primitives, asymmetric equilibria of strategic pricing decisions may arise, in which one firm commits statically and the other firm prices contingently; in this case, there also exists a unique mixed strategy equilibrium. Such equilibrium behavior tends to emerge, when capacity is ampler, and products are less differentiated or demand uncertainty is lower. With asymmetric fixed capacities, if demand uncertainty is low, a unique asymmetric equilibrium emerges, in which the firm with more capacity chooses committed pricing and the firm with less capacity chooses contingent pricing. We identify two countervailing profit effects of contingent pricing under competition: gains from responsively charging high price under high demand, and losses from intensified price competition under low demand. It is the latter detrimental effect that may prevent both firms from choosing a contingent pricing strategy in equilibrium. We show that the insights remain valid when capacity decisions are endogenized. We caution that responsive price changes under aggressive competition of less differentiated products can result in profit‐killing discounting.     

Assortment Planning for Vertically Differentiated Products

We consider the problem of a retailer managing a category of vertically differentiated products. The retailer has to pay a fixed cost for each product included in the assortment and a variable cost per product sold. Quality levels, fixed, and variable costs are exogenously determined. Customers differ in their valuation of quality and choose the product (if any) that maximizes their utility. First, we consider a setting in which the selling prices are also fixed. We find that the optimal set of products to offer depends on the distribution of customer valuations and might include dominated products, that is, products which are less attractive than at least one other product, on every possible dimension. We develop an efficient algorithm to identify an optimal assortment. Second, we consider a setting in which the retailer also determines the selling prices. We show that in this case the optimal assortment does not include any dominated product and does not vary with the distribution of customer valuations when there is no fixed cost. We develop several efficient algorithms to identify an optimal assortment and optimally price the products. We also test the applicability of our methods with realistic data for two product categories.     

顾客策略行为下差异产品两阶段定价模型研究

互联网和信息技术的发展,为零售商收集顾客信息带来方便的同时,也使得消费者变得越来越具有策略性和选择性。首先,构建零售商只销售一种高质量产品的情形,研究其两阶段的定价策略,并分析产品的跨期折扣因子对产品的零售价格、销售量和零售商利润的影响。然后,考虑零售商可提供高质量和低质量两种产品的情形,顾客在第一销售期、第二销售期都可以选择两种产品。构建两阶段的定价决策模型,并分析产品的跨期折扣因子、顾客对低质量产品的接受度等参数对产品两阶段的零售价格、销售量的影响。最后,用数值算例分析了第二种模型下顾客对低质量产品的接受度等模型参数对零售商两阶段总利润的影响,然后比较了第一种和第二种模型下高质量产品的零售价格和销售量。研究结论较全面的分析了顾客策略行为对差异产品两阶段销售期的定价决策的影响,为零售商进行定价优化决策提供了十分重要的参考。     

再制造闭环供应链最优差别定价模型

本文建立了再制造闭环供应链差别定价模型, 在集中式决策和分散式决策条件下分别讨论了再制造闭环供应链的最优差别定价问题, 得到了集中式决策和分散式决策的最优定价组合及其最大利润, 并通过数值算例说明了废旧品回收价或补贴价的变化会对最优零售价、最优批发价产生的影响,最后就如何提高供应链的运行效率提出了建议和对策。     

关税与成本变动下零售商主导的跨境双渠道供应链定价决策

构建了零售商为Stackelberg领导者的跨境供应链博弈模型,通过引入关税、国际运输成本等因素并分析关税变动对跨国供应链产品定价和各成员利润的影响。结果表明：随着产品关税的增加,国内制造商产品A批发价格会增加、产品A直销价格和境外制造商产品B批发价格会减少,而关税变动对零售商定价决策的影响与消费者价格敏感系数有关;本国加征关税会使得国内制造商利润增加、境外制造商利润减少,而关税增加对零售商利润影响与消费者价格敏感系数有关：只有当消费者价格敏感系数较大时,本国关税上调才会使得国内零售商利润增加;随着境外产品B国际运输成本的增加,产品A、B批发价格会减少,而产品A、B零售价格都会增加,供应链中各成员利润都会减少。     

面向网络零售平台的合作广告策略研究

制造商通过第三方网络零售平台开展直销渠道已经成为普遍模式。除价格策略外，广告宣传是企业获得消费者最常用的策略之一，已有研究表明，合作广告策略可有效协调供应链冲突和优化绩效，但在新零售模式中，传统渠道和网络渠道的特点使得网络零售平台和传统零售商的广告宣传对不同销售渠道的影响更加复杂和有趣，因此本文研究网络零售平台的参与对制造商合作广告策略的影响。在文中通过数学建模的方法比较制造商的四种不同策略：不合作策略、制造商仅与传统零售商合作的策略、制造商仅与网络零售平台合作的策略和制造商与两者均合作的策略，通过对不同策略中渠道成员的利润进行比较，可得以下结论：1）制造商的最佳策略为同时与传统零售商和网络零售平台合作；2）当两渠道的广告存在相互"搭便车"行为时，渠道成员之间最优策略一致；3）当网络、传统渠道的广告宣传为竞争关系时，渠道成员的最优策略不一致，但存在"相对"最优策略：传统零售商和网络零售平台同时与制造商合作，该策略下传统零售商、网络零售平台的利润可能会降低，但降低比例为最小。     

Demand Forecast Sharing in Supply Chains

This paper examines the incentives of a manufacturer and a retailer to share their demand forecasts. The demand at the retailer is a linearly decreasing function of price. The manufacturer sets the wholesale price first, and the retailer sets the retail price after observing the wholesale price. Both players set their prices based on their forecasts of demand. In the make‐to‐order scenario, the manufacturer sets the production quantity after observing the actual demand; in the make‐to‐stock scenario, the manufacturer sets the production quantity before the demand is realized. In the make‐to‐order scenario, we show that sharing the forecast unconditionally by the retailer with the manufacturer benefits the manufacturer but hurts the retailer. We also demonstrate that a side payment contract cannot induce Pareto‐optimal information sharing equilibrium, but a discount based wholesale price contract can. The social welfare as well as consumer surplus is higher under the discount contract, compared with under no information sharing. In the make‐to‐stock scenario, the manufacturer realizes additional benefits in the form of savings in inventory holding and shortage costs when forecasts are shared. If the savings from inventory holding and shortage costs because of information sharing are sufficiently high, then a side payment contract that induces Pareto‐optimal information sharing is feasible in the make‐to‐stock scenario. We also provide additional managerial insights with the help of a computational study.     

The Newsvendor Problem and Price‐Only Contract When Bankruptcy Costs Exist

We study a supply chain of a supplier selling via a wholesale price contract to a financially constrained retailer who faces stochastic demand. The retailer might need to borrow money from a bank to execute his order. The bank offers a fairly priced loan for relevant risks. Failure of loan repayment leads to a costly bankruptcy (fixed administrative costs, costs proportional to sales, and a depressed collateral value). We identify the retailer's optimal order quantity as a function of the wholesale price and his total wealth (working capital and collateral). The analysis of the supplier's optimal wholesale price problem as a Stackelberg game, with the supplier the leader and the retailer the follower, leads to unique equilibrium solutions in wholesale price and order quantity, with the equilibrium order quantity smaller than the traditional newsvendor one. Furthermore, in the presence of the retailer's bankruptcy risks, increases in the retailer's wealth lead to increased supplier's wholesale prices, but without the retailer's bankruptcy risks the supplier's wholesale prices stay the same or decrease in retailer's wealth.     

Production and pricing problems in make-to-order supply chain with cap-and-trade regulation

This paper studies the production and pricing problems in MTO (make-to-order) supply chain containing an upstream manufacturer who produces two products based on MTO production and a downstream retailer. The manufacturer is regulated by cap-and-trade regulation and determines the wholesale prices of the two products. To comply with the regulation, the manufacturer can buy or sell emission permits through an outside market. The retailer determines its order quantities to meet the price-sensitive demands. We derive the optimal total emissions and production quantities of the two products, and based on them, we analyze the impact of emission trading price on the optimal production decisions and the two firms’ optimal profits. The emission trading decisions follow a two-threshold policy and the optimal total emissions are increasing in the cap. However, contrary to intuition, the optimal production quantities of the two products may be decreasing in the cap. The manufacturer׳s optimal profit is decreasing (increasing) in the buying (selling) price of emission permits, and that the retailer׳s optimal profit is decreasing in the buying (selling) price of emission permits. The optimal total emissions are decreasing in buying or selling price of emission permits, however, the optimal production quantities of the two products may be increasing (decreasing) in the buying (selling) price of emission permits. Numerical examples are conducted to illustrate our findings and some managerial insights are presented.