An Observational Investigation of Poker Style and the Five-Factor Personality Model

Little empirical investigation has been made of the relationship between personality and gambling play style. In an observation of on-table poker behavior, this study classified 44 players competing in an amateur league (43 male; mean age 32) according to two main dimensions of play style; tight or loose and aggressive or passive. Superstitious beliefs towards the game were additionally measured. The NEO-PI-R questionnaire (Costa and McCrae, Revised NEO personality inventory (NEO-PI-R) and NEO-five factor inventory (NEO-FFI) professional manual, 1992) was used to measure personality according to the five-factor model. Results showed players with superstitious beliefs to be significantly higher in neuroticism and lower in conscientiousness and than those with no superstitious beliefs. Results approaching significance showed players adopting an aggressive style to be higher in extraversion than passive players and superstitious players to be lower in extraversion than non-superstitious players. Analysis of play style according to age of player revealed a significantly higher mean age among loose compared to tight players. Implications of results concerning validity of these style classifications and potential development in future work are discussed.     

Modeling resource flow asymmetries using condensation networks

This paper examines strict Nash networks in the noncooperative directed flow model of Bala and Goyal (Econometrica 68(5):1181–1230, 2000) with partner heterogeneity (payoff of a player in a link depends on the identity of her link partner). We focus on the asymmetries with regard to the resources obtained by players. Using the notion of condensation networks, we partition the population into groups of players who obtain the same resources and order these groups according to the resources they obtain. We show that the partner heterogeneity assumption impacts the strict Nash networks asymmetries in a different way than Galeotti (Econ Theory 29(1):163–179, 2006) player heterogeneity assumption (the payoff of a player in a link depends on her own identity).     

Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences

This article considers a legislative bargaining model in which the rejecter in the previous round becomes the proposer in the current round. We allow the time and risk preferences to differ across players and the voting quota to be a supermajority or submajority. We show that there exists a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium and that each player’s equilibrium payoff conditional on being a proposer is unique, and we explicitly derive the equilibria and equilibrium payoff. We compare a proposer’s equilibrium payoff when the time interval between two consecutive rounds tends to zero with respect to the protocols of the selection of proposers and the voting quota: we show that a proposer’s equilibrium payoff can be greater in this article’s rejecter-proposer model than in the Baron–Ferejohn random-proposer model; even though the voting quota increases, a proposer’s equilibrium payoff can increase.     

ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN CONTESTS WITH DELEGATION

We study two‐player contests in which each player hires a delegate, and the delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort. First, we look closely at the delegates' decisions on when to expend their effort, given contracts between the players and the delegates, and look at the players' decisions on their contracts. Then, we compare the outcomes of the endogenous‐timing framework with those of the simultaneous‐move framework. We show that the higher‐valuation player offers her delegate greater contingent compensation than her opponent, the delegate of the higher‐valuation player chooses his effort level after observing his counterpart's, the equilibrium expected payoff of the delegate of the higher‐valuation player is greater than that of his counterpart, and economic rent for each delegate exists. We show that, in the endogenous‐timing framework, each player offers her delegate better contingent compensation, each delegate's expected payoff is greater, and each player's expected payoff is smaller, as compared with the simultaneous‐move framework. (JEL D72)     

STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION OF SEQUENTIAL GAMES OF COMPLETE INFORMATION

In models of strategic interaction, there may be important order of entry effects if one player can credibly commit to an action (e.g., entry) before other players. If one estimates a simultaneous‐move model, then the move‐order effects will be confounded with the payoffs. This article considers nonparametric identification and simulation‐based estimation of sequential games of complete information. Relative to simultaneous‐move games, these models avoid the problem of multiple equilibria and require fewer payoff normalizations. We apply the estimator in several Monte Carlo experiments and to study entry‐order effects using data from the airline industry. (JEL C57, C15, L93)     

On the role of the hostage in ultimatum bargaining games

This paper examines behavior in a three-player ultimatum game. The payoff to the non-decision-making player (the “hostage”) is separate from the bargaining pie and varies. We find that while responders may behave altruistically towards the hostage, they are more likely to reject a given offer if it leaves them with a more inequitable payoff relative to the hostage. Offers appear to be unaffected by the presence of a hostage. Though not a direct test of the Fehr and Schmidt [Fehr, E., Schmidt, K.M., 1999. A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (3), 817–868] and Bolton and Ockenfels [Bolton, G., Ockenfels, A., 2000. ERC: a theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. American Economic Review 90, 166–193] models, our results are qualitatively consistent with their predictions.     

THREE‐PLAYER TRUST GAME WITH INSIDER COMMUNICATION

We examine behavior in a three‐player trust game in which the first player may invest in the second and the second may invest in the third. Any amount sent from one player to the next is tripled. The third player decides the final allocation among three players. The baseline treatment with no communication shows that the first and second players send significant amounts and the third player reciprocates. Allowing insider communication between the second and the third players increases cooperation between these two. Interestingly, there is an external effect of insider communication: the first player who is outside communication sends 54% more and receives 289% more than in the baseline treatment. As a result, insider communication increases efficiency from 44% to 68%. (JEL C72, C91, D72)     

It is not just escalation: The one dollar game revisited

This paper examines the one-dollar auction game ruling out escalation. The aim of the paper is to understand if players’ expectations about competitors’ moves are strong enough to induce at least one player to bid more than the auctioned euro. Any other bid represents an expected loss for the bidder, so he maximises his own payoff by choosing a bid, which produces a null expected payoff. The empirical results and the analysis based on them support theoretical findings. It is possible that the winner pays more than €1 to get €1 because of his expectations about competitors’ bids and because of his indifference over a certain interval. The results are symptoms of some risk aversion. In an English auction escalation leads to this result, but when escalation is ruled out, expectations and indifference of preferences can lead to the same result.     

Role-reversibility, stochastic ignorance, and social cooperation

This paper studies the effect of role-reversibility and stochastic ignorance, conditions that minimize the strategic bias of individual choice, on social cooperation. Under role-reversibility, each agent maximizes her expected payoff, knowing the status quo at the time of the action as well as the ex ante probabilities about her future roles. In contrast, under stochastic ignorance, players make their choices under a Harsanyi-type veil of uncertainty. Without the role-specific context influencing the judgment of the individual, cooperative norms emerging under stochastic ignorance are more likely to be close to first-best than are norms chosen under conditions of role-reversibility.     

Risk and final offer arbitration usage rates: Evidence from major league baseball

We use major league baseball data to examine risk and final-offer arbitration usage. Risk attitudes are proxied by the likelihood that FOA-generated salary increases place the player’s baseball employment at risk. Employment risk is inversely related to player quality. Our evidence suggests that higher-quality (low-risk) players are more likely to file for arbitration and seek an arbitrated settlement than lowerquality (high-risk) players. We thank Paul Burgess for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

Career concerns and personnel investment in the Major League Baseball player draft

This study examines the relationship between career concerns of organizational decision-makers and their investments by analyzing data from Major League Baseball's (MLB) annual player draft. Career concerns for MLB general managers (GMs) can create incentives to prioritize near-term success and thus spend fewer draft resources on high school players (who, being younger than college players, are less likely to provide near-term benefit to an MLB team). Findings are consistent with this: underperforming expectations in the prior season leads teams to spend significantly smaller proportions of signing bonus dollars on high school players, an effect driven by GMs with relatively short tenures.     

INTERRACIAL WORKPLACE COOPERATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE NBA

Using data from the National Basketball Association (NBA), we examine whether patterns of workplace cooperation occur disproportionately among workers of the same race. We find that, holding constant the composition of teammates on the floor, basketball players are no more likely to complete an assist to a player of the same race than a player of a different race. Our confidence interval allows us to reject even small amounts of same‐race bias in passing patterns. We find some evidence of own‐race bias in situations where the outcome of a particular play is less important. Our findings suggest that high levels of interracial cooperation can occur in a setting where workers are operating in a highly visible setting with strong incentives to behave efficiently. (JEL J15, J71, L23)     

The partnered core of a game with side payments

An outcome of a game is partnered if there are no asymmetric dependencies between any two players. For a cooperative game, a payoff is in the partnered core of the game if it is partnered, feasible and cannot be improved upon by any coalition of players. We show that the relative interior of the core of a game with side payments is contained in the partnered core. For quasi-strictly convex games the partnered core coincides with the relative interior of the core. When there are no more than three partnerships, the sums of the payoffs to partnerships are constant across all core payoffs. When there are no more than three players, the partnered core satisfies additional properties. We also illustrate our main result for coalition structure games.     

Income and child development

We examine how income is associated with the home environments and the cognitive and behavioral development of pre-school children using data from a birth cohort study of children born at the end of the 20th century. Lower-income 3-year-old children are more likely than wealthier children to live in homes with inadequate physical environments and to have mothers who are more likely to be stressed, depressed, harsh and unresponsive. Additionally, low income children have lower PPVT scores, more mother-reported aggressive, withdrawn, and anxious behavior problems, and also more interviewer-reported problems with behavior, than more affluent children. A key policy question is whether increases in the incomes of poor families would result in improvements in children's outcomes, at least in part through improvements in the home environment. This question is difficult to answer using observational data. However, we argue that, even under the most generous interpretation of the associations we estimate, large income transfer programs would have relatively small effects on children's cognitive and behavioral outcomes.     

Rent-seeking for a public good with additive contributions

We analyze rent-seeking for a public good with two groups, where the provision of a public good is decided in the all-pay contest where “the winner takes all”. We assume that the valuation of the public good varies across groups, but is the same for all members within a group. Free-riding in such situation was predicted by Baik et al. (J Public Econ 82(3):415–429, 2001). We describe a continuum of equilibria where all players make contributions. There is room for substantial payoff asymmetry, which ranges from equal payoffs to all group members to a zero payoff for the player who makes a contribution and positive payoffs for free-riders. The results generalize for the case where the prize has both a private and a public component.     

HISTORY DEPENDENCE AND THE FORMATION OF SOCIAL PREFERENCES: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

We study the minimal contributing set (MCS) game, a three‐person sequential step‐level public goods game. The behavior of critical third players changes with experience in this game even though they face no strategic or payoff uncertainty. We explore why these changes occur by manipulating subjects' experience in the first half of the experiment. The treatments give subjects very different initial experiences, but all treatments move subjects' choices toward experienced subjects' play in the control sessions. Long‐run play is indistinguishable across treatments. Our results are more consistent with the “discovered preferences” hypothesis ( Plott 1996 ) than either the “constructed preference” or “reference point” hypotheses. (JEL H41, C72, C92)     

Strategic Groups and Rent Dissipation

We consider a rent-seeking contest in which players can form strategic groups before expending their outlays. We examine the profitability of endogenous group formation and the effect of such group formation on rent dissipation. We show the following: When just one strategic group is formed in equilibrium, group formation is beneficial both to the group members and to the nonmembers, and rent dissipation is smaller than with usual individual rent seeking. However, when more than two strategic groups are formed in equilibrium, group formation is never profitable to any players, and rent dissipation is greater than with individual rent seeking.     

Greed and adolescent financial behavior

Financial problems in adolescents have increased over the last decades. We investigated if individual differences in greed relate to financial behavior. Greed is an important motive for economic behavior and refers to the tendency to never be satisfied and to always want more. We developed a short version of the Dispositional Greed Scale (Seuntjens, Zeelenberg, Van de Ven, & Breugelmans, 2015), which we then used in a large survey with adolescents (N = 3899). Dispositional greed is associated with them having more income, spending more, saving less often, and having debt more often. Identifying what personality characteristics influence financial behavior at a young age is important, as the financial habits that people learn during adolescence persist in adulthood. We find that greed has both positive effects (having a higher income), but also negative effects with the greedy being less likely to save and being more likely to have a debt.     

CONTESTS WITH STOCHASTIC ABILITIES

We consider the properties of perfectly discriminating contests in which players' abilities are stochastic, but become common knowledge before efforts are expended. Players whose expected ability is lower than that of their rivals may still earn a positive expected payoff from participating in the contest, which may explain why they participate. We also show that an increase in the dispersion of a player's own ability generally benefits this player. It may benefit or harm his rival but cannot benefit the rival more than it benefits himself. We also explore the role of stochastic ability for sequential contests with the same opponent (multibattle contests) and with varying opponents (elimination tournaments) and show that it reduces the strong discouragement effects and holdup problems that may otherwise emerge in such games. High own ability dispersion selects such players into the contest and favors them in elimination contests. ( JEL D72, D74)     

Understanding the antecedents of aggressive behavior in Persian Gulf War veterans within individual,interpersonal, and community contexts

ABSTRACT

The present study applies the social-ecological framework to examine multiple level correlates of aggressive behavior of veterans of the first Gulf War in 1991. Data were collected from the VA‘s Persian Gulf Family Support Programs (PGFSP), and the sample includes 1,519 veterans who participated in the PGFSP. At the individual level, the study finds that younger and female veterans and those with higher self-esteem were less likely to report displaying aggressive behavior. At the interpersonal level, veterans who displayed misconduct in the home are more likely to display aggressive behavior. At the community level, veterans who were in the Air Force was less likely, while those in the Marines were more likely to be aggressive. Implications for practice are discussed.