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1.
Tito Boeri J. Ignacio Conde‐Ruiz Vincenzo Galasso 《Journal of the European Economic Association》2012,10(4):684-715
We document the presence of a trade‐off in the labor market between the protection of jobs and the support offered to unemployed people. Different countries’ locations along this trade‐off represent stable political‐economic equilibria. We develop a model in which individuals determine the mix of job protection and support for the unemployed in a political environment. Agents are heterogeneous along two dimensions: employment status (insiders and outsiders) and skills (low and high). Unlike previous work on the political economy of labor market institutions, we emphasize the role of job protection and unemployment benefits in the wage‐setting process. A key implication of the model is that flexicurity configurations with low levels of job protection and high levels of support to the unemployed should emerge in the presence of a highly educated workforce. Panel regressions of countries’ locations along this institutional trade‐off are consistent with the implications of our model. 相似文献
2.
John William Hatfield Gerard Padr i Miquel 《Journal of the European Economic Association》2012,10(3):605-633
We revisit the classic problem of tax competition in the context of federal nations, and derive a positive theory of partial decentralization. A capital poor median voter chooses to use redistributive capital taxes to provide public goods. The expectation of high capital taxes, however, results in a small capital stock which lowers returns to redistribution. The median voter therefore wants to commit to a lower level of capital taxes. She does so by setting a partial degree of decentralization in the Constitution. The equilibrium degree of decentralization balances the positive effect of tax competition on capital taxes with the loss in redistribution that results. We show that the degree of decentralization is nonmonotonic in inequality, increasing in the redistributive efficiency of public good provision, and decreasing in capital productivity. When public goods are heterogeneous in their capacity to transfer funds, all voters agree that goods with high redistributive capacity should be decentralized. 相似文献
3.
This paper presents a political economy theory of fiscal policy and unemployment. The underlying economy is one in which unemployment can arise but can be mitigated by tax cuts and increases in public production. Such policies are fiscally costly, but can be financed by issuing government debt. Policy decisions are made by a legislature consisting of representatives from different political districts. With the available policies, it is possible for the government to completely eliminate unemployment in the long run. However, with political decision making, the economy always has unemployment. Unemployment is higher when the private sector experiences negative shocks. When these shocks occur, the government employs debt‐financed fiscal stimulus plans which involve both tax cuts and public production increases. When the private sector is healthy, the government contracts debt until it reaches a floor level. Unemployment levels are weakly increasing in the economy's debt level, strictly so when the private sector experiences negative shocks. Conditional on the level of workers employed, the mix of public and private output is distorted. 相似文献
4.
Leonardo Bursztyn 《Journal of the European Economic Association》2016,14(5):1101-1128
A large body of literature has emphasized the elite capture of democratic institutions as the explanation for the low levels of spending on public education in many low‐income democracies. This paper provides an alternative to that longstanding hypothesis. Motivated by new cross‐country facts and evidence from Brazilian municipalities, we hypothesize that many democratic developing countries might invest less in public education spending because poor decisive voters prefer the government to allocate resources elsewhere. One possible explanation is that low‐income voters could instead favor redistributive programs that increase their incomes in the short run, such as cash transfers. To test for this possibility, we design and implement an experimental survey and an incentivized choice experiment in Brazil. The findings from both interventions support our hypothesis. 相似文献
5.
In a model of a competitive industry selling base goods and add‐ons, we investigate the conditions under which citizen‐consumers will support policies that eliminate behavioral inefficiencies induced by naïve consumers. Unregulated competitive markets have two effects: they produce deadweight losses, and they redistribute income away from biased consumers. Both unbiased and naïve consumers believe that they benefit from this redistribution (the naïve consumers are wrong), so support for efficiency‐improving regulation is limited. Extending our model to consumers with partial sophistication about their naïveté, we predict patterns of regulation consistent with the form and timing of the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009. 相似文献
6.
We consider an economy with two language groups, where only agents who share a language can produce together. Schooling enhances the productivity of students. Individuals attending a unilingual school end up speaking the language of instruction only, whereas bilingual schools render individuals bilingual atthe same cost. The politically dominant group (not necessarily the majority) chooses the type(s) of schools accessible to each language group, and then individuals decide whethertoattend school. Weshow that the dominant either choose laissez‐faireor restrict access to schools in the language of the dominated. Instead, the dominated favour the use of their own language. Thus, although agents do not derive utility from speaking their mother tongue, language conflicts of the expected type endogenously arise. Democracy (majority rule) always leads to the implementation of a socially optimal education system, whereas restrictions to the use of the language of the dominated are implemented too often under minority rule. The model is consistent with evidence from Belgium, France, and Finland. (JEL: I2, J15) 相似文献
7.
A dynamic political economy theory of fiscal policy is presented to explain the simultaneous existence of public education and pensions in modern democracies. The driving force of the model is the intergenerational conflict over the allocation of the public budget. Successive generations of voters choose fiscal policies through repeated elections. The political power of elderly voters creates the motive for adults to support public investment in the human capital of future generations since it expands future pension possibilities. We characterize the Markov perfect equilibrium of the voting game in a small open economy. The equilibrium reproduces salient features of intergenerational fiscal policies in modern economies. 相似文献
8.
Andreas Müller Kjetil Storesletten Fabrizio Zilibotti 《Journal of the European Economic Association》2016,14(1):252-302
We propose a dynamic general equilibrium model that yields testable implications about the fiscal policy run by governments of different political color. Successive generations of voters choose taxation, expenditure, and government debt through repeated elections. Voters are heterogeneous by age and by the intensity of their preferences for public good provision. The political equilibrium switches stochastically between left‐ (pro‐public goods) and right‐leaning (pro‐private consumption) governments. A shift to the left (right) is associated with a fall (increase) in government debt, an increase (fall) in taxation, and an increase (fall) in government expenditures. However, left‐leaning governments engage in more debt accumulation during recessions. These predictions are shown to be consistent with the time‐series evidence for the United States in the postwar period, and also with the evidence for a panel of OECD countries. (JEL: D72, E62, H41, H62, H63) 相似文献
9.
Ruixue Jia Masayuki Kudamatsu David Seim 《Journal of the European Economic Association》2015,13(4):631-668
Who becomes a top politician in China? We focus on provincial leaders—a pool of candidates for top political office—and examine how their chances of promotion depend on their performance in office and connections with top politicians. Our empirical analysis, based on the curriculum vitae of Chinese politicians, shows that connections and performance are complements in the Chinese political selection process. This complementarity is stronger the younger provincial leaders are relative to their connected top leaders. To provide one plausible interpretation of these empirical findings, we propose a simple theory in which the complementarity arises because connections foster loyalty of junior officials to senior ones, thereby allowing incumbent top politicians to select competent provincial leaders without risking being ousted. Our findings shed some light on why a political system known for patronage can still select competent leaders. 相似文献
10.
We quantify the private returns and social costs of political connections exploiting a unique longitudinal dataset that combines matched employer–employee data for a representative sample of Italian firms with administrative archives on the universe of individuals appointed in local governments over the period 1985–1997. According to our results, the revenue premium granted by political connections amounts to 5.7% on average, it is obtained through changes in domestic sales but not in exports, and it is not related to improvements in firm productivity. The connection premium is positive for upstream producers for the public administration only, and larger (up to 22%) in areas characterized by high public expenditure and high levels of corruption. These findings suggest that the gains in market power derive from public demand shifts towards politically connected firms. We estimate that such shifts reduce the provision of public goods by approximately 20%. 相似文献
11.
Giancarlo Corsetti Luca Dedola Sylvain Leduc 《Journal of the European Economic Association》2014,12(1):153-176
This paper analyzes the cross‐country effects of productivity and demand disturbances in the United States identified with sign restrictions based on standard theory. Productivity gains in US manufacturing increase US consumption and investment vis‐à‐vis foreign countries, resulting in a trade deficit and higher international prices of US goods, despite the rise in their supply. Financial adjustment works via a higher global value of US equities, real dollar appreciation, and an expansion of US gross foreign liabilities as well as assets. Positive demand shocks to US manufacturing also increase investment and cause a real dollar appreciation, but have limited effects on the trade balance and net foreign assets. Our findings emphasize the importance for macroeconomic interdependence of endogenous fluctuations in aggregate demand across countries in response to business cycle shocks. 相似文献
12.
We study political activism by several interest groups with private signals. When their ideological distance to the policymaker is small, a “low‐trust” regime prevails: agents frequently lobby even when it is unwarranted, taking advantage of the confirmation provided by others' activism; conversely, the policymaker responds only to generalized pressure. When ideological distance is large, a “high‐trust” regime prevails: lobbying behavior is disciplined by the potential contradiction from abstainers, and the policymaker's response threshold is correspondingly lower. Within some intermediate range, both equilibria coexist. We then study the optimal organization of influence activities, contrasting welfare levels when interest groups act independently and when they coordinate. (JEL: D72, D78, D82) 相似文献
13.
George W. Gau 《决策科学》1978,9(2):341-345
This paper describes two statistical measures that can be applied to the analysis of the results in a discriminant analysis. These measures, similar to R2 and R2 in multiple regression, assess the “goodness of fit” of the model or the degree of separation established by the discriminant functions among the groups in the sample and in the population. 相似文献
14.
Marketers are often interested in testing whether the mean vectors of multivariate distributions are equal. The test usually applied, one-way MANOVA, assumes the distributions are multinormal. Unfortunately, this assumption is not supported in many studies. As an alternative, a nonparametric multivariate one-way analysis of variance procedure is presented. 相似文献
15.
Despite the increased application of cluster analysis in decision sciences, few attempts have been made to derive hypothesis-testing procedures for the evaluation of clustering solutions. In fact, the present paper shows that at least one such attempt failed to specify a meaningful sampling distribution for the test procedure. An alternative index based on the concept of point-biserial correlation is proposed as a possible recovery measure. The index is subsequently used to form the basis of a valid statistical test for the existence of cluster structure. 相似文献
16.
According to the constant growth model and perceived finance theory, the cost of new external equity exceeds the cost of retained earnings due to flotation costs and underpricing. Carlson and Dietz [1] have recently argued that the constant growth model is operationally inadequate whenever the net proceeds from the issuance of a new share differ from book value. Specifically, they contend that the cost of new external equity is less than the cost of retained earnings whenever the net proceeds from a new share exceed book value. We show that these conclusions stem from an error in interpretation and therefore that the constant growth model is valid regardless of the relationship between market prices and book value. 相似文献
17.
This paper develops a theoretical framework that relates a service guarantee to service quality. The framework hypothesizes that a service guarantee can positively affect service quality through its positive effect on both learning through service failure and employee motivation and vision. A longitudinal, empirical study was conducted to test these hypotheses. Surprisingly, the service guarantee was not found to have a direct effect on learning through service failure. However, the service guarantee clearly had a positive effect on service quality primarily through its positive effect on employee motivation and vision. The research strongly supports using a service guarantee to improve service quality. 相似文献
18.
Herbert H. Tsang 《决策科学》1977,8(4):757-759
This note discusses a theoretical peculiarity about the interrelationships between the sample size and the two types of decision errors in hypothesis testing theory. It is shown that for a given decision rule, while the alpha error invariably diminishes as the sample size becomes larger, the beta error could increase for certain values of the parameter under the alternative hypothesis. 相似文献
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20.
We use book translations as a new measure of international idea flows and study the effects of Communism's collapse in Eastern Europe on these flows. Using novel data on 800,000 translations and difference‐in‐differences approaches, we show that while translations between Communist languages decreased by two thirds with the collapse, Western‐to‐Communist translations increased by a factor of 4 and quickly converged to Western levels. Convergence was more pronounced in the fields of applied and social sciences, and was more complete in Satellite and Baltic than in Soviet countries. We discuss how these patterns help us understand how repressive institutions and preferences towards Western European ideas shaped the international diffusion of knowledge. 相似文献