Limites et pertinence de la guerre juste face au terrorisme et aux nouvelles guerres

This article aims to examine the pertinence as well as the limits of the just war theory in order to apprehend the ethical issues raised by contemporary forms of political violence. Terrorism is undoubtedly an extreme case of political violence that puts to the test the theoretical and practical relevance of jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles. From a sociological point of view, it appears necessary to understand contemporary terrorism within the historical evolution of armed conflicts and under the light of current research devoted to the concept of ‘new wars’. Although I will argue that just war theory does not sufficiently take into account current studies on the empirical features of contemporary wars, it is nonetheless possible to salvage the theoretical and practical relevance of just war theory in a more specified sense. From a philosophical point of view, the goal of this article is to confront the theoretical and practical relevance of just war theory with the current body of research in the field of the sociology of war in order to assess both its limitations and its potential scope.     

Nouvelles guerres justes et nouvelles guerres saintes: la rhétorique du bellicisme

From Cicero to St. Thomas, from Erasmus of Rotterdam to Grotius and Pufendorf, the concept of ‘just war’ is used to state the conditions under which the rhetoric of belligerence can meet the standards of both rationality and morality to justify going to war. The classical humanism and the philosophy of law will try in the Renaissance, especially with the beginning of a retreat of the divine in public affairs, to formalize and even humanize the war. Not only does the ideal of justice require honorable motives (jus ad bellum) for the use of weapons to be acceptable, but also how to behave in hostilities should also observe a certain restraint inspired by morality (jus in bello). Even Erasmus, the pacifist par excellence, admits that one must defend oneself against the Turks. On the other hand, the concept of ‘holy war’, used in the three major monotheistic religions, offers a different sound when going to war. Then the reference becomes abstract and absolute, so no argument can occur, no debate can be tolerated, because we face the divine plan. People of Yahweh, the disciples of Allah or the Children of the victorious Jesus Christ, all are refusing the opportunity to discuss the foundations of the war, hence an intangible reality which is conducive to a total violence. However, these two types of war are not reducible to one another, because one is based on a reasonable discussion, the other on the basis of Revelation on which nothing can be said. However, the boundaries between them become blurred when the stronger pretends to be the defender of a just cause and wants to impose its law over all opposing voices. In this case, the discourses of legitimacy become unbearable and confusing.     

Why Did the Communists Win or Lose? A Comparative Analysis of the Revolutionary Civil Wars in Russia,Finland, Spain,and China

According to classic interpretations of the communist revolutions, political mobilization of peasantry was critical for the success of the revolutionary forces. This article, which reexamines the experience of civil wars in Russia, Finland, Spain, and China, argues that peasants’ contribution to the revolutions in Russia and later in China became possible under two historical conditions: breakdown of state authorities during the mass mobilization wars and existence of an unresolved agrarian problem in the countryside. Neither of these conditions alone, as the experience of other countries has shown, was sufficient for a success of the revolutionaries. The Spanish civil war of 1936–1939, for instance, was not preceded by a major international war. Because institutions of the traditional social order had not been undermined by war, Franco was able to defeat the Popular Front government, despite the peasants’ support of the revolution. In the Finnish civil war of 1918, which broke out in the wake of World War I and the Russian Revolution, state institutions did not collapse completely and the peasantry was divided in their responses to the revolution; the rural smallholders, for example, aligned with the Mannerheim's White army, not with the urban revolutionaries.     

PERSONALITY,INFORMATION ACQUISITION,AND CHOICE UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

This article studies the role of personality in choice under risk and uncertainty. We explore the hypothesis that personality plays a role in decision making in situations of uncertainty but not in situations of risk. In addition to offering support for this main hypothesis, we explore the various pathways through which personality exerts its influence. What we find is that in uncertain environments, where decision makers are able to acquire information about the unknown probability distributions they face, personality variables influence the type of information people acquire, which then influences their choice. Our experimental design brings in two novel aspects of choice under uncertainty: information acquisition and advice. The findings indicate that indeed, under uncertainty, personality matters for choice in a way it does not under risk. Furthermore, the results suggest that personality can play a role at multiple levels, such as people's preferences for certain types of information and the likelihood of following advice. (JEL C90, D03, D81)     

‘Subjects,Participants, Collaborators’

Existing accounts of new war have not actively engaged with feminist analysis. Protest masculinity is suggested as an alternative explanatory framework to conventional explanations of violence in new war. To explore the intersection between masculinity and new wars the example of Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front has been investigated. The article concludes that masculinity is an essential cause to the creation of new war and to the form that new war takes once it has originated.     

The Nuclear Power Plant as God

There is a theological meaning to the disaster at the Fukushima nuclear power plants. I can clarify this meaning through a sociological investigation of the significance of nuclear power in post‐war Japan. First, as preparation, I will compare the ideology of Christ to that of John the Baptist. Christ thought that we had already arrived at the Kingdom of God. This idea led to the activist aspect of Christ. Second, I will show that nuclear power was considered as a key for the gate to the Kingdom of God in Japan. We can distinguish three stages in Japan's post‐war period: the ideal, the fictive and the impossible. It was nuclear power that embodied the ideal during the first era. Third, I will explain how the Japanese fascination with nuclear power has been compatible with Japanese aversion toward it. For the Japanese, the nuclear power plant seemed to be like non‐alcoholic beer. In the fourth and fifth parts, I will prove that the nuclear disaster implies a message equivalent to Christ's announcement. Theodicy is an answer to the question of irrational misfortune in a world created by God. However the Book of Job as ultimate theodicy shows paradoxically the incompetence of God. This situation is similar to the disaster at Fukushima, which demonstrated the incompetence of nuclear power (as God). The distance between Job and Christ is short, because if God plays the role of Job himself, it becomes Christ. We will explain why Christ's message can be a call for revolutionary social movement.     

Have wars and violence declined?

For over 150 years liberal optimism has dominated theories of war and violence. It has been repeatedly argued that war and violence either are declining or will shortly decline. There have been exceptions, especially in Germany and more generally in the first half of the twentieth century, but there has been a recent revival of such optimism, especially in the work of Azar Gat, John Mueller, Joshua Goldstein, and Steven Pinker who all perceive a long-term decline in war and violence through history, speeding up in the post-1945 period. Critiquing Pinker’s statistics on war fatalities, I show that the overall pattern is not a decline in war, but substantial variation between periods and places. War has not declined and current trends are slightly in the opposite direction. The conventional view is that civil wars in the global South have largely replaced inter-state wars in the North, but this is misleading since there is major involvement in most civil wars by outside powers, including those of the North. There is more support for their view that homicide has declined in the long-term, at least in the North of the world (with the United States lagging somewhat). This is reinforced by technological improvements in long-distance weaponry and the two transformations have shifted war, especially in the North, from being “ferocious” to “callous” in character. This renders war less visible and less central to Northern culture, which has the deceptive appearance of being rather pacific. Viewed from the South the view has been bleaker both in the colonial period and today. Globally war and violence are not declining, but they are being transformed.     

The Information Environment of War

This article observes high levels of anxiety about war in the present era, although wars are in decline. It addresses this paradox by distinguishing ideal‐typical features of Industrial and Information War. Industrial War is fought predominantly between states over territory, harnesses industry and the military, and requires mass mobilisation of people as well as resources. Information War is the prerogative of a few advanced societies and has emerged in a context that has enabled the extension of market practices on a global scale (with America as a unipolar power). Information War transcends frontiers, is asymmetrical, and its hard side is manifest in digitalised technologies and small professional forces. However, its soft side evokes the expanded and fast‐changing information environment of globalised media, trans‐national networks and the Internet. Through these, media wars can be experienced intensely by civilians who are otherwise untouched: at once close up and far away. This contributes to heightened consciousness of war, although such spectators are removed from danger. Although interests try to control information flows from and about war, the information environment is huge, shifting and unpredictable. As such, it is impossible to control fully, thereby presenting opportunities for vigorous symbolic struggles involving anti‐war campaigners and others.     

Media art and the resurrection of an image: motion and sculpturing

The last decades' increase in the visual methods in social science has not been reflected in the study of religion. There is a rather perplexing absence of such methods in the study of religion, given the importance of visual symbolism in many religious traditions. This article is about photo-elicitation among young Christians, Muslims and non-religious people in the multicultural Grønland area in inner-city Oslo, Norway. We focus on two images of holy books: a Bible with a pair of aged hands folded on top, and a Qur'an with a prayer bead. Four narratives that these two images elicited form the basis of the article: (1) ‘Everyday life sociologists of religion’; (2) ‘Cousin Religion's holy book: tool for everyday cosmopolitanism’; (3) ‘Translating holy books’; and (4) ‘The image becomes sacred’. From these narratives, we discuss how photo-elicitation can work in the study of religion. We outline which participants provided which narratives. We discuss the potential of images for tapping silent knowledge about different religious life-worlds, and for bridging different social and cultural worlds.     

Guerre juste et guerre sainte au regard des droits de l'homme

The permanence of conflict, and the resurgence of holy war today, belie the condemnations of war by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Charter of the United Nations. They provoke questions about derogations from these principles to prevent violations of human dignity and to consider a military intervention in reference to human rights. First of all, the ambiguity of humanitarian or military intervention needs clarification; then a priori objections against justifiable military intervention postpone its interpretation indefinitely. Only justice may legitimate armed interventions to protect the innocent by disarming their attacker. It requires a re-understanding of sovereignty as the responsibility to protect. From this, preventive military intervention remains unjustifiable. Nevertheless, in the case of an effective and imminent threat, the absolute and immediately necessity to protect oneself or another does legitimate first action as an ultimate defence under contradiction, as shown by the defence against the holy war of terrorism. But it requires systematic investigation concerning the specific situations and purposes implied. So, only human rights can legitimate military intervention, according to this rethinking of the criteria, and only to protect oneself and others; and the implementation of such an intervention, in complex situations, requires extreme prudence and considerable wisdom.     

Site of struggle: the Freedom Park fracas and the divisive legacy of South Africa’s Border War/Liberation Struggle

Every war is fought twice: militarily and then discursively. The war of words or discursive struggle tends to be particularly acrimonious following civil wars. This is true of South Africa’s Border War/Liberation Struggle, during which the white minority’s ‘terrorist’ became the black majority’s ‘freedom fighter’. Notwithstanding the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the legacy of this conflict remains divisive. Contestations over the meaning and memory of the war have manifested themselves in a number of ways. These include tensions during the integration of the South African Defence Force (SADF) and the armed wings of the liberation movements. A commemorative crisis has also followed the erection of new memorials, such as Freedom Park, to honour heroes and heroines of the Liberation Struggle. A fracas followed the decision of the Park’s trustees to omit the names of deceased SADF soldiers from the Wall of Names. This paper examines how Freedom Park became the site of struggle between self‐styled representatives of SADF veterans and cultural elites of the post‐apartheid order. It suggests that this controversy exemplifies the functioning of memory politics in transitional societies.     

Globalized Hopes and Disillusions

In contrast to the common tendency to see war as the result of leadership decisions based on risk assessments, and political and economic considerations about gains or losses, we use a constructivist and institutional perspective to historicize and politicize the way “nation‐state interests” and “nation‐state preferences” even in a decision to go to war are socially constructed and culturally embedded. We maintain that with the end of the Cold War, many societies found themselves at a crossroads where they had to resolve internal conflicts in regards to neoliberal globalization. These internal conflicts and a crisis of identity, between those who supported the principle of globalization and regarded it as a promise for democracy, openness, liberty and peace, and those who saw it as a danger to their exceptionality and distinctiveness, ended in wars (either internal wars or external wars) when the objectors of neoliberal globalization succeeded in creating an institutional turn which presented war as the “efficient,” “necessary,” “legitimate”, or “desired” solution to the new threatening reality. We demonstrate the validity of this argument by using Israel as a test case, examining how institutional changes in the 1990s, arising from internal societal conflicts around the Oslo Agreements, led the state to move from the brink of peace to new wars despite exogenous objections to its policy.     

“Ancient Volscian Border Dispute Flares”

Reception of the 2012 film adaptation of Shakespeare's Coriolanus, directed by and starring Ralph Fiennes, dealt with two particular themes: the homoerotic relationship between Fiennes' Coriolanus and the rebel leader Aufidius whose forces he eventually joins, and the choice to shoot the film in Serbia and Montenegro. While south-east Europe has become an increasingly popular location for Anglophone filmmaking, the promotion and reception of Coriolanus foregrounded the significance of Belgrade and the Balkans as a site of recent conflict. Moreover, the film constructs the world of Coriolanus and Aufidius through simulating or even re-using images of “Balkan” space with which viewers have already become familiar through news media, and it therefore draws on and contributes to representative practices that constitute the Balkans as a violent and warlike zone. Yet Aufidius' rebel force resembling militias from the Yugoslav wars is opposed to a highly disciplined “Roman” military equipped for urban warfare in 2000s Iraq. This article contends that the film achieves this contrast primarily through evoking different military masculinities associated with each force, which have been widely disseminated through still and filmed war photography, and secondarily through its use of specific ex-Yugoslav landscapes and cityscapes. The complex relationship between images of the Balkans, masculinity and military discipline in Coriolanus shows that images of military masculinities juxtaposed with a post-Yugoslav material environment continue to operate as symbolic resources in a contemporary western imaginary of war.     

Making Feminist Sense out of ‘Charlie Wilson's War’

Charlie Wilson's War (2007), Mike Nichols's film about the womanizing Congressman who engineered black funds for the CIA's proxy war in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, is historically misleading but highly instructive, because in packaging dominant American masculine identity and war politics as popular entertainment for post-9/11 audiences, it reveals the sexed and gendered ‘politics of the visual’ in global affairs. This intertextual study of ‘Charlie Wilson's war’ as movie, constructed history and legacy examines Wilson as a prime exhibit of a needy masculinity that, like the film's emasculated CIA, bulks itself up through surrogate military selves. It also analyses modes of the imaginary and specularity in brother-bonding with the mujahidin, tracks the proxy system's loops of masculine identity-and-war-making between Stateside and South Asia in the post-Vietnam 1980s and interrogates the dynamics of imperial ‘un-seeing’ in this campaign and its long aftermath. While US proxy wars proliferate worldwide, the lack of useable political memory about the ground truths of ‘Charlie's war’ continues to matter because America's second ‘good’ war in Afghanistan, bound to the first by gendered causal links, has re-empowered the forces that still menace women's rights and lives.     

美国媒体在世纪初战争中的作为和立场分析——与越战对比

2004年以来,美国媒体报道的军方虐囚丑闻至今未曾停息。媒体在世纪初战争中的这一表现与40年前在越战中的表现有一定的相似性,但是由于时代背景和战争对手的不同,媒体的战争表现存在一定的差异。笔者试图从媒体的报道方式、战争对手的形象建构、媒体在战争中的能动性以及报道立场这四个方面将二者作对比,分析其中的异同,并由此预测,美国媒体在下一场战争中形成大规模反战论调的可能性不大。     

The preeminent sacred symbol: Theorizing image of God outcomes

Images of God are the most consequential religious beliefs known to social science. Although sociologists have identified a wide and diverse range of outcomes of imagining different versions of God, more work is needed to show how these outcomes fit together within a multistep theoretical framework. To lay groundwork for such a theory, the present paper (a) briefly summarizes major theoretical perspectives on sources and outcomes of images of God, from psychology, social psychology, and sociology; (b) reviews a wide range of studies that identify specific outcomes of different images of God; and (c) recommends a new theoretical direction based on (a) and (b). Although this new direction will need to be developed in substantially greater detail in another context, the starting point for such work, suggested here, is that images of God function as humans' preeminent sacred symbols. This insight helps bridge an unnecessary chasm between Durkheim's theory of ritual and Stark's theory of gods.     

Neutralizing Problematic Frames in the Culture Wars: Anti‐Evolutionists Grapple with Religion

This article contributes to the literature on culture wars work by examining how anti‐evolutionists neutralize the framing of their position as religious. Their efforts are uncovered by analyzing 570 letters to the editor published in American newspapers in the months surrounding a nationally covered 2005 federal judicial decision on the legality of the Dover PA, school board's decision to undermine evolutionary theory in the classroom. Anti‐evolutionists neutralized the framing of their position as religious through the processes of selective acknowledgement and disagreement with the problematic framing. These findings provide insights into the anti‐evolutionist movement, the nature of the culture wars, and the basic ways in which problematic frames are neutralized. First, it shows how public anti‐evolutionist discourse has not followed its leaders' efforts to minimize the religious motivations of the movement. Second, the wide variety of neutralizations partially explains the persistence of many cultural disputes. Third, this study calls attention to the under theorized role of disagreement and agreement in undoing problematic definitions of the situation.     

The Things They Carry: Combat, Disability and Unemployment among US Men

Sociologists have long recognized that historical events, such as wars, depressions, and natural disasters, can affect the trajectories of people's lives and can reproduce or alter social structure. The following paper examines the effect of a type of event, war, on a facet of people's lives, their ability to work. It uses data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to test three accounts regarding how wars affect men's lives. The direct cumulative disadvantage account sees wars as negatively affecting the service-men who see combat regardless of their pre-combat characteristics. The moderated cumulative disadvantage account suggests that combat most negatively affects those who, before they fought, had lower status. The turning point account suggests the reverse: combat most negatively affects those who, before they fought, had greater status. The evidence suggests that, with regard to disability and unemployment, the effects of combat are most consistent with the direct cumulative disadvantage account.     

Fighting Words: What We Can Learn from Hitler's Hyperbole

The question of why human beings fight wars continues to stalk modern thought. This article treats Hitler's national socialist discourse as an extreme example of the social construction of a social problem, a cultural paradigm of how to talk people into fighting revolutions and wars. Drawing upon recent work in rhetorical studies by Gusfield and others, I show how political agents concoct a rhetoric of motives which they use to incite their followers to fight their enemies. The formal and poetic features of this system of discourse are identified and explicated. We can learn many things from Hitler. By identifying his technique, we can recognize when political agents are using the same technique and counter its seductive effects. We learn that the main effect of war rhetoric is social integration through the constitution of common enemies. And finally, we realize that wars are made to happen through the calculated use of symbolic practices. War is not, as many have argued, a fall into a latent animality, but an expression of our symbol-mindedness–our capacity to make and use hyperboles.     

Monotheistic Theodicy as Imaginary Face‐Work

In this article, I outline the cognitive process involved in accomplishing monotheistic theodicy, or the act of reconciling the belief in an omnipotent and morally perfect God with personal experiences of suffering. Based on in‐depth interviews with intimate partner violence victims, I argue that believers accomplish monotheistic theodicy by performing imaginary face‐work—or protective face‐work on the behalf of significant imagined others—that saves God's face as a morally perfect being. Believers perform this imaginary face‐work by constructing accounts that portray God as morally innocent of their suffering. These accounts fall into three main types: (1) fidelity to a higher principle, (2) ultimate benefit, and (3) shifting blame. These accounts serve as new cognitions that resolve the cognitive dissonance and concomitant negative emotions believers experience because of their suffering. Overall, the findings and analysis contribute to sociological theory by further extending the concepts of face and face‐work to imagined others.