Heterogeneous and Correlated Risk Preferences in Commercial Fishermen: <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Perfect Storm</Emphasis> Dilemma

Commercial fishing involves both physical and financial risks. This combination questions whether fishermen are inherently risk-loving, whether physical and financial risk preferences are correlated, and how much preferences vary across fishermen. This paper addresses these questions with a panel data set of daily participation decisions in the California sea urchin dive fishery. Weather buoy data and the prevalence of great white sharks at a particular fishing site proxy for physical risk. Overall, urchin fishermen are not risk-loving on average, risk preferences are heterogeneous, and there is some evidence that risk preferences are positively correlated across physical and financial domains.JEL Classification: Q22, D81     

At the nexus of risk and time preferences: An experimental investigation

Although many economic decisions involve choices between uncertain outcomes occurring at different times, most theoretical and empirical work restricts attention to one dimension or another. In this paper, we investigate whether both risk and time preferences can be represented by a single parameter. We collect experimental data to estimate models which allows for a disentanglement of risk and time preferences. Results reveal that the discounted expected utility model assumption, that risk and time preferences can be explained by a single parameter, is not supported by the data. The model estimates imply people prefer to delay the resolution of risky outcomes.     

The effect of fast and slow decisions on risk taking

We experimentally compare fast and slow decisions in a series of experiments on financial risk taking in three countries involving over 1700 subjects. To manipulate fast and slow decisions, subjects were randomly allocated to responding within 7 seconds (time pressure) or waiting for at least 7 or 20 seconds (time delay) before responding. To control for different effects of time pressure and time delay on measurement noise, we estimate separate parameters for noise and risk preferences within a random utility framework. We find that time pressure increases risk aversion for gains and risk taking for losses compared to time delay, implying that time pressure increases the reflection effect of Prospect Theory. The results for gains are weaker and less robust than the results for losses. We find no significant difference between time pressure and time delay for loss aversion (tested in only one of the experiments). Time delay also leads to less measurement noise than time pressure and unconstrained decisions, and appears to be an effective way of decreasing noise in experiments.     

A theoretically-consistent empirical model of non-expected utility: An application to nuclear-waste transport

Few theoretically-consistent empirical models addressing the relationship between ambiguity, risk, and preferences for health and safety exist. To fill this gap, we propose a theoretical non-expected-utility model (NEUM) that is relatively easy to estimate using an interval-data model. The NEUM we develop hinges upon two sources of variability, one over risk and the other over ambiguity about the risk. Using data from a survey of Nevada residents concerning risks from nuclear-waste transport, we provide individual-specific welfare estimate for a risk increase. Our findings suggest that negative externalities from nuclear-waste transport perceived risks and ambiguity may be substantial. JEL Codes D81 · D62 · Q53 · Q51     

Individual vs. couple behavior: an experimental investigation of risk preferences

In this article, we elicit both individuals’ and couples’ preferences assuming prospect theory (PT) as a general theoretical framework for decision under risk. Our experimental method, based on certainty equivalents, allows to infer measurements of utility and probability weighting at the individual level and at the couple level. Our main results are twofold. First, risk attitude for couples is compatible with PT and incorporates deviations from expected utility similar to those found in individual decision making. Second, couples’ attitudes towards risk are found to be consistent with a mix of individual attitudes, women being more influent on couples’ preferences at low probability levels.     

The psychometric and empirical properties of measures of risk preferences

We examine the psychometric and empirical properties of some commonly used survey-based measures of risk preferences in a population-based sample of 11,000 twins. Using a model that provides a general framework for making inferences about the component of measured risk attitudes that is not due to measurement error, we show that measurement-error adjustment leads to substantially larger estimates of the predictive power of risk attitudes, of the size of the gender gap, and of the magnitude of the sibling correlation. Risk attitudes are predictive of investment decisions, entrepreneurship, and drinking and smoking behaviors; are robustly associated with cognitive ability and personality; and our estimates are often larger than those in the literature. Our results highlight the importance of adjusting for measurement error across a wide range of empirical settings.     

Equilibria with vector-valued utilities and preference information. The analysis of a mixed duopoly

This paper deals with the equilibria of games when the agents have multiple objectives and, therefore, their utilities cannot be represented by a single value, but by a vector containing the various dimensions of the utility. Our approach allows the incorporation of partial information about the preferences of the agents into the model, and permits the identification of the set of equilibria in accordance with this information. We also propose an additional conservative criterion which can be applied in this framework in order to predict the results of interaction. The potential application of the theoretical results is shown with an analysis of a mixed oligopoly in which the agents value additional objectives other than their own benefit. These objectives are related to social welfare and to the profit of the industry. The flexibility of our approach provides a general theoretical framework for the analysis of a wide range of strategic economic models.     

Time preferences and risk aversion: Tests on domain differences

Understanding how individuals discount and evaluate the risks of environmental outcomes is a prime component in designing effective environmental policy. We use an incentivized experimental design to investigate whether subjects’ time preferences and risk aversion across the monetary and environmental domains differ. We find that subjects’ time preferences are not significantly different across the two domains. In contrast, subjects exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion in the environmental domain. Furthermore, we corroborate earlier results, documenting that women are more risk averse than men in the monetary domain, and show this finding to also hold in the environmental domain.     

Stability of risk preferences and the reflection effect of prospect theory

Are risk preferences stable over time? To address this question we elicit risk preferences from the same pool of subjects at two different moments in time. To interpret the results, we use a Fechner stochastic choice model in which the revealed preference of individuals is governed by some underlying preference, together with a random error. We take cumulative prospect theory as the underlying preference model (Kahneman and Tversky, Econometrica 47:263–292, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5:297–323, 1992). We observe that the aggregate pattern of preferences is very similar in both sessions, and it matches the results reported in the literature. Most subjects are risk averse for gains, and risk seeking for losses. However, the subjects that jointly agree with the reflection effect of prospect theory are around 50%. The percentage of individuals that change their responses across sessions is quite high, 63%. Estimating the stochastic choice model we find that 72% of the subjects have an underlying preference which agrees with the reflection effect of prospect theory. The remaining 28% are mainly classified as risk averse for both gains and losses. The results reinforce the empirical validity of the reflection effect. Deviations from the reflection effect can be attributed to noise, as well as to the existence of a fraction of risk averse subjects.     

Joint measurement of risk aversion,prudence, and temperance

Risk aversion—but also the higher-order risk preferences of prudence and temperance—are fundamental concepts in the study of economic decision making. We propose a method to jointly measure the intensity of risk aversion, prudence, and temperance. Our theoretical approach is to define risk compensations of different orders, and in an experiment we elicit these compensations with a price list technique. We find evidence for risk aversion, prudence, and temperance. These traits correlate within subjects. The compensations elicited for prudence are significantly larger than those for risk aversion and temperance. In contrast to commonly used utility functions, prospect theory can predict this behavioral pattern. In our experiment, risk-averse, risk-loving, and risk-neutral subjects are prudent. This supports a recent theoretical observation that prudence may be a more universal trait than previously realized.     

A simplified axiomatic approach to ambiguity aversion

This paper takes the Anscombe–Aumann framework with horse and roulette lotteries, and applies the Savage axioms to the horse lotteries and the von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms to the roulette lotteries. The resulting representation of preferences yields a subjective probability measure over states and two utility functions, one governing risk attitudes and one governing ambiguity attitudes. The model is able to accommodate the Ellsberg paradox and preferences for reductions in ambiguity.     

The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval

The role of risk preferences in determining the outcome to bargaining is examined for the case in which acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval. Using an n-agent extension of the Ståhl-Rubinstein alternating offer model, we find that risk preferences play a fundamentally different role when bargaining is settled using a nonunanimity voting rule. Risk preferences determine not only an agent's reservation price but also the likelihood that he is made part of the winning coalition. An implication of this analysis is that when the preferences of the agents are not too diverse, it is advantageous for an agent to be relatively risk-averse.The helpful comments and suggestions of Rich McLean and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. This article was presented as a paper at the 1988 Winter Econometric Society Meetings.     

Dynamic Decision Making when Risk Perception Depends on Past Experience

The aim of the article is to propose a preferences representation under risk where risk perception can be past experience dependent. A first step consists in considering a one-period decision problem where individual preferences are no more defined only on decisions but on pairs (decision, past experience). The obtained criterion is used in the construction of a dynamic choice model under risk. The article ends with an illustrative example concerning insurance demand. It appears that our model allows to explain modifications in the insurance demand behavior over time observed on the insurance markets for catastrophic risk and difficult to justify with standard models.     

Giving in the face of risk

Decisions about how to share resources with others often need to be taken under uncertainty regarding its allocational consequences. Although risk preferences are likely important, existing research is silent about how social and risk preferences interact in such situations. In this paper we provide experimental evidence on this question. In a first experiment givers are not exposed to risk while beneficiaries’ final earnings may be larger or smaller than the allocation itself, depending on the realized state of the world. In a second experiment, risk affects the earnings of givers but not of beneficiaries. We find that individuals’ risk preferences are predictive for giving in both experiments. Increased risk exposure of beneficiaries tends to decrease giving whereas increased risk exposure of givers has no effect. We propose a simple non-linear generalization of a model allowing for other-regarding preferences, ex-post and ex-ante fairness, and risk aversion. We find some support for it in our data when risk is on the beneficiaries’ side but less so when risk is on the givers’ side. Our results point to the importance of the further development of models of social preferences that also incorporate risk preferences.     

Social comparison and risk taking behavior

This paper studies the effects of social comparison on risk taking behavior. In our theoretical framework, decision makers evaluate the consequences of their choices relative to both their own and their peers’ conditions. We test experimentally whether the position in the social ranking affects risk attitudes. Subjects interact in a simulated workplace environment where they perform a work task, receive possibly different wages, and then undertake a risky decision that may produce an extra gain. We find that social comparison matters for risk attitudes. Subjects are more risk averse in the presence of small social gain than social loss. In addition, risk aversion is decreasing in the size of the social gain.     

Metapreferences and the reasons for stability in social choice: Thoughts on broadening and clarifying the debate

The standard model of collective choice looks at aggregation procedures which take individual preferences as existing for a specified set of alternatives. In this paper we propose that actors also have preferences for rules of choice or characteristics of choice processes (e.g., the perceived fairness of procedures or the popularity of outcomes) rather than simply for alternatives (outcomes) themselves. We argue that the positing of the existence of meta-preferences can illuminate a number of areas of choice theory. Here we focus on one such area: the problem of “too much” stability in majority rule decision making - a stability which belies the standard theoretical results on the generic instability of majority rule processes. We also show that discussion of the prevalence of stability in collective decision making needs to be clarified because there are at least six distinct types of stability which are sometimes confounded in the literature.     

The Impact of Health-Related Emotions on Belief Formation and Behavior

We present a theoretical model of health beliefs and behaviors that explicitly takes into account the emotional impact of possible bad news (i.e., illness), ex-ante in the form of anxiety and ex-post in the form of disappointment. Our model makes it possible to explain (simultaneously) a number of anomalies such as ’low’ testing rates, heterogeneous perceptions of risk levels, underestimation of health risk, ostriches and hypochondriacs, over-use and under-use of health services, patient preference for information when relatively certain of not being ill, yet avoiding information when relatively certain of being ill, etc. Our model matches observed patterns both in health beliefs and health behaviors and irrational health beliefs and behaviors can be characterized as the optimal response under a given structure of emotions and preferences.     

Intentional time inconsistency

We propose a theoretical model to explain the usage of time-inconsistent behavior as a strategy to exploit others when reputation and trust have secondary effects on the economic outcome. We consider two agents with time-consistent preferences exploiting common resources. Supposing that an agent is believed to have time-inconsistent preferences with probability p,  we analyze whether she uses this misinformation when she has the opportunity to use it. Using the model originally provided by Levhari and Mirman (Bell J Econ 11(1):322–334, 1980), we determine the optimal degree of present bias that the agent would like to have while pretending to have time-inconsistent preferences and we provide the range of present-bias parameter under which deceiving is optimal. Moreover, by allowing the constant relative risk aversion class of utility form, we characterize the distinction between pretending to be naive and sophisticated.

     

Collective citizenship: From citizenship and mental health to citizenship and solidarity

Although the concept of citizenship is a widely used theoretical framework within political philosophy, its use in the field of mental health remains underexplored. Within this context, citizenship emphasises the social inclusion and participation of people who are marginalized and offers a more social and relational view of services and support for people with mental health problems than has been common in mental health systems of care. At the same time, however, the citizenship approach has operated in the context of systems of care in the United States that favour highly individualized conceptions of, and approaches to, care, and these systems of care operate in the social and political context of highly individualized concepts of the citizen. In this article building on the work of other citizenship scholars, we argue that a collective form of citizenship, grounded in the 5Rs framework, holds the individual and collective in creative tension. Furthermore, the paper applies this model to the domain of mental health, where people are treated in individualistic ways and experience marginalisation, making the collective dimension imperative and promoting participation, empowerment and the contribution for social change to people with mental health problems. Our theoretical framework of collective citizenship, while geared toward the needs of persons with mental health problems, also contributes to recent citizenship theory on the inclusion of marginalized, stigmatised, and excluded groups. We illustrate the application of this approach through an ethnographic-participant observation case study of a collective citizenship group with which we are associated.