Antecedents to contraceptive innovation: Evidence from rural Northern Thailand

A number of different causal mechanisms have been proposed to explain the onset of fertility declines in populations with previously uncontrolled fertility, but they have never been adequately tested. The present study identifies and tests five antecedents to family limitation practices in a sample of 755 currently married couples resident in rural Northern Thailand. The loglinear multiple regression models estimated indicate that couples in more developed districts, more modern couples, couples in which wives have more equal roles, couples believing that intergenerational wealth transfers favor children rather than their parents, and more wealthy couples, were all significantly more likely to be early adopters of contraception. Local development levels appeared to have the greatest net effects on the timing of adoption of fertility control. In addition, couples in areas where contraceptive services were more readily available were also significantly more likely to be contraceptive innovators, net of these five variables.     

Education,employment, and fertility in Kinshasa and prospects for changes in reproductive behavior

This paper examines fertility behavior of women in Kinshasa, Zaire's capital city with a population of roughly four million. We look at relationships linking women's education, employment, and fertility behavior (children ever born, age at first marriage, contraception, abortion, breastfeeding, and postpartum abstinence), using data from a 1990 survey of reproductive-age women. Other things equal, there are significant differences by educational attainment and by modern sector employment in lifetime fertility and in most of the proximate determinants as well. The results suggest that modern contraception and abortion are alternative fertility control strategies in Kinshasa, with abortion appearing to play an important role in contributing to the observed fertility differentials by education and employment. The dramatic increases that have taken place in women's access to secondary and higher education are likely to reduce fertility in the future, while the effects of Zaire's current economic and political crisis are uncertain. Our findings are consistent with some of the arguments of Caldwell et al. (1992) on a new type of fertility transition in sub-Saharan Africa. If Zaire seeks to lower fertility, policy efforts should be made to soften the impact of economic crisis on school enrollments and enhance opportunities for young women to remain in school, at least well into the secondary level. Policy should also seek to promote more effective marketing and delivery of modern family planning services, so as to induce women to substitute modern contraception for abortion as a means of controlling their fertility.     

Unmet need for couples: An analytical framework and evaluation with DHS data

While estimates of unmet need continue to be an important measure of the extent of demand for contraception and family planning programs success in developing countries, there are various reservations about the validity of these estimates. For instance, the traditional formulation of the measurement has relied solely on information from women while inferences from the findings are often drawn for couples. As more survey data have become available for both men and women in a number of countries, there is increasing evidence suggesting that husbands' preferences are indeed important determinants of the reproductive behavior of couples. This paper developsan analytical framework for measuring unmet need for couples. The approach: (1) takes a fresh look at the classification of pregnant and amenorrheic women, and (2) incorporates the contraceptive use and fertility preferences of husband and wife in estimating the level of unmet need in six sub-Saharan African countries. Our findings shows that taking these factors into account results in a 50 to 66 percent reduction in the level of unmet need in these countries. The importance of husbands' variables in determining the level of unmet need is clearly evident when examined among fecund couples in which the wife is neither pregnant nor amenorrheic. The implications of these findings for family planning programs and research are discussed.     

Withdrawal in Pakistan: new insight into an old method

Although family planning programs pay almost no attention to the validity of coitus interruptus (withdrawal), it is a traditional method of family planning widely used to regulate fertility in Pakistan. Large-scale quantitative studies conducted in recent years in Pakistan by the Population Council have indicated that withdrawal is the most popular temporary method of fertility regulation in the country, second among all methods only to female sterilization. Pakistani couples use withdrawal mainly because they believe that modern methods are unsafe for women and unreliable. They have some fears and misconceptions about modern methods. The method may work well in Pakistan also because users seem to feel that they own it. Withdrawal is therefore a reasonable option given Pakistanis' beliefs and circumstances. Those who use withdrawal in Pakistan practice the technique with considerable efficacy and tend to continue using it. Furthermore, couples which use withdrawal have discussed their family planning preferences and decided together to use the method. However, in order to improve the use of modern methods of contraception, information provision, counseling, and interpersonal communication must be improved.     

Demographic aspects of fertility in Thailand

Abstract Data from a national rural and urban sample survey are analysed in order to examine various demographic aspects of fertility in Thailand. Marital fertility rates found for Thailand are among the highest in Asia. Particularly noteworthy is the persistence of high fertility at older ages of childbearing for rural women. Cumulative fertility shows a pronounced relationship with age at marriage and current marital status. Women who marry at an older age or who experience disruption of their marriages are clearly more likely to have fewer children ever born. Differences in both current and cumulative fertility are strongly associated with residence. Rural women who constitute the vast majority of Thai women, experience the highest fertility, Bangkok-Thonburi women experience the lowest fertility and provincial urban women are characterized by an intermediate fertility level which is closer, however, to the experience of their counterparts in the capital than in the countryside. Rural-urban fertility differences are mitigated but by no means eliminated by differences in infant mortality. In both rural and urban areas a positive association between cumulative fertility and infant morality is evident. Breast-feeding, commonly practised for extended periods-among both rural and urban Thai women, undoubtedly serves to some extent as an intervening variable in this relationship. A comparison of current fertility with cumulative fertility strongly suggests that a decline in marital fertility has been under way recently among urban women, especially those residing in the capital, but not at all among rural women. Although it seems safe to assume that the urban fertility decline results in large part from an increasing use of contraception among urban women, those still in the reproductive ages who were using or had previously used birth control were characterized by higher cumulative fertility than women who had never practised contraception. Evidently couples resort to family planning only late in the family building process after they have already achieved or exceeded the number of children they wish to have.     

Comparison and fairness in family planning]

There are two kinds of comparison in family planning (FP) practice. First, people compare the number of children they have with their desired family size. Second, people compare their number of children with other's. The extent of their satisfaction from the comparison often depends on their expectation. And people's expectation about their family size may have an impact on the level of fertility. One task in a FP program is to regulate people's objects for comparison and to reduce the number of children they expect to have. But, changes in people's desired number of children are largely dependent upon the socio economic charges which can not be achieved in short time. Therefore, it would be more advisable to direct people to compare their fertility behavior with those of couples who have only one child, rather than those who have 3 or 4. Satisfaction with family size also comes from a feeling of fairness. People not only look at what they get, but also at what others get. Fairness and justice in FP program implementation is important. If those who violate local birth control policies and regulations are not properly punished, other people would feel that the situation is unfair and they would regret that they did not do the same. The pressure brought by over-population to socio-economic development has been gradually felt by most people. But, it is still difficult to have them strictly observe the present fertility regulation policy. If restrictions of various kinds are enforced and education and publicity are used, people will feel that they are being treated fairly. This will facilitate the promotion of the FP program.     

Women's autonomy,women's status and fertility-related behavior in Zimbabwe

Women's household decision-making autonomy is a potentially important but less studied indicator of women's ability to control their fertility. Using a DHS sample of 3,701 married black African women from Zimbabwe, I look at women who have no say in major purchases, whether they should work outside the home,and the number of children. When men dominated all household decisions, women were less likely to approve of contraceptive use, discuss their desired number of children with their spouse, report ever use of a modern method of contraception, and to intend to use contraception in the future. However, women's decision-making autonomy was not associated with current modern contraceptive use. Women who had no decision-making autonomy had 0.26 more children than women who had some autonomy. These autonomy measures provide additional independent explanatory power of fertility-related behavior net of traditional measures of women's status such as education and labor force participation.     

Current primary investigation on the view of family planning of Chinese peasants]

The ideal number of children for 850 couples among 10 cities or counties and 20 villages in China were surveyed. Of the 850, only 1 wanted unlimited children, which accounted for 0.12% of the couples. About 33 desired more than 5, which accounted for 3.9%. However, most of the couples, about 81.4%, prefer 2 or 3 children. 3.2% of the couples were happy with 1 child in their life. In China, peasants still want more children because of their economic situation. There is no retirement and health insurance in the countryside, and the major labor force is in field work. Some consider males as better able to keep family heritage intact. Also, there is difference between agricultural and nonagricultural couples. Comparing the percentage of couples who want 2-3 children, 80% in agricultural sector and 92% in nonagricultural sector desired this number. The remainder of the agricultural group desired more than 3 children. Since economic reform started in the countryside in the early 80s, effects on fertility are seen. One is that peasants want more children because of a rising need for labor. On the other hand, many more opportunities are available to change careers and obtain more education, lowering fertility. However, a rise in fertility is predicted as people concentrate more on economic reform and economic development, increasing their need for children.     

The association of television and radio with reproductive behavior

This note analyzes the association between media exposure and reproductive behavior in 48 developing countries. A summary of part of a more extensive Demographic and Health Surveys report, it shows strong connections between media exposure and the use of modern contraception, the number of children desired, and recent fertility. Television viewing is particularly important; it is assumed to expose viewers to aspects of modern life that compete with traditional attitudes toward the family and is associated with greater use of modern contraceptive methods, with a desire for fewer children, and with lower fertility. These relationships are particularly noteworthy because the data measure only the frequency of media exposure with no information about its content.     

Economic development and fertility decline: lessons from Asia's newly industrialized countries

The general thesis that economic development and fertility decline are interrelated is substantiated in literature that discusses the successes of the newly industrialized countries of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. When countries are developing rapidly, family planning accelerates the rate of fertility change, particularly among the poor uneducated rural population. Relying on economic and social development is not enough. National policy in Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan recognized that population growth drains resources and the family planning programs operating since the 1960s contributed to a drop from 5 children/woman to 2 by 1988, and 70% of married couples used contraception. Coupled with this, age at marriage rose, contraception became more available, and educational and employment opportunities increased. Economically, the growth rate in the 1980's was 6-10% annually, with growth in the manufacturing and service sectors and export trade. Close economic ties evolved between governments and private sectors. Social development programs had been fully funded and gains evident in education, living standards, health care and nutrition, and life expectancy. The success of family planning is attributed to encouraging contraceptive awareness and use. Fertility reduction may occur with social and economic development, but no developing countries have reduced fertility without family planning. The relative importance of family planning may change over time, and reducing the cost through government sponsored family planning programs and encouraging the acceptability of contraceptive usage.     

The influence of wives’ and husbands’ fertility preferences on progression to a third birth in Nepal, 1997–2009

As couples across the globe increasingly exercise conscious control over their reproduction, both spouses’ family-size preferences have the opportunity to influence their fertility. Using couple-level measures of rural Nepalese spouses’ family-size preferences and more than a decade of monthly panel data collected subsequently on fertility outcomes, we investigate how both spouses’ preferences influence progression to a third birth in a country where the widely professed ideal family size is two children. Contrary to expectations based on women's relative disadvantage, we find that it is wives’ preferences that drive couples’ progression to a third birth. We find also that the influence of wives’ preferences is not explained by contraceptive use but that this influence is moderated by couple communication about family planning. Wives’ preferences drive progression to a third birth among couples who had discussed how many children to have.     

Costs and benefits of children: implications for population policy

Family size preferences are strongly affected by parents' perceptions of the value, economic contributions, and costs of children. Better understanding of these factors can help policy-makers to improve the effectiveness of population IEC campaigns, design strategies to persuade couples to have smaller families, assess the relationship between economic development and family size preferences, and devise national population policies and family planning programs that reflect individual choices. Parents in high-fertility countries are more likely to perceive children as productive investments than those in low-fertility countries. Parents in the former countries maintain children are an economic advantage or provide practical assistance in the household; they are less likely to emphasize the psychological advantages of children. As economic development occurs, and parents no longer value children for their economic contributions, psychological and social reasons become more important. Changing fertility preferences is more complex than providing couples with family planning services. Similarly, efforts to persuade families that large families are a burden are successful only when families are already interested in reducing their family size. Efforts to persuade couples to have smaller families are likely to be more successful if there are alternative sources of old-age support available, for example, from increased household savings, public or private pensions, or greater contributions from 1st and 2nd children. Investments in education and training, especially for women and children, would also support these goals.     

Attitudes About Children and Fertility Limitation Behavior

The relationship between attitudes and individual behavior is at the core of virtually all demographic theories of fertility. This paper extends our understanding of fertility behavior by exploring how psychic costs of childbearing and contraceptive use, conceptualized as attitudes about children and contraception, are related to the transition from high fertility and little contraceptive use to lower fertility and wide spread contraceptive use. Using data from rural Nepal, I examine models of the relationship between multiple, setting-specific attitudes about children and contraception and the hazard of contraceptive use to limit childbearing. Specific attitude measures attempt to capture the relative value of children versus consumer goods, the religiously based value of children, and the acceptability of contraceptive use. Findings demonstrate that multiple measures of women’s attitudes about children and contraception were all independently related to their fertility limitation behavior.     

Which couples at given parities expect to have additional births? An exercise in discriminant analysis

Do couples at given parities who expect to have additional births differ on selected characteristics from their counterparts who do not expect to have any more children? This question is examined herein focusing attention on the wife’s age, age at marriage, religion, and education and the husband’s education and income. The method used is the discriminant-function analysis. The data are from the 1965 U. S. National Fertility Study. The combined discriminatory power of the social and economic background characteristics examined herein has been found to be greater at higher parities than at lower ones, while the opposite is true of demographic characteristics.     

Secrecy and silence: why women hide contraceptive use

A recent Population Council survey of 1860 married women and 1056 of their husbands in urban Zambia found that many women who use contraception do so without their husbands' knowledge and that those women who hid their practice of contraception from their husbands did so because they found it very difficult to bring up the subject of family planning with them. These findings indicate that low levels of contraceptive use are not the result of a simple communication matter. Sex and sexuality are often the exclusive domain of African husbands. As such, if a wife initiates a discussion of family planning, she may threaten her husband's sense of control and create discord within the family. The culture of silence about sex and sexuality is very strong in Africa. 57% of women stated that were they to propose contraceptive use with their husbands and the husband opposed such practice, they would nonetheless use them without his knowledge. 7% of the women stated that if their husbands disapproved of contraceptive use, they would nonetheless openly use a method against his wishes. The majority of women correctly perceived their husbands' views on family planning use and fertility preferences. In focus groups, both men and women said that they did not believe that women have the right to independently act upon their reproductive preferences. A husband's inadequate financial support of his children could, however, justify clandestine contraceptive use. These findings point to the need to include easily hidden methods in the mix of contraceptives family planning programs offer. Moreover, service providers should not automatically encourage husbands' involvement. A client's right to privacy should always be respected.     

Marital Fertility Control Among the Qing Nobility: Implications for Two Types of Preventive Check

Demographers, as early as Malthus, have assumed that the preventive checks, delayed marriage and celibacy, were absent in traditional China. In this paper on the Qing (1644–1911) imperial lineage, we demonstrate that, instead, there may have been a different, more ‘modern’ preventive check: fertility control within marriage. Marital fertility of lineage couples during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was low to moderate. Such low fertility was the product of three behavioural mechanisms: late starting, early stopping and, most significantly, long spacing. Couples apparently regulated their fertility according to their economic resources and the sex of their surviving children. Moreover, they did so, we suggest, by regulating their coital frequency. Deliberate fertility control, in other words, was already within the ‘calculus of conscious choice’ for some Chinese well before this century. The speed of contemporary sinitic fertility transitions may accordingly be attributed to the fact that they did not require a change in attitudes, only the diffusion of new incentives and effective technologies.     

Couples’ time together: complementarities in production versus complementarities in consumption

Economists have previously suggested that gains from marriage can be generated by complementarities in production (gains from specialization and exchange) or by complementarities in consumption (gains from joint consumption of household public goods and joint time consumption). This paper uses the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) from 2003 to 2011 to test whether couples that engage in less specialization (are more similar in hours of market work) spend more time together. We find that among married couples without young children, those with a greater difference in weekly hours of work between husband and wife spend less time together on non-working weekend days. Importantly, we find that this relationship is quite symmetric between couples in which the husband works greater hours and couples in which the wife works greater hours. We do not find evidence of a relationship between specialization and couple time together among couples with young children.     

The value and cost of children

Recent research on actual and perceived benefits and costs of children to their parents in both developed and less developed countries is summarized. Such figures and research cannot only help predict fertility behavior but can also provide data for welfare departments figuring support costs, courts setting support costs, and government planners allocating resources. Findings on costs and satisfactions from several major surveys are presented and then actual costs in the U.S. are presented in a series of tables. Research indicates that efforts to popularize small families could well take an economic approach - developing social security systems for the aged, substituting mother's for children's work in developing countries. Compulsory education might also help. 1 researcher suggests publicizing exact costs of raising a child. A survey in Hawaii found that parents uniformly underestimated the direct costs of each child. Also, couples might be most receptive to family planning during the years when economic costs are highest.     

Economic considerations in family growth decisions

Abstract Examination of the fertility patterns of a sample of white Detroit couples at selected stages of the family life cycle indicates that, in a large American metropolis, family income is more closely related to the time when a family is formed and has its children than to the number of children it expects to have. In a longitudinal study, current income is strongly related to the timing of demographic events-the age at marriage, whether pre-maritally pregnant, the time interval from marriage to a given parity, and fertility during a two-year follow-up period. This paper also explores the hypothesis that a family's evaluation of its economic position and the choices it makes about important family expenditures has a relation to fertility apart from the family's objective current income level. Couples who consider their income adequate for their needs or relatively greater than that of their friends or peers, and those who expect substantial increases in the future, tend to expect more children than those who do not. Small but consistent differences obtain over the parities studied. Variables indexing alternative family expenditure patterns, such as cars, or savings for college education for children, are associated with lower family size expectations and longer spacing patterns.     

Age at marriage as a variable in socio-economic differentials in fertility

Earlier studies have pointed out that socio-economic differentials in fertility depend upon both religion and farm background. These studies report a negative relation between fertility and socio-economic status for non-Catholic American couples in contrast to a positive relation for Catholics. Likewise, a negative differential for American couples with farm background has been observed in contrast to no differential for twogeneration urbanites. Age at marriage is a third such interaction variable: the strong negative socio-economic differential observed when wife’s age at marriage is under 19 diminishes with advancing age at marriage and becomes positive for wives who married at age 23 or older. Moreover, for both non-Catholics and Catholics, couples with and without farm background, the differential by wife’s education is negative when wife’s age at marriage is young, positive when her age at marriage is old. Both sociological factors (the incidence of non-familial adult roles) and differential fecundity appear to underlie the interaction. The analysis is based on reports of once-married, white, nonfarm wives aged 30 to 39 included in the 1955 or 1960 Growth of American Families Studies or the 1965 National Fertility Study (approximately 1,000 in each survey).