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1.
Lowest-unique sealed-bid auctions are auctions with endogenous participation, costly bids, and the lowest bid among all unique
bids wins. Properties of symmetric NEs are studied. The symmetric NE with the lowest expected gains is the maximin outcome under symmetric strategies, and it is the solution to a mathematical program. Comparative statics for the number
of bidders, the value of the item and the bidding cost are derived. The two bidders’ auction is equivalent to the Hawk–Dove
game. Simulations of replicator dynamics provide numerical evidence that the symmetric NE with the lowest expected gains is
also asymptotically stable. 相似文献
2.
A decision maker relies on information of parties affected by her decision. These parties try to influence her decision by selective disclosure of facts. As is well known from the literature, competition between the informed parties constrains their ability to manipulate information. We depart from this literature by introducing a cost to communicate. Our parties trade off their reporting cost against the effect on the decision. Some information is never revealed. In contrast to setups without communication costs, our decision maker can benefit by ex ante committing to an ex post suboptimal decision rule. Moreover, committing ex ante not to listen to one of the parties may also be beneficial for the decision maker. 相似文献
3.
A probability forecast scored ex post using a probability scoring rule (e.g. Brier) is analogous to a risky financial security. With only superficial adaptation,
the same economic logic by which securities are valued ex ante – in particular, portfolio theory and the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) – applies to the valuation of probability forecasts.
Each available forecast of a given event is valued relative to each other and to the “market” (all available forecasts). A
forecast is seen to be more valuable the higher its expected score and the lower the covariance of its score with the market
aggregate score. Forecasts that score highly in trials when others do poorly are appreciated more than those with equal success
in “easy” trials where most forecasts score well. The CAPM defines economically rational (equilibrium) forecast prices at
which forecasters can trade shares in each other’s ex post score – or associated monetary payoff – thereby balancing forecast risk against return and ultimately forming optimally hedged
portfolios. Hedging this way offers risk averse forecasters an “honest” alternative to the ruse of reporting conservative
probability assessments. 相似文献
4.
In this paper we examine optimal bidding without the independence axiom in a unified framework which allows for a clear graphical representation. Thus, we can show very simply the independence axiom to be a necessary and sufficient condition on preferences for strategical equivalence of the two first-price and second-price auctions, respectively, and for the second-price sealed-bid auction to be demand revealing. The analysis reveals that the betweenness property is necessary and sufficient for the ascending-bid auction to be demand revealing while optimal bids exceed (are less than) bidders' valuations, iff preferences are quasiconcave (quasiconvex). Furthermore, it can be shown that fanning out (fanning in) leads to a higher (lower) selling-price in open than in sealed-bid auctions. 相似文献
5.
In making all-or-none choices between alternative securities, Samuelson (1997b) suggested that investors of different risk-aversion should calculate from past samples of those securities their relevant Harmonic Means, or Geometric means, or other associative means representative of their respective degrees of relative-risk-aversion. Here it is shown how this learning procedure can be improved upon when you have prior knowledge that the securities have log-Normal distributions. Classical estimation theory, concerning consistent, efficient, and sufficient statistics, is shown to have a cash value by means of the calculable measure of (ex ante) “risk-corrected certainty equivalents.” Needed qualifications and testings are also presented. 相似文献
6.
We examine empirically several alternative models of ex ante crowding out. Our econometric analysis encompasses sixteen developed countries employing a uniform model, a consistent data base, and a common estimating procedure. Our results find little support for ex ante crowding out (i.e., direct—substitutability effects) and little support for the standard Keynesian assumption of no substitutability. We do discover a rather strong effect of both debt—financed and tax-financed government expenditure stimulating household consumption demand in many countries. A tentative rationalization for these results is that the household sector views rising government expenditure as a signal of the government's commitment to provide for an ever—expanding share of household sector future needs. As a consequence, household saving is discouraged at the possible expense of investment and longer—run growth. 相似文献
7.
The paper addresses the question, how policy decisions under uncertainty depend on the underlying welfare concept. We study three different welfare measures: The first is directly based on the ex ante (expected) utility of a representative consumer whereas the second relies on an ex ante and the third on an ex post valuation of policy changes compared to the status quo. We show that decisions based on these measures coincide if and only if risk-neutral expected utility maximization is applied. Differences between the decisions are analyzed for both, risk-averse expected utility maximization and the MaxiMin criterion. For risk-averse decision makers, differences between the first and the second concept arise if the absolute risk-aversion of the decision maker is not constant in income. For risk-aversion and the MaxiMin criterion, the effort levels to provide a public good based on an optimization of ex post utility changes exceed those based on the first or second concept. Implications for environmental policy decisions based on the concepts of abatement costs and benefits from abatement are discussed. 相似文献
8.
Bidding the same price in descending bid auctions and in first price sealed bid auctions is equivalent to expected utility maximizing behavior, and this is equivalent to dynamically consistent bidding. The claim that, in strategic form, descending bid and first price sealed bid auctions are the same game is thus shown to be false, since the mapping from strategies to payoffs is not the same for the two auction forms. 相似文献
9.
In this paper we suggest a model of sequential auctions with endogenous participation where each bidder conjectures about the number of participants at each round. Then, after learning his value, each bidder decides whether or not to participate in the auction. In the calculation of his expected value, each bidder uses his conjectures about the number of participants for each possible subgroup. In equilibrium, the conjectured probability is compatible with the probability of staying in the auction. In our model, players face participation costs, bidders may buy as many objects as they wish and they are allowed to drop out at any round. Bidders can drop out at any time, but they cannot come back to the auction. In particular we can determine the number of participants and expected prices in equilibrium. We show that for any bidding strategy, there exists such a probability of staying in the auction. For the case of stochastically independent objects, we show that in equilibrium every bidder who decides to continue submits a bid that is equal to his value at each round. When objects are stochastically identical, we are able to show that expected prices are decreasing. 相似文献
10.
This article reports 15 first-price auction experiments, each with four bidders, designed to test Cedric Smith' (1961) hypothesis that risk-neutral behavior can be induced in subjects' decisions by paying them in lotteries on money that are linear in the outcome probabilities. We choose the first-price auction environment because of its relatively high success in surviving a large number of tests, which contrasts with the widely documented tendency of subjects to violate the expected utility axioms in making choices among gambles. In the first five experiments, subjects were experienced in first-price auctions with monetary rewards. We prescreened these subjects for exceptionally high bidding consistency with the constant relative risk-averse model. The results unyielded only weak support for the risk-neutralizing procedure (3 of 10 risk-averse cases became risk-neutral, but only 1 in 8 that were retested continued to exhibit risk-neutral behavior). We recruited 16 new subjects with no previous experience for four lottery-only auctions. Eight of the 16 subjects bid as if risk-neutral, but in a retest of 12 subjects only 2 remained consistently risk-neutralized. Finally we recruited 12 inexperienced subjects, and each subject bid against 3 robot bidders whose bidding strategies were known to the human bidder. We use this procedure to control for Nash expectations. These 12 subjects were run under both monetary and lottery reward conditions. Two of the 12 subjects bid as if risk-neutral in the lottery auction, but both of these subjects had shown risk-neutral behavior with monetary rewards. In conclusion, we find very weak support for the risk-neutralizing procedure. We caution other researchers to run calibration tests of the procedure in the particular context they are studying to assess its reliability. 相似文献
11.
Research in psychology suggests that some individuals are more sensitive to positive than to negative information while others
are more sensitive to negative rather than positive information. I take these cognitive positive–negative asymmetries in information
processing to a Bayesian decision-theory model and explore its consequences in terms of decisions and payoffs. I show that
in monotone decision problems economic agents with more positive-responsive information structures are always better off,
ex ante, when they face problems where payoffs are relatively more sensitive to the action chosen when the state of nature
is favorable.
相似文献
12.
We present an axiomatic model of preferences over menus that is motivated by three assumptions. First, the decision maker
is uncertain ex ante (i.e., at the time of choosing a menu) about her ex post (i.e., at the time of choosing an option within her chosen menu) preferences over options, and she anticipates that this
subjective uncertainty will not resolve before the ex post stage. Second, she is averse to ex post indecisiveness (i.e., to having to choose between options that she cannot rank with certainty). Third, when evaluating a
menu she discards options that are dominated (i.e., inferior to another option whatever her ex post preferences may be) and restricts attention to the undominated ones. Under these assumptions, the decision maker has a preference
for commitment in the sense of preferring menus with fewer undominated alternatives. We derive a representation in which the
decision maker’s uncertainty about her ex post preferences is captured by means of a subjective state space, which in turn determines which options are undominated in a
given menu, and in which the decision maker fears, whenever indecisive, to choose an option that will turn out to be the worst
(undominated) one according to the realization of her ex post preferences. 相似文献
14.
“Randomized dictatorship,” one of the simplest ways to solve bargaining situations, works as follows: a fair coin toss determines the “dictator”—the player to be given his first-best payoff. The two major bargaining solutions, that of Nash (Econometrica 18:155–162, 1950) and that of Kalai and Smorodinsky (Econometrica, 43:513–518, 1975), Pareto-dominate this process (in the ex ante sense). However, whereas the existing literature offers axiomatizations of the Nash solution in which this ex ante domination plays a central role (Moulin, Le choix social utilitariste, Ecole Polytechnique Discussion Paper, 1983 ; de Clippel, Social Choice and Welfare, 29:201–210, 2007), it does not provide an analogous result for Kalai–Smorodinsky. This paper fills in this gap: a characterization of the latter is obtained by combining the aforementioned domination with three additional axioms: Pareto optimality, individual monotonicity, and a weakened version of the Perles–Maschler (International Journal of Game Theory, 10:163–193, 1981) super additivity axiom. 相似文献
15.
Heath and Tversky (1991, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 4:5–28) posed that reaction to ambiguity is driven by perceived competence. Competence effects may be inconsistent with ambiguity
aversion if betting on own judgement is preferred to betting on a chance event, because judgemental probabilities are more
ambiguous than chance events. This laboratory experiment analyses whether ambiguity affects prices and volumes in a double
auction market, and contrasts ambiguity aversion to competence effects. In order to test for the presence of competence effects,
in the experiment uncertainty is tied to the realisation of events about which the decision maker is more or less knowledgeable.
Two experiments are presented: in the first, knowledge is exogenous, whereas in the second the knowledge judgement is endogenous.
Market prices provide evidence in favour of the competence hypothesis only when competence is self-assessed. Comparable volumes
are observed in both experiments.
相似文献
16.
In this paper, we study the auction to allocate an indivisible good when each potential buyer has a private and independent valuation for the item and suffers a negative externality if a competitor acquires it. In that case, the outside option of each buyer is mechanism-dependent, which implies that participation is endogenous. As several works in the literature have shown, the optimal auction entails strong threats to induce full entry and maximal expected revenue. This results from the full commitment assumption, which ensures that threats are credible. We show that absent credible threats, the entry process does not lead to full participation: the equilibrium entails screening of agents in the entry stage and a trade-off between reserve prices and entry fees. Besides, we discuss the conditions under which the impossibility to use threats does not prevent the seller from ensuring a minimal screening and reaching a high expected revenue. 相似文献
17.
This study explored changes in net disposable income for low‐income single‐mother families before and after the 1996 welfare reform in the USA. Although many studies on welfare reform have focused on employment or total family income as a way to measure low‐income single‐mother families’ economic well‐being, little is known about their net income after expenses related to entering the workforce. This study analyzed net disposable income after tax deductions and childcare costs to provide a more accurate understanding of income changes using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation conducted by the US Census Bureau. The results revealed that while low‐income single mothers were working more after welfare reform, their net disposable income decreased during this time because their earnings were low and offset by an increase in childcare costs and a decline in means‐tested benefits, including Temporary Assistance for Needy Families benefits. Key Practitioner Message: ● To understand effects of the 1996 welfare reform on low‐income families’ economic well‐being; ● To understand comprehensive income sources and work related expenses of low‐income families; ● To provide policy suggestions for comprehensive childcare subsidies to support low‐income single mothers’ employment. 相似文献
18.
Ranking finite subsets of a given set X of elements is the formal object of analysis in this article. This problem has found a wide range of economic interpretations
in the literature. The focus of the article is on the family of rankings that are additively representable. Existing characterizations
are too complex and hard to grasp in decisional contexts. Furthermore, Fishburn (1996), Journal of Mathematical Psychology
40, 64–77 showed that the number of sufficient and necessary conditions that are needed to characterize such a family has
no upper bound as the cardinality of X increases. In turn, this article proposes a way to overcome these difficulties and allows for the characterization of a meaningful
(sub)family of additively representable rankings of sets by means of a few simple axioms. Pattanaik and Xu’s (1990), Recherches
Economiques de Louvain 56, 383–390) characterization of the cardinality-based rule will be derived from our main result, and other new rules that stem from our general proposal are discussed and characterized
in even simpler terms. In particular, we analyze restricted-cardinality based rules, where the set of “focal” elements is
not given ex-ante; but brought out by the axioms.
相似文献
19.
The paper reports experimental data on the behavior in the first-price sealed-bid auction for a varying number of bidders when values and bids are private information. This feedback-free design is proposed for the experimental test of the one-shot game situation. We consider both within-subjects and between-subjects variations. In line with the qualitative risk neutral Nash equilibrium prediction, the data show that bids increase in the number of bidders. However, in auctions involving a small number of bidders, average bids are above, and in auctions involving a larger number of bidders, average bids are below the risk neutral equilibrium prediction. The quartile analysis reveals that bidding behavior is not constant across the full value range for a given number of bidders. On the high value quartiles, however, the average bid–value ratio is not different from the risk neutral prediction. The behavior is different when the winning bid is revealed after each repetition. 相似文献
20.
Policy recommendations based on unit labour costs (ULC) indices can lead to undesirable and counterproductive policies, because they do not reveal possible distortions in the base year. In this paper, we discuss the problems with the ULC-current account relation and provide an alternative measure for relative wage costs called Wage Competitive index (WCI) based on the assumption of convergence of the returns on capital. We show how to calculate it and that it is more efficient than traditional ULC and REER indicators. The implication is that policymakers should not focus on nominal wage setting only, but also more broadly on all factors which affect the return on capital. This implies that the well-known Rehn– Meidner rule, which underlies the Macroeconomic Dialogue should be modified. 相似文献
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