FISCAL POLICY AND LENDING RELATIONSHIPS

This paper studies how fiscal policy affects loan market conditions in the United States. First, it conducts a structural vector‐autoregression analysis showing that the bank spread responds negatively to an expansionary government spending shock, while lending increases. Second, it illustrates that these results are mimicked by a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model where the bank spread is endogenized via the inclusion of a banking sector exploiting lending relationships. Third, it shows that lending relationships represent a friction that generates a financial accelerator effect in the transmission of the fiscal shock. (JEL E44, E62)     

THE FISCAL FRAMEWORK OF MONETARY POLICY

This paper i11ustrates the importance of the fiscal framework for monetary analysis by discussing three separate issues. I begin by examining how the fiscal framework changes the macroeconomic equilibrium associated with different steady state rates of money growth. This includes a summary of research that I have presented elsewhere and comments on several additional aspects of the way in which the fiscal structure destroys the neutrality of monetary policy.
The second section deals with the short-run impact of changes in monetary policy. Here again the fiscal structure complicates the economy's response to monetary policy.
The final section looks at the effect of the fiscal structure on the central banks choice of monetary policies. Fiscal structures are likely to influence the policies adopted because they affect the costs and benefits of monetary policies.     

THE IMPACT OF FISCAL POLICY ON PROFITS

This paper investigates the impact of fiscal policy on profits using panel data for 18 high‐income OECD countries during the period 1975–1999. We estimate a profit equation allowing a consistent treatment of the government budget constraint, and we try to disentangle the effects of different spending and taxation items. As far as public spending is concerned, our results strongly suggest that capital expenditures are associated with higher profits, while expenditures on goods and services and in particular on wages and salaries deteriorate profits. In general, “productive” expenditures seem to increase profits while the effect of “unproductive” expenditures is insignificant. Transport and communication expenditures seem to have a positive impact on profits. On the revenue side, we find that both direct and indirect taxation has a negative impact on profits. (JEL E62, H32, H54)     

FISCAL READJUSTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES: A NONLINEAR TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS

We analyze the fiscal adjustment process in the United States using a multivariate threshold vector error regression model. The shift from single-equation to multivariate setting adds value both in terms of our economic understanding of the fiscal adjustment process and the forecasting performance of nonlinear models. We find evidence that fiscal authorities intervene to reduce real per capita deficit only when it reaches a certain threshold and that fiscal adjustment takes place primarily by cutting government expenditure. The results of out-of-sample density forecast and probability forecasts suggest that a shift from a univariate autoregressive model to a multivariate model improves forecast performance. ( JEL C32, C53, E62)     

ELASTIC CAPITAL SUPPLY AND THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY

Existing analyses of the effects of fiscal policy in general equilibrium models have typically been conducted under the assumption that the long-run supply of capital is perfectly elastic at a fixed rate of time preference. These analyses have shown that the long-run response of the capital stock to changes in fiscal policy is crucial to generating the potential for “multiplier” effects in these models. In this paper we ask, what are the implications of relaxing the assumption of perfectly elastic capital supply for the analysis of fiscal policy? We show that with less than perfectly elastic capital supply, the potential for multipliers is actually enhanced. (JEL E62, D90)     

TAXONOMY AND THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY

This paper reviews the development of monetarist theory and the circumstances under which emphasis shifted to "fiscalism," discusses Bent Hansen's view that the controversy is largely a sham dispute, and suggests two types of research needed to assess, historically and theoretically, the relative practical importance of the two approaches to reduction or elimination of economic instability.     

FISCAL POLICY, EXPECTATION TRAPS, AND CHILD LABOR

This paper develops a dynamic model with overlapping generations where there are two possible equilibria: one without child labor, and one with it. It is shown that intergenerational transfers can eliminate the child labor equilibrium and that this intervention is Pareto improving. However, if society does not believe that the government will implement the transfer program, it won't, reinforcing society's expectations. This is true even if the transfer program would have been implemented in the absence of uncertainty. Thus a government may be powerless to prevent the child labor equilibrium if it does not command the confidence of their populace, leaving the country in an expectations trap. ( JEL D91, E60, J20, O20)     

MONETARY POLICY AND ENDOWMENT RISK IN A LIMITED PARTICIPATION MODEL

A limited participation model is constructed to study the risk‐sharing role of monetary policy. A fraction of households exchange money for interest‐bearing government nominal bonds in the asset market and the government injects money through open market operations. In equilibrium, money is nonneutral and monetary policy redistributes consumption across households. Without idiosyncratic endowment risk, monetary policy becomes a perfect risk‐sharing tool, but with idiosyncratic endowment risk, it is not. The Friedman rule is not optimal in general. (JEL E4, E5)     

THE TERMS OF TRADE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF FISCAL POLICY

This paper develops an example of a noncooperative game between fiscal authorities in two countries. The key strategic link between countries is the terms of trade. An equilibrium without cooperation is characterized by excessive tax rates and public spending levels in each country. The outcome is analogous to the Nash equilibrium of the static optimal tarif game in trade theory. But in this model there is also a dynamic distortion caused by noncooperative behaviour. This dynamic distortion depresses capital accumulation and reduces the equilibrium capital stock in each country. Numerical examples suggest a significant welfare benefit of cooperation.     

FISCAL POLICY AND TRADE ADJUSTMENT: ARE THE DEFICITS REALLY TWINS?

Since the mid 1980s, an extensive emprical literature has examined the relationship between U.S. Fiscal deficits, exchange rates, and trade balances. We investigate two questions that continue to spark debate: do increased government deficits casue doller appreciation, and do fiscal deficits lead to higher trade deficits (the popular ‘twin deficit’ notion)? We examine these issues fusing a five-variable VAR system, generating posterior probability bounds to assess significance. Our result provide some evidence that growing goverment deficits apperciate the dollar, and support the “twin deficit” notion that government deficits contrinute to trade deficits.     

FUTURES MARKET BACKWARDATION UNDER RISK NEUTRALITY

J.M. Keynes first introduced the theory of normal backwardation in futures markets. In the language of (British) commodities markets, a backwardation is an excess of the spot price over futures prices. As is well-known, Keynes suggested that this might be explained as a risk premium. Less well known is that Keynes actually proposed two distinct theories of backwardation.
Of these two theories of backwardation, the latter has recently received much attention. The purpose of this paper is to formalize Keynes' first theory, his liquid stocks theory, with an eye to its eventual empirical test.
We follow the recent formalizations of the risk premium theory by assuming the existence of perfectly competitive asset markets. To emphasize the differences between the two theories, however, we assume that there are well-funded risk neutral investors. Thus, risk premia cannot explain backwardation under our assumptions. Instead, backwardations arise because of interactions between equilibrium in the commodities exchange, both in spot and futures trading, and the production, consumption and storage decisions taken on the real side of the economy.     

POLITICAL OPPORTUNISM AND COUNTERCYCLICAL FISCAL POLICY IN ELECTION‐YEAR RECESSIONS

Political budget cycles (PBCs) have been well documented in the literature, albeit not for all circumstances. Similarly, there is clear evidence on the positive effect of economic growth on electoral success. However, no work has been done on the impact of economic growth on the magnitude of PBCs. The theoretical model argues that a government has an incentive to increase fiscal manipulations when a recession is expected to hit and curtail reelection chances; this amounts to countercyclical policy for opportunistic rather than Keynesian motives. Very robust evidence for this behavior is found in Portuguese municipalities; in election years, budget deficits go up even more and significantly so, when a recession is expected. (JEL D72, E62, H62)     

SUSTAINABILITY OF THE FRIEDMAN RULE IN AN INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POLICY GAME

This article develops a two-country monetary economy model in order to analyze the international monetary policy game between governments and the domestic monetary policy game between each government and its private sector. We prove that if governments can commit to their own private sectors, the cooperative equilibrium of the game between governments is for them to follow the Friedman rule. When governments lack such ability to commit, we find that the Friedman rule is more likely to be sustained in our open-economy model than in the closed-economy model of Ireland. ( JEL E31, E52, E61)     

MANAGING RISK TAKING WITH INTEREST RATE POLICY AND MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATIONS

We develop a model in which a financial intermediary's investment in risky assets—risk taking—is excessive due to limited liability and deposit insurance, and characterize the policies that implement efficient risk taking. In the calibrated model, combining interest rate policy with state‐contingent macroprudential regulations—either capital or leverage regulation, and a tax on profits—achieves efficiency. Interest rate policy mitigates excessive risk taking by altering the return and the supply of collateralizable safe assets. In contrast to commonly used capital regulation, leverage regulation has stronger effects on risk taking and calls for higher interest rates. (JEL E44, E52, G11, G18)     

COMPETITIVE FIRM BEHAVIOR UNDER RISK IN DISEQUILIBRIUM TRADING

The objective of this paper is to study the behavior of the purely competitive firm in a market in which traders' plans may not be realized each period. The emphasis of the study is motivated by a desire to introduce explicit price-makers into the theory of competitive markets. The method of introducing price-makers may lead to situations in which markets are not cleared each period and shortages may arise with the realization of plans being in doubt. In this environment traders learn to adjust decisions to offset periodic disappointment. Multiperiod models are introduced to analyze the decision process of the competitive firm in the market and stochastic dynamic programming methods are used to obtain characteristics of optimal plans. Results are compared to the situation in which plans are always realized.     

AIDS TESTING: AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF EVOLVING PUBLIC POLICY

Should laissez faire prevail as to the private-market supply of the AIDS antibody test? Applying a recent theorem from the economics of property rights, this paper determines that the answer is negative, and shows that the optimal policy regarding the AIDS antibody test differs according to whether individuals are at low risk or high risk. Next, using the same economic theory, this paper finds that rules guaranteeing strict confidentiality of the AIDS test result are unjustified. They also are unjustified on traditional legal grounds.     

MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY DESIGN AT THE ZERO LOWER BOUND: EVIDENCE FROM THE LAB

The global economic crisis of 2007–2008 has pushed many advanced economies into a liquidity trap. We design a laboratory experiment on the effectiveness of policy measures to avoid expectation‐driven liquidity traps. Monetary policy alone is not sufficient to avoid liquidity traps, even if it preventively cuts the interest rate when inflation falls below a threshold. However, monetary policy augmented with a fiscal switching rule succeeds in escaping liquidity trap episodes. We measure the effect of fiscal policy on expectations, and report larger‐than‐unity fiscal multipliers at the zero lower bound. Experimental results in different treatments are well explained by adaptive learning. (JEL E70, C92, D83, D84, E52, E62)