Re‐examining the Glass Cliff Hypothesis using Survival Analysis: The Case of Female CEO Tenure

We use the glass cliff to study the appointment and employment duration of 193 female CEOs between 1992 and 2014 in a sample of large, small and mid‐size North American firms. Consistent with the glass cliff, we find that women are appointed as CEOs in precarious situations. However, we find female CEOs are 40% less likely to face turnover at any point after appointment than male CEOs. This conflicts with an implication of the glass cliff and differs significantly from existing research which shows that female CEOs have only a slightly lower risk of turnover than male CEOs. Our larger, more recent sample captures changes in the labour market that explain the departure from the results of earlier studies. We find evidence that the lower turnover rate of female CEOs is related to firms’ desire to avoid the negative publicity that would accompany their termination, and we also show that greater education has a positive impact on CEO job security.     

Unternehmenserfolg, Wechsel im Vorstandsvorsitz und Disziplinierung von Finanzvorständen

The Chief Financial Officer (CFO) is often referred to as a company’s No. 2 on contemporary management boards; yet corresponding empirical evidence is scarce. As a result, academic literature has not yet investigated whether CFOs—like CEOs—are dismissed more frequently if corporate performance is poor and to what extent forced Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover also influences disciplinary action towards CFOs. Therefore, in this paper we examine the antecedents of forced CFO departures in the largest German corporations between 1999 and 2006. Building on principal-agent theory, we expect respective relationships between the board of directors, the CEO, and the CFO. Moreover, we propose that principals also take team-specific and firm-specific human capital into consideration when disciplining agents. We find that poor corporate performance and forced CEO turnover both independently increase the likelihood of CFO dismissal. In addition, we find indications for a close team relationship between CFOs and CEOs. In summary, our results support the prominent role of CFOs alongside CEOs on contemporary management boards and suggest a more detailed consideration of CFOs in future research on performance consequences of managerial successions.     

Determinants of CEO Age at Succession

Based on Brickley’s (2003) call for research on the CEO/turnover relation, we examine determinants of CEO age at succession. Utilizing the similarity–attraction paradigm, we propose that board members will select new CEOs that are similar to their own age. We find a strong positive relation between successor CEO age and average board member age. Thus, the similarity–attraction paradigm seems to play a role in board of director selection of CEO successors. However, we also propose that poor prior performance may mitigate similarity–attraction. Our results are also consistent with this hypothesis because we find no relation between successor CEO and board age following poor prior performance. Finally, the hiring of an age-similar CEO does not reduce the companies’ subsequent financial performance and may even have a slightly positive impact on it.     

Relational Ownership and CEO Continuity: A Property Rights Perspective

Inspired by agency theory, research on Chief Executive Officer (CEO) succession often focuses on turnovers as a mechanism to discipline CEOs in the event of poor firm performance. Recent research extends this view by showing that CEO turnovers can also lead to substantial disruption in a firm's management. Less is known, however, about the antecedents of disruption and continuity in the context of CEO turnovers. Drawing on modern property rights theory, we investigate how CEO continuity varies across different types of firms. Using a sample of Swiss publicly traded firms, we find that relational ownership enhances the likelihood of CEOs staying in office or moving to the position of board chair. Firms with little relational ownership, in contrast, display a high degree of CEO continuity only when capital intensity is high. Provided that a CEO turnover occurs, relational ownership and capital intensity reduce the likelihood of interim CEO successions. These findings highlight the importance of a nuanced view of CEO continuity, taking into account owner types as well as contextual factors.     

CEO grandiose narcissism and firm performance: The role of organizational identification

This study reconciles the positive and negative sides of CEO grandiose narcissism by examining the role that CEO organizational identification plays in moderating the effect of CEO grandiose narcissism on top management team (TMT) behavioral integration. We first distinguish between grandiose and vulnerable narcissism and we then draw on upper echelons theory and executive personality research to hypothesize and test a model in which CEO grandiose narcissism is positively related to TMT behavioral integration when CEOs are high in organizational identification. The relationship is expected to be negative when CEOs do not identify strongly with their organizations. TMT behavioral integration, in turn, predicts subsequent firm performance. Findings based on multi-source data from a sample of 97 CEOs and their firms supported the hypotheses. These results highlight the complex nature of CEO grandiose narcissism – namely, that the construct has both positive and negative aspects as it relates to top management team dynamics and firm performance and that the relationship is affected by CEOs' identification with their organizations.     

Are Female Executives Over‐represented in Precarious Leadership Positions?

We use a sample of CEO appointments at US corporations over the years 1992–2004 to test the 'glass cliff' hypothesis, which posits that females are appointed to leadership positions at firms that are in a precarious financial condition. Our analysis utilizes three measures of stock-price-based financial performance and two distinct control samples of appointments of males to the CEO position. We find that corporate performance preceding CEO appointments tends to favor females, implying that females (males) are appointed to the CEO position largely at times when the firm is in relatively better (worse) financial health. Disaggregating the data by appointments in up versus down markets, at high-risk versus low-risk firms, and by calendar time yield similar conclusions. There appears to be no glass cliff facing female CEOs at US firms. Our findings suggest a need for additional research to identify where and for what types of positions this phenomenon is prevalent.     

Hedging and accounting-based RPE contracts for powerful CEOs

Several firms prohibit their CEOs from trading in the stock of peer firms. This is puzzling since hedging by the CEO through private trading in the capital market can reduce the CEO’s exposure to systematic compensation risk. When the CEO’s incentive contract comprises relative performance evaluation, we find that the firm might want to disallow private hedging even though there are no technological interdependencies or strategic interactions to peer firms. In the analysis, we highlight two frequently observed characteristics of incentive contracts. First, the use of accounting benchmarks is widespread in compensation contracts for CEOs. Second, empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that powerful CEOs have influence on the process of designing their own compensation. We find that in the presence of a powerful CEO, the firm can benefit from disallowing private hedging. In particular, the firm’s decision to allow or to disallow private hedging depends on the characteristics of the accounting benchmarks and the characteristics of the peer firms.     

CEO burnout,managerial discretion,and firm performance: The role of CEO locus of control,structural power,and organizational factors

Despite the possibility of burnout resulting from dynamics in firms' upper echelons, little if any work has focused on chief executive officer's (CEO's) burnout and firm performance. Drawing on managerial discretion theory, this article analyzes the influence of CEO burnout on firm performance and the moderating roles of the individual (CEO locus of control), structural power (CEO duality and CEO tenure), and organizational characteristics (size, age, and resource availability) related to managerial discretion. Using a sample of 156 CEOs in Swedish firms, we find a negative association between CEOs who report higher burnout and firm performance. Our results confirm that CEO duality and resource availability ameliorate and firm size exacerbates the negative association between CEO burnout and firm performance. Contrary to our expectations, CEO locus of control, CEO tenure, and firm age do not influence this relationship. We discuss the implications of our research for upper echelons theory and strategic leadership theory.     

CEO Reciprocal Interlocks in French Corporations

In France the chairperson of the board is mostoften the firm's CEO. This position strengthensthe insiders' hold on the board of directors.Moreover, a large fraction of outside directorsis composed of CEOs of other firms. Thereciprocal interlocking of CEOs creates the possibility of mutual interdependence of CEOs.We investigate factors explaining reciprocalinterlocking directorates of CEOs in Frenchcorporations. Our results indicate that CEOs oflarger firms hold more reciprocal CEOinterlocks and when CEOs have more outsidedirectorships, CEOs hold more reciprocalrelationships. We also find a positiverelationship between the number of CEOsreciprocal interlocks and their firms'performance measured by ROA. We find evidencethat CEOs hold more reciprocal interlocks whena blockholder is present on the CEO's board.     

Monitoring the monitor: Enabling strategic change when the former CEO stays on the board

Firms often retain their former CEOs on the board after succession to benefit from the former CEOs’ firm-specific expertise. However, their presence can inhibit successor CEOs from implementing meaningful strategic change, as the former CEOs seek to preserve their personal legacy and may see the strategic landscape differently, especially when the successor CEO is hired from outside the firm. Using a strategic leadership interface perspective, we propose that board members can alleviate this potential tension and enable strategic change. To test our theory, we focus on a subsample of succession events: when the former CEO stays on board as chair and the successor CEO is an outsider. This scenario is likely to result in strategic tension and cognitive differences between these two organizational leaders. We find that in such situations, boards with a higher proportion of outside directors experience greater post-succession strategic change; we find no effect in other succession scenarios. We isolate legacy conservation as a motivating factor by showing that the effect manifests for divestitures but not for acquisitions.     

The private life of CEOs; A strategic leadership perspective

Major events in the private lives of CEOs have been a source of fascination for decades. However, despite gaining traction, studies on the relevant phenomena (e.g., marriage, divorce, parenthood, illness) remain scattered in parallel across disciplines. We thematically review the interdisciplinary evidence on the fast-emerging literature on CEO private life events (72 unique studies) to consolidate our understanding of how private life events can become reflected in the professional domains of CEO influence. Through this approach, we comprehensively intersect empirical progress on CEO life events with key strategic leadership outcomes (i.e., performance, strategy, socio-ethical issues, innovation, governance), allowing us to identify key gaps and highlight inconsistencies. We then propose several research opportunities and challenges to move the field from phenomenon-driven standalone studies to a more coherent research program on the blurred boundaries between the private and professional lives of CEOs.     

Birds of a feather?: Firm sales growth and narcissism in the upper echelons at the CEO-TMT interface

Blending conceptual framing from the CEO-TMT interface literature with upper echelons decision-making theory, we develop a model of the role of CEO narcissism and narcissism in the upper echelons. We argue that narcissistic CEOs tend to have higher narcissism in their Top Management Teams (N-TMTs). In turn, TMTs characterized by narcissism can benefit from positive aspects of narcissism while avoiding its pitfalls; especially when strategic decision speed is slower and behavioral integration is higher. In a field study of 104 TMTs from publicly-listed South Korean firms, we find an association between narcissistic CEOs and N-TMT, and that N-TMT mediates in the indirect, conditional relationship between CEO narcissism and sales growth. We also invoke threshold theory in anticipation that outcomes associated with N-TMT may be nonlinear. In support of our threshold hypothesis, we find a curvilinear relationship between N-TMT and sales growth; and this curvilinear relationship is stronger for a small number of TMTs scoring high on N-TMT (> +2SD), where TMTs’ activities are defined by deliberative integration. The pattern of results we report provides evidence for the importance of accounting for narcissism in the upper echelons as a predictor of sales growth, and key contextual moderators of this relationship.     

The perks of narcissism: Behaving like a star speeds up career advancement to the CEO position

It is widely acknowledged that narcissism is a peculiar characteristic of leaders, such as CEOs. However, the role of narcissism in CEO emergence and appointment has not been studied yet. We overcome this gap by studying whether having a highly narcissistic personality allows individuals to become CEOs sooner. We posit that these individuals have quicker career development, climbing the hierarchical chain faster. We also hypothesize that this relation may be moderated by the firm's characteristics, comparing family and nonfamily firms. Family firms are the most widespread organizational form of firms around the world, and their peculiarities might affect the appointment of narcissistic CEOs. Estimates on a sample of 172 individuals partially confirm the hypotheses. Highly narcissistic individuals become CEOs quicker, regardless of whether the firm is a family business or not. Narcissistic individuals thus benefit from their personality when aiming at becoming CEOs faster in their career advancement.     

Do Chief Executives’ Traits Affect the Financial Performance of Risk‐trading Firms? Evidence from the UK Insurance Industry

We examine the effects of four key dimensions of Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs’) traits on six financial performance metrics using panel data for 1999?2012 drawn from the UK's property?casualty insurance industry. We find that CEO insurance experience and CEO financial expertise enhance financial performance, while two other CEO traits ? power and age ? are generally not significant. Our results thus reinforce the importance of CEO insurance industry expertise and CEO financial expertise in the management and trading of risks. Our results have potential commercial and policy implications.     

Do CEOs exercise managerial discretion to save their jobs?

Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) wield considerable power and authority. In many industries and contexts, CEO turnover is studied in terms of antecedents, the event itself, and the related consequences. However, the extent to which CEOs exert their power and attempt to prevent their dismissal has not been thoroughly examined. In this study, we examine the role of CEOs exercising managerial discretion in their effort to prevent their own corporate demise. We hypothesize that CEOs cut discretionary expenses such as research and development, advertising, and rent in order to boost earnings and enhance financial performance. A sample of CEO turnover from Standard and Poor’s ExecComp database for the period 1992–1998 in US firms yielded 474 turnover firms and 2,066 control firm-years. We tested the effects of CEO turnover and managerial discretion on firm performance measured by cumulative abnormal stock returns. We also compared the turnover and non-turnover firms in terms of pattern of discretionary spending prior to CEO turnover. The results are consistent with our prediction that CEOs facing termination attempt to post higher earnings by reducing discretionary spending after controlling for firm performance, firm diversification, book to market ratio, and CEO ownership, industry-, and year dummies.     

CEO proactiveness,innovation, and firm performance

Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are essential in driving firm innovation. However, despite existing research on CEO personality characteristics and firm innovation and performance, we know relatively little about how personality characteristics reflecting anticipatory action and strong outcome-oriented components, such as proactiveness, shape firm innovation and performance. We explore the relationship between CEO proactiveness and three facets of organizational innovation, as well as its impact on firm performance. We suggest that CEO proactiveness is manifested in different network-building, problem-solving, and feedback-seeking behaviors with different implications for exploratory innovation, exploitative innovation, and organizational ambidexterity, and that its effect on firm performance is partially mediated by organizational ambidexterity. By examining the influence of this important CEO personality characteristic on key firm strategic choices and performance, we extend research on strategic leadership and firm innovation and performance.     

CEO humility,narcissism and firm innovation: A paradox perspective on CEO traits

We examine how two seemingly contradictory yet potentially complementary CEO traits—humility and narcissism—interact to affect firm innovation. We adopt a paradox perspective and propose that individuals can have paradoxical traits and that, in particular, humility and narcissism can coexist harmoniously, especially among the Chinese, whose philosophical tradition embraces paradoxical thinking and behaving. CEOs that are both humble and narcissistic are hypothesized to be more likely to have socialized charisma, to cultivate an innovative culture, and to deliver innovative performance. Two studies using multisource data involving 63 CEOs, 328 top managers, and 645 middle managers in Study 1 and 143 CEOs and 190 top managers in Study 2 support the hypotheses and point to new directions for studying CEO traits and their effects on firm outcomes.     

Benefiting from CEO's empowerment of TMTs: Does CEO–TMT dissimilarity matter?

This study examines empowering leadership from an upper echelons perspective by focusing on top management teams (TMTs) and considering the demographic dissimilarities between the CEO and other TMT members. Data from a multisource survey of 129 Chinese firms demonstrate the importance of the fit between the backgrounds of the leader and the TMT members. Although empowerment of TMTs by CEOs predicts superior organizational performance in general, the findings show that this practice is most beneficial when the CEO and the TMT members differ in their informational demographics but have a longer tenure overlap. If either dissimilarity in informational demographics or tenure overlap is lacking, the CEO's empowerment of the TMT has a less positive effect on firm performance. Essentially, a three-way interaction is demonstrated. Introducing boundary conditions for the empowerment of TMTs by CEOs and testing their interactive influence broadens our understanding of how CEO leadership style can affect organizational performance, and refines the guidance for practitioners on TMT management.     

A mixed-methods study of CEO transformational leadership and firm performance

This mixed-methods study explores the relationship between CEO transformational leadership and firm performance relying exclusively on secondary data. We used a random sample comprising of 42 CEOs of publicly-listed US and European companies. We evaluated their transformational leadership drawing upon media sources which were content analyzed to create individual CEO profiles. These profiles were then given to a panel of three judges who rated the CEOs on their transformational leadership style. We obtained the firm performance data from Thomson Datastream. Our results showed significant associations between intellectual stimulation and inspirational motivation respectively, and different financial performance indicators. We also observed a tendency of positive relationships between individualized consideration and firm performance. These findings remained significant after controlling for company baseline performance, firm size, CEO tenure, and company location. Our findings largely support the positive role of CEO transformational leadership in shaping firm performance.     

“See You in Court”: How CEO narcissism increases firms' vulnerability to lawsuits

Although some researchers have suggested that narcissistic CEOs may have a positive influence on organizational performance (e.g., Maccoby, 2007; Patel & Cooper, 2014), a growing body of evidence suggests that organizations led by narcissistic CEOs experience considerable downsides, including evidence of increased risk taking, overpaying for acquisitions, manipulating accounting data, and even fraud. In the current study we show that narcissistic CEO's subject their organizations to undue legal risk because they are overconfident about their ability to win and less sensitive to the costs to their organizations of such litigation. Using a sample of 32 firms, we find that those led by narcissistic CEOs are more likely to be involved in litigation and that these lawsuits are more protracted. In two follow-up experimental studies, we examine the mechanism underlying the relationship between narcissism and lawsuits and find that narcissists are less sensitive to objective assessments of risk when making decisions about whether to settle a lawsuit and less willing to take advice from experts. We discuss the implications of our research for advancing theories of narcissism and CEO influence on organizational performance.