食品安全“监管困局”、信号扭曲与制度安排

在既有研究提出的食品安全“监管困局”现象基础上，通过仿真建模及分析进一步解剖该困局的动态形成过程，构建食品市场中生产者、消费者和监管者构成的两期博弈模型，剖析食品安全“监管困局”的内在形成机理． 研究发现: 1) 加大监管力度形成的违规揭露信息会影响到消费者的支付预期，当违规揭露水平超过消费者心理承受时会降低消费者的支付水平，进而影响食品行业平均收益，导致生产经营者的超额违规收益迅速增大，反过来又增强了生产经营者的违规动机，是为食品安全“监管困局”的动态形成过程; 2) 食品安全“监管困局”在于监管者与企业、监管者与消费者两种信息结构使监管力度的信号被扭曲所致，即政府监管力度对消费者形成信号扭曲，消费者无法通过市场价格实现质量信号分离，从而降低支付水平而影响行业平均收益． 本文由此提出针对性的制度安排．     

基于演化博弈的直播电商监管机制研究

针对直播电商粗放发展过程中出现的诱导消费、失信经营、维权难等问题，本文构建了面向直播电商“平台-经营者-消费者”的监管机制模型，运用演化博弈理论分析了不同监管模式下三方主体策略选择的动态演化过程及影响因素，建立了直播电商数字化全链条监管框架，提出了直播电商事前事中事后监管过程中的路径优化策略.研究表明：各主体间策略选择互相影响，平台监管不足时易出现消费者维权式监管困境；不同收益水平经营者在同等监管策略和强度下存在策略选择差异，高收益者更具违规动机应加强监管；通过加强平台事中监管、提高监管效率和事后惩处强度，能有效提高经营者诚信经营水平.同时，提出的监管框架从事前风险预警、事中经营规范、事后违规治理层面，为打破维权式监管困境、破解违规经营和交易取证难等问题提供了新思路.本文对政府和平台优化直播电商全链条监管路径具有较好的参考意义，有利于推动直播电商市场健康有序发展.     

基于非线性系统稳定性理论的P2P网络借贷三方演化博弈分析

由于风险管理意识不足、监管措施缺位、制度设计不完善等问题,近年来我国P2P借贷违约事件频繁发生。为了挖掘P2P网贷行业问题产生的本质机理,并考虑到P2P网贷行业运行是一个多参与主体的博弈过程,本文建立了监管机构、P2P平台和借款人之间的三方博弈复制动态模型。然后,我们将该复制动态模型的演化稳定策略分析问题,转化成一个非线性系统关于平衡点的稳定性分析问题。接着,基于非线性系统稳定性理论,我们首先发现对于三方博弈模型不能简单运用雅可比矩阵的迹和行列式来判断稳定性;然后,对不同情况下的演化稳定策略进行了详细讨论,并得出结论：如果违约借款人在面对合规经营的P2P平台时收益为零、监管支出小于监管收益以及监管机构对违规经营P2P平台的惩罚力度足够,则监管机构、P2P平台和借款人100%都会收敛于监管、合规经营和守约的策略。另外,本文给出了确保期望演化稳定策略的惩罚力度下限的具体值。根据该数据,监管机构可以设定一个相对温和的惩罚力度,让作为金融创新模式的P2P网络借贷能够稳定、健康的发展。最后,根据相关的假设和得出的结论,完善P2P网络借贷监管制度可从如下几个方面进行考虑：①违约借款人在面对合规经营的P2P平台时收益为零;②降低监管成本;③增加监管收益;④加大对违规经营P2P平台的惩罚力度;⑤降低违规经营P2P平台的额外收益;⑥降低合规经营P2P平台的运营成本;⑦提高P2P平台长期合规经营所获得的额外收益。     

食品安全监管"三档"建设初探

近年来,随着我国经济的高速发展,人们生活水平不断提高,食品安全问题日趋成为人们关注的焦点,并发展成为一个世界性的问题.重视食品安全,已经成为衡量人民生活质量、社会管理水平的一个重要方面.那么,如何强化食品安全监管工作,完善食品安全监管手段,我认为,加强食品安全监管档案建设具有重要作用.本文从建立食品企业生产经营档案、执法部门监管档案和综合协调监督档案这三个层面,提出对食品安全监管"三档"建设工作的几点探索和建议.     

排污权交易系统中政府监管策略分析

有效监管是发挥排污权交易制度优越性的根本前提.本文通过构建管制者与排污企业之间的两阶段博弈模型,在分析排污权交易条件下企业行为特征的基础上,从监管力度、许可证分配、违规处罚结构三方面,对有效实现总量控制目标的最优监管对策进行均衡分析.基于博弈分析结论并针对其不足,利用社会科学计算实验方法,构建基于异质主体的排污权交易实验平台,从动态、有限理性的视角对复杂系统监管策略进行验证分析.结果表明:实现总量控制的最优机制设计是激励企业守法排放.这并不是单纯地设置更高的惩罚力度,而是需要追求监管水平与处罚力度的统一.整合了许可证价格的动态监管策略能够更加成本有效的确保环境质量目标达成.     

企业违规行为与最优随机打击——一个实验研究

针对企业违规问题,在考虑企业风险偏好和决策理性程度异质的基础上建立模型,分析在面对监管打击时准完全理性企业群体和存在社会学习过程的有限理性企业群体的不同反应,借鉴最优随机打击理论,提出在资源约束条件下利用完全随机打击和随机分组打击两种方式对抑制两类企业群体的违规会得到不同的效果,通过实验对企业违规水平与监管部门的检查打击力度以及相同检查打击力度下不同实施方式间的关系进行验证。研究结果表明,企业违规水平与检查打击力度呈单调递减关系,但有限理性企业群体与检查打击力度呈二次曲线关系,准完全理性企业群体与检查打击力度呈线性关系;在相同的检查打击力度下,准完全理性群体在低检查打击力度时的违规比例会高于有限理性群体,在较高检查打击力度且完全随机检查打击方式下的违规比例会低于有限理性群体,在检查打击力度同样较高且采用随机分组打击方式的情况下,两群体的违规比例水平基本相当。此外,随机分组打击方式相对于完全随机打击方式对有限理性企业违规水平的降低效果更为明显。研究结论可以为监管部门选择打击方式提供参考。     

政府治理视角下平台电商信用监管的动态演化博弈研究

为破解不完全信息下平台电商的信用“监管困局”,本研究在平台电商、消费者与政府三元主体联动关系的基础上,分别构建政府动态惩罚机制与激励机制下平台电商与消费者的演化博弈模型,并分析平台电商与消费者之间策略选择的影响因素及演化路径。研究表明：在政府监管下,平台电商与消费者通过长期的反复博弈、调整的过程,最终博弈系统演化轨迹呈逐渐收敛的趋势。具体而言,政府动态惩罚机制下,当政府惩罚力度逐渐增加时,平台电商倾向于选择“自律”策略;政府动态激励机制下,当政府对平台电商的激励逐渐增加时,平台电商倾向于选择“自律”策略。更为重要的是,当政府的惩罚力度大于激励政策力度时,政府实施惩罚性政策但没有激励政策的效果要优于政府实施激励政策但不实施惩罚性政策的效果。而当政府的惩罚力度小于激励政策力度时,政府实施激励政策但不实施惩罚性政策的效果与政府实施惩罚性政策但没有激励政策的效果几乎接近。由此可见,政府应将惩罚机制与激励机制相结合适度监管,以此追求信用监管的动态平衡。另外,消费者对平台电商的声誉评价具有两面性：当消费者对平台电商声誉评价越高时,平台电商倾向于选择“自律”策略;而消费者对平台电商声誉评价越低,平台电商反而倾向于选择“不自律”策略。     

考虑消费者策略行为的供应链两周期定价与契约设计

针对由一个制造商与一个零售商构成的供应链,考虑消费者的策略性跨期购买行为,构建了两周期动态博弈模型,分析了消费者策略性程度对两周期均衡结果、消费者剩余和社会福利的影响,比较了分散式与集中式决策的均衡偏差,设计了与消费者策略性程度相关的两周期收益共享契约与"两周期收益共享+转移支付"组合式契约。研究表明：分散式决策下,消费者策略性程度有利于增加消费者剩余和社会福利,但会对供应链成员不利;某些情形下,消费者策略性程度会使分散式与集中式决策的系统利润差值增大;当消费者策略性程度相对较低时,两周期收益共享契约不仅可实现供应链完美协调,还可增加消费者剩余和社会福利;当消费者策略性程度较高时,通过组合式契约可实现供应链完美协调,但此时消费者策略性程度的增强可能对消费者剩余和社会福利产生负面影响。     

黑网吧成因及其治理对策

食品安全监管是一项复杂的系统工程,农村食品安全状况更是不尽人意.维护农村食品市场经营秩序,加大市场监管力度,规范市场交易行为,切实保障农民消费者的合法利益,维护农村食品市场安全是工商行政管理部门担负的重要职责.     

非对称信息供应链质量信号传递博弈分析

基于博弈论和委托代理理论,研究了非对称信息条件下供应链节点企业间如何进行质量信号传递的问题。供应商对生产过程投资水平进行决策并采取质量预防策略,为获得最优质量契约可将其生产过程水平类型以信号传递给生产商,其对接收到的中间部件或原材料进行质量评价决策和加工处理决策。运用最优化原理,构建了生产商产品质量决策控制模型,并对生产商支付的"信息租金"进行了量化的描述并进行了仿真检验,结果证明:供应商有激励性动机将其生产过程水平类型以信号传递给生产商,并提高中间部件或原材料质量水平;当生产商观测到供应商所提供的产品质量信号后,将降低其产品质量检验水平、提高加工处理水平,增加向供应商的前向支付,作为对供应商提高产品质量水平的质量奖励,同时整个供应链的联合期望收益将显著增加,并使生产商为获取供应商产品质量水平向其支付的"信息租金"减少。最后论证了供应商进行产品质量信号传递过程中"棘轮效应"的成因,并给出了以上各结论相应的定量分析与证明。     

A Brief Review and Assessment of the Leegin Decision: Who Wins and Who Loses When Manufacturers Are Free to Set Retail Prices?

For decades, it has been a per se violation of U.S. antitrust law for manufacturers or distributors to specify retail selling prices. In the spirit of atomistic, unrestrained competition, retailers were free to set prices without undue interference from upstream channel participants. Attempts by manufacturers or other channel participants to restrict retail price setting initiatives were viewed by regulators as an unwarranted and illegal interference with the market mechanism. Restrictions on price setting initiatives would, it was argued, lessen competition and ultimately raise prices above competitive levels to the detriment of consumers. Recently, under the leadership of newly appointed Chief Justice Roberts, a more “business friendly” Supreme Court has reversed this policy; vertical price fixing is no longer a per se violation of U.S. antitrust law. By a five‐to‐four margin, the Court held in Leegin Creative Leather Products that manufacturers could, under certain circumstances, establish binding retail selling prices. Henceforth, retail price setting restrictions will be subject to a rule of reason evaluation whereby price restrictions will be assessed on a case‐by‐case basis. Proponents of the now‐legal restrictions argue that this will ensure that merchandise sold through retail outlets will receive needed support, free riding will be reduced or eliminated, and new brand introduction will be facilitated. Critics argue that the Court's decision marks a return to the days of fair trading; marginal firms will be protected, so‐called “inframarginal consumers” will be forced to pay for services they do not want or need, and prices for many branded products will rise, all to the detriment of consumer welfare.     

The Weakest Link: Demonstrating the Inconsistency of "Appropriate Levels of Protection" in Australia-Salmon

In Australia-Salmon, the WTO Appellate Body found Australia to be in violation of the WTO SPS Agreement based on the inconsistency of the "appropriate level of protection" underlying various SPS measures. Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement prohibits arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in "appropriate levels of protection" if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. In Australia-Salmon, Canada challenged Australia's import ban on salmon. Australia permitted the entry of other fish products that were known to host some of the same diseases cited by Australia in justifying its salmon import ban. The distinction in the "appropriate levels of protection" between Australia's regulation of salmon and its treatment of these other fish products was found to be "arbitrary or unjustified" and to have "resulted in a restriction on international trade."Australia-Salmon was the first WTO decision to find an Article 5.5 violation. Canada successfully made a "weakest link" argument to undercut Australia's regulatory justification. The decision rests on the relationship between the risk purportedly justifying the salmon import ban and the risk seemingly ignored in Australia's treatment of other fish products-the regulatory "situations" compared concerned the identical pathogens with the identical potential consequences. As such, Australia-Salmon may be an example of a category of regulatory "chains" that are peculiarly exposed to Article 5.5 challenge. In responding to the Appellate Body's ruling, Australia reduced its limits on salmon and imposed new restrictions on the other fish products. The outcome suggests that a challenge of one SPS measure under Article 5.5 may lead to the imposition of new restrictions on other imported products-an unexpected result for the free trade regime.     

政府市场规制、产品消费选择和企业绿色技术创新

本文通过构建由地方政府、企业和消费者组成的绿色技术创新系统演化博弈模型,分析了不同现实情形下系统的均衡策略演化过程,并借助系统动力学实验方法进一步研究了相关因素对系统均衡的影响。研究发现:(1)在绿色技术创新演化博弈系统所有可能的均衡策略中,只存在三个稳定的均衡策略,即地方政府、企业和消费者的策略分别为(市场规制,不绿色技术创新,购买传统产品)、(市场规制,绿色技术创新,购买传统产品)、(市场规制,绿色技术创新,购买绿色产品)。(2)企业绿色技术创新品牌收益和消费者绿色产品消费的经济收益是影响博弈演化系统最终向不同稳定均衡策略演进的主要因素。(3)在第一种均衡状态下,产品的基础价值、绿色偏好收益、绿色消费意识和产品价格等是影响消费者购买绿色产品的主要因素;在第二种均衡状态下,政策收益、规制成本及产品市场需求量是影响政府采取市场规制策略的主要因素;在第三种均衡状态下,绿色技术创新补贴系数、市场规制强度和企业绿色技术创新品牌收益是影响企业采取绿色技术创新策略的主要因素,且各影响因素对博弈主体策略选择的方向和边际的影响均存在较大差异。上述结论将为进一步完善绿色发展理论提供参考,也为构建市场导向的绿色技术创新体系提供借鉴。     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION IN MARKETS WITH NAÏVE CONSUMERS

In a model of a competitive industry selling base goods and add‐ons, we investigate the conditions under which citizen‐consumers will support policies that eliminate behavioral inefficiencies induced by naïve consumers. Unregulated competitive markets have two effects: they produce deadweight losses, and they redistribute income away from biased consumers. Both unbiased and naïve consumers believe that they benefit from this redistribution (the naïve consumers are wrong), so support for efficiency‐improving regulation is limited. Extending our model to consumers with partial sophistication about their naïveté, we predict patterns of regulation consistent with the form and timing of the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009.     

住房反向抵押贷款保险市场博弈演化模型研究

针对目前我国住房反向抵押贷款保险市场"供需双冷"的问题,本文从供给需求角度入手,构建了住房反向抵押贷款保险市场主体博弈模型,运用演化博弈理论分析了老年人和保险公司策略选择的动态变化过程,研究了住房反向抵押贷款保险市场的演化路径,揭示了市场的演化规律.模型解析及数值算例结果表明:当保险公司开展住房反向抵押贷款保险业务的成本收入率处于0和1之间,同时老年人的效用比大于1时,市场具有(申请,开展),(不申请,不开展)两个演化稳定均衡;老年人或保险公司对住房反向抵押贷款保险的初始接受程度超过特定阈值是市场收敛至(申请,开展)均衡的必要条件;市场收敛至(申请,开展)的概率与博弈支付矩阵的结构和参数密切相关.本文的结论可以为政府提供决策支持,以制定合适的政策,引导并促进住房反向抵押贷款保险市场健康有序发展.     

The European Commission''s White Paper "Strategy for a Future Chemicals Policy": A Review

The European Commission has proposed a radical new policy for the regulation of chemicals in the EU in the form of a White Paper. The current system has separate regulatory provisions for "new" chemicals (introduced to the market since September 18, 1981) and "existing" chemicals (on the market before September 18,1981). The proposed future policy will have a single unified regulatory system for all chemicals, which should result in better regulation of chemicals in the EU single market. It will be better because risk assessments will be targeted at the chemicals of greatest concern. Furthermore, the system will be streamlined, making regulatory decisions faster, and thus reducing the so-called burden of the past (the large number of chemicals that have never been assessed for their risks to human health or the environment). The new system incorporates the precautionary principle, which will be applied where there is an early indication of unacceptable risk or where there is undue delay in the regulatory process. Moreover, the new strategy is intended to promote greater transparency for all stakeholders.     

机构投资者持股对信息披露的治理作用研究——以管理层盈余预告为例

本文以我国A股上市公司2004-2007年盈余预告披露数据为例,实证检验了机构投资者对信息披露的治理作用。结果发现:(1)随着机构投资者持股比例的增加,管理层采取的盈余预告精确性提高(更具体的形式和更小的误差),及时性也增强;(2)银行、财务公司类机构、一般基金类机构对管理层盈余预告选择的积极治理作用相对较强,而养老、保险类机构对管理层盈余预告选择的积极治理作用则相对较弱;(3)处于不同持股规模时,管理层盈余预告的精确性、及时性均随着机构投资者整体持股比例增大而提高。但是,机构投资者持股比例的提高易导致了管理层盈余预告的乐观态度倾向;(4)股权分置改革后,机构投资者持股对管理层盈余预告披露选择的积极治理作用比股权分置改革前有所增强。建议大力发展机构投资者规模和专业素质以优化投资者结构,促进我国资本市场的健康发展。     

竞争性网络间的互联互通问题分析

竞争性网络的运营商基于自身利益可能拒绝互通或合谋相互征收高额接入费,这两种行为都将损害消费者福利,因而需要政府规制。本文在考虑网络外部性、运营商的市场份额、市场容量和用户的转换成本等因素影响的基础上,通过构建一个包含"防降价均衡"机制的三阶段博弈模型来分析运营商的服务定价、互通决策、政府的接入费规制决策以及社会福利变化,发现存在合理的接入费区间使得运营商有动力互通且社会福利得到改善。     

低介入度产品迷惑式品牌名称的原产地认知研究——以瓶装水、洗发水、服装为例

以瓶装水、洗发水、服装为研究对象测量中国消费者对低介入度产品的品牌原产地识别准确度(BORA低),发现消费者的BORA低比较低;教育、经济收入、性别直接影响BORA低,并且教育、年龄通过民族中心主义观念这个中介变量间接影响BORA低。研究揭示中国消费者不清楚低介入度产品的原产地信息,说明原产地研究的隐含假设值得商榷,对国内原产地研究提出建议,并且建立消费者对于BORA低的认知模型。     

Channel Strategies for Durable Goods: Coexistence of Selling and Leasing to Individual and Corporate Consumers

In durable goods markets, such as those for automobiles or computers, the coexistence of selling and leasing is common as is the existence of both corporate and individual consumers. Leases to corporate consumers affect the price of used goods on the second‐hand market which in turn affect the buying and leasing behavior of individual consumers. The setting of prices (or volumes) for sale and lease to individual and corporate consumers is a complicated problem for manufacturers. We consider a manufacturer who concurrently sells and leases a finitely durable good to both individual and corporate consumers. The interaction between the manufacturer and consumers is modeled as a dynamic sequential game, where each player seeks to maximize its own payoff over an infinite horizon. We study how the corporate channel substitutability of new goods and used goods and transaction costs in the second‐hand market affect the manufacturer's pricing decisions, consumer behavior, and social welfare in the retail market. Making a number of simplifying assumptions, including two‐period lifetime for the finitely durable goods, we consider Markov Perfect Equilibrium as the solution concept. We show that the manufacturer can maximize her profit by segmenting consumers according to their willingness to pay. Selling and leasing are the mechanisms used for price discrimination in the retail market. We show that as she leases a larger share of her production to the corporate consumer, (1) the manufacturer does not necessarily have to adjust the optimal selling price of new goods to individual consumers, and the volume of sales of new goods to individual consumers can stay the same; (2) the manufacturer does increase the retail lease price, and the number of individual leases decreases; (3) the net supply of used goods on the market increases, leading to a lower market price for used goods; and (4) more individual consumers are able to participate in the market, and their collective welfare or net utility improves. We also show that as production costs increase the manufacturer increases prices, reducing volumes across all channels. When transaction costs increase, the manufacturer reduces leasing in both corporate and retail channels.