企业“外包”战略研究

外包这种独特的经营方式大踏步进入中国,实行外包是企业发展战略之一,转变经营观念,积极推行外包战略,规范外包管理,扎扎实实地提高企业核心竞争力,在加入WTO之后,这种新的产业的发展、生存方式是引人瞩目的一道风景。在外包战略在被广泛应用,适用于现今追求企业弹性化的经营管理潮流。一、外包的基本诠释1.外包概念。外包是(out sourcing),是指企业致力于开发具有核心竟争力的业务,其余非核心业务由外部企业按照规定要求提供优质服务的一种经营方式。外包就是企业做自己最能干的事情(扬已所长),把其它的工作外包给能做好这些事情的专业组织(避已之短)。外包业是新近兴起的一个行业,它给企业带来了新的活力。2     

论IT战略下外包决策的动力与风险

IT外包作为企业信息化建设中的一项新内容,在近10年中得到了迅猛发展。本文对IT外包的概念和特点进行了阐述,分析了IT外包的优势与不足,提出了企业IT外包的策略。对IT外包在制造型企业信息化建设中的应用进行了分析和研究,认为实施IT外包将会给企业的发展带来契机。     

人力资源管理外包风险的认识与防范

人力资源管理外包绝不是简单地将一些管理职能"扔"给外包服务商就可以了,它还存在着各种风险。随着新经济时代的到来,企业在提高效率、赢得竞争优势方面面临着比以往更大的压力。为了"减压",有些企业将自己的弱项或鸡肋环节外包出去,不失为有益     

论企业信息系统外包的决策选择

信息系统外包是企业培育和提升核心能力以获取持续竞争优势的一种战略行为。本文在借鉴西方企业外包研究的基础上,对业务外包的理论依据进行了阐述;从运营成本、服务水平和安全管理风险等方面讨论了信息系统外包决策对企业的影响,并进一步对比国内外的外包情况。     

资源需求与交易成本对服务外包治理机制的作用——基于N公司的案例研究

提出了服务外包中双方的交易治理机制由客户需要的资源类型以及交易成本共同决定,并建立了需要探究的理论框架。以N公司所实施的4个不同的软件服务外包项目为研究对象,详细分析了各个项目所需求的资源、交易成本情况与项目实施中的具体治理机制之间的关系。根据案例研究结果,提出了在不同资源需求(被操作性资源与操作性资源)以及不同交易成本(交易成本低与交易成本高)时可供选择的交易治理机制。     

多部件采购外包的两阶段均衡投标策略

本文考虑一个由单个制造商和多个供应商群体组成的供应链——该制造商需要采购多个部件,对于每个部件在市场上均存在多个供应商。不同于传统的从各供应商群体分别采购各个部件,制造商考虑将所有部件的采购整体外包给某个供应商。在第一阶段,制造商使用一级价格密封投标的逆向拍卖来确定赢得整体采购合约的供应商。接下来,第一阶段投标的获胜者生产其所能供应的部件,并使用逆向拍卖向第一阶段中未获胜的其他竞标者采购其余部件。我们分析了供应商在两个阶段的均衡竞价策略,并比较了制造商在亲自逐件采购和外包整体采购两种情况下的期望采购成本。我们证明了在两种机制下制造商的总的期望采购成本相等。     

加快承接国际服务外包是新一轮对外开放的重要战略选择

积极参与服务业全球化进程,发展服务外包,是加速发展现代服务业、提升产业结构和转变外贸增长方式的重要突破IZl。我国应抓住机遇,确立加快以承接国际服务外包、扩大服务业开放为重点的新一轮对外开放战略。     

多层供应链外包模式的选择及其协调

本文研究由两个原始设备制造企业（品牌企业）、一个代工企业和一个供应商组成的多层供应链的外包模式选择问题。应用主从博弈和纳什博弈理论,当一个原始设备制造企业的外包模式给定后,通过对不同外包模型求解比较,给出了后跟进的原始设备制造企业外包模式的最优选择策略。研究发现：后跟进的原始设备制造企业最优策略应采取与前一个原始设备制造企业相同的外包策略。针对最优外包策略,还设计了使供应链达到协调的二部定价契约机制,提高了外包供应链的竞争力。     

漫长的战斗——“官”、“商”之争

“钱财好比政治体上的脂肪，它会使得政治体臃肿无力。”     

外包企业全球价值链整合与产业升级的战略选择

从20世纪后期开始,外包这种传统的生产组织模式凭借经济全球化、IT技术的快速发展和知识经济要素在经济活动中显现的经济发展新模式,在全球范围内得到了迅速     

信号成本与服务外包供应商信号传递关系的博弈模型

由于服务外包市场的信息不对称性和不完美性,外包商难以清楚了解供应商的能力,使得服务外包供应商选择市场出现逆向选择。为解决非对称信息条件下服务外包供应商选择市场运行的低效问题,本文利用信号博弈建立了信号成本与外包供应商信号传递关系的数学模型,并通过案例分析说明了该模型对管理的指导意义。     

How Governance Misalignment and Outsourcing Capability Impact Performance

Notwithstanding the popularity of outsourcing as a business strategy, the performance benefits realized through outsourcing efforts are observed to be mixed in practice. This leads to important unresolved questions regarding why some firms are able to derive substantial value from their outsourcing initiatives while other firms are left disappointed. This study joins an emerging literature integrating transaction cost economics and capabilities‐based perspectives to develop a deeper understanding of the drivers of outsourcing performance. I develop a theoretical model that examines the independent and joint influence of governance misalignment (i.e., deviation from transaction cost's predicted mode of governance) and a firm's outsourcing capability on the performance of outsourced processes. I test the theoretical model using a dataset of 172 outsourced and 156 in‐house processes. The finding that governance misalignment corresponds to inferior process performance supports transaction cost's discriminating alignment hypothesis. Interestingly, I also find that a retained technical expertise (TE) and outsourcing knowledge management routines (OKMR; both contributors to a firm's outsourcing capability) positively influence outsourcing performance both directly and via their relationship with governance misalignment. While a retained technical expertise and outsourcing knowledge management routines each positively influence outsourcing performance, they do so in distinctive ways. These findings have important managerial implications and make a significant theoretical contribution. Specifically, this study demonstrates that the notion of a governance misalignment is firm‐specific, conditional on the governance capabilities of the organization. This insight underscores the value of integrating transaction cost logic with capabilities‐based perspectives.     

Impact of Customer Traffic and Service Process Outsourcing Levels on e‐Retailer Operational Performance

Many service firms deliver services via a mix of internally developed and delivered (i.e., insourced) and externally developed and delivered (i.e., outsourced) service processes. Service process outsourcing is especially common in e‐retailing. Portions of e‐retail customer ordering processes and delivery processes can be digitized and contracted to third‐party vendors. Via outsourcing, service systems change from dyadic to triadic. Prior research examines consumer perceptions of dyadic (consumer to e‐retailer) outcomes, but little research considers service co‐delivery with outsourcing partners (i.e., triadic systems). Literature also does not focus on joint associations of service process outsourcing and customer traffic with e‐retailer operations. We analyze several years of data on North American e‐retailers. We first examine factors associated with e‐retailer outsourcing levels, for front‐end and back‐end service processes. We observe customer traffic is positively associated with future outsourcing. We then examine how outsourcing moderates associations between contemporaneous customer traffic and e‐retailer operational performance, as measured by numbers of processed orders, website response times, and customer satisfaction. Results suggest outsourcing levels are associated with operational outcomes, yet surprisingly, high outsourcing and high traffic jointly may not benefit e‐retailers.     

The Impact of Switching Costs on the Outsourcing of Knowledge‐Intensive Business Processes

This study examines the impact of switching costs on vendor selection and contract efficiency in the outsourcing of knowledge‐intensive business services (KIBS). We show that under most plausible scenarios in KIBS outsourcing, there is an intrinsic tension between vendor selection and contract efficiency: in the process in which the winning vendor's bid constitutes the terms of the contract between client and vendor (e.g., competitive bidding), there is good selection but contract inefficiency (positive information rent paid by the client). If, by contrast, the client establishes the contract terms, then its performance yields contract efficiency but poor selection. We also highlight the implications of performance metrics for contract design in KIBS outsourcing.     

国内外信息技术外包研究现状及趋势对比分析

以国外ABI、EBSCO Host数据库以及国内中国期刊数据库中收录的论文为基础数据源,利用文献计量法,对检索数据在年份分布、期刊构成、学者队伍、论文内容和方法等方面进行归纳总结;对比分析了国内外16年来(1992-2007)信息技术外包(IT外包)的发展现状、趋势以及研究热点,揭示了我国在IT外包学术研究方面与国外研究存在的差距,并提出了针对性的建议,为今后国内的研究提供借鉴。     

中国IT服务外包企业能力研究

基于企业能力理论与价值链分析,建立了适合我国国情的中国IT服务外包企业能力评价模型;通过对北京市近40家IT服务外包企业的实地访谈与问卷调查,分析了中国IT服务外包企业的能力现状及存在问题;结合理论研究与实证分析,提出了提升中国IT服务外包企业能力的对策建议。     

企业研发外包的控制机制:信息泄露下的支付合同选择

采用委托代理模型的框架,通过分析研发项目特点、外包代理方的行为特征及其信息泄漏对研发外包支付合同的影响,提出了相应的支付合同选择机制。研究表明,在无信息泄漏的情况下,当研发机构的努力程度可观测时,研发委托方可以采用固定支付合同实现外包;反之,委托方需要与代理方分享利润,并且利润分享比例与代理方的风险规避度、市场的不确定性和研发机构的开发效率负相关。在存在信息泄露的情况下,利润分享比例与研发项目对委托企业的重要性程度及其项目本身的复杂性程度负相关,并且委托方还应根据研发机构获取市场能力的不同进行调整。     

业务外包风险分析与控制

结合现代企业理论中的交易费用理论和“委托-代理”理论,对业务外包风险进行了深入的剖析,详细分析了外包决策和执行两个阶段的风险,并提出了相应的风险控制策略。     

The Individually Responsible and Rational Decision Approach to Economic Lot Sizes for One Vendor and Many Purchasers

Banerjee's [2] joint economic lot size (JELS) model, along with related works by Monahan [12] and Lal and Staelin [10], represents one approach to minimizing the total inventory carrying and ordering costs of a vendor and his purchaser(s). Noting that JELS philosophy requires a coordinated system and that its practical implementation is problematic, we present an alternative approach to the same problem: the individually responsible and rational decision (IRRD) approach. The IRRD approach is consistent with a free enterprise system and easy to implement. In order to show that the IRRD approach is also more economical than the JELS approach, we first build a more refined JELS model for the case of one vendor and many identical purchasers. Drawing on earlier criticisms of specific JELS models, our refinement relaxes the lot-for-lot assumption commonly used by JELS scholars. To be comparable with earlier works, we retain the assumption of deterministic conditions and demonstrate the economic advantages of IRRD over JELS through a numerical example. An algebraic proof of IRRD's superiority over JELS is offered in the more general and realistic case of a vendor dealing with K nonidentical purchasers with reasonably predictable annual demand but uncertain order quantities and timings.