MINIMUM WAGE EFFECTS WITH OUTPUT STABILIZATION

What are the effects of legal minimum wage rates on the U.S. economy? Does minimum wage legislation promote the economic self-interest of high wage union labor and impede the economic self-interest of capitalists as our earlier research [Cox and Oaxaca 1982] suggested? This paper uses a nine sector econometric/simulation model of U.S. industry from 1975–1978 to answer these questions in the context of stabilization policies which hold aggregate real output constant. While most simulated percentage effects are small, those for the unskilled workers themselves are not. A 15.7 percent increase in the average nominal wage rate of unskilled labor, as a result of minimum wage legislation, produced an 11 percent decrease in unskilled employment, 2.2 million jobs lost, while increasing the real wage of unskilled workers by 15 percent. Simulated changes in several key variables support our earlier observations that the self-interests of labor unions, with skilled workers, conflict with those of capitalists over the issue of minimum wage legislation.     

Do unions always decrease wage dispersion? The case of Brazilian manufacturing

The literature on the impact of unions on wages has established that unionized workers earn a wage premium when compared to their nonunion counterparts and that the dispersion of wages within the union sector is lower than in the nonunion sector. I examine the validity of these findings in the context of a developing country labor market and show that unionism does create a positive wage differential but that wage dispersion is greater in the union sector. These findings are explained by the greater variance in the characteristics of unionized workers, the vulnerability of nonunion workers to market conditions, and the structure of wage bargaining.     

Labor Union Political Strategy in an Era of Decline and Revitalization

U.S. labor unions faced sharp membership losses over the last few decades, and some responded by ushering in a new, revitalized model of organizing. Yet we know little about how these forces may be shaping the political activities of the labor movement. Has crisis prompted unions to take aim at public policies inhibiting union vitality, or have unions turned outward to embrace broader social causes? This paper uses an original dataset of union appearances in congressional hearings to analyze unions’ legislative advocacy activities. Findings suggest substantial differences between those unions that are likely to appear in hearings on core labor‐related topics and those that appear in hearings on broad social issues: AFL‐CIO unions are more likely to participate in hearings on core labor issues, while unions commonly cited as “revitalized” and public sector unions are more likely to appear in hearings on broad social issues.     

Unions in the 2000 election: A strategic-choice perspective

In the 2000 elections, organized labor mounted a“massive“ political effort. The AFL-CIO spearheaded a program that emphasized both grassroots and“checkbook” politics. Labor 2000, however, represented much more than an attempt to influence elections. Political action, dedicated to a“Working Families Agenda“ became a strategy of choice to elect candidates, influence lawmakers, mobilize union members, and recruit workers into the labor movement. In this paper, I examine Labor 2000 from a strategic-choice perspective. Specifically, I look at the scope and variety of labor's political effort; how labor allocated its political resources; the degree of competition it faced; and the election outcomes. In addition, I examine the effort in terms of its potential for transforming unions. Data from a variety of sources, some of which have not been previously used, are examined to put Labor 2000 into perspective as a strategy. The results indicate that labor did have some success in mobilizing union members politically. However, labor's impact proved insufficient to achieve immediate national election goals. Questions remain about the wisdom of political action as a strategy of choice, especially in terms of its viability as an instrument for institutional revival.     

Remaking the labour movement in Italy: the revival of strikes at Fiat-Chrysler Automobiles in 2015–17

ABSTRACT

After the Fiat-Chrysler merger in 2009, CEO Sergio Marchionne imposed a drastic reorganization of labour relations in Italy’s plants, precipitating a profound crisis of the system of industrial relations in the country. But between 2015 and 2017 a significant section of workers at Melfi, Atessa and Termoli plants went on strike against compulsory overtime and labour intensification, establishing links with grassroots unions that successfully organized in logistics. The metalworkers’ union FIOM-CGIL, however, delegitimized the union representatives who resisted Marchionne’s plans. In this article, we trace the context and development of these still little-known strikes. Because of their growing institutionalization, we argue, the confederal unions (CGIL, CISL, UIL) have both failed to mobilize workers and repressed workers’ attempts to resist the deterioration of their conditions. The strikes at FCA and in logistics, however, show that new forms of radical unionism are emerging, pointing to new possibilities for working-class organizing.     

Immigration and the Transformation of American Unionism

Does immigration hamper union organizing in the United States? The prevailing literature strongly suggests that it does and for two reasons: first, immigrants increase the labor pool and diminish union influence over the labor market. And second, immigrants may be harder to organize than native workers. In this dominant view, unions are well served to restrict immigration and have always done so. But how, then, to explain the fact that American labor has long been deeply divided over the response to immigration? Drawing on new archival research and interviews, this paper uncovers a neglected side of American labor history in which many union leaders have extended solidarity to immigrants and sought to organize them. Moreover, analysis of time series data on immigration and union density corroborates the implicit theory of this alternate account of labor history: immigration has, in fact, no statistically significant effect – either positive or negative – on union density over time. Depending on specific conditions and strategies, unions can and have been successful in organizing during periods of high immigration.     

Unionism and employment conflict resolution: Rethinking collective voice and its consequences

IX. Conclusions and Overall Assessment The central proposition advanced by F&;M is that the collective voice/response face of unionism more than counterbalances the monopoly face of unionism. Following this reasoning, it may be concluded that union workers would remain unionized and nonunion workers would become unionized. But what if the collective voice/response face of unionism does not more than counterbalance (let alone “dominate”) the monopoly face of unionism? Suppose that, consistent with the evidence presented herein, the exercise of voice in the employment relationship leads to further deterioration of the employment relationship rather than to the effective redress of worker grievances? In this circumstance, existing unions would lose members, and unorganized workers would choose not to become union members. Supposition aside, there is no question that unionization continues to decline sharply. When F&;M's book first appeared, about one in five private sector workers belonged to a union; today, less than one in eight private sector workers belongs to a union. But while F&;M and, later, Freeman and Rogers (1999), attributed the decline in unionization to employer/management opposition and weak labor law, some of this decline can be attributed to worker resistance. Such resistance may stem, in turn and following F&;M, from recognition of the net negative consequences of unionism's monopoly face, but also, and contrary to F&;M, from recognition of the net negative consequences of unionism's collective voice/response face. If workers judged unions' voice response face, in particular, grievance procedures, to be effective in redressing worker grievances, more union workers would likely remain union members and more unorganized workers would join unions — even in the “face” of employer opposition. While there is little question that there are widely varying types of real-world employment relationships or that unions are best suited to protecting worker interests in certain of these (usually highly adversarial) relationships, the fact that workers as a whole decreasingly choose to become union members suggests that they do not perceive union voice to be effective in redressing deteriorated employment relationships or to be more effective in this respect than nonunion voice options. Such reasoning is consistent with the picture sketched in this paper — a different picture from that forwarded by F&;M — of unionism and grievance procedures as largely reactive, adversarial-oriented mechanisms for dealing with workplace conflict resolution, especially in a pluralist, mixed-motive type of employment relationship.     

The Political and Civic Lives of Public Sector Workers: Unions and “Public Service Motivation”*

Public sector employees are highly engaged in civic and political life, from voting to volunteering. Scholars have theorized that this political activity stems from “public service motivation,” or the selection of publicly oriented individuals into public work. We build on this work by analyzing the role of public sector unions in shaping participation. Unions are central mobilizing organizations in political life, and one in three public sector workers are unionized. Special supplements of the Current Population Survey provide data on various forms of participation, sector, union membership, and union coverage. Logistic regressions find that unionized public sector workers have much higher odds of engaging in a range of activities compared to non‐union public workers, including protest, electoral politics, and political communication. Union membership impacts service work to a lesser extent, suggesting that unions are more central to political lives. These findings have implications for the consequences of union decline, including the class, race, and gender composition of who participates in democratic life.     

Union Organizing and Labor Outreach in the Contemporary United States

Despite their long decline, labor unions increasingly find themselves in the news. From the spirited debate over income inequality, to fights over minimum wage and the unlikely mobilization of fast food workers at the very bottom of the American labor market, labor issues are of great public interest. In this article, I review scholarship on contemporary union organizing and outreach activity. This work suggests that while innovative organizing and outreach strategies, sometimes lumped together under the rubric of “social movement unionism” and “alt‐labor,” are demonstrated to be effective in advancing union causes, only a handful of unions appear to have the will and resources to utilize them. Moreover, while the implementation of new organizing and outreach strategies has been uneven and has not boosted union membership nationally, organized resistance to unions, from court rooms to state legislatures, has increased substantially.     

The economic status of union workers in the United States

Although American labor unions evolved out of poverty, today’s typical union worker is relatively affluent. Current Population Survey data show that average annual household earnings in 2002 for full-time union workers were nearly $79,000, nearly double the median of all households (including ones with non-workers), and more than for nonunion worker households. While relatively few union workers are truly “poor,” a larger proportion (over one-third for members of teachers’ unions) comes from households with over $100,000 in annual income. A puzzle: why do union members tend to support liberal policies and politicians far more than their relative affluence would predict? Perhaps it partly reflects rent-seeking behavior.     

The AFL-CIO Split: Does It Really Matter?

In 2005, the AFL-CIO split and the Change to Win Coalition (CtW) was founded because of the personal ambition of dissident union leaders and their frustration with the severe and continuing decline in union membership. The CtW was build on a shared faith that only a fresh start could lead the unions out of their crisis. But a convincing case has not been made that the seceding unions would be more successful outside of AFL-CIO. When it is seen against the backdrop of the crisis in the labor movement and the enormity of the task of union organizing and revival, the AFL-CIO split does not really matter.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">What do unions do?</Emphasis>—A management perspective

conclusion Over the past 30 years, progressive human resource policies and government regulation of the workplace have improved working conditions. Today unions are no longer exercising union power to“protect the underdog” or “level the playing field” (Kaufman, 2005). Unions are using their power to pass legislation to benefit their narrow special interests. There are two groups in the workforce that may provide unions with organizing opportunities. One segment of the workforce is the growing number of nonpermanent employees or contingent workers. Another is the growing low-wage part of the service sector. The Service Employees International Union has been one of the few unions to expand membership among these employees. The aging of the baby boomers will raise the demand for service workers in health care facilities and in hotel and office maintenance which will increase organizing opportunities for unions in this industry (Kosters, 2004).     

Unions and wage inequality

Summary and Conclusions The impact of unions on the structure of wages has recently attracted renewed interest as analysts have struggled to explain the rise in earnings inequality in several industrialized countries. Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States provide a potentially valuable set of countries for examining this question. All three countries now collect comparable data on wages and union status in their regular labor force surveys. Several features of the collective bargaining institutions of these countries make them suitable for studying the relationship between unions and wage inequality. Bargaining is highly decentralized; there are no general mechanisms for extending collective bargaining provisions beyond the “organized” sector; and the fraction of the work force covered by collective bargaining is relatively modest. Thus it is possible to compare the structure of wages for workers covered by union contracts to those who are not covered, and potentially infer the effect of unions on overall wage inequality.     

Judging unions’ future using a historical perspective: the public policy choice between competition and unionization

VII. Conclusion In discussing the future of private sector union membership one needs to evaluate the early period of union ascendancy (1930s through the early 1950s) as well as the past few decades when unions have been in decline. We know trends currently in place are unfavorable to unions. What conditions would be favorable? When the earlier period of union growth us studied, two factors become prominent — the competitiveness of the labor market and the ability of unions to fullfill their major goal of either extracting economic rents or remedying market failures that result in exploitive employment relationship.     

Inside contracting at the Sargent Hardware Company

Conclusions Four major points emerge from the events at the Sargent factory. First, the image of inside contracting as a system pitting owners against contractors is simplistic and incomplete. Rank and file workers constituted an important third force and were involved in a complex set of changing relationships with each group and within their own group. Shifts of power in this three-way straggle led to the organizational transition away from inside contracting.Second, the history of the Sargent factory organizational structure cannot be understood without reference to the labor unions. Too often, organizational historians act as if the unions had no effect on an organization's internal structure. Conversely, labor historians often overlook the ways in which factory structures shaped the organizational task work of unions. At Sargent's, the labor unions took on a part of the work done by inside contractors, such as representing the owner to the workers and enforcing contractual obligations. The unions did serve as a voice for workers, but they also categorized workers and enforced contracts, work that enabled the new more bureaucratic structure to emerge.Third, the Sargent case provides important information about the nature of early unionization efforts and the link between those efforts and the evolving union structure. The initial worker coalition was based on a broad vision of an altered workplace, one that valued mutuality. The results of the struggle, however, gained influence for workers in only a very narrow arena and did so only at the expense of a large portion of the workforce. Unions then became a major force for division within the rank and file, separating them by craft category and perpetuating community ethnic divisions.Finally, ethnic and community ties were significant factors in the shifting patterns of alliance within the factory. Irish and Italian workers brought commonalities as well as differences into the workplace and these qualities interacted with their emerging class and occupational identities. It is important to note that the final hierarchy, Sargent on top, Irish unions and craft workers in the middle, and Italian laborers on the bottom, paralleled the larger New Haven community class and ethnic structure.The Sargent case pushes the traditional frame of analysis outward, beyond a two-way struggle, beyond an examination of just the factory structure, beyond a conventional view of business unions and beyond the factory walls into the community. As a result, a much richer and more comprehensive history emerges.     

Formalization,collectivization, and the demand for union services

Formalized collective bargaining rather than individual employer-employee negotiation is the fundamental characteristic of a unionized labor market. Formalization involves the substitution of rules for employer discretion. Collectivization substitutes simultaneous decision making on behalf of all workers in a unit for a set of individual employee decisions. Formalization and collectivization are present in nonunion as well as union labor markets and their extent varies within as well as between these two sectors. In particular, individuals may negotiate where they belong in a union environment, and the presence of rules invites negotiation over their interpretation. Nevertheless, because formalization and collectivization are obvious concomitants of trade union organization, their costs to both employers and employees should explain the probability of union organization, as well as the incidence of such antecedents of the modern trade union as the Italian padrone who acted as foreman, pay-master, and employment agency for newly-arrived immigrants to the United States; and the Indianjamdar, a construction industry recruiter-foreman. Our occasional observations of union-induced costreductions may appear to counter the implicit assumption in much of the trade union literature that unions always induce suboptimal combinations of factor inputs and factor payments (nonunion firms could choose union-induced parameters on their own and do not). Because these cost reductions may be accompanied by increased costs imposed by unions, however, the cost reductions discussed below imply nothing about overall effects of unions on employers or employees. I wish to thank John Pencavel for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. For further analysis of these points, see Flanders (1968). See Epstein and Monat (1973) for a discussion of the services provided by labor contractors.     

Have unions impeded growing wage dispersion among young workers?

Wage inequality is examined for young males over the period 1980–1993. While wage inequality increased substantially for nonunion workers over this period, wage inequality increased only modestly for union workers. In part, this difference results from divergent trends in skill prices—returns to skill rose in the nonunion sector but contracted slightly in the union sector. In particular, returns to education increased sharply in the nonunion sector while remaining stagnant in the union sector. At least for young workers, these findings suggest that unions have been largely successful in resisting market pressures for greater wage inequality. We also uncover evidence suggesting that, as relative returns to education decline in the union sector, highly educated young workers become less likely to choose union employment. We acknowledge the helpful comments of Dek Terrell, Steve Trejo, and Carol Horton Tremblay.     

Dénoncer en justice les discriminations syndicales : contribution à une sociologie des appuis conventionnels de l’action judiciaire

This article examines the rise in court cases relating to discrimination against trade union workers in France since the late 1990s. It seeks to identify sources of support for victims of discrimination to help them file complaints before the Courts. The judicialization of union-related discrimination cases was made possible by a new discourse that links the recognition of individual merit and the common cause of re-unionization. The development of a special method of proof and the specialization of certain union actors and lawyers have helped make legal action against discrimination routine. But the historical roots of this strategy raise the question of how it can be applied to workers in secondary labor markets, particularly precarious workers.     

Unionization and productivity in commercial banking

This paper examines the net effect of unions on productivity in the commercial banking industry. The focus of the study is on three methodological issues. First, an attempt is made to determine whether individual unions have a differential impact on banking productivity. The influence of unions on output per man-hour was initially estimated by including a union dummy variable in a Cobb-Douglas formulation of bank production. Separate binary variables were then entered into alternative specifications of the model to test the heterogeneity hypothesis. This hypothesis postulates differential productivity effects among the individual unions operating in the commercial banking sector. Second, the sample banks were paired on a case-by-case basis to assure the homogeneity of the two groupings: i.e., union and nonunion. Sample homogeneity is necessary because of the assumptions of identical production functions and output prices between the groups. Third, a complete covariance model was specified in order to estimate the impact of unionization on each parameter of the production function. In general, the unionized banks were less productive than their nonunion peers. It should be noted, however, that the standard errors were large in all the specifications. Moreover, the labor relations problems associated with one union had a large impact on the sector results.