THE DURATION OF FIRM‐DESTINATION EXPORT RELATIONSHIPS: EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN, 1997–2006

This article uses survival analysis to investigate the duration of Spanish firms' trade relationships by destination over 1997–2006. Whereas firm export status is highly persistent, firms' destination portfolio is very dynamic: a typical firm‐country exporting relationship has a median duration of 2 years. Yet, if a firm manages to export to a country beyond 2 years the risk of exiting that market sharply falls afterwards. The results indicate that not only firm heterogeneity but also destination heterogeneity are crucial to explain survival in export markets. In particular, country (political) risk heavily shapes the effect of firm, product, and other destination characteristics on the length of trade relationships. Whereas firm productivity, comparative advantage, partners' GDP, and proximity enhance duration of trade with low‐risk countries, they have no effect on trade survival with high‐risk countries. On the contrary, information spillovers are particularly relevant to enhance survival of trade relationships with high‐risk countries. (JEL C41, F10, F14)     

INTERNATIONAL DEAL EXPERIENCE AND CROSS‐BORDER ACQUISITIONS

I show that corporate directors' human capital facilitates international investments. Directors' experience with cross‐border transactions positively influences firms' decisions to conduct their first cross‐border acquisitions. Cross‐border acquirers are more likely to buy firms headquartered in countries with which the directors have prior deal experience. This effect is strongest for target firms headquartered in culturally and institutionally dissimilar countries. Announced cross‐border acquisitions are received more favorably by financial markets and are more likely to be completed successfully when the announcing firm has a director with cross‐border acquisition experience. These effects are not driven by investment bank involvement in the deal process or by other forms of directors' human capital, and they are robust to endogeneity of director hires. (JEL F23, F21, J24, L23)     

DOES CORRUPTION ATTENUATE THE EFFECT OF RED TAPE ON EXPORTS?

I use firm ‐level data to examine whether corruption attenuates the adverse effects of red tape on exports. I find that, conditional on there being customs‐related red tape, a firm is better off if it can use bribes to lower the delay that it faces. However, I also find that corruption has a negative overall effect on a firm's decision to export. That is, corruption prevents some firms from entering the export market. These results suggest that to gauge the overall effect of corruption, we must compare its red‐tape attenuating effect with its adverse effect on a firm's decision to export. (JEL F10, F14, K42)     

FIRM PRODUCTIVITY AND SALES DESTINATIONS: EVIDENCE FROM WITHIN CHINA

This paper builds on and extends the literature on the linkage between firm productivity and their export destinations to study the productivity of Chinese firms and their sales destinations in other provinces within China. Moving the study from international markets to domestic markets conveniently avoids the hard to control heterogeneity across different destination markets in international trade, as provincial markets within China are less heterogeneous than international markets but segmented by Chinese provincial borders. The paper explicitly controls the fact that many firms only sell in their home provinces by using the zero‐inflated negative binomial method. It finds that firms with higher productivity tend to sell in other provincial markets, and more productive firms enter more provincial markets. The results are robust. (JEL F15, D21, D24)     

Embeddedness and capital markets: Bank financing of businesses

The article examines the social and economic dimensions of capital markets, particularly the effects of bank and capital market structure; lending criteria and bank policies; and demand for credit, on bank financing of businesses. A critical problem in most capital markets is that lenders have inadequate information to assess the risk and creditworthiness of loan applicants. We find that many bankers continue to use assessments of character as a signal of the potential borrower's creditworthiness. Banking deregulation limits the range of signals available to lenders and therefore may have detrimental consequences for banks and local economies.     

COMMODITY PRICES AND BANK LENDING

We analyze the transmission of changes in commodity prices to bank lending in a large sample of developing countries. A bank-level analysis shows that a fall in commodity net export prices is associated with a reduction of bank lending, particularly for commodity exporters and during episodes of terms-of-trade decline. We complement this analysis with loan-level data from a credit register, which allows us to identify the effect of a commodity price shock on the supply of credit, controlling for unobserved factors that could drive borrowers' credit demand. Results show that banks with relatively lower deposits and poor asset quality transmit the changes in commodity prices to lending more aggressively. (JEL F30, F34, G21, Q02)     

ESTIMATING MARKET POWER IN HOMOGENOUS PRODUCT MARKETS USING A COMPOSED ERROR MODEL: APPLICATION TO THE CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY MARKET

This study proposes a novel econometric approach to estimating market power in homogenous product markets. We use a composed error model to estimate the stochastic part of firms' strategic pricing equation. This part is formed by two random variables: a traditional error term, which captures random shocks, and a random conduct term, which measures the degree of market power. This approach allows for the conduct parameter to vary flexibly across firms and within firms over time, and avoids ad hoc structural restrictions for identifying firms' conduct. The empirical application of our approach is based on a well‐known California wholesale electricity market data set, which has been rigorously used to study market power. Our results suggest that realization of market power varies over both time and firms, and reject the assumption of a common or time‐invariant conduct parameter. (JEL C34, C51, L13, L94)     

IMPORTED CAPITAL INPUT,ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY,AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM FIRM‐LEVEL DATA

Importing capital inputs has been recognized as a critical channel for technology transfer across countries. We examine whether and to what extent the productive impact of imported capital varies with firms' abilities to absorb new technologies using ordinary least squares, instrumental variable, and threshold regression estimators. We find that firms with higher absorptive capacity gain significantly more from importing foreign capital. Our results also suggest a threshold for such benefits. Furthermore, the productive contribution of skilled labor is significantly higher in firms that import foreign capital. Developing policies to augment absorptive capacity will help firms in developing countries to realize benefits associated with imported capital. (JEL F14, D24, L24, O33)     

FOREIGN BANKS AND THE BANK LENDING CHANNEL

We provide new evidence on bank ownership and transmission of monetary policy using bank‐level data on 453 banks in Central and Eastern European economies between 1998 and 2012. Only domestic banks adjust loans to changes in monetary policy, while foreign banks do not. Conventional wisdom says that this is because foreign banks can rely on parent banks' funding to insulate against monetary policy shocks. In this paper we document an alternative explanation. Deposits in foreign banks do not react to monetary policy, hence the bank lending channel is only triggered in domestic banks. (JEL E50, F36, G21)     

FIRMS' EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF AI AND ROBOTICS: EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY

This study presents new evidence on firms' views about the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics on their business and employment, using data from an original survey of more than 3,000 Japanese firms. The focus of this study is on technology‐skill complementarity. Firms with highly educated employees tend to expect positive impacts of AI‐related technologies on their business, and vice versa. Larger firms and firms that engage in global markets tend to have positive views about the impacts of AI‐related technologies. (JEL O33, J23, J24, M15)     

MEASURING THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS' FOREIGN INVESTMENTS

Earlier work found evidence for geographic linkages of aggregate foreign direct investment across countries and country‐pairs. From a theoretical point of view, such linkages at the macroeconomic level may root in between‐firm as well as within‐firm linkages and originate from information spillovers across or within firms in exploring unknown markets, and vertical linkages between production plants across different locations within the firm. We use data on the universe of German multinational enterprises (MNEs) to empirically explore how marginal investments at one foreign affiliate depend on investments at other affiliates within the same MNE. The empirical approach employs two channels or modes of cross‐affiliate interdependence: mere geography (capturing horizontal linkages through correlated learning and horizontal competition within the firm) and input–output relationships within or across industries (which capture vertical linkages). Adding to earlier findings at the aggregate level, we find evidence of a significant interdependence of investments within the firm. In the firm‐level data at hand, vertical linkages appear to be more important than horizontal ones. Investments at one location tend to stimulate investments at other locations of the same MNE, particularly if input linkages are strong. The opposite seems to be true for output linkages. Beyond vertical linkages, mere geographic proximity matters only to a minor extent. This suggests that evidence of linkages through geographic closeness at aggregate data levels accrue mainly to reasons of vertical linkages within networks of affiliates. (JEL C31, D22, F21, F23, F68, G31, H32)     

IMPACT OF CORRUPTION ON FIRM‐LEVEL EXPORT DECISIONS

This article examines the impact of corruption on the self‐selection of firms into domestic and export markets. A heterogeneous firm model predicts that corruption decreases the probability that a firm only sells domestically, increases the probability that a firm exports indirectly through an intermediary, and decreases the probability that a firm exports directly. The propositions of the model are tested using a comprehensive dataset of over 23,000 firms in 80 developing countries. The results confirm both the self‐selection of firms according to their productivity and the anticipated impact of corruption. This indicates that in developing countries where corruption is especially severe, intermediaries provide a crucial link to global markets. (JEL F1, O1)     

BENIGN NEGLECT OF COVENANT VIOLATIONS: BLISSFUL BANKING OR IGNORANT MONITORING?

Theoretically, bank's loan monitoring activity hinges critically on its capitalization. To proxy for monitoring intensity, we use changes in borrowers' investment following loan covenant violations, when creditors can intervene in the governance of the firm. Exploiting granular bank‐firm relationships observed in the syndicated loan market, we document substantial heterogeneity in monitoring across banks and through time. Better capitalized banks are more lenient monitors that intervene less with covenant violators. Importantly, this hands‐off approach is associated with improved borrowers' performance. Beyond enhancing financial resilience, regulation that requires banks to hold more capital may thus also mitigate the tightening of credit terms when firms experience shocks. (JEL G21, G32, G33, G34)     

BANKS,DEBT AND RISK: ASSESSING THE SPILLOVERS OF CORPORATE TAXES

We find evidence of tax-driven strategic allocation of debt and asset risk across group entities of European banks. We evaluate the effects that establishing tax neutrality between debt and equity finance has on systemic risk, and show that the degree of coordination in implementing the hypothetical tax reform matters. In particular, a coordinated elimination of the tax advantage of debt would significantly reduce systemic losses in the event of a severe banking crisis. By contrast, uncoordinated tax reforms are not equally beneficial precisely because national tax policies generate spillovers through cross-border bank activities. (JEL G21, G28, H25)     

CAN TRADE REALLY HURT? AN EMPIRICAL FOLLOW‐UP ON SAMUELSON'S CONTROVERSIAL PAPER

This paper investigates Samuelson's [Samuelson, P. A. “Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Confirm Arguments of Mainstream Economists Supporting Globalization.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18(3), 2004, 135–46] argument that technical progress of the trade partner may hurt the home country. We illustrate this prospect in a simple Ricardian model for situations with outward knowledge spillovers. Within this framework Samuelson's Act II effects may occur. Based on industry level panel data for 17 OECD countries for the period 1973–2000 we show econometrically that the outflow of domestic knowledge via exports or foreign direct investment (FDI) to the rest of the world may have a negative impact on industry output in the home country. This is particularly so when exporting to technologically less advanced countries and, more specifically, China. (JEL F10, F11, F14, O30)     

RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES AND REGIONAL HIGH‐TECH FIRM START‐UP AND EXIT

If localized knowledge spillovers are present in the university setting, higher rates of both start‐up and/or survival would be observed in areas that are geographically proximate to the university. Using a detailed industry data set for Texas for 1999:3–2005:2, we analyze start‐up and exit rates for high‐tech firms. Based on a Poisson quasi‐maximum likelihood estimation, we find evidence that the level of R&D and proximity of a research institution positively affects the likelihood of technology start‐ups. However, using both the Cox proportional hazards model and Kaplan–Meier approach, our results suggest that geographic proximity to knowledge centers does not reduce hazard rates. (JEL R12, R53, O18)     

QUALITY DIFFERENCES,THIRD‐DEGREE PRICE DISCRIMINATION,AND WELFARE

We propose a model with two markets to analyze the welfare implications of price discrimination with quality differences. In each market a local firm that operates in that market only competes against a global firm that operates in both markets. Local firms produce higher‐quality goods than the global firm. If the quality levels of the local firms' products are the same, price discrimination is never welfare‐decreasing. If they differ, discrimination is welfare‐increasing if quantity increases. Because of a positive allocation effect of price discrimination, there are parameter values such that welfare increases while total output decreases with price discrimination. (JEL D43, D60)     

CHAINED CREDIT CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL ACCELERATORS

Sufficiently high net worth of financial intermediaries (FIs) is considered a necessary condition for financial and macroeconomic stability. In this paper, we explore why the net worth of FIs is important as compared to that of nonfinancial firms using a dynamic general equilibrium model, in which both FIs and nonfinancial firms rely on costly external debt. We find that an exogenous disruption of the FIs' net worth has a greater aggregate impact than does the same‐sized disruption of the nonfinancial firms' net worth. The key reason is that the net worth of the FIs in the United States is small. (JEL E22, E44, G21)     

Financial Resources and Product Market Development: Strategic Choice and Institutional Processes During China's Transition

During an economic transition from socialism, market exchange replaces redistribution. We study firm decisions to enter product markets to understand the factors that influence this process. Managers in Chinese State Owned Enterprises operated within institutional constraints to make strategic decisions, and state intervention shaped which factors were salient. Firms financed through central government and bond issues relied less on markets. Firms funded through local government moved into markets faster; firms funded by banks were initially faster to markets but slower to markets after bank reform shifted lending policies. Thus, the accessibility, flexibility, and stability of financing shaped decisions about market entrance.     

PRODUCT BUNDLING AND INCENTIVES FOR MERGERS AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCES

This paper analyzes firms' choice of a merger or a strategic alliance in bundling their products with other complementary products. Tying two products of unequal value makes them equally valuable as they become inseparable for purchase. Consequently, firms can charge a higher price for the bundled products than before. If foreclosure is not the main purpose of bundling, firms would prefer strategic alliances to mergers because mergers only intensify competition by internalizing the complementarities of two products. In equilibrium, bundling occurs only through strategic alliances. (JEL L4, L11, L13, L23)