For a New Incomes Policy: New Possibilities and Objectives

Abstract. Moving off from the lessons of the Italian incomes policy experience of the 1980s, this paper presents a new framework to interpret the performance of incomes policy (LP) agreements and institutions, and propose new strategies for the 1990s. IP is viewed as a cooperative outcome that evolves from a non-cooperative long-term game between several players (workers, unions, firms, government, parliament, etc.), along the lines of the model drawn up by Brunetta and Carraro (1988). The paper is divided into three sections. The first summarizes the history of IP in Italy, starting from the phase of the predetermination of disinflation (1983-84). We firstly outline some of the fundamental features of recent Italian development (the “Italian model”), noting how new IP measures could be taken to create an adequate response to the new European and international deadlines. The difficulties and uncertainties that presently exist at both national and international level make the introduction of IP in new, cooperative and evolutive terms, necessary. The second section examines the various topics and new objectives of a “strategic” IP resumption, particularly relevant to the concerted action on the cost of labour, presently being discussed. The topics we consider are: the link between wage reform and IP; the recent concerted agreements reached on fiscal drag (26.1.89) and on the cost of labour (25.1 and 6.7.90); the importance of the role of productivity gain-sharing; programmed inflation and price control; indexation of gross wages and safeguarding the net wage; increase of the tax base; profit-sharing. The third and final section presents a few observations which further investigate the distribution of productivity gains between sectors and uses: how it is articulated amongst the various bargaining levels (central, sectoral or enterprise). Redistribution amongst sectors is dealt with in terms of “protected” and “unprotected” areas of the economy, showing the need of a concerted regulation at the central level. Sharing between factors and allocations presents a very different case, and is dealt with at sectoral and firm level.     

Appendix. Incomes Policies in Europe during the Eighties

Abstract. Moving off from the lessons of the Italian incomes policy experience of the 1980s, this paper presents a new framework to interpret the performance of incomes policy (LP) agreements and institutions, and propose new strategies for the 1990s. IP is viewed as a cooperative outcome that evolves from a non-cooperative long-term game between several players (workers, unions, firms, government, parliament, etc.), along the lines of the model drawn up by Brunetta and Carraro (1988). The paper is divided into three sections. The first summarizes the history of IP in Italy, starting from the phase of the predetermination of disinflation (1983-84). We firstly outline some of the fundamental features of recent Italian development (the “Italian model”), noting how new IP measures could be taken to create an adequate response to the new European and international deadlines. The difficulties and uncertainties that presently exist at both national and international level make the introduction of IP in new, cooperative and evolutive terms, necessary. The second section examines the various topics and new objectives of a “strategic” IP resumption, particularly relevant to the concerted action on the cost of labour, presently being discussed. The topics we consider are: the link between wage reform and IP; the recent concerted agreements reached on fiscal drag (26.1.89) and on the cost of labour (25.1 and 6.7.90); the importance of the role of productivity gain-sharing; programmed inflation and price control; indexation of gross wages and safeguarding the net wage; increase of the tax base; profit-sharing. The third and final section presents a few observations which further investigate the distribution of productivity gains between sectors and uses: how it is articulated amongst the various bargaining levels (central, sectoral or enterprise). Redistribution amongst sectors is dealt with in terms of “protected” and “unprotected” areas of the economy, showing the need of a concerted regulation at the central level. Sharing between factors and allocations presents a very different case, and is dealt with at sectoral and firm level.     

Environmental Taxes and the Choice of Green Technology

We study several important aspects of using environmental taxes to motivate the choice of innovative and “green" emissions‐reducing technologies as well as the role of fixed cost subsidies and consumer rebates in this process. In our model, a profit‐maximizing monopolistic firm facing price‐dependent demand selects emissions control technology, production quantity, and price in response to the tax, subsidy, and rebate levels set by the regulator. The available technologies vary in environmental efficiency as well as in the fixed and variable costs. Both the optimal policy for the firm and the social‐welfare maximizing policy for the regulator are analyzed. We find that the firm's reaction to an increase in taxes may be non‐monotone: while an initial increase in taxes may motivate a switch to a greener technology, further tax increases may motivate a reverse switch. For the regulator, we compare the social welfare achievable in the centralized system (which serves as an upper bound) to the highest level achievable under different classes of environmental policies. If the regulator is limited to a tax‐only policy, then when the regulator is moderately concerned with environmental impacts, the tax level that maximizes social welfare simultaneously motivates the choice of clean technology and closes the gap to the upper bound; however, both low and high levels of societal environmental concerns may lead to the choice of dirty technology and significant welfare losses as compared to the centralized case. Supplementing the environmental taxation with fixed cost subsidies and consumer rebates can eliminate this effect, expanding the range of parameters over which the green technology is chosen and often closing the welfare gap to the centralized solution.     

A Model of the Consumption Response to Fiscal Stimulus Payments

A wide body of empirical evidence finds that approximately 25 percent of fiscal stimulus payments (e.g., tax rebates) are spent on nondurable household consumption in the quarter that they are received. To interpret this fact, we develop a structural economic model where households can hold two assets: a low‐return liquid asset (e.g., cash, checking account) and a high‐return illiquid asset that carries a transaction cost (e.g., housing, retirement account). The optimal life‐cycle pattern of portfolio choice implies that many households in the model are “wealthy hand‐to‐mouth”: they hold little or no liquid wealth despite owning sizable quantities of illiquid assets. Therefore, they display large propensities to consume out of additional transitory income, and small propensities to consume out of news about future income. We document the existence of such households in data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. A version of the model parameterized to the 2001 tax rebate episode yields consumption responses to fiscal stimulus payments that are in line with the evidence, and an order of magnitude larger than in the standard “one‐asset” framework. The model's nonlinearities with respect to the rebate size and the prevailing aggregate economic conditions have implications for policy design.     

政府碳税与补贴政策对外包再制造影响研究

为分析政府碳税与补贴政策对外包再制造影响,基于政府两种政策构建了外包再制造下制造/再制造博弈模型。基于博弈模型,对比分析政府两种对策对外包再制造下最优解的影响,研究主要得到：政府补贴政策可以有效提高废旧产品回收率,但只有当单位新产品碳税额度只有大于某一阈值时,政府碳税政策才会提高废旧产品回收率;政府采取补贴政策时,原始制造商通过降低单位再制造产品外包费用来获取政府补贴;政府采取碳税政策时,原始制造商通过提高单位新产品零售价格,把部分碳税转移给消费者;政府补贴政策可以同时增加原始制造商和再制造商收益;政府碳税政策可以增加再制造商收益,但只有单位新产品碳税额度大于某一阈值时,才可以增加原始制造商收益;当单位新产品对环境造成影响一定,并且单位再制造产品对环境造成影响与单位新产品对环境造成影响之比大于某一阈值时,政府补贴政策对环境造成影响最大、政府碳税政策对环境造成影响最小。     

Production and Sales Planning in Capacitated New Product Introductions

How should a firm with limited capacity introduce a new product? Should it introduce the product as soon as possible or delay introduction to build up inventory? How do the product and market characteristics affect the firm's decisions? To answer such questions, we analyze new product introductions under capacity restrictions using a two‐period model with diffusion‐type demand. Combining marketing and operations management decisions in a stylized model, we optimize the production and sales plans of the firm for a single product. We identify four different introduction policies and show that when the holding cost is low and the capacity is low to moderate, a (partial) build‐up policy is indeed optimal if consumers are sensitive to delay. Under such a policy, the firm (partially) delays the introduction of its product and incurs short‐term backlog costs to manage its future demand and total costs more effectively. However, as either the holding cost or the capacity increases, or consumer sensitivity to delay decreases, the build‐up policy starts to lose its appeal, and instead, the firm prefers an immediate product introduction. We extend our analysis by studying the optimal capacity decision of the firm and show that capacity shortages may be intentional.     

碳税政策下制造商竞争的供应链定价策略和社会福利研究

本文在考虑消费者环境意识下，探讨了制造商竞争情形下基于碳税政策的供应链成员定价策略和社会福利问题。研究表明，碳税政策的实施均会使得普通产品和低碳产品的批发价格和零售价格上升，且普通产品的价格变化总是较低碳产品更加明显；实施碳税政策前后，清洁型制造商面临的产品需求和利润变化总是较普通制造商更具有相对优势；制造商竞争有利于碳税政策引导制造商降低单位产品的碳排放量，实现绿色转型；碳税政策下，不论是清洁型制造商还是普通制造商，他们降低自身产品的单位碳排放量对提升自身产品在需求上的优势或减少自身产品在需求上的劣势都是有益的。当制造商之间的竞争性较小时，实施最优的碳税政策可以显著改善社会福利；特别是当消费者环境意识水平较低时，实施最优的碳税政策更为必要。当制造商之间的竞争强度较大时，不论消费者环境意识高低，直观税率值1可以作为一个近似最优的碳税政策，用以改善社会福利。     

Technology Choice and Capacity Portfolios under Emissions Regulation

We study the impact of emissions tax and emissions cap‐and‐trade regulation on a firm's technology choice and capacity decisions. We show that emissions price uncertainty under cap‐and‐trade results in greater expected profit than a constant emissions price under an emissions tax, which contradicts popular arguments that the greater uncertainty under cap‐and‐trade will erode value. We further show that two operational drivers underlie this result: (i) the firm's option not to operate, which effectively right‐censors the uncertain emissions price; and (ii) dispatch flexibility, which is the firm's ability to first deploy its most profitable capacity given the realized emissions price. In addition to these managerial insights, we also explore policy implications: the effect of emissions price level, and the effect of investment and production subsidies. Through an illustrative example, we show that production subsidies of higher investment and production cost technologies (such as carbon capture and storage technologies) have no effect on the firm's optimal total capacity when firms own a portfolio of both clean and dirty technologies, but that investment subsidies of these technologies increase the firm's total capacity, conditionally increasing expected emissions. A subsidy of a lower production cost technology, on the other hand, has no effect on the firm's optimal total capacity in multi‐technology portfolios, regardless of whether the subsidy is a production or investment subsidy.     

生产性财政支出、经济增长与社会福利最大化

从理论与实证两个方面研究生产性财政支出对经济增长与社会福利的促进作用这一财政领域十分关注的问题.理论研究中,通过构建包含政府财政消费性支出和生产性支出的内生增长模型,推导了经济增长和社会福利最大化目标下各自最优的生产性财政支出结构,并分析了政府生产性财政支出在两目标下最优支出结构的差异及原因.实证研究发现,2004年～2012年间,中国的东、中、西三大经济带政府生产性支出在社会福利目标下的最优占比普遍低于经济增长目标;而在2004年～2008年间,政府实际的生产性财政支出占比还未达到两目标下的最优占比值,政府的生产性财政支出还有进一步提升的空间;但在2009年～2012年间,政府实际的生产性财政支出占比已接近甚至超过了两目标下的最优占比值,继续增加生产性财政支出将对经济增长与社会福利的提升都产生抑制作用,尤其在东部地区、中部地区更为明显.因此,在中国经济发展进入"新常态"时期,政府更需审时度势、通过适时优化财政支出以促进经济增长与社会福利的最大化.     

Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Persistent Shocks

This paper studies the optimal level of discretion in policymaking. We consider a fiscal policy model where the government has time‐inconsistent preferences with a present bias toward public spending. The government chooses a fiscal rule to trade off its desire to commit to not overspend against its desire to have flexibility to react to privately observed shocks to the value of spending. We analyze the optimal fiscal rule when the shocks are persistent. Unlike under independent and identically distributed shocks, we show that the ex ante optimal rule is not sequentially optimal, as it provides dynamic incentives. The ex ante optimal rule exhibits history dependence, with high shocks leading to an erosion of future fiscal discipline compared to low shocks, which lead to the reinstatement of discipline. The implied policy distortions oscillate over time given a sequence of high shocks, and can force the government to accumulate maximal debt and become immiserated in the long run.     

Optimal Planning Quantities for Product Transition

The replacement of an existing product with a new one presents many challenges. In particular, uncertainties in a new product introduction often lead to extreme cases of demand and supply mismatches. This paper addresses inventory planning decisions for product upgrades when there is no replenishment opportunity during the transition period. We allow product substitution: when a company runs out of the old product, a customer may be offered the new product as a substitute. We show that the optimal substitution decision is a time‐varying threshold policy and establish the optimal planning policy. Further, we determine the optimal delay in a new product introduction, given the initial inventory of the old product.     

财政政策与宏观经济稳定:情势转变视角

本文利用马尔可夫情势转变向量自回归模型,考察了20世纪90年代以来,我国宏观经济运行与财政政策的情势转变特征、财政政策对宏观经济稳定的影响以及财政政策的非线性效应。分析表明,我国财政支出政策的相机抉择变化比较符合凯恩斯经济周期理论所强调的"逆势而动"的特点,且有助于实体经济稳定,但加剧了通货膨胀波动;税收政策的相机抉择变化不符合宏观经济运行需要,并在一定程度上加剧了实体经济波动,但有助于价格稳定。我国财政政策总体上具有显著的、持续时间较长的"凯恩斯效应"。     

A POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORY OF FISCAL POLICY AND UNEMPLOYMENT

This paper presents a political economy theory of fiscal policy and unemployment. The underlying economy is one in which unemployment can arise but can be mitigated by tax cuts and increases in public production. Such policies are fiscally costly, but can be financed by issuing government debt. Policy decisions are made by a legislature consisting of representatives from different political districts. With the available policies, it is possible for the government to completely eliminate unemployment in the long run. However, with political decision making, the economy always has unemployment. Unemployment is higher when the private sector experiences negative shocks. When these shocks occur, the government employs debt‐financed fiscal stimulus plans which involve both tax cuts and public production increases. When the private sector is healthy, the government contracts debt until it reaches a floor level. Unemployment levels are weakly increasing in the economy's debt level, strictly so when the private sector experiences negative shocks. Conditional on the level of workers employed, the mix of public and private output is distorted.     

开放经济中跨国公司的最优所得税模型

通过对不同避免双重征税方法下最优所得税模型的建立,解析了政府最优政策的收入函数,得到税收竞争均衡中的公司所得课税政策.对小型开放经济而言,在扣除法和抵免法,以及免税法与抵免法的不对称体系下,对跨国公司从源征收公司所得税都是最优选择.由此,得到不同于国际税收经典理论的结论.     

Economic manufacturing quantities under conditions of learning and forgetting (EMQ/LaF)

Abstract

Abstract. It has been empirically observed that productivity improves as production continues due to system 'learning’, but that it deteriorates once the activity is stopped due to system 'forgetting’. Both learning and forgetting follow an exponential form with a 'doubling factor’ ranging between 0.75 and 0.98. We review and critique two previously proposed models, correct some minor errors in them, and expand one of them to accommodate a finite horizon. We also propose a new model that is more in harmony with the established learning function, for the determination of the optimal number and size of the lots in the finite and infinite horizon. The methodology used throughout is dynamic programming. We investigate the impact of all three models on the optimal lot sires and their costs, and establish the functional relations between the total cost and the various factors affecting them.     

Social Connections and Incentives in the Workplace: Evidence From Personnel Data

We present evidence on the effect of social connections between workers and managers on productivity in the workplace. To evaluate whether the existence of social connections is beneficial to the firm's overall performance, we explore how the effects of social connections vary with the strength of managerial incentives and worker's ability. To do so, we combine panel data on individual worker's productivity from personnel records with a natural field experiment in which we engineered an exogenous change in managerial incentives, from fixed wages to bonuses based on the average productivity of the workers managed. We find that when managers are paid fixed wages, they favor workers to whom they are socially connected irrespective of the worker's ability, but when they are paid performance bonuses, they target their effort toward high ability workers irrespective of whether they are socially connected to them or not. Although social connections increase the performance of connected workers, we find that favoring connected workers is detrimental for the firm's overall performance.     

经济增长和环境质量相容性政策条件——环境技术进步方向视角下的政策偏向效应检验

现有文献关注政策规制的经济与环境绩效,却并未重视不同类型政策的技术偏向,以及技术偏态情境中经济增长和环境质量相容发展的政策条件。本文扩展Acemoglu等(2012)的环境技术进步方向模型,数理演绎不同性质政策的技术偏向,以及技术进步方向转变时经济增长和环境质量的动态演化过程,再结合我国经济数据进行政策效果评价。研究结果发现:(1)环境技术进步方向是技术研发效率和环境政策累积作用的结果,环境政策会通过影响不同类型技术创新激励的方式,改变环境技术进步方向。(2)异质性政策转变技术进步方向,影响经济增长和环境质量,其作用存在不同的着力点和偏向性。其中,研发补贴政策的清洁技术偏向和产出激励效果明显,而规制类政策的环境质量效应优于研发补贴,但其对经济增长的作用表现出非线性U型特征。(3)单一政策干预往往难以破除经济增长和环境质量的两难困境,而政策组合的效果明显优于单一政策,特别是在碳排放权交易试点地区实施研发补贴政策,以及在碳排放权交易试点地区同时实行环境税与研发补贴,效果明显优于实施单一政策。但最优的政策组合并非固定不变,而往往处于动态变化过程中。     

Competing on Time: An Integrated Framework to Optimize Dynamic Time‐to‐Market and Production Decisions

This study develops a comprehensive framework to optimize new product introduction timing and subsequent production decisions faced by a component supplier. Prior to market entry, the supplier performs process design activities, which improve manufacturing yield and the chances of getting qualified for the customer's product. However, a long delay in market entry allows competitors to enter the market and pass the customer's qualification process before the supplier, reducing the supplier's share of the customer's business. After entering the market and if qualified, the supplier also needs to decide how much to produce for a finite planning horizon by considering several factors such as manufacturing yield and stochastic demand, both of which depend on the earlier time‐to‐market decision. To capture this dependency, we develop a sequential, nested, two‐stage decision framework to optimize the time‐to‐market and production decisions in relation to each other. We show that the supplier's optimal market entry and qualification timing decision need to be revised in real time based on the number of qualified competitors at the time of market‐entry decision. We establish the optimality of a threshold policy. Following this policy, at the beginning of each decision epoch, the supplier should optimally stop preparing for qualification and decide whether to enter the market if her order among qualified competitors exceeds a predetermined threshold. We also prove that the supplier's optimal production policy is a state‐dependent, base‐stock policy, which depends on the time‐to‐market and qualification decisions. The proposed framework also enables a firm to quantify how market conditions (such as price and competitor entry behavior) and operating conditions (such as the rate of learning and inventory/production‐related costs) affect time‐to‐market strategy and post‐entry production decisions.     

Long‐Term Debt and Optimal Policy in the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level

The fiscal theory says that the price level is determined by the ratio of nominal debt to the present value of real primary surpluses. I analyze long‐term debt and optimal policy in the fiscal theory. I find that the maturity structure of the debt matters. For example, it determines whether news of future deficits implies current inflation or future inflation. When long‐term debt is present, the government can trade current inflation for future inflation by debt operations; this tradeoff is not present if the government rolls over short‐term debt. The maturity structure of outstanding debt acts as a “budget constraint” determining which periods' price levels the government can affect by debt variation alone. In addition, debt policy—the expected pattern of future state‐contingent debt sales, repurchases and redemptions—matters crucially for the effects of a debt operation. I solve for optimal debt policies to minimize the variance of inflation. I find cases in which long‐term debt helps to stabilize inflation. I also find that the optimal policy produces time series that are similar to U.S. surplus and debt time series. To understand the data, I must assume that debt policy offsets the inflationary impact of cyclical surplus shocks, rather than causing price level disturbances by policy‐induced shocks. Shifting the objective from price level variance to inflation variance, the optimal policy produces much less volatile inflation at the cost of a unit root in the price level; this is consistent with the stabilization of U.S. inflation after the gold standard was abandoned.