Group decision and negotiation support in evolving,nonshared information contexts

Based on evolutionary systems design (ESD), group decision and negotiation support in evolving, nonshared information contexts is discussed. A non-shared information context — one without full information sharing — is associated with what has been loosely called a noncooperative context in the group decision and negotiation support systems (GDNSS) literature. Without full information sharing, we have a game with incomplete information that, in general, is evolving. The paper discusses how the GDNSS, MEDIATOR, supports evolution of the group problem representation — a process of consensus seeking (through information sharing, here partial) subject to problem adaptation and restructuring within which compromise is possible.     

Living Healthy and Living Long: Valuing the Nonpecuniary Loss from Disability and Death

This analysis uses three valuation approaches—risk–risk tradeoff, paired risk–dollar comparison, and utility function estimation—to estimate the nonpecuniary cost associated with disability in late life. In addition, we obtain an estimate of the value of life using a paired risk–dollar comparison. The data were obtained from interviews with 548 persons using an iterative computerized questionnaire. Respondents reported a median value of life of $12 million. They were willing-to-pay .7–1.4 million to avoid disability in late life or approximately $47–$95 thousand for each year of disability over age 62. The results were robust to the valuation technique employed.     

Did We Overestimate the Value of Health?

Adam Smith's idea that wage differences reveal preferences for risk rests on strong theoretical foundations. This paper argues, however, that the dominant approach to identify compensating wage differentials—regressing individual wages on aggregate measures of risk—may lead to arbitrary estimates of these risk differentials. In a dataset with information on both, the incidence of illnesses or injuries across firms and industries, I calculate an implicit value of one injury or illness of about (1990) USD 18,800 pursuing the dominant approach. In contrast, regressing wages on the incidence of risk across firms produces a value of one injury or illness of about USD 11,300.     

The effect of computer intervention and task structure on bargaining outcome

This paper reports on a study that examined the impact of computer presentation of suggested solutions during negotiation, in bargaining situations that can be characterized as integrative or distributive. It was found that in the integrative task, the bargainers achieved higher joint outcomes when presented with suggestions. They had a more negative perception of the negotiation atmosphere, however. In the distributive task, the suggestions did not help achieve joint gains, but it lessened negative attitudes of the bargainers. Bargainers who received suggestions felt both they and their partner had been somewhat more flexible, cooperative, considerate, and less suspicious. Thus, regardless of negotiation situation, the suggestions resulted in some benefit to the negotiators.     

Negotiation and Defeasible Decision Making

In economically meaningful interactions negotiations are particularly important because they allow agents to improve their information about the environment and even to change accordingly their own characteristics. In each step of a negotiation an agent has to emit a message. This message conveys information about her preferences and endowments. Given that the information she uses to decide which message to emit comes from beliefs generated in previous stages of the negotiation, she has to cope with the uncertainty associated with them. The assessment of the states of the world also evolves during the negotiation. In this paper we analyze the intertwined dynamics of beliefs and decision, in order to determine conditions on the agents that allow them to reach agreements. The framework for decision making we consider here is based on defeasible evaluation of possibilities: an argument for a choice defeats another one if it is based on a computation that better uses all the available information.     

Economic globalization and violent civil conflict: Is openness a pathway to peace?

There has been little systematic assessment of the impact of globalization on armed conflict within states. Drawing from bargaining theories of conflict, we posit that the global marketplace functions as an “audience” that rewards or punishes the policy choices of states. Globalization, which connotes an increased exposure to this marketplace, increases the relevance of the “costs” that this “audience” may impose. These prospective costs thus encourage peace and stability, as states that are integrated into the global economy have more to lose by instigating and sustaining violent conflict within their borders. Employing a two-stage Heckman Model, we assess the impact of various facets of globalization, including access to information, trade, foreign investment and aid flows, on intrastate conflict within the developing countries for 1990–1996.     

The Simplest Dynamic General-Equilibrium Model of an Open Economy

This paper presents the simplest possible general-equilibrium model of an open economy in which producer and consumer decisions are both intra- and intertemporally consistent. Consumers maximize the present value of the utility of consumption; producers maximize the present value of profits. The model solves for the set of intertemporally consistent prices. The parsimonious structure of the model is achieved by dividing the economy into two producing sectors—exports and domestic goods—and two consumed goods—imports and domestic goods. As a result, there is only one endogenous price per period to be solved for (the price of the domestic good), although “structural” questions, such as the evolution of the real exchange rate, can be posed with the model. Furthermore, with this structural breakdown, the model can be calibrated with national accounts data only. In the paper, we show how to calibrate such a model (including specification of an adjustment-cost function, to avoid “bang-bang” behavior) and use the model to examine various questions where intertemporal issues are important, including terms-of-trade shocks and tariff reform.     

On the logic of common belief and common knowledge

The paper surveys the currently available axiomatizations of common belief (CB) and common knowledge (CK) by means of modal propositional logics. (Throughout, knowledge — whether individual or common — is defined as true belief.) Section 1 introduces the formal method of axiomatization followed by epistemic logicians, especially the syntax-semantics distinction, and the notion of a soundness and completeness theorem. Section 2 explains the syntactical concepts, while briefly discussing their motivations. Two standard semantic constructions, Kripke structures and neighbourhood structures, are introduced in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. It is recalled that Aumann's partitional model of CK is a particular case of a definition in terms of Kripke structures. The paper also restates the well-known fact that Kripke structures can be regarded as particular cases of neighbourhood structures. Section 3 reviews the soundness and completeness theorems proved w.r.t. the former structures by Fagin, Halpern, Moses and Vardi, as well as related results by Lismont. Section 4 reviews the corresponding theorems derived w.r.t. the latter structures by Lismont and Mongin. A general conclusion of the paper is that the axiomatization of CB does not require as strong systems of individual belief as was originally thought — onlymonotonicity has thusfar proved indispensable. Section 5 explains another consequence of general relevance: despite the infinitary nature of CB, the axiom systems of this paper admit of effective decision procedures, i.e., they aredecidable in the logician's sense.     

High Stakes and Acceptance Behavior in Ultimatum Bargaining:

This paper presents the results of a within-subject experiment testing whether an increase in the monetary stakes by a factor of 50 – which had never been done before – influences individual behavior in a simple ultimatum bargaining game. Contrary to current wisdom, we found that lowest acceptable offers stated by the responder are proportionally lower in the high-stake condition than in the low-stake condition. This result may be interpreted in terms of the type of utility functions which characterize the subjects. However, in line with prior results, we find that an important increase of the monetary stakes in the ultimatum game has no effect on the offers made by the proposer. Yet, the present research suggests that the reasons underlying these offers are quite different when the stakes are high.     

The role of multi-objective optimization in negotiation and mediation support

The paper reviews the methodology of multi-objective modeling and optimization used in decision support based on computerized analytical models (as opposed to logical models used in expert systems) that represent expert knowledge in a given field. The essential aspects of this methodology relate to its flexibility: modeling and optimization methods are treated not as goals in themselves but as tools that help a sovereign user (an analyst or a decision maker) to interact with the model, to generate and analyze various decision options, to learn about possible outcomes of these decisions. Although the applications of such methods in negotiation and mediation support is scarce yet, their flexibility increases essentially the chances of such applications. Various aspects of negotiation and mediation methods related to multi-objective optimization and game theory are also reviewed. A possible application of the MCBARG system for supporting negotiation related to the acid rain problem is briefly summarized.     

Nondestructive creation: Entrepreneurship and management research in the study of growth

Economists’ focus on institutions in explaining economic growth, while important, can obscure the significant role played by individual entrepreneurs and the process of entrepreneurship. The prevailing view of entrepreneurship in economics (which continues to shape prevailing public policies) centers on Schumpeter's famous concept of “creative destruction.” In the context of sustained high levels of economic growth, as in the recent American experience, I focus on a different feature of entrepreneurship—“nondestructive creation,” in which the uncoordinated contest of ideas and search for new applications of existing ideas generate growth. And this nondestructive creation should be analyzed and can be fostered.     

Valuing Others’ Information under Imperfect Expectations

Sometimes we believe that others receive harmful information. However, Marschak’s value of information framework always assigns non-negative value under expected utility: it starts from the decision maker’s beliefs – and one can never anticipate information’s harmfulness for oneself. The impact of decision makers’ capabilities to process information and of their expectations remains hidden behind the individual and subjective perspective Marschak’s framework assumes. By introducing a second decision maker as a point of reference, this paper introduces a way for evaluating others’ information from a cross-individual, imperfect expectations perspective for agents maximising expected utility. We define the cross-value of information that can become negative – then the information is “harmful” from a cross-individual perspective – and we define (mutual) cost of limited information processing capabilities and imperfect expectations as an opportunity cost from this same point of reference. The simple relationship between these two expected utility-based concepts and Marschak’s framework is shown, and we discuss evaluating short-term reactions of stock market prices to new information as an important domain of valuing others’ information.      

Analysis,modeling, and the management of international negotiations

Negotiation management, a framework for practical implementation of computer-based support to negotiators and their staffs, is defined and described in this paper. In particular, three integrated tools and their underlying methodologies, are illustrated. The collaborative use of computers and information techniques in complex negotiation is framed in terms of a discovery and design paradigm in which parties engage in dialogue, learn, and develop trust that can support the negotiation itself through a process of joint analysis and modeling.     

The value of a statistical life: A comparison of two approaches

Using an original data set, this article presents the first effort to compare systematically the values of a statistical life obtained from the two main methodologies existing in the literature—the revealed-preference approach (wage-risk analysis) and the contingent-valuation approach—applied to the same sample of individuals. A survey was conducted in the Montreal area with a questionnaire containing two series of questions: one set of contingent-valuation questions and one set of questions pertaining to the information necessary for performing a wage-risk study. The results show that the values of a statistical life obtained from each method are different from each other.This research was supported by the Fonds F.C.A.R. of the Quebec government, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, and by the Fondation Mercure of l'École des Hautes Études Commerciales. The authors want to thank the editor and an anonymous referee for their useful comments.     

On the evaluation of solution concepts

It is proposed that solution concepts for games should be evaluated in a way that is analogous to the way a logic is evaluated by a model theory for the language. A solution concept defines a set of strategy profiles, as a logic defines a set of theorems. A model theoretic analysis for a game defines a class of models, which are abstract representations of particular plays of the game. Given an appropriate definition of a model, one can show that various solution concepts are characterized by intuitively natural classes of models in the same sense that the set of theorems of a logic is characterized by a class of models of the language. Sketches of characterization results of this kind are given for rationalizability, Nash equilibrium, and for a refinement of rationalizability —strong rationalizability — that has some features of an equilibrium concept. It is shown that strong rationalizability is equivalent to Nash equilibrium in perfect information games. Extensions of the model theoretic framework that represent belief revision and that permit the characterization of other solution concepts are explored informally.     

Hostage taking: Understanding terrorism event dynamics

This paper employs advanced time series methods to identify the dynamic properties of three hostage taking series. The immediate and long run multipliers of three covariates—successful past negotiations, violent ends, and deaths—are identified. Each hostage series responds differently to the covariates. Past concessions have the strongest impact on generating future kidnapping events, supporting the conventional wisdom to abide by a stated no-concession policy. Each hostage series has different changepoints caused by a variety of circumstances. Skyjackings and kidnappings are negatively correlated, while skyjackings and other hostage events are positively correlated. Policy recommendations are offered.     

How can business cope with terrorism?

“What can business do to cope more successfully with terrorism?” The policy against terrorism available to business is a neglected issue in the scholarly literature especially in so far as individual firms rather than the business sector as a whole are concerned.Two sets of proposals are advanced, based on an economic analysis of terrorism. The first set discusses possibilities to reduce terrorists’ incentives to attack business premises; the second part outlines proposals designed to minimize the costs to businesses once a terrorist attack has taken place, hence reducing the impact.     

Cognitive rationality and alternative belief measures

In this article, we first examine the various criticisms of the probabilistic model. Then we introduce capacities in order to show that if a probability measure corresponds to anesthetizing the belief of the agent's knowledge, it is then possible to suggest another type of rationality—namely, being able to describe a wise and a rash behavior when facing risk—and therefore another model of belief under uncertainty. While trying to specify various alternative measures, possibility, necessity, and measures resulting from a triangular norm or from a triangular conorm, we finally try to define the field of application of the probabilistic model as well as a sign of the rationality choice: constraint of mass-unity for traditional rationality, and constraint of duality for the one we present.This article is a revised version of a paper presented during the FUR V Congress, Duke University, North Carolina, USA, June 10–13, 1990. I am indebted to Bertrand Munier, Alain Chateauneuf, Olivier Favereau, Jacques-François Thisse, Bernard Walliser, and Kip Viscusi for helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.     

Ranked-Weighted Utilities and Qualitative Convolution

For gambles—non-numerical consequences attached to uncertain chance events—analogues are proposed for the sum of independent random variables and their convolution. Joint receipt of gambles is the analogue of the sum of random variables. Because it has no unique expansion as a first-order gamble analogous to convolution, a definition of qualitative convolution is proposed. Assuming ranked, weighted-utility representations (RWU) over gains (and, separately, over losses, but not mixtures of both), conditions are given for the equivalence of joint receipt, qualitative convolution, and a utility expression like expected value. As background, some properties of RWU are developed.