考虑额外营销和惩罚成本的垄断企业虚假质量信息研究

由于消费者认知水平的差异，在仅以价格作为产品质量信号的市场中，企业与消费者之间存在着信息鸿沟，这为企业使用虚假质量信息提供了空间。因此本文在企业和消费者拥有不对称质量信息的背景下，对企业使用虚假质量信息的问题进行研究。通过差异化产品的消费者效用模型和不同质量信息策略下企业利润模型的构建，探讨企业虚假质量信息的使用策略。随后，引入虚假质量信息的额外营销成本和被发现后的惩罚成本，考虑额外营销成本和惩罚力度对企业虚假质量信息策略的影响。研究发现企业是否使用虚假质量取决于额外营销成本和使用虚假信息后被发现的惩罚成本。对于高、低质量的产品企业倾向于单独使用虚假质量信息，而不会对差异化质量的产品同时使用虚假质量信息。     

What Determines Trust in Information About Food-Related Risks? Underlying Psychological Constructs

Trust in risk information about food related-hazards may be an important determinant of public reactions to risk information. One of the central questions addressed by the risk communication literature is why some individuals and organizations are trusted as sources of risk information and others are not. Industry and government often lack public trust, whereas other sources (for example, consumer organizations, the quality media, medical doctors) are highly trusted. Problematically, previous surveys and questionnaire studies have utilized questions generated by the investigators themselves to assess public perceptions of trust in different sources. Furthermore, no account of the hazard domain was made. In the first study reported here, semistructured interviewing was used to elicit underpinning constructs determining trust and distrust in different sources providing food-related risk information ( n = 35). In the second study, the repertory grid method was used to elicit the terminology that respondents use to distinguish between different potential food-related information sources ( n = 35), the data being submitted to generalised Procrustes analysis. The results of the two studies were combined and validated in survey research ( n = 888) where factor analysis indicated that knowledge in itself does not lead to trust, but that trusted sources are seen to be characterised by multiple positive attributes. Contrary to previous research, complete freedom does not lead to trust—rather sources which possess moderate accountability are seen to be the most trusted.     

信息不对称条件下双寡头市场中质量差异化产品虚假信息问题研究

基于博弈论和契约理论,研究了信息不对称条件下双寡头市场质量差异化产品定价过程中虚假信息的问题。消费者与企业关于产品质量信息存在严重不对称,为企业使用虚假质量信息提高企业利润提供了较大的空间。为分析企业使用虚假信息的问题,本文基于Bertrand博弈模型构建了双寡头市场质量差异化产品定价模型并求解企业利润。求解结果表明双寡头市场的纳什博弈均衡解为两企业均使用虚假信息,在此基础上进一步从契约的角度对企业使用虚假信息的问题进行了合理规避。最后运用算例分析验证了模型的正确性。     

电商平台信息披露策略研究

电商平台模式下，供应商决定产品价格将产品直接出售给消费者，并与平台企业共享收益。通常，消费者与产品供应商/平台企业在产品属性(匹配)信息上存在不对称性。本文基于博弈理论，研究电商平台(如：亚马逊、京东等)的产品信息披露策略，比较两种信息披露方式：“平台披露”与“供应商披露”。首先考虑由一个平台企业和一个供应商组成的垄断结构。研究表明，信息披露策略取决于产品属性(匹配)的相对重要性。同时，与平台披露相比，供应商更愿意披露全部产品信息。然后考虑一个平台企业和两个供应商组成的竞争结构。研究发现，与垄断结构不同，平台披露下，平台总是披露全部产品信息；而供应商披露下，信息披露策略取决于产品属性(匹配)信息的相对价值。此外，平台会偏好由供应商负责信息披露。     

基于可持续性消费的企业质量价格决策研究

随着可持续性消费理念的普及,消费者愿意为可持续性生产的产品支付更高的价格,这种绿色商品溢价能快速传导到价值链上游,进而推动绿色产业升级。本文在信息非对称环境下建立了一个可持续性制造型企业及其消费者组成的供应链模型,研究可持续性消费者比例与可持续性偏好对企业质量价格决策的影响。研究结论如下：在完全信息下,当企业只服务可持续消费者时,企业的收益随可持续性消费者比例递增;在信息非对称时,可持续性消费者比例越大,企业分离时所付出的成本越高,因此可持续性投入高的企业越倾向于混同而不是分离。另外,消费者的可持续性偏好对企业来说总是有利的。但是信息非对称时,可持续性消费者比例越高,并不总是对企业有利。     

Digitalisierung und Konvergenz von Online- und Offline-Welt

The increasing diffusion of mobile phones with internet access (Smartphones) enables more and more consumers to use the mobile internet. In addition, there is a continuing integration of location-based services (LBS). By means of Global Positioning Systems or WiFi-triangulation LBS provide context-aware information to consumers. This leads to a convergence of online and offline worlds. The usage of LBS delivers additional information to consumers (e.g. alternative offers or detailed product information). Therefore LBS do have an influence on consumer behavior. Particularly during the search process, information about prices or geographic distances, that are relevant for the purchase, are of importance. This study analyzes the relevance of location-based internet search empirically. Search costs are estimated on an individual level in a choice-based conjoint analysis using two different products. As a result, location-based internet search is considered to be very relevant for search and influential on consumer behavior. The study shows different consumers preferences and different search costs depending on the product. To conclude the study, the implications are discussed. The major contribution of this study is that it shows that offline and online search do have a mutual impact on each other. Furthermore, search costs are measured in a mobile context.     

What Are the Sources of Exposure to Eight Frequently Used Phthalic Acid Esters in Europeans?

Phthalic acid esters (phthalates) are used as plasticizers in numerous consumer products, commodities, and building materials. Consequently, phthalates are found in human residential and occupational environments in high concentrations, both in air and in dust. Phthalates are also ubiquitous food and environmental contaminants. An increasing number of studies sampling human urine reveal the ubiquitous phthalate exposure of consumers in industrialized countries. At the same time, recent toxicological studies have demonstrated the potential of the most important phthalates to disturb the human hormonal system and human sexual development and reproduction. Additionally, phthalates are suspected to trigger asthma and dermal diseases in children. To find the important sources of phthalates in Europeans, a scenario-based approach is applied here. Scenarios representing realistic exposure situations are generated to calculate the age-specific range in daily consumer exposure to eight phthalates. The scenarios demonstrate that exposure of infant and adult consumers is caused by different sources in many cases. Infant consumers experience significantly higher daily exposure to phthalates in relation to their body weight than older consumers. The use of consumer products and different indoor sources dominate the exposure to dimethyl, diethyl, benzylbutyl, diisononyl, and diisodecyl phthalates, whereas food has a major influence on the exposure to diisobutyl, dibutyl, and di-2-ethylhexyl phthalates. The scenario-based approach chosen in the present study provides a link between the knowledge on emission sources of phthalates and the concentrations of phthalate metabolites found in human urine.     

Limited Information and Advertising in the U.S. Personal Computer Industry

Traditional discrete‐choice models assume buyers are aware of all products for sale. In markets where products change rapidly, the full information assumption is untenable. I present a discrete‐choice model of limited consumer information, where advertising influences the set of products from which consumers choose to purchase. I apply the model to the U.S. personal computer market where top firms spend over $2 billion annually on advertising. I find estimated markups of 19% over production costs, where top firms advertise more than average and earn higher than average markups. High markups are explained to a large extent by informational asymmetries across consumers, where full information models predict markups of one‐fourth the magnitude. I find that estimated product demand curves are biased toward being too elastic under traditional models. I show how to use data on media exposure to improve estimated price elasticities in the absence of micro ad data.     

Strategic Consumer Cooperation in a Name‐Your‐Own‐Price Channel

Supplier reluctance to openly advertise highly discounted products on the Internet has stimulated development of “opaque” name‐Your‐Own‐Price sales channels. Unfortunately (for suppliers), there is significant potential for online consumers to exploit these channels through collaboration in social networks. In this paper, we study three possible forms of consumer collaboration: exchange of bid result information, coordinated bidding, and coordinated bidding with risk pooling. We propose an egalitarian total utility maximizing mechanism for coordination and risk pooling in a bidding club and describe characteristics of consumers for whom participation in the club makes sense. We show that, in the absence of risk pooling, a plausible bidding club strategy using just information exchange gives almost the same benefits to consumers as coordinated bidding. In contrast, coordinated bidding with risk pooling can lead to significantly increased benefits for consumers. The benefits of risk pooling are highest for consumers with a low tolerance to risk. We also demonstrate that suppliers that actively adjust for such strategic consumer behavior can reduce the impact on their businesses and, under some circumstances, even increase revenues.     

考虑策略型消费者的在线零售商库存信息披露及联合定价、库存决策模型

在两期销售环境下,研究了面向策略型消费者的在线零售商库存信息披露及联合定价、库存决策问题。考虑在线零售商库存信息共享和隐藏两种库存披露策略,构建了在线零售商两期销售利润模型。通过分析消费者的购买行为,讨论了在具有策略型消费者的市场中,在线零售商应如何选择库存信息披露策略,以及如何制定最优定价和库存决策。在此基础上,分析了相关参数对在线零售商决策及利润的影响。研究结果表明,在线零售商的最优定价及库存决策受消费者估值折扣系数和第二期定价策略的影响。特别地,当在线零售商选择第一期缺货时,更倾向于共享其库存水平信息;当在线零售商选择第二期缺货或者两期均不缺货时,消费者估值折扣系数存在一个阈值,当低于该阈值时,在线零售商会选择隐藏库存水平信息,当高于该阈值时,在线零售商会选择共享库存水平信息。     

竞争市场上保修期与价格的联合质量信号传递作用

虽然顾客重视产品的质量（可靠性），但其在做出购买决策时往往不能完全掌握产品的质量信息。不同质量的产品可能具有不同生产和保修成本，因此保修期和销售价格可以成为传递产品质量的有效信号。考虑市场上存在相互竞争的两个生产商：在位者和新进者，顾客了解在位者的产品质量信息但不了解新进者的质量状况。研究并比较了仅保修期作为单质量信号、保修期和价格同时作为质量信号时，市场实现分离均衡的条件，以及新进者的保修期设计与定价决策。研究表明：在保修期作为单质量信号时，只要高质量新进者的单位时间保修成本小于低质量新进者，即可实现分离均衡；在保修期和价格同时作为质量信号时，当满足某些条件时也可实现分离均衡。相对于保修期作单质量信号的情形，当保修期和价格同作质量信号时，高质量新进者实现分离均衡所需提供的保修期更短、价格更低（信息租金更少），且能获得更高的市场份额和利润。最后，数值分析表明保修期和价格同作质量信号时所需满足的条件是比较宽松的，比保修期单独作质量信号时更容易实现分离均衡。     

Food Risks on the Web: Analysis of the 2017 Fipronil Alert in the Italian Online Information Sources

In the summer of 2017, several European Union Member States were involved in a food alert caused by the presence of fipronil pesticide residues in chicken eggs. The food alert became a major news and received wide coverage both in the mass media and on the Internet. This article describes a study that analyzed how the Italian online information sources represented the fipronil alert, using web monitoring techniques and both manual and automatic content analysis methods. The results indicate that the alert was amplified because general news media could represent the alert within the frame of a political scandal, and because different social actors exploited the case. However, online information sources correctly communicated that the risks for consumers were low, reporting mainly what was officially communicated by the Italian health authorities. The study provides empirical evidence on how the online information sources represent food risks and food alerts and offers useful indications for health authorities in charge of the public communication of food risks.     

Consumer Awareness, Understanding and Usage of Unit Pricing

The debate continues over whether prescribed quantities or unit pricing offers the best method to enable consumers to make value-for-money comparisons. In theory, the 'informed' consumer should benefit from being given unit-price information to identify optimum purchases; in practice, however, it would appear that many consumers do not use the data. Although unit pricing can reduce the level of confusion caused by large product ranges and large numbers of unique size–price combinations, results of a survey of over 1000 people showed that: 31% of the sample did not understand how unit pricing was meant to help them compare products; 35% could not be bothered to look at unit prices and 28% stated that unit pricing was too difficult to use. Those least likely to look at unit prices are women, the least educated and consumers aged 18–34. The research investigated why consumers do not use unit-price information and found: some consumers do not possess the cognitive ability to process the information and feel unit pricing is too complicated to use; some products are not comparable, which makes unit prices misleading; many shops do not provide unit-price information; unit-price information was felt unnecessary when evaluating products with few or no alternative sizes or brands; unit-price comparisons take too much time; consumers use simpler strategies for getting value for money, e.g. volume discount heuristic, own brands, special offers, x% free, reward points, etc. The paper explores policy and retailer implications for unit pricing and examines recommendations for government.     

考虑消费者版权意识差异的信息产品定价策略

依据消费者的版权意识差异将消费者细分为伦理消费者和普通消费者,研究了信息产品垄断厂商的最优定价策略及其对艺术创作者的影响。研究表明:垄断厂商的最优定价因消费者结构、市场敏感性等因素而存在较大差异,没有一个固定的定价策略。高价策略可以得到伦理消费者的支持,但当存在盗版威胁时,垄断厂商因普通消费者的价格敏感特性而面临利润损失,单位可变成本越低,利润损失越大。此外,艺术创作者的期望定价要低于垄断厂商的最优定价,提高版权费率并不能保证给艺术创作者带来收益增加,双方存在定价协调问题。     

网店信息呈现的框架效应对消费者购买决策的影响研究

目前有关在线消费者购买意愿的研究，绝大多数是基于实验统计的方法，分析影响消费者购买决策的因素，网店信息呈现的框架形式往往仅作为其中的关键因素被一些研究提及并加以验证。但是，"形态各异"的信息到底如何影响消费者心理进而影响到他们的决策？商家如何从消费者心理的微观层面来设计信息呈现策略，从而增强其购买意愿？目前关于此的研究尚不多见。本研究从前景理论的决策参考点视角，以价格因素为例，一方面，通过情境实验，验证了价格信息的不同呈现框架对于消费者购买意愿的影响作用；另一方面，在利用情境实验界定了消费者心理价格参考点的基础上，通过决策模型的构建和计算，从微观层面分析了不同价格信息呈现框架下，消费者购买选择大相径庭的原因。研究结果表明：（1）在风险框架下，相对于用不确定的语言来描述商品价格信息，确定性语言描述会使消费者的心理价格参考点和购买意愿更高。（2）在属性框架下，相对于用负面的语言来描述商品信息，正面的语言描述更能提高消费者的心理价格参考点和购买意愿。（3）在目标框架下，相对于强调购买行为可能给消费者带来的收益，强调不购买该商品可能给消费者带来的损失更有助于消费者的心理价格参考点和购买意愿的提高。基于上述研究结果，作者围绕网店如何有效的呈现信息提出了管理建议，并讨论了本研究的理论意义与应用价值。     

基于策略性竞争博弈的供应链信息共享策略

在供应链成员的市场信息以及成本非对称的情形下,讨论两个终端企业（一个自产自销,一个从上游批发产品）,在供应链中信息共享策略的方案,包括：信息优势企业如何根据市场需求情况确定是否信息共享（若是,则如何共享）;信息劣势企业如何根据对方透露出的市场信息来决策订货量;上游供应链如何决策批发价,从而控制整个供应链的博弈态势,使下游销售商在竞争中更为主动。经过研究发现,低市场类型时,自产自销商乐于共享信息,使竞争对手摄于低迷的市场状况从而降低订货量;在高市场类型且市场波动较小时自产自销商依然选择共享,在乐观的市场条件下表明自己的竞争优势,从而一定程度上威摄入侵者;而市场波动较大时,由于信息共享的额外收益不足以抵消信息共享需付出的额外成本,从而选择不共享信息。     

诱导性信息对消费者选择的折中效应的影响

为了考察消费者处于诱导性信息环境下的选择结果,通过2个实验发现,即使当消费者面对各种诱导性信息时,依然会在消费选择中表现出折中效应。但是,如果改变呈现诱导性信息的方式,使消费者在中性信息环境下自主做出选择,再呈现诱导信息,则可以系统性地弱化折中效应,从而改变消费者的选择偏好。     

Trade-offs in Online Purchase Decisions:: Two Empirical Studies in Europe

The Internet offers firms a new way to market their products and services and to interact with their end-consumers. While many firms have developed websites, very little is known about the trade-offs consumers are willing to make when making online purchases. With millions of websites competing for attention, online firms need to know in what way consumers make purchase decisions online. Consumers mainly evaluate websites on the basis of choice and convenience. In this paper, we present the results of two European studies that examine what consumers actually value in an online environment. In study 1, we assess choice-related trade-offs in terms of number of product categories, variety of products within a given category and product-related information. Conjoint analysis revealed that product-related information represents an important decision-making variable. In study 2, we assess convenience-related trade-offs in terms of logistics, fulfilment and security. Conjoint analysis revealed that fulfilment is the most important variable related to online handling. Finally, our study clearly indicates that firms have to distinguish different consumer segments on the basis of their preferences. This knowledge enables online firms to use their resources more effectively.     

网络视角的风险与时尚对消费者信息搜索行为影响研究

消费者决策一直是消费者行为研究的核心,信息搜索作为消费者决策的第一步受到理论和实践界的普遍关注。互联网时代,消费环境快速变化呈现出网络化特点,消费者追求时尚与个性化,产品技术复杂化增加了消费者购买的风险,这些因素使得消费行为越发嵌入于网络当中。基于此,文章从网络视角出发,以感知风险和时尚为切入点研究社会网络对消费者信息搜索行为的影响。在网络构建上,与通常直接建立网络的方法不同,作者将网络结构指标与回归分析相结合,通过对以往文献的梳理,构建了以网络规模、网络结构洞、网络凝聚子群和关系强度为指标的社会网络结构量表,采用回归的方法揭示社会网络对消费者信息搜索的作用。通过对样本消费者调查研究发现,时尚和社会网络影响消费者信息搜索行为。其中,时尚敏感度与消费者信息搜索行为之间存在正向关联。社会网络中的网络规模和关系强度会分别发挥正向和负向的调节作用,调节时尚敏感度与信息搜索行为之间的关系。该研究在一方面为今后网络角度的消费者行为研究在网络构建上提供帮助,另一方面验证了企业在进行产品设计、品牌营销时,可以借助社会网络,提高战略的针对性和有效性。     

Monopoly Versioning of Information Goods When Consumers Have Group Tastes

Large sunk costs of development, negligible costs of reproduction, and distribution resulting in economies of scale distinguish information goods from physical goods. Versioning is a way firms may take advantage of these properties. However, in a baseline model where consumers differ in their tastes for quality, an information goods monopolist only offers one version, and this differs from what we observe in practice. We explore formulations that add features to the baseline model that result in a monopolist offering multiple versions. We examine versioning where consumers differ in individual tastes for quality, and groups of consumers that share the same group taste are delineated by segments of individual tastes. We find that if groups have mutually exclusive characteristics—a horizontal dimension—that they value relative to the shared characteristics, then versioning is optimal. Consequently, any horizontal differentiation in product line design favors versioning. In addition, when group tastes are hierarchical such that higher taste groups value characteristics that lower taste groups value but not vice versa—a vertical dimension—as long as the valuations of the higher and adjacent lower taste group are sufficiently close, then versioning is also optimal. Our conditions, which also help determine how many versions are optimal, are based on exogenously defined parameters so that it is feasible to check them in practice.