UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PAYMENTS AS A SEARCH SUBSIDY: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

This paper examines the consequences of a change in unemployment insurance payments. Most previous works on this topic have utilized a job search model to predict that an increase in unemployment insurance payments will lead to an increase in the expected duration of unemployment. It is shown in the paper that this conclusion rests on two assumptions of dubious validity. When these assumptions are replaced by more reasonable ones significantly different predictions are obtained. For example, an increase in unemployment insurance payments is predicted to reduce the number of long term unemployed.     

Gender Differences in Unemployment Dynamics and Initial Wages over the Business Cycle

Using administrative data from Spanish Social Security for the period 2002–2013, we explore differences between unemployed men and women in: their probabilities to find a job, their initial wages if they find a new job, and the likelihood to fall back into unemployment. We estimate bivariate proportional hazard models for unemployment duration and for the consecutive job duration for men and women separately, and decompose the gender gap using a non-linear Oaxaca decomposition. Gender differentials in labour market outcomes are procyclical, probably due to the procyclical nature of typically male occupations. While a higher level of education protects women in particular from unemployment, having children hampers women’s employment and initial wages after unemployment. There are lower gender gaps in the public sector and in high technology- firms. Decompositions show that the gender gaps are not explained by differences in sample composition. Indeed, if women had similar characteristics to men, the gender gap would be even wider.     

The Effect of Unemployment Insurance on Temporary Help Services Employment

A model with fixed effects and controls for state-specific linear time trends is developed to analyze the influence of state unemployment insurance taxes on temporary help services employment using state level panel data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. Prior research has shown that imperfect experience rating of unemployment insurance taxes increases temporary layoffs and that, conversely, more extensive experience rating leads to a decrease in temporary layoffs. The current analysis demonstrates that more extensive experience rating increases temporary help services agency-intermediated temporary employment. To the extent that the increase in temporary help services employment represents a substitution of temporary help services jobs for traditional direct hire jobs, it implies a negative effect on job quality. Steps to address low unemployment insurance recipiency rates by temporary help services workers may alleviate the impact of unemployment insurance tax structures on temporary help services employment.     

The Effects of Being Out of the Labor Market on Subsequent Wages: Evidence for Uruguay

Based on administrative data combining workers’ earnings histories and unemployment insurance benefits, we document short and long term wage losses for a large sample of Uruguayan formal workers with high tenure. The contribution of this paper is to provide original evidence about job separation costs in a developing country, based on a unique array of social security and unemployment insurance administrative micro-data. Our main findings indicate that workers lose around 38 % of their previous wages in the first quarter after separation, and 1 year after, losses are still more than 14 %. If we consider earnings plus unemployment insurance benefits, losses at the quarter of separation are considerable lower, amounting 22 % of previous wages. We also provide original evidence about how wage losses vary across age groups, gender, industry and size of the firm. Differences between switchers and non switchers, as well as the effects of the economic cycle are also analyzed.     

Household job search: A theoretical and empirical model

This article links the literature on family decision making and the economics of job search by examining job search by an unemployed individual within a household context. A theoretical model was developed which demonstrates the interdependence of the utility of household members when one is searching for work. The costs of search are borne by all household members while the benefits are captured in the searcher's expected future wage. A reservation wage was shown to be determined by household financing options, and the perception of relevant labor market parameters. An empirical model of the reservation wage for a sample of unemployment insurance recipients was estimated using two-stage least squares. Results, reported for male and female subgroups, support the hypotheses derived from the household job search model. In particular, the reservation wage was shown to depend on unemployment duration, labor market conditions, increased labor force participation of other household members, use of household assets to finance search, existence of dependents, and unemployment insurance benefits.     

Job security and unemployment in an efficiency-wage model

Job security and its effects on unemployment are controversial issues. I investigate the effects of job security in an efficiency-wage model of unemployment. Though efficiency-wage ideas have wide appeal and provide strong foundations of involuntary unemployment, not much has been written about the ramifications of job security in these scenarios. I show that job security creates wage and unemployment effects when efficiency-wage aspects are relevant, because employment guarantees shift the burden of workers' effort attraction to the wage mechanism. These effects are further enhanced when workers have some bargaining power. My results, therefore, suggest a trade-off between employment stability and employment: High employment security leads to smaller employment (or larger involuntary unemployment). I thank Ron Oaxaca and participants at the W.E. Upjohn Conference on Unemployment Insurance for useful comments.     

DO UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AFFECT ON‐THE‐JOB SEARCH? EVIDENCE FROM LABOR TURNOVER BEFORE ESTABLISHMENT CLOSURES

We develop a job search model that predicts that potential job losers would reduce on‐the‐job search (OTJS) effort and job‐to‐job transitions before layoffs, in response to an increase in the potential duration of unemployment benefits (UB). To test this prediction, we exploit changes in the maximum potential duration of benefits in Germany to analyze how it affected labor turnover before establishment closings. The evidence supports the model prediction that workers with longer potential benefit duration are more likely to remain with their establishments until closure and to enter nonemployment. These findings indicate that the effects of UB on the OTJS decisions of potential job losers should be considered in the optimal design of the parameters of unemployment insurance systems. (JEL J63, J64, J65)     

PROFIT-SHARES, BARGAINING, AND UNEMPLOYMENT

This paper considers the effect of profit sharing on unemployment in a simple model with an employment externality, overhead costs, and free entry. When wages are determined by Nash bargains and employment is set by firms, equilibrium unemployment is unambiguously reduced by mandated profit sharing. However, a bargained profit share may have the perverse effect of lowering both employment and compensation in general equilibrium. If overhead costs relevant to firms' entry decisions are excluded from the profit share accounting, then a mandated profit share may also have such a perverse effect. (JEL E24)     

UNCERTAINTY AND STICKY-DOWNWARD BUT UPWARD-MOBILE WAGES

The usual search models of unemployment hold that firms do not offer wage cuts to employees in time of slack demand because the employees have alternatives open to them at wages higher than the reduced wage that would be required to maintain full employment. This paper extends these models by considering employees as choosing in conditions of uncertainty and showing that refusal to accept a wage cut is often rational in the absence of a higher alternative wage. Additional implications are derived for union behavior and simultaneous inflation and unemployment.     

Unemployment,Reemployment, and Health Insurance Status Among Older Workers in the Flexible Labor Market

As employment becomes more precarious, and spells of displacement become more common across the labor market, many individuals are forced to make decisions about the speed at which they seek reemployment and the types of employment they will seek. Using repeated cross‐sectional data from various years of the Displaced Worker Supplement of the Current Population Survey, we examine the degree to which employer‐provided health insurance and organizational provision of advanced layoff warning helped workers—particularly those from earlier birth cohorts—navigate the labor market during a period of growing employment flexibility. Our results indicate that workers from older cohorts, rather than older chronological ages, suffered more from displacement in terms of longer unemployment spells and declines in job quality upon reemployment. Workers able to obtain a job with health insurance had shorter unemployment durations, while those displaced from jobs with health insurance remained unemployed for longer periods of time. Advance notice appears to reduce some of the disproportionately negative effects of displacement for older workers, perhaps by easing the shock of a psychological contract breach. Our findings point to the importance of historical and cultural factors in shaping labor market outcomes.     

A multidimensional employment quality index for Brazil, 2002–11

In countries where informal, insecure jobs are widespread, traditional labour market indicators – such as the unemployment rate, labour force participation rate and wages – are not necessarily the most meaningful. The authors use a multidimensional employment quality index to analyse the Brazilian labour market over the period 2002–11, across three dimensions: earnings, formality (measured by the existence of an employment contract and social security contributions) and job tenure. The results show a significant increase in employment quality overall, especially in the years 2009–11, but with considerable differences between wage employees and self‐employed workers, and between industries.     

Befristete Beschäftigung: Chance oder Risiko?

The paper investigates whether increased labor market flexibility leads to a reinforcement of the existing segmentation of the labor market or whether it is dismantling the barriers in the labor market. Using spell data (employment and unemployment periods) from the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP, time period: 1984–1999) both determinants of fixed-term contracts and their consequences (renewed temporary employment, unemployment) are investigated with the help of random-effects logit-models. The results show that respondents’ characteristics (amount and type of human capital, formerly experienced periods of unemployment), structural variables (branch, firm size), and occupational characteristics (position, marginal employment) are influencing the risk of getting a temporary job. Furthermore it becomes evident that fixed-term contracts are increasing the risk of getting a temporary job again or of becoming unemployed after termination of the temporary job. These results show that fixed-term contracts above all are part of the secondary labor market, and that they especially have negative consequences for the employees in this segment. On the other hand fixed-term contracts can be seen as a chance in the way that they offer at least an alternative to unemployment. Hence, a too narrow evaluation of temporary employment would be too simplistic.     

Regional wages and subjective measures of employment opportunities

We utilise a rich set of regional labour market variables to explain regional variation in Norwegian manufacturing wages. In particular, regional indicators of labour market conditions are computed from survey data in which respondents are asked to evaluate local employment opportunities. We find that average reported satisfaction with local job prospects and other survey-based indicators perform better in regional wage equations than traditional labour market variables, including the regional unemployment rate. Our results suggest that subjective measures of employment opportunities provide useful information about wage pressure.     

Is Any Job Better than No Job? Life Satisfaction and Re-employment

Using data for West Germany from the German Socio-Economic Panel, we analyse the impact of transitions from unemployment to full-time employment on life satisfaction, with special focus on the influence of job quality. We apply various indicators of job quality (self-reported job satisfaction, wages, type of contract, and indicators of the fit between the worker and job requirements). We control for the influence of income changes and other factors affecting life satisfaction, using a conditional logit estimator. Results suggest that job quality only matters to some extent, and often people in bad jobs are still better off than those who remain unemployed. This effect is statistically significant for most indicators of job quality, except for workers with low job satisfaction and for those whose new job is much worse than their pre-unemployment job.     

Unemployment classifications and subjective well-being

Further research on the impact of unemployment on workers and their families requires greater refinement and more precise measurement of the concept. While previous studies have indicated the effects of unemployment on a wide range of variables, such as health and well-being, many of these studies suffer from imprecision by conceptualizing unemployment too narrowly and by using too strict a dichotomy between currently employed and currently unemployed workers. This research effort attempts to broaden and refine the concept of unemployment by defining it in terms of two job dimensions: current employment status and previous job loss. Using this conceptualization, the authors find that current unemployment after other job losses may have more devastating effects on well-being than losing one's job for the first time. Similarly, among the currently employed, those who have lost jobs in the past may experience more emotional difficulties than those who have never lost their jobs.     

Career Sidestep,Wage Setback? The Impact of Different Types of Employment Interruptions on Wages

We examined the wage implications of different types of wage employment interruptions in a sample of 44,384 Belgian employees. The employment interruption types included are family leave, unemployment, self‐employment, educational leave and a category other interruptions (for example, travel, voluntary work). We conduct separate analyses for men and women. Results indicate that unemployment spells and family breaks are penalized by lower subsequent wages, while the wage impact of self‐employment spells and educational leave is insignificant. Family breaks and unemployment spells were found to be more harmful for men than for women. Implications of the results and directions for future research are discussed.     

ENTITLEMENT EFFECTS, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS

Many studies have identified the work disincentive effects of unemployment insurance. This paper points out the entitlement effect of this and other social insurance programs on employment, as the risks of labor-market participation are reduced by the existence of unemployment benefits. This employment-increasing effect can offset the disincentive effect, with the net impact on employment becoming an empirical issue. Using data on a sample of married women for 1971, we find that on net there is a slight negative effect on employment of higher unemployment insurance benefits. The entitlement effect on employment is, though, generally positive and significant, suggesting that the provisions of social insurance induce increased labor-force participation among women who otherwise would remain out of the labor force.     

Underemployment and depression: longitudinal relationships

We conceptualize employment status not as a dichotomy of working versus not working but as a continuum ranging from adequate employment to inadequate employment (involuntary part-time or low wage) to unemployment. Will shifts from adequate to inadequate employment increase depression as do shifts from employment to unemployment, and to what extent does prior depression select workers into such adverse employment change? We analyze panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth for the years 1992-1994 for the 5,113 respondents who were adequately employed in 1992. Controlling for prior depression, both types of adverse employment change resulted in similar, significant increases in depression. These direct effects persisted despite inclusion of such potential mediators as changes in income, job satisfaction, and marital status. Marital status buffered the depressive effect of both types of adverse change, but education and job dissatisfaction amplified the effect of unemployment on depression. Prior depression did not predict higher risk of becoming inadequately employed but did predict increased risk of unemployment, particularly for those with less education. These results confirm that both unemployment and inadequate employment affect mental health, and they invite greater efforts to monitor the extent and impact of underemployment.     

A THEORY OF TURNOVER AND WAGE DYNAMICS

We develop a model of turnover and wage dynamics with insurance, match‐specific productivity, and long‐term contracting. The model predicts that wages are downward rigid within firms but can decrease when workers are fired. We apply the model to study the impact of business cycles on subsequent wages and job mobility. Workers hired during a boom have persistent higher future wages if staying with the same firm. However, these boom hires are more likely to be terminated and have shorter employment spells. (JEL C73, D23, D82, J33)     

Optimal income taxation with Kalai wage bargaining and endogenous participation

This paper characterizes the optimal redistributive tax schedule in a search–matching framework where (voluntary) nonparticipation and (involuntary) unemployment are endogenous and wages are determined by proportional bargaining à la Kalai. The optimal employment tax rate is given by an inverse elasticity rule. This rule depends on the global response of the employment rate, which depends not only on the participation (labor supply) responses, but also on the vacancy posting (labor demand) responses and on the product of these two responses. For plausible values of the parameters, our matching environment induces much lower employment tax rates than the usual competitive model with endogenous participation only. However, optimal employment tax rates are larger (in absolute value) when a given level of the global elasticity of employment is more due to search frictions and less due to participation responses.