Divorce as risky behavior

Given that divorce often represents a high-stakes income gamble, we ask how individual levels of risk tolerance affect the decision to divorce. We extend the orthodox divorce model by assuming that individuals are risk averse, that marriage is risky, and that divorce is even riskier. The model predicts that conditional on the expected gains to marriage and divorce, the probability of divorce increases with relative risk tolerance because risk averse individuals require compensation for the additional risk that is inherent in divorce. To implement the model empirically, we use data for first-married women and men from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to estimate a probit model of divorce in which a measure of risk tolerance is among the covariates. The estimates reveal that a 1-point increase in risk tolerance raises the predicted probability of divorce by 4.3% for a representative man and by 11.4% for a representative woman. These findings are consistent with the notion that divorce entails a greater income gamble for women than for men.     

Earnings,relative income,and family formation

The probability of first marriage for men who graduated from Wisconsin high schools in 1957 was analyzed with respect to their Social Security earnings records, Wisconsin income tax reports for parents, and other variables. The findings provide no support for Easterlin's hypothesis that marriage will occur earlier when young men judge their economic prospects favorably with respect to their parents' income. However, young men's earnings and time spent in schooling to increase them were found to be important influences on marriage timing. Additional schooling had little effect net of the time it absorbed.     

The relationship between cohabitation and divorce: Selectivity or causal influence?

Recent evidence linking premarital cohabitation to high rates of divorce poses a complex theoretical and empirical puzzle. We develop hypotheses predicting that premarital cohabitation is selective of those who are prone to divorce as well as hypotheses predicting that the experience of premarital cohabitation produces attitudes and values which increase the probability of divorce. Using multiwave panel data from a recent cohort of young men and women in the United States, we specify and test models of these predictions. The results are consistent with hypotheses suggesting that cohabitation is selective of men and women who are less committed to marriage and more approving of divorce. The results also are consistent with the conclusion that cohabiting experiences significantly increase young people's acceptance of divorce.     

The Retrenchment of Marriage: Results from Marital Status Life Tables for the United States, 1995

Marital status life tables were calculated using 1995 US rates of marriage, divorce, and mortality. Compared to figures for 1988, the proportion of persons surviving to age 15 who ever marry remained fairly steady at about five‐sixths of all men and seven‐eighths of all women. The average age at first marriage rose substantially: to 28.6 years for men and 26.6 years for women. The probability of a marriage ending in divorce changed little and was .437 for men and .425 for women. It is likely that no US period or cohort will ever have half of all marriages end in legal divorce, though the highest cohort may reach 47 percent. Patterns of marriage and divorce observed since 1970 show the effect that cohabitation continues to have on the American family, where it is delaying, but not replacing, marriage.     

Effect of family structure on life satisfaction: australian evidence

How do family arrangements affect subjective well-being? We investigate this issue using data pooled from the IsssA and HILDA, both large, representative national samples of Australia (pooled n=38 447). Our regression analysis of cross-sectional and panel data examines how large are the differences in life satisfaction according to marital status and cohabitation. We find that women and men in formal marriages experience higher levels of life satisfaction than do people in other family arrangements. Moreover, both multiple tests in the cross-section, and tests controlling for prior happiness in the panel analysis, suggest that this is a causal relationship. Aggregating up the levels of life satisfaction generated by different marriage and cohabitation arrangements across a lifetime, suggests that a life-long marriage is the most satisfying. Early divorce followed by an enduring second marriage is little worse (because little time is spent outside the married state). But divorce without remarriage, or long lasting cohabitation without formal marriage, reduce the lifetime sum of subjective well-being by 4–12% for both women and men.     

Economic potential and entry into marriage and cohabitation

This article explores the relationship between economic potential and rates of entry into marriage and cohabitation. Using data from the 1990 census and the 1980-1992 High School and Beyond (Sophomore Cohort), we developed a method for explicitly estimating five time-varying measures of earnings potential. The analyses of union formation are based on an intergenerational panel study of parents and children, to which our measures of earnings potential were appended. The results indicate that all five measures of earnings potential strongly and positively influence the likelihood of marriage for men, but not for women. Earnings potential does not affect entry into cohabiting unions for either men or women.     

The effects of the welfare system on marital dissolution

The economic theory of marriage predicts that the partners expectations of greater financial resources outside of marriage should increase the probability of marital dissolution. One potential implication is that marriages should be less stable in states with higher AFDC benefits. I study this implication empirically using data on separations and divorces among marriages involving women in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. I find no supporting evidence that higher welfare benefits lead to increased rates of marital dissolution among married women with children.I thank Mary Ellen Benedict, Madeline Zavodny, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments, and Saul Hoffman for providing his data on AFDC benefits. Responsible editor: T. Paul Schultz.     

Economic opportunities,marriage squeezes and the propensity to marry: An economic analysis of period marriage rates in England and Wales

An economic model of the decision to marry has been developed by Gary Becker and is now part of the ‘new home economics’. From it one can deduce that the propensity to marry is a function of the relative earning capacities of men and women, the relative scarcity of unmarried persons of the opposite sex and real income. The effects of changes in these variables on the annual first marriage rates of men aged 16–19, 20–24 and 25–29 and women aged 16–19 and 20–24 respectively are estimated over the post-war period. It is found that women's earning capacity relative to men's has a particularly strong negative effect on marriage rates, and that the decline in first marriage rates during the 1970s was primarily attributable to the growing economic opportunities for women. As demographic studies have suggested, the relative numbers of bachelors and spinsters of particular ages (‘marriage squeezes’) also have a significant impact, and there is evidence of substitution in the ages of marriage partners in response to such ‘squeezes’. The income elasticity of marriage is only found to be significant among men below age 25 and women below age 20, and it increases as we move down the age distribution. This suggests the ‘liquidity constraints’ influence the timing of marriage among young people. In sum, this economic model is able to account for over 90 per cent of the post-war variation in young persons' marriage rates.     

Socio-economic resources and first-union formation in Finland, cohorts born 1969-81

Social scientists generally agree that better individual economic prospects enhance the probability of marriage for men, whereas there are conflicting views with regard to women. Moreover, it is argued that cohabitation does not require as strong an economic foundation as marriage. The aim of this study, which was based on Finnish register data, was to find out how the socio-economic resources of young adults affect first-union formation, and whether the effects vary by sex or union type. The results show that high education, labour-force participation, and high income seem to promote union formation. The findings are similar for women and men, which is plausible given the comparatively gender-egalitarian societal context. Similar factors encourage entry into both union types, although the union-promoting effects of university-level education and stable employment are stronger in the marriage models, suggesting that long-term prospects are more important when marriage is contemplated.     

Gender-specific labor market conditions and family formation

Slack labor market conditions for women relative to men increase the marriage rate in the USA. This paper examines the long-term consequences of such marriages. Despite the significant effect on marriage timing, labor market conditions experienced in youth do not affect the probability that a woman will marry by the age of 30. Further, labor market conditions at the time of marriage are uncorrelated with the probability of divorce, spouses?? characteristics, or the number of children. These findings suggest that labor market fluctuations induce only intertemporal adjustments for marriage timing without affecting reservation match quality or total fertility.     

晚清东北地区人口婚姻状况探析

晚清时期,东北地区人口婚姻带有地域特色:已婚人口中女性婚配人口多于男性,婚龄普遍为早婚,且男小女大;未婚人口中,男性多于女性;男女终身不嫁的不婚人口很少,但男性较多;丧偶人口中,守寡女性占据绝大多数,鳏夫续娶较多,寡妇再嫁则很少;离婚人口中,有休妻、出妻等绝婚现象,但离婚人口很少。种种婚姻状况,主要是由于东北民族婚俗与陋习、东北移民人口的社会、经济状况决定的。     

Gender Differences in the Consequences of Divorce: A Study of Multiple Outcomes

In this study, I examined gender differences in the consequences of divorce by tracing annual change in 20 outcome measures covering four domains: economic, housing and domestic, health and well-being, and social. I used data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) and fixed-effects panel regression models on a sample of N = 18,030 individuals initially observed in a marital union, N = 1,220 of whom divorced across the observation period (1984–2015). Three main findings emerged from the analysis. First, men were more vulnerable to short-term consequences of divorce for subjective measures of well-being, but postdivorce adaptation alleviated gender differences in these outcomes. Second, a medium-term view on multiple outcomes showed more similarity than differences between women and men. The medium-term consequences of divorce were similar in terms of subjective economic well-being; mental health, physical health, and psychological well-being; residential moves, homeownership, and satisfaction with housework; and chances of repartnering, social integration with friends and relatives, and feelings of loneliness. Third, the key domain in which large and persistent gender differences emerged were women’s disproportionate losses in household income and associated increases in their risk of poverty and single parenting. Taken together, these findings suggest that men’s disproportionate strain of divorce is transient, whereas women’s is chronic.     

A reconsideration of the economic consequences of marital dissolution

A close look at the income flows in the years following a divorce or separation reveals marked differences in the distribution of effects. The economic consequences of divorce are especially adverse for women. In most cases, children remain with the mother, who usually has considerably lower potential labor market earnings than her former husband, partly because her responsibilities for the children are likely to reduce her labor supply and may have limited her past human capital investments. Alimony and child support are the principal mechanisms for transfers from the ex-husband to the ex-wife, but payments are rarely frequent or sizeable enough to make up for an appreciable amount of the labor income lost through the departure of the ex-husband. Human capital investments on the part of the mother have a modest effect on her economic situation in the years following the divorce. Most men who divorce or separate are immediately better off because they retain most of their labor incomes, typically do not pay large amounts of alimony and child support to their ex-wives, and no longer have to provide for the level of needs associated with their former families. Much more important than growth in the ex-wife's own labor income is the role of a new husband's labor income upon her remarriage. More than half of the white women remarry within five years following a divorce or separation; the comparable fraction for black women is less than half. An interesting question is whether the currently unmarried would enjoy the same kind of economic benefits, were they to remarry, as women who have remarried. Estimates from a model of the new husband's labor income, adjusted for selection bias inherent in the process of remarriage, indicate that the currently unmarried would probably not gain equal benefits if they were to remarry. The expected labor income of potential husbands of black women averages only about $5000--a modest amount when compared with the alternatives available to these women.     

The gender longevity gap: explaining the difference between singles and couples

This paper studies the respective gender longevity gap in favour of women among singles, utilitarian and altruistic couples. The following hypotheses are derived: (1) the gender longevity gap is smaller within couples than among singles; (2) marriage increases longevity of men but decreases longevity of women; and (3) the gender longevity gap decreases with an increase in wealth. The hypotheses are tested using a complete data set of the Swiss deceased at the age 65+ in 2001 and 2002, with information on the individuals’ age at death and their average earnings over the life cycle.     

Earnings mobility among Italian low-paid workers

This paper uses Italian panel data to analyse low pay transitions since the early 1990s. Results indicate that having more human capital reduces the probability of falling into low pay, but there is little impact on raising exit rates from low pay. Human capital effects are found to be larger for women than for men. There is considerable state dependence: the experience of low pay raises the probability of subsequent low pay episodes. Also, there is substantial unobserved heterogeneity associated with factors such as initial conditions, mobility out of the earnings distribution and educational attainment.

Income prospects and age-at-marriage

This paper provides an empirical investigation of a theoretical model of the marriage market. In the model, women are valued more for their ability to bear children and men are valued more for their ability to make money. Men cannot reveal their labor market ability to potential spouses until they enter the labor force. At the same time, the relevant information for evaluating females as spouses is revealed at a younger age. The model predicts that the income of males will be positively associated with age-at-first-marriage. We find empirical support for the model. However, we also find the association between male earnings and age-at-first-marriage becomes negative for those who married after age 30, which was not predicted by the model. Consistent with the model, we do not find a strong relationship between earnings and age-at-first-marriage among females. JEL classification: J1, J12 Received August 11, 1994 / Accepted August 10, 1995     

A Markov Chain for calculating the durability of marriage

The usual Markov model of marriage permits informative experiments on the effect of alterations in the transition rules. It can tell, for example, what difference it would make to the durability of marriage if there was no divorce and the other transitions were as observed. This is in addition to the capacity of the usual model to find the effect of small changes in the transition rates.

Canadian data for 1970–1982 permit comparisons over time, and show among other things not only that married men live longer than single, but that the difference is increasing; the increase in the “marriage bonus”; over time also appears for women.     

A Markov chain for calculating the durability of marriage

"The usual Markov model of marriage permits informative experiments on the effect of alterations in the transition rules. It can tell, for example, what difference it would make to the durability of marriage if there was no divorce and the other transitions were as observed. This is in addition to the capacity of the usual model to find the effect of small changes in the transition rates. Canadian data for 1970-1982 permit comparisons over time, and show among other things not only that married men live longer than single, but that the difference is increasing; the increase in the 'marriage bonus' over time also appears for women." (SUMMARY IN FRE)     

Catholicism and marriage in the united states

This study examines the effects of a Catholic background on age at first marriage, the odds of never marrying, and the odds of ever divorcing. Estimates using Catholic upbringing are compared with estimates using Catholic at the time of the survey. A case is made that if the latter measure of Catholicism is used, serious selection bias problems occur in some cases because this measure excludes defectors and includes converts. Further, it is shown that a Catholic upbringing generally has no effect on men’s age at first marriage and has a positive effect on the age when women marry. It is also shown that older Baptist men are substantially more likely than Catholic men to experience a divorce. Older Catholic women are somewhat less likely to experience a divorce than non-Baptist Protestant women. There is no Catholic effect on the odds that younger men and women will divorce.     

<Emphasis Type="Bold">Women’s Progress for Men’s Gain? Gender-Specific Changes in the Return to Education as Measured by Family Standard of Living, 1990 to 2009–2011</Emphasis>

This study investigates gender-specific changes in the total financial return to education among persons of prime working ages (35–44 years) using U.S. Census data from 1990 and 2000, and the 2009–2011 American Community Survey. We define the total financial return to education as the family standard of living as measured by family income adjusted for family size. Our results indicate that women experienced significant progress in educational attainment and labor market outcomes over this time period. Ironically, married women’s progress in education and personal earnings has led to greater improvement in the family standard of living for married men than for women themselves. Gender-specific changes in assortative mating are mostly responsible for this paradoxical trend. Because the number of highly educated women exceeds the number of highly educated men in the marriage market, the likelihood of educational marrying up has substantially increased for men over time while women’s likelihood has decreased. Sensitivity analyses show that the greater improvement in the family standard of living for men than for women is not limited to prime working-age persons but is also evident in the general population. Consequently, women’s return to education through marriage declined while men’s financial gain through marriage increased considerably.