THE IMPACT OF MERGERS ON FARES STRUCTURE: EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN LOW‐COST AIRLINES

This paper examines mergers that lead to an almost immediate replacement of the target firm's business model in favor of that of the acquiring firm. We examine the post‐merger behavior of the two leading European dedicated low‐cost airlines, EasyJet and Ryanair, each acquiring another low‐cost airline, Go Fly and Buzz, respectively. We find that both takeovers had an immediate and sustained impact on both the pricing structures and the extent of intertemporal price schedules used on the acquired routes, with early booking fares noticeably reduced and only very late booking fares increased. The analysis suggests that the takeovers had a net beneficial effect for consumers, at least in price terms, as a consequence of the introduction of the acquiring firms' business models and associated yield management pricing systems. (JEL L11, L13, L93)     

NONLINEAR PRICING STRATEGIES AND COMPETITIVE CONDITIONS IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY

This paper empirically examines the effect of competitive conditions on nonlinear pricing strategies in the airline industry. We use a unique data set to analyze the impact of concentration and the competitive pressures generated by Southwest and other low cost carriers on the relative prices within a menu of fares. The menu orders tickets by quality based upon cabin and ticket restrictions. We analyze the ratio of fares charged for various qualities within the menu to the fares charged for the lowest quality nonrefundable, restricted tickets. We observe a fare compression for only the highest fares on only the most concentrated (i.e., monopoly) routes. This result is something of a puzzle given a monopolist's market power. We find, however, that actual and potential competition from Southwest reduces low end fares and generally leads to substantial fare compression throughout the fare menu. (JEL L11, L93)     

THE ROLE OF HOSPITAL COMPETITION ON TREATMENT EXPENDITURE AND OUTCOME: EVIDENCE FROM STROKE AND CARDIAC TREATMENT IN TAIWAN

This article examines whether market competition affects treatment expenditure and health outcomes of stroke and cardiac treatment in Taiwan. Our measure of treatment expenditure is the hospital expenditure paid at the index admission (short term) and the sum of inpatient and outpatient expenditures paid in the subsequent year (long term). Our measure of health outcome is the probability of death in 1 and 12 months after the hospital's discharge. Our measure of competition follows the method developed by Kessler and McClellan that calculates the Herfindal index based on the predicted patient flows using exogenous variables (e.g., traveling distance to hospitals). Using data of patients hospitalized for new stroke and cardiac treatment between 1997 and 2001 in Taiwan, we find that an increase of market competition results in an insignificant impact on a patient's mortality. In terms of treatment expenditure, our results indicate that hospitals facing more competition incur higher expenditures, either the short‐ or long‐term expenditure. Finally, we find evidence showing that an increase of treatment expenditure at admission is due to a raise of length of stay and treatment intensity per day as well as the usage of expensive equipment. (JEL I11, L13, L41)     

INFORMATION VALUE UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY AND ENDOGENOUS MARKET LEADERSHIP

In an oligopoly model with firms choosing to produce in one of two periods, we identify the circumstance under which a firm's having early information regarding stochastic demand results in market leadership. High demand volatility leads to Stackelberg competition with the information‐advantaged firm leading. In the N‐firm case an equilibrium with multiple leaders and multiple followers emerges endogenously. In a duopoly information acquisition game we identify conditions that determine whether neither, one, or both firms will pay to acquire early information and note that one firm's obtaining early information may generate a positive externality benefitting its competitor. Both symmetric and asymmetric outcomes are possible and Stackelberg market leadership may occur in equilibrium, but only when firms have different costs of information. Our finding that an information advantage may convey leadership which then affects the value of information to the players applies to other settings exhibiting first‐mover advantage such as certain public good provision games. (JEL C72, D82, L13)     

THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF THIRD‐DEGREE PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN A DIFFERENTIATED OLIGOPOLY

This article examines the welfare effects of third‐degree price discrimination under oligopolistic competition with horizontal product differentiation. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for price discrimination to improve social welfare: the degree of substitution must be sufficiently greater in the “strong” market (where the discriminatory price is higher than the uniform price) than in the “weak” market (where it is lower). It is verified, however, that consumer surplus is never improved; social welfare improves solely owing to an increase in the firms' profits in the case of linear demands. (JEL D43, L11, L13)     

ANTITRUST TREATMENT OF NONPROFITS: SHOULD HOSPITALS RECEIVE SPECIAL CARE?

Nonprofit hospitals receive favorable tax treatment in exchange for providing socially beneficial activities. Extending this rationale suggests that nonprofit hospital mergers should be evaluated differently than mergers of for-profit hospitals because suppression of competition may also allow nonprofits to cross-subsidize care for the poor. Using detailed California data, we find no evidence that nonprofit hospitals are more likely than for-profit hospitals to provide more charity care or offer unprofitable services in response to an increase in market power. Therefore, we find no empirical justification for applying, as some courts have suggested, different antitrust standards for nonprofit hospitals. (JEL I11, L1, L44)     

ENTRY DETERRENCE AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCES

Researchers have written extensively on the impact that strategic alliances between airlines have on airfare, but little is known of the market entry deterrent impact of strategic alliances. Using a structural econometric model, this paper examines the market entry deterrent impact of codesharing, a form of strategic alliance, between incumbent carriers in domestic air travel markets. We find evidence of market entry deterrence, but deterrence impact depends on the specific type of codesharing between market incumbents as well as the identity of the potential entrant. We quantify the extent to which market incumbents' codesharing influences potential entrants' market entry cost and probability of market entry. (JEL L13, L93)     

DIFFERENCES IN AVERAGE PRICES ON THE INTERNET: EVIDENCE FROM THE ONLINE MARKET FOR AIR TRAVEL

Using daily ticket price quotes, this article examines whether there are systematic differences in the airfares obtained through different online travel Web sites. I find that after controlling for ticket availability and heterogeneities that affect ticket prices, there is little systematic difference in the average fares. The parity in average fares observed in 2002 data is in contrast to differences as large as 18% documented by Clemons et al. (2002), and stems in part from the fact that airlines directly compete for online travel dollars today, but did not in 1997. (JEL L2 )     

MARKET STRUCTURE AND MEDIA DIVERSITY

We estimate a mixed logit model of the demand for local news service. Results provide evidence that suggest the representative consumer values more diverse news, more coverage of multicultural issues, and more information on community news, and has a distaste for advertising. Demand estimates are used to calculate the impact on consumer welfare from a marginal decrease in the number of independent television stations that lowers the amount of diversity, multiculturalism, community news, and advertising. Consumer welfare decreases, but the losses are smaller in large markets. For example, small‐market consumers lose $45 million annually while large‐market consumers lose $13 million. (JEL C9, C25, L13, L82, L96)     

PRODUCT COMPATIBILITY HINDERS PRE-EMPTIVE ADVERTISING

This paper considers competition in systems of complementary products and examines how compatibility affects the use of informative advertising by an incumbent to deter entry. Advertising increases demand for a product; customers become price sensitive and competition increases, pre-empting new market entrants. However, compatibility reduces competition, so incumbent advertising becomes less effective at deterring entry and additional, costly advertising would be required to induce deterrence. Moreover, compatibility increases advertising by a potential entrant; with efficient advertising technology, consumers are informed about all products and the incumbent cannot deter entry by using additional advertising. Therefore, product standardization policies that encourage compatibility can support new market entrants by discouraging pre-emptive advertising strategies. (JEL D21, D43, L13, L15)     

TRANSPARENCY IN MARKETS FOR EXPERIENCE GOODS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

We propose an experimental design to investigate the role of information disclosure in the market for an experience good. The market is served by a duopoly of firms that choose both the quality and the price of their product. Consumers differ in their taste for quality and choose from which firm to buy. We compare four different treatments in which we vary the degree to which consumers are informed about quality. Contrary to theoretical predictions, firms do not differentiate quality under full information. Rather, both tend to offer products of similar, high quality, entailing more intense price competition than predicted by theory. Under no information, we observe a “lemons” outcome where quality is low. At the same time, firms manage to maintain prices substantially above marginal cost. In two intermediate treatments, quality is significantly higher than the no‐information level, and there is evidence that prices become better predictors of quality. Taken together these findings suggest that information disclosure is a more effective tool to raise welfare and consumer surplus than theory would lead one to expect. (JEL L15, C91, D82)     

ON FRUITFUL AND FUTILE TESTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEARCH AND PRICE DISPERSION

We exploit cross‐sectional and temporal differences in search intensity in order to examine the relationship between search costs and price dispersion using a hand‐collected panel data set from Jerusalem's Shuk Mahane Yehuda outdoor market. We present empirical evidence that price dispersion increases with the cost of search using several different measures of price dispersion; however, our interpretation of this finding is sensitive to the search proxy in question. We also address several acute difficulties facing empiricists seeking to test theoretical price‐dispersion models in which consumers are heterogeneous in their search behavior. (JEL L11, L13)     

WAGES,RENTS, AND HETEROGENEOUS MOVING COSTS

The model of compensating differentials in regional labor and land markets was formalized by Roback (1982) . The model interprets regional differences in constant quality wages and rents as compensating firms and residents for inter‐regional differences in amenities. This paper extends the Roback model to allow for moving costs which vary among a city's residents and businesses. This modification of the model generates new interpretations of regional differences in rents and wages. The theoretical results suggest that the interpretation of inter‐city rent and wage differentials as compensating is misguided, that such differentials are inappropriate as weights in Quality of Life (QOL) comparisons, and stresses the importance of local housing market parameters in the determination of these differentials. The importance of amenities is retained, but housing supply becomes the main other determinant of regional rents. Housing supply was ignored in the literature following on Roback's initial insight. We show that interactions between amenities and housing supply will bias QOL rankings. Finally, we support the empirical importance of heterogeneous moving costs by demonstrating the effects of exogenous supply constraints on local housing prices. (JEL R31)     

BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH ASYMMETRIC MARGINAL COSTS

This article tests the prediction of three discrete asymmetric duopoly price competition games in the laboratory. The games differ from each other in terms of the size of the cost asymmetry that induces a systematic variation in the difference between the firms' marginal costs. While the standard theory requires the low‐cost firm to set a price just equal to the high‐cost firm's marginal cost, which is identical across all three games, and win the entire market, intuition suggests that market price may increase with a decrease in the absolute difference between the two marginal costs. We develop a quantal response equilibrium model to test our competing conjecture. (JEL L11, L12, C91, D43)     

RETURNS TO INVESTORS IN STOCKS IN NEW INDUSTRIES

We examine investors' returns from publicly traded stock in new industries associated with major changes in transportation and communication in the United States. Return distributions during the development of own‐brand personal computers, airlines, airplane and automobile manufacturers, railroads, and telegraphs reveal three general characteristics. A few companies generate outstanding returns, many firms fail, and returns are volatile. Firms' expected returns are higher than market returns for three of the five industries. Sharpe ratios and Jensen's alphas for portfolios of each new industry indicate that portfolios of stocks in firms in new industries are not an obvious bad deal. (JEL G1, G12, N2, N21, N22)     

THE IMPACT OF A PUBLIC OPTION IN THE U.S. HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET

We develop a game‐theoretical framework to examine the implications of the introduction of a nonprofit “public option” in the U.S. health insurance market. In this model, heterogeneous consumers have to choose between two competing insurance plans. One plan is offered by a profit‐maximizing private insurer; the other by social‐welfare‐maximizing public option. In equilibrium, the distinct objectives of the two insurers induce adverse selection in consumer choice: the public option covers the less healthy consumers, yielding the more profitable segment of market to the private insurer. However, our empirical results suggest that both insurers will capture significant parts of the health insurance market. (JEL I11, L10, L21, L32)     

IDENTIFYING THE EFFECT OF OPEN ACCESS ON CITATIONS USING A PANEL OF SCIENCE JOURNALS

An open‐access journal allows free online access to its articles, obtaining revenue from fees charged to submitting authors or from institutional support. Using panel data on science journals, we are able to circumvent problems plaguing previous studies of the impact of open access on citations. In contrast to the huge effects found in these previous studies, we find a more modest effect: moving from paid to open access increases cites by 8% on average in our sample. The benefit is concentrated among top‐ranked journals. In fact, open access causes a statistically significant reduction in cites to the bottom‐ranked journals in our sample, leading us to conjecture that open access may intensify competition among articles for readers' attention, generating losers as well as winners. (JEL L17, O33)     

Deregulation and Liberalization of European Air Transport Markets

This paper is concerned with the remaining limitations to full interoperability within the European Union (EU) air transport market. Twenty years ago the European air transport network was fragmented, with airlines being treated as public entities designed to serve largely national interests. Considerable progress has been made in recent years, notably the three 'Packages' of EU legislation, to remove such barriers. The situation still differs in several ways from the almost totally free market that has been in place in the USA since the 1980s but, within the EU, fares and market entry are independent of national frontiers. Some barriers remain, largely legacy effects that are gradually being tidied up, but with some significant matters concerning routes outside of the EU and capacity constraints relating to the still largely publicly provided infrastructure still needing resolution.     

AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF DYNAMIC INCENTIVES TO SHARE KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge‐sharing arrangements are an important part of the innovation process as they help firms acquire technological capabilities, shorten development time, and spread risk and cost. A question central to the study of knowledge‐sharing arrangements is the impact of competition on cooperation. While cooperation has the benefit of avoiding duplication, it may have an adverse effect on the competitive advantage of a leading firm. Hence, firms face a difficult challenge during the innovation process while deciding which components of it, if any, to carry out in collaboration with other firms. This paper reports the results of controlled laboratory experiments which identify how the decision to form research joint ventures changes with both relative progress during the R&D process and the intensity of product market competition. The design is based on a modified version of Erkal and Minehart “Optimal Sharing Strategies in Dynamic Games of Research and Development.” Research Paper 1038, University of Melbourne, Department of Economics, 2008. The results indicate that if expected profits are such that the lagging firms always stay in the race, cooperation unravels as firms move forward in the discovery process and as monopoly profits become more attractive. These results are generally consistent with the theoretical predictions. (JEL C91, L24, O30, D81)     

ESTIMATING TIME‐VARYING BARGAINING POWER: A FISHERY APPLICATION

We propose an unobserved‐components‐inspired approach to estimate time‐varying bargaining power in bilateral bargaining frameworks. We apply the technique to an ex‐vessel fish market that changed management systems from a regulated open‐access system to an individual fishing quota (IFQ) system over the timespan analyzed. We find that post‐IFQ implementation fishers do improve their bargaining power and thus accrue more of the rents generated by the fishery. However, unlike previous studies, we find that fishers do not move to a point of complete rent extraction. Rather, fishers and processors appear to be in a near‐symmetric bargaining situation post‐IFQ implementation. (JEL C22, L11, Q22)